JUDGMENT 1. - These two writ petitioner involve exactly identical question, and as such are being decided by this common order. 2. Facts of the case in both the matters are that the petitioners were the employees of the respondent-University, holding different pots. While so serving, the State Government, in order to provide relief against stagnation, issued a notification dated 25.1.1992, providing for grant of selection scale, on completion of 9-18-27 years of service, if the incumbent does not get any promotion. The University adopted that notification on 4.7.1996, and prescribed promotional pay scale, and further directed that the selection scales will be effective from 25.1.1992, but then, no arrears shall be paid. 3. According to the respondents, options were obtained from the employees as to whether they want to elect revised pay scale, or want to continue to be governed by the old pay scales. Thereafter the petitioners were given the selection scales on completion of 9-18-27 years of service and the fixation of pay was made. 4. In Writ Petition No. 570, fixation of pay was made vide Annexure dated 25.11.1994, by being given first selection scale on completion of 15 years of service, then vide Annexure-2 dated 30.11.1994 he was given second selection scale on completion of 18 years of service w.e.f. 19.6.1990. Vide Annex.-l he was given the pay scale of 1640-2900 as he was working in the pay scale of 1400-2600, and the second selection scale was granted in the pay scale of 2000-3200. Thereafter vide Annexure-3, dated 23.3.1999, the revised pay fixation was made, giving him selection scale from 19.6.1981, and second selection scale from 19.6.1990, and in this order the petitioner was mentioned to be in the existing pay scale of 1600-2900, and therefore, first selection scale of 2000- 3200 was given from 19.6.1981, and second selection scale of 2200-4000 was given from 19.6.1990, and it was also made clear that no arrears will be payable upto 4.7.1996. While in the case of petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1377, the petitioner has pleaded to have been given the selection scale vide order dated 21.5.1999 Annexure-1 and order dated 22.5.1999 Annexure-2, vide Annexure-1 he was given the selection scale of 2200-4000 w.e.f. 12.9.1992 and vide Annexure-2 he was given revised scale of 8000-13500 w.e.f. 1.9.1996. From perusal of Annexure-1 it transpires, that this is clearly mentioned therein to be the "REVISED". From perusal of Annexure-1 it transpires, that this is clearly mentioned therein to be the "REVISED". Then the petitioner has not disclosed as to when he was given selection scales, though in para 7 & 8 he had only pleaded that the petitioner was granted selection scale in the scale of2000-3200 w.e.f. 25.1.1992, and thereafter granted subsequent selection scale of 2200-4000 w.e.f. 12.9.1992, and this scale of 2200-4000 was subsequently revised to 8000-13500. It so happened, that after passing of the orders of March, and May 1999, in the year 2002 itself, it came to the notice of the Finance Department, that since the petitioners were working in the pay scale of 1400-2600, and since the promotional post did not carry the pay scale of 2000-32000, therefore, the first selection scale, to which they were entitled, was 1640-2900, and the second selection scale to which they were entitled to, was 2000-3200, and thereupon, vide Annexure-4 the things were clarified, and it was directed, that the recovery of the amount, excess paid to the petitioner, be made. This is the order Annexure-4 in Writ Petition No. 1377 and Annexure-5 in Writ Petition No. 570. The writ petitions have been filed seeking to assail these orders Annexure-4 & 5 as mentioned above. 5. Though the writ petitions have been framed, relying on the circular of the Government, to the effect that no such adverse order should be made without giving opportunity of hearing to the concerned employee, and the said circular is annexed. However it was conceded before me, that the selection scale as granted has wrongly been granted, and the petitioners are entitled to the selection grades as per the impugned orders only, and it has been contended that though the petitioners were wrongly given selection scale, but then, the petitioners were not at fault in being given the pay scale, rather the scales were wrongly given by the employer, and therefore even it is found that it was wrongly given, still no recovery of the amount, which has already been paid to him, can be made from the petitioner. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India & Ors., reported in JT 1994 (1) SC 574 , Union of India v. M. Bhaskar reported in 1996(4) SCT 56 , Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana, reported in 1995 SCC (Suppl.) 1 SCC 18 , Union of India v. Rekha Majhi, reported in JT 2000(4) SC 379 , and those of this Court in Nand Lal & Ors. v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, reported in 1999 RLR 707 , Alam Ali v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2000(2) RLR 721 and Narain Lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2003(3) RLR 81. