Judgment ( 1. ) THE appellant in this miscellaneous appeal has assailed the order dated 27-3-1996 passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Bhopal Bench in Case No. O. A. 292/95. ( 2. ) BRIEFLY stated facts indicates that M. P. Rajya Nagrik Apoorti Nigam Ltd. (hereinafter refer to as "nigam") has filed an original application claiming an amount of Rs. 18,26,000/- due to non-delivery of 4 wagons containing sugar. Consignment was dispatched on 8/9-5-93 vide 3 RRs. Sugar was loaded in 51 wagons booked from Niphad to Shajapur. However, at the destination out of these 21 wagons, 4 wagons were not delivered, hence, claim application was filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal. Non-delivery certificate was issued by Railways on 21-8-93. A Notice under Section 106 of the Indian Railways Act to the Railway Administration by Registered Post acknowledgment due 18-9-93 was sent vide Receipt No, 1243. The Railways has certified the non-delivery of these 4 wagons containing 220 bags of sugar. Each bag weighed 200 kg. The invoice was for Rs. 18,26,000/- @ Rs. 830/-per quintal, in spite of service of notice, respondents have failed to pay the claim made by the appellant. ( 3. ) BEFORE Claims Tribunal no reply was filed by the respondents. An affidavit of Shri Ramagopal, Executive Director of Nigam was also filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal. It was stated that notice was sent by registered post. Original postal acknowledgment was received back. Original Receipt No. 1243 of despatch of notice by the registered post, issued by postal department has also been placed on record of the case of Claims Tribunal. ( 4. ) THE learned Claims Tribunal without rebuttal of affidavit, without any reply being filed by the respondents, has passed the impugned order dismissing the claim application filed by the petitioner solely on the ground that issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Indian Railways Act and its service has not been established. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Claims Tribunal, this appeal has been preferred. ( 5. ) SHRI S. P. Rai, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the Claims Tribunal has gravely erred in law in dismissing the application on the ground of non-issuance of notice as required under Section 106 of the Indian Railways Act. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Claims Tribunal, this appeal has been preferred. ( 5. ) SHRI S. P. Rai, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the Claims Tribunal has gravely erred in law in dismissing the application on the ground of non-issuance of notice as required under Section 106 of the Indian Railways Act. He has further submitted that no affidavit in rebuttal was filed, even reply denying allegation of service of notice was not filed by the respondents. The averment that notice was received by the respondents was not traversed and its acknowledgment has been received by the applicant "nigam". He has placed on record acknowledgment. ( 6. ) SHRI A. K. Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the order, he submitted that the discrepancy in the application as to date of dispatch of Receipt No. 1243, in the application date is shown as 18-9-93 whereas, of on the back of receipt postal stamp bear date as 22-9-93. Acknowledgment was not filed before the Claims Tribunal. Thus, the Claims Tribunal is justified in dismissing the application. ( 7. ) IN our opinion, the learned Claims Tribunal has gravely erred in law in dismissing the application filed by the "nigam" on the ground that notice under Section 106 of the Indian Railways Act was not issued/served. It passes our comprehension in the absence of any reply filed by the respondents traversing the allegation regarding the issuance and receipt of notice, how the Claims Tribunal has come to the conclusion that such a notice was not issued by registered post. The plea is essentially that of fact and if we go to the facts, there is an affidavit of Shri Ramgopal, Executive Director of Nigam in which it is clearly mentioned that notice dated 18-9-93 was dispatched by registered post and original postal acknowledgment was received back by Nigam. No counter affidavit in rebuttal was filed by Railways. The original receipt of dispatch is on the record of case. With abandant caution original acknowledgment has been placed on record during the course of hearing by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and the same is taken on record. It correlates the Receipt No. 1243, dated 22-9-93 it shows that notice was received by Railways. The acknowledgment bears the date of receipt by the respondents on 28-9-93 at the given address. It correlates the Receipt No. 1243, dated 22-9-93 it shows that notice was received by Railways. The acknowledgment bears the date of receipt by the respondents on 28-9-93 at the given address. There is seal of the Post Office, Shajapur, also on the back of the receipt of the acknowledgment of receiving back acknowledgment at Shajapur on 6-10-93. Even if above acknowledgment is ignored totally from consideration, in view of the Receipt No. 1243 of dispatch and affidavit