JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as counsel for the 1 caveator.The simple issue raised by the petitioners is sought to be complicated by him by adverting to and invoking the principle that authority to review the quasi judicial orders depends on statute or exercise of legislative power by 5 the executive without due authority invalidating the act in case which relates to revocation or a putting in abeyance suspension order passed by the authority who has passed he order earlier during the pendency of the inquiry.The respondent No. 3 who was elected as Sarpanch was suspended by order dated 16.6.2003 by the Divisional Commissioner as a delegate of State under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. By order dated 25th August, 2003, the very same authority on considering that it appears to be a case of cross complaint on the basis of community bias, put in abeyance the order passed by him earlier resulting the reinstatement. Ordinarily, no contention could have been raised against this order inasmuch as the principle that the authority who has power of making an order of suspension has also power to revoke the same appropriately applies to the facts of the present case and in such matters, apart form the concerned person who has been put under suspension during the pendency of inquiry, 20 its revocation does not give a cause of action to others.The petitioners who are amalgam of Up-sarpanch alongwith other nominated members chose to challenge the order dated 28.2.2003 alleging it to be without authority. It was contended that while State Government, which is authority empowered to make an order of suspension under Section 38(4) 25 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 was empowered to revoke or put in abeyance the order passed by it, its delegate could not exercise that power. The source of power of the State to revoke the suspension order emanates from the provisions of Section 97(4) of the Act of 1994.It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power of review is a creature of Statute and unless Statute provides for it, no authority can review its own order. The source of power of the State to revoke the suspension order emanates from the provisions of Section 97(4) of the Act of 1994.It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power of review is a creature of Statute and unless Statute provides for it, no authority can review its own order. Reliance was placed upon Patel Narshi Thakersi and Others v. Pradhyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , H.C. Suman and another v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., New Delhi and Others, AIR 1991 SC 2160 and Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority & Ors. v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawaila & Ors. JT 1992(3) SC 417 . The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 12.2.2004 under appeal. 2. None of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant merits acceptance. Section of the Act of 1994 relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in furtherance of the contention raised by h'm does not assist him. Section 97(3) confers power of revision or review on the government. 3. So far as Sub-section (1) and Sub - section (2) of Section 97 are concerned, they relate to exercise of revisional power by the State in respect of orders passed by any authority other than the State under the provisions the Act or to say it enables the State Government to revise orders passed by any authority under the Act which is subordinate to it. Sub-section (3) confers upon the State Government, the power to review its own order passed under Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 97. Sub-sections (1) and (2) confers power upon State to stay execution of any such decision which is being subjected to revision.We may notice that the order under Sub-section (1) can only be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing to the person effected thereby and, therefore, it is apparent that power exercisable under Sub-section (1) of Section 97 and Sub-section (2) of Section 97 in exercise of quasi judicial power by the superior authority are its State are like the powers exercisable by the subordinate authorities under the Act. If Sub-section (3) confers power to review its own order passed as quasi judicial authority, while under Section 97, it does not travel beyond the review of order passed under Section 97(1). 4. If Sub-section (3) confers power to review its own order passed as quasi judicial authority, while under Section 97, it does not travel beyond the review of order passed under Section 97(1). 4. The power under Sub-section (4) of Section 38 to suspend any member, Chairman, Dy. Chairman of Panchayati Raj Institution against whom inquiry has been initiated under Sub-section (1) in regard to offence involving moral turpitude pending trial, is conferred on the State Government. While Sub-section (1) of Section provides for removal after affording an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned after making such enquiry as deemed necessary in that regard. Sub-section (4) is only by way of interim measure confers administrative power on the State. If so desired, the person against whom inquiry has been initiated under Section 38(1) or criminal proceedings are pending trial on a charge involving moral turpitude, he may be suspended during the said proceedings from discharging function of his office so that he may not be in a position to influence enquiry by use of his office. The power is akin to power of suspending a civil servant during pending enquiry. 5. Section 98 of the Act of 1994 specifically envisaged that the State Government may by notification in the official gazette delegates its powers to any subordinate authority. It is not in dispute that in exercise of this power, notification has been issued conferring power of Sub-section (4) on the Divisional Commissioner. Therefore, the Divisional Commissioner exercises the power of the State Government under Section 38(4) as a delegate. If the so State Government can revoke its order of suspension, its delegate too has the power to revoke the orders of suspension made by it. As per counsel for the appellant, the State Government does passes power to revoke or suspend its order suspending any person from his office under Section 38(4). 1 Therefore, as delegate of State to exercise its power under Section 38(4) the Divisional Commissioner too has the same power to revoke or keep in abeyance the order of suspension passed by it. 6. This should put end to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of the petition. 7. However, the learned counsel for the appellant made reference to the decision referred to above. 6. This should put end to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of the petition. 7. However, the learned counsel for the appellant made reference to the decision referred to above. His contention is that the power of review is a creation of statute and therefore, being not conferred on the Divisional Commissioner or delegate of the State, he cannot exercise that power. 8. Suspension of an elected person pending enquiry into alleged misconduct is purely administrative in nature and is in the very nature of thing temporary in nature and administrative in character.The expression "suspension" according to the Oxford Dictionary is as under: "1. the action of suspending someone or something or the condition of being suspended, in particular: the official prohibition of someone from holding their usual post or carrying out their usual role for a particular length of time: the investigation led to the suspension of several officers." 9. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term to suspend with reference to present context as a form of sure or discipline to forbid a public, authority, employee or ecclesiastical person from performing his duties or exercise his function for a more or less definite interval of time to cause a temporary cessation as of work by an employee. 10. To wit suspension has been described by Black as temporary withdrawal or cession from employment as distinguished from permanent severance accomplished by removal. 11. Random House Dictionary explains the word 'suspend' contextually to debar usually for a limited period from the exercise of an office or function or the employment of a privilege. ....to come to stop usually temporarily cease from operating for a time. 12. Apparently the order suspending a person from discharging his function is temporary in nature and can be brought to an end by the person making it at any time if the necessity for continuing debarring a person from discharging of his is not felt necessary for the purpose of pending enquiry or it terminates on passing of final orders. 13. It is also well settled that review or revocation of pure administrative order as distinct from judicial or quasi judicial order does not need a statute source for exercise of such power. 14. The decisions to which reference has been made reveal that each of the decisions was rendered in different context. 13. It is also well settled that review or revocation of pure administrative order as distinct from judicial or quasi judicial order does not need a statute source for exercise of such power. 14. The decisions to which reference has been made reveal that each of the decisions was rendered in different context. Patel Narshi Thakershi's case (supra) was a case which concerned the quasi judicial order made by the State in respect of judicial work entrusted to the executive officers. The Court said: "This case illustrates the consequence of entrusting judicial work to those who had no judicial training and back-ground. A simple question whether the family of the respondent was divided or undivided has been pending decision for about 20 years." 15. Apparently, the question whether a family is divided or undivided is to be adjudicated in a quasi judicial manner and cannot be determined by executive order. It is in that context the court said: "It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication." It is in that context the Court further observed: "No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. Therefore, in the present case the Commissioner functioning as delegate of the State also cannot nave the power to review under Section 63." 16. This case does not deal with making of suspension order during the inquiry which is not a quasi judicial order. 17. The case of H.C. Suman (supra) AIR 1991 SC 2160 was again a case which related to nullifying a quasi judicial order creating a substantive right in some person which was sought to be taken away by its earlier order. 15 In this connection, it is to be noticed that noticing the factual matrix the Supreme Court said it cannot be disputed that as a consequence of quasi judicial order, the notification dated 27th Oct., 1987 has created a substantive right in favour of persons whose names have been mentioned in list 'B' of the affidavit by Shri S.C. Saxena filed in the High Court. Vide subsequent 20 notification dated 27th March, 1987 it was sought to be made in exercise of its executive power by the State. 18. With reference to Section 21 of General Clauses Act, the Court reiterated its earlier decision in State of Kerala and Others v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Others, (1988) 4 SCC 669 and said: "It was held by the High Court that if in pursuance of an earlier order passed by the Government, some person acquires a right enforceable in law, the said right cannot be taken away by a subsequent order under general power of rescindment available to the Government under the General Clauses Act and that the said power of rescindment had to be determined in the light of the subject matter, context and the effect of the relevant provisions of the statute. The view taken by the High Court was upheld by this Court in paragraph of the report. The Notification dated 29th August, 1990, would, therefore, be invalid on this ground also." 19. Apparently, by the suspension order of the erstwhile Sarparichduring the pendency of the enquiry it did not create any right in favour of the appellants so as to invoke the principle enunciated in H.C. Suman's case (supra) AIR 1991 SC 2160 and in the case of State of Karnataka v. K.B. Madhawan Pille . 20. Lastly, reference was made to Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority's case (supra) JT 1992(3) SC 417. It was a case where the question arose whether the delegate of an executive of the State would also exercise the legislative power of the State to impose tax. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority had levied the development fee which was challenged on multiple grounds amongst others, one ground was that even if there is any 45 power to levy such fee by the State Legislature in the absence of delegation of such power, the Development Authority could not impose any development fee. It is in the aforesaid context, considering the question whether development fee which is an exaction of tax and which could be levied and collected only if authorised by law in terms of Article 265, the so Supreme Court considered the extent of the power of a delegate of the State to exercise legislative function of the State in fiscal matters. The High Court did not countenance the contention of the Development Authority and upheld the plea held by the petitioner appellants and quashed the levy. The Court said: "After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr. Goshwami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee." 21. Apparently, this case has no application to the fact of suspension or icy revocation of the order of suspension passed against a delinquent officer and elected member of the Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an inquiry is pending. 22. In R.R. Verma & Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1461 , it was made clear by the Supreme Court that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary application (sic. implication) is not applicable to decisions of purely of an administrative nature. Any Government must be free to alter its policy or decision in administrative matters. Only rider envisaged were that they be bound by statutory requirements and also to observe principle of natural justice where rights of parties are to be affected. In coming to this conclusion the Court distinguished its earlier decisions in Patel Narshi Thakersi and Others v. Pradhyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1970 SC 1273) , D.N. Ray and Others v. State of Bihar and Others, ( AIR 1971 SC 1045 ) and in The State of Assam and Another v. J.N. Roy Biswas, (AIR 1975 25 SC 2277) on the ground that in all these cases were where the Government was exercising quasi judicial power. 23. Therefore, we find that the appellant-petitioner has no locus to challenge the order putting in abeyance suspension of respondent by the Divisional Commissioner nor there is any merit in the contention raised by them before us. 24. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******