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Punia contended, that Hon'ble the Supreme Court has not laid down as a rule of thumb, that in every case, where the payment has been made under mistake, should never be recovered from the employee, rather it is the only consequence of detection of mistake. He has relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in V. Gangaram v. Regional Joint Director, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 139 , State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh, reported in (1998) 9 SCC 595 , and a judgment of this Court in Kanhiyalal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1997(1) WLC 611 . Learned counsel also relied upon the proposition laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para-19 in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 496 , and the guidelines given in Delhi Administration v. Manohar Lal, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 222 , and submitted, that simply because in particular case, Hon'ble the Supreme Court directed that no recovery should be made, as that was a judgment in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, this Court should not be blindly follow them as a rule of law, until and unless, they laid it down as a rule of law. Thus it was contended, that the employer is legitimately entitled to make the recovery of the amount paid under mistake and since it is not in dispute, that the payments were made to the employees, the impugned orders are legal and valid. 7. I have considered the submissions, and have gone through the aforesaid judgments. 8. Thus it was contended, that the employer is legitimately entitled to make the recovery of the amount paid under mistake and since it is not in dispute, that the payments were made to the employees, the impugned orders are legal and valid. 7. I have considered the submissions, and have gone through the aforesaid judgments. 8. The first judgment in the line, being, that of Shyam Babu Verma's case. In this case the question involved was about validity of the order dated 15.6.1984 issued by the Chief Superintendent Central Hospital (Northern Railway). The petitioners therein were appointed as Pharmacist, in the scale of 130-240, since they were getting revised pay scale, the seniority list was prepared , which included the petitioners. Then by the impugned order it was conveyed, that petitioners were covered by Cl. (d) of Section 31 of the Pharmacy Act, and their salary was fixed in the scale of Rs. 330-480, instead of Rs. 330-560 w.e.f. 1973, and that after completion of 10 years of service, they would be getting the scale of Rs. 330-560, it was not in dispute that after completion of 10 years of service, petitioners have been getting the scale of Rs. 330-560. The petitioners case was that sudden reduction of the scale of pay from Rs. 330-560 to Rs. 330-480, after several years of the implementation of the said scale, has not only affected financially, but has also affected even the seniority of the petitioners. The basis of the claim of the petitioner was that prior to 1.1.1973 there was only one scale of Rs. 130-240, and thereafter the same service was bifurcated into different types of Pharmacist according to their expense, and qualification, possessed by them. According to the petitioner, no fault can be found, either with the third Pay Commission, or the respondent putting the petitioners in two different categories. Then the argument of 'equal pay for equal work' was also raised. However, Hon'ble the Supreme Court negatived both the contentions, and positively held that the petitioners were entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 330-480 only w.e.f. 1.1.1973, and only after period of 10 years, they will become entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 330-560. Then in para 11, in continuation of this very sentence, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- ".... but as they have received the scale of Rs. 330-480 only w.e.f. 1.1.1973, and only after period of 10 years, they will become entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 330-560. Then in para 11, in continuation of this very sentence, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- ".... but as they have received the scale of Rs. 330-560 since 1973, due to no fault of their, and that scale is being reduced in the year 1984 with effect from 1,1.1973, it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them. Accordingly, we direct that no steps should be taken to recover or to adjust any excess amount paid to the petitioners, due to the fault of the respondents, the petitioners being in no way responsible for the same." 9. This judgment was rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court on 8.2.1994. 