filed by Nigam of Shri Ramgopal, there is absolute nothing to doubt that notice was issued, acknowledgment of which was received by Nigam. ( 8. ) THE ground employed by the Claims Tribunal to discard receipt of issuance of notice that the stamp of the Post Office affixed on the back side of the Receipt No. 1243 is absolutely untenable. It is rightly submitted at Bar and seen in the practise that sometimes seal is affixed on the back side of the receipt. In the absence of any counter affidavit/reply the Claims Tribunal has gravely erred in law in doubting the genuineness of Receipt No. 1243 by which notice was sent. Notice was drawn on 18-9-93, however, it was dispatched on 22-9-93 that explains the discrepancy in the date 18-94993 mentioned in the application, Section 194 of the Railways Act provides for "presumption where notice is served by post". Section 194 is quoted below :- " 194. Presumption where notice is served by post.-- Where a notice or other document is served by post, it shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter containing it would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, and in proving such service, it shall be sufficient to prove that the letter containing the notice or other document was properly addressed and registered. " Even otherwise there is a presumption of regular course of official Act. When a notice is dispatched by the registered post, until and unless cogent evidence is addused by the opposite side, the service is to be presumed. In the instant case there was no traverse of the plea, no counter affidavit in rebuttal, the receipt of dispatch of notice was on record, there is absolutely nothing to doubt its genuineness. In Kirsloskar Bros. In the instant case there was no traverse of the plea, no counter affidavit in rebuttal, the receipt of dispatch of notice was on record, there is absolutely nothing to doubt its genuineness. In Kirsloskar Bros. Ltd. , Indore v. Engineering Machinery Mart, Narsinghpur ( AIR 1982 MP 75 ) it has been laid down that when a notice is proved to have been put into the post office, it is presumed that the letter sent through the post office reached the addressee. This presumption is not confined to the presumption of that letter being posted merely, but extends to its receipt by the addressee at its destination. The reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Har Charan Singh v. Shiv Rani and Ors. ( AIR 1981 SC 1284 ). In Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. (supra), this Court has held thus :-"10. Now, the question which arises is as to the nature and extent of the presumption which arises with regard to a letter so posted under a certificate of posting. In this respect, Shri Chaphekar was vehement in his reliance on the ratio of B. L. Shrivastavas case (AIR 1975 Madh Pra. 21) (supra), wherein it has been held that the certificate of posting may give rise to the presumption that the letters were posted, but no presumption can be drawn that they were received by the addressee. While making the aforesaid observations the cases of Shambhudaya (1963 Jab LJ 805) (supra); Harihar Banerji (AIR 1918 PC 102) (supra) and Mobarik Ali Ahmed ( AIR 1957 SC 857 ) (supra) do not appear to have been brought to the notice of this Court. While making the aforesaid observations the cases of Shambhudaya (1963 Jab LJ 805) (supra); Harihar Banerji (AIR 1918 PC 102) (supra) and Mobarik Ali Ahmed ( AIR 1957 SC 857 ) (supra) do not appear to have been brought to the notice of this Court. In the case of Harihar Banerji (supra), Their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down the law regarding presumption of letters sent by post and/or by a registered post, thus :- "if a letter properly directed, containing a notice to quit, is proved to have been put into the post office, it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed and that presumption would apply with still greater force to letters which the sender has taken the precaution to register, and is not rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself. " In the case of Mobarik Ali Ahmed (supra) the Supreme Court has made the following observations :- "the main contention in respect of these letters is that there is no proof that they were received by the appellant at Karachi. It is contended that evidence given by either Jasawalla or the complainant that the originals were written and posted is not relevant to show that the same have been received. It is urged that the proof of mere posting of a letter is not presumptive evidence of the receipt thereof by the addressee unless there is also proof that the original has not been returned from the Dead Letter Officer. Illustration (b) to Section 16 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is relied on for the purpose and it is urged that a combination of the two facts is required to raise such a presumption. We are quite clear that the illustration only means that each one of these facts is relevant. It can not be read as indicating that without a combination of these facts no presumption can arise. Indeed that section with the illustrations thereto has nothing to do with presumptions