10. Next judgment in the line is in Sahib Ram's case. In this case the question was, that the appellant was appointed as Librarian, in the Government College, in the pay scale of Rs. 220-550, and the State Government accepting the recommendations of the Government of India, and University Grants Commission, upgraded the pay scale of Librarians w.e.f. 1.1.1973 to Rs. 7001600, if they possessed the mentioned qualifications. Thereafter, considering the representations made by several Librarians appointed prior to 31.12.1972, it was decided that the existing incumbents on the posts of Librarians in colleges, who have been appointed on the post on or before 3.12.1972, may be sanctioned the upgraded scale of Rs. 700-1600, in relaxation of the prescribed qualification. The Principal of the College accordingly revised the pay scale of the appellant. However, the Government directed the Principal to withdraw the pay scale of Rs. 700-1600, which order was challenged by way of writ petition in the year 1993, and the High Court vide order dated 9.9.1993 dismissed the writ petition. Hon'ble the Supreme Court found, that admittedly the appellant does not possess the requisite qualification, and therefore, he is not entitled to the relaxation, and that the Principal erred in granting him relaxation. Then in para 5 it was held as under:- ". . . Since the date of relaxation the appellant had been paid his salary on the revised scale. Then in para 5 it was held as under:- ". . . Since the date of relaxation the appellant had been paid his salary on the revised scale. However, it is not on account of any misrepresentation made by the appellant that the benefit of the higher pay scale was given to him but by wrong construction made . by the Principal for which the appellant cannot be held to be at fault. Under the circumstances the amount paid till date may not be recovered from the appellant." This judgment was rendered on 19.9.1994. 11. The M. Bhaskar's case, was a case, where Hon'ble the Supreme Court was considering two questions, both of whom were relatable to the Railway Board's memorandum dated 15.5.1987, on the subject of recruitment of Traffic Commercial apprentices. The questions were (1) the purport of the memorandum, and (2) the validity of the same. The broad contents of the memorandum, which brought about some changes in the recruitment of Traffic Commercial Apprentice, one of the changes being, that, on and from 15.5.1987 the recruitment of these Apprentices would be made in the pay scale of Rs. 1600-2600, which earlier was Rs. 1,400-2,300/- and instead of all the posts being filed up by the promotions, ratio of promotees was made 75% and of remaining 25%. 10% were required to come through Railway Recritment Boards, and 15% on the basis of Limited Department Competitive Examination. The pre-1987 Apprentices laid their claim for the higher scale of pay, on the basis of 1987 memorandum; which claim was allowed by the majority of Central Administrative Tribunals, and validity of that view was challenged by the appellant Hon'lbe the Supreme Court decided the bunch of matters, which arose from judgments of Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunals of different States, and the different High Courts, and in para-17, all the appeals were disposed of by setting aside the judgments of those Tribunals, which had held that the pre-1987 Traffic Commercial Apprentices had become entitled to the higher pay and the contrary view was affirmed. The judgment of Kerala High Court, declaring the memorandum as invalid, was also set aside. The judgment of Kerala High Court, declaring the memorandum as invalid, was also set aside. Then in para-18 it was held as under : "Despite the aforesaid conclusion of ours, we are of the view that the recovery of the amount already paid because of the aforesaid judgments of the Tribunals would cause hardship to the concerned respondents-appellants and, therefore, direct the Union of India and its officers not to recover the amount already paid." In this very para it was further held as under : "This part of our order shall apply (1) to the respondents-appellants who are before this Court; and (2) to that pre-1987 Apprentices in whose favour judgment had been delivered by any CAT and which had become final earlier because no appeal was carried to this Court or, if carried, the same was dismissed. This benefit would be available to no other. [Emphasis supplied] 12. The next judgment relied upon is in Rekha Majhi's case. In this case the sole question for consideration of Hon'ble the Supreme Court was as mentioned in para-1 of the judgment, viz. "whether the respondent herein is entitled to dearness relief on the family pension to her even after getting appointment on compassionate ground in the railways". In that case, the husband of the respondent was a railway employee who died in harness, family pension as well as gratuity, provident fund, and all other retirement benefits, admissible to the husband, were given to the respondent, and in addition, she was given compassionate appointment. The respondent continued to draw the salary as a railway employee, as well as family pension, till 25.1.1994, when it was