but only with relevance. Some cases relating to this have been cited before us. It can not be read as indicating that without a combination of these facts no presumption can arise. Indeed that section with the illustrations thereto has nothing to do with presumptions but only with relevance. Some cases relating to this have been cited before us. We have considered the same but it is unnecessary to deal with them. " As held by the Privy Council in Harihar Banerjis case (AIR 1918 PC 102) (supra) and as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mubarik Ali Ahmad ( AIR 1957 SC 857 ) (supra), on proof of the facts that a letter properly containing the particular document is proved to have been put into the post office, it is presumed that the letter sent through the post office reached the addressee. This presumption is not confined to the presumption of that letter being posted merely, but extends to its receipt by the addressee at its destination and at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office. Earlier, a Division Bench of this Court in Shambhudayals case, (1963 Jab LJ 85) (supra) had ruled on the point thus :- "it is well settled that unless contrary is established by the reliable evidence, normal presumption is that a communication properly addressed and posted must have reached the addressee. " 11. This being the position of law as settled by the decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, it has to be recorded that the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court while deciding the case of B. N. Shrivastava (AIR 1975 Madh Pra 21) (supra), were not intended to lay down the law of universal application and the authority relied on by Shri Chaphekar has to be regarded is confined to the decision of that case. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows on the various observations made in extra. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it; [quinn v. Leathen, (1901) AC 495 Rel], See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Mishra (AIR 1968 SC 467 ). It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it; [quinn v. Leathen, (1901) AC 495 Rel], See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Mishra (AIR 1968 SC 467 ). Moreover, this Court can not be regarded to have proceeded contrary to the law laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court governing the point. If it was intended in the case of B. L. Shrivastava, who lay down the law regarding presumption touching the question, with due deference and all respect at my command I may venture to state that the case relied on does not correctly lay down the law on the point. Moreover, in the case of Har Charan Singh ( AIR 1981 SC 1284 ) (supra) the law on the point has been laid down thus:-" section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic "meaning of service by post" and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgment due is received from the addressee or not. It is, obvious that when the section raised the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the documents sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (1) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by prepaying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumption both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act is rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept, it is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof and, in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. " "12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can not now be successfully contended that even when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it, the presumption (does not ?) extends to the receipt thereof by the addressee. " "12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can not now be successfully contended that even when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it, the presumption (does not ?) extends to the receipt thereof by the addressee. In view of the law laid down in the case of Har Charan Singh ( AIR 1981 SC 1284 ) (supra), the observations made in B. L. Shrivastavas case (AIR 1975 Madh Pra 21) (supra) can not be regarded any longer good law. " ( 9. ) IN Smt. Sushila Devi and Anr. v. Manohar Lal (AIR 1985 Allahabad 78) it has been held that "where a quit notice was sent by a registered post and the tenant in his written statement did not dispute the service of notice on him and stated that the notice sent by landlord was fictitious and without any basis and did not satisfy requirement of Section 106. Held, under the circumstances the bald interested denial of service of notice by tenant was not sufficient to displace the onus, to rebut the presumption of service. ( 10. ) IN the instant case the respondents have not chosen to file even counter affidavit. Thus, in our opinion the order passed by the Claims Tribunal is untenable and it has to be set aside. ( 11. ) RESULTANTLY, the impugned order is hereby set aside. The Claims Tribunal is directed to proceed further in accordance with law to decide matter finally as far as possible within 8 months. Parties to bear their own costs as incurred.