discovered, that the respondent was not entitled to draw two dearness reliefs; one on the salary, and the other on the family pension. Consequently, the appellants re-fixed the family pension of the respondent, after deducting dearness reliefs and issued orders for recovery of dearness relief paid to her on family pension. Aggrieved of it an O.A. was filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta, which was allowed. Hon'ble the Supreme Court found, that the appellants were legally justified in denying the respondent the dearness reliefs on the family pension, and for that purpose reliance was placed on earlier judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of India v. G. Vasudevan Pillay, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 32 . Hon'ble the Supreme Court found, that the appellants were legally justified in denying the respondent the dearness reliefs on the family pension, and for that purpose reliance was placed on earlier judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of India v. G. Vasudevan Pillay, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 32 . Then in para-8, the contention was noticed, to the effect that the appellants are not entitled to recover the dearness reliefs on the family pension, paid to the respondent between 26.1.1987 to 25.1.1994, as it was noticed, that no circular, or rule was brought to the notice of the Court prior to 1993, and R. 21, or the basis of which, respondents were held not entitled to dearness relief was published for the first time in the year 1993. In these circumstances Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- "It, therefore, appears that the dearness relief on the pension paid to the respondent was voluntarily and after a conscious decision taken in respect thereof. And it was only after the Rules, 1993 was promulgated and orders for refixing her pension and recovery of' excess amount on family pension paid to her were issued. Moreover, it is stated that the respondent who is a widow is the lone bread earner of the family and her financial condition is not such as to pay back the excess amount she has already drawn. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the recovery of excess pension paid to the respondent is not justified on legal and equitable grounds." [Emphasis supplied] 13. This judgment was rendered on 6.4.2000. 14. Then coming to Nand Lal's case in that case the petitions were filed for declaring the provisions of R. 14(l)(i) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Revised Pay Scales) Rules, 1987, in so far as it prescribed the cut off date for the purpose of grant of advance increment, ultra vires and for quashing the order dated 7.3.1989, issuing clarification, for revision of pay scale and all consequential orders. Dealing with the controversy, it was held, that the petitioners cannot claim to have any benefit of Rules, 1987 for advance increment and fixation of their pay accordingly. Then this Court by simply referring to a judgment in Shyam Babu's case, Sahib Ram's case and Union of India v. Ram Gopal Agrawal, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 589 held as under:- ". . Then this Court by simply referring to a judgment in Shyam Babu's case, Sahib Ram's case and Union of India v. Ram Gopal Agrawal, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 589 held as under:- ". . . . . if a higher pay scale has erroneously been given to a person long back and he had received it out of no fault on his part, it shall not be just and proper to recover the excess amount already paid to him. Thus, in view of the above, the respondents are restrained to take any steps to recover or adjust any excess amount paid to the petitioners due to the fault of the respondent-Board as the petitioners cannot, by any means be held responsible for the same. However, it is further clarified that if the amount has already been recovered fully or partly, the recovered amount shall not be liable to be refunded to the employees." 15. Similarly in Naraian Lal's case, the prayer made by the petitioner was, that the respondents be restrained from effecting any recovery, mentioned in the Audit Report (Annex.3) and be further directed to make payment of difference of pay, between First grade, and Second grade teacher. However, during arguments, the writ petition was confined only to the recovery of amount. It was found by this Court that the petitioner was appointed in 1955, and was promoted in 1967, and audit report was made in the year 1987-88. This Court noticed, that the petitioner has retired in the year 1994, and then by simply referring to the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Shyam Bobu Verma's case, Sahib Ram's case, Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2480 , Ramesh Kumar Sharma v. State, of Rajasthan, reported in WLR 1997 Raj. 55 , Nand Lal's case and Lakshmi Narayan Mukhopadhyay v. Union of India, reported in JT 2002(5) SC 355 , simply held, that in case the Court finds that any benefit was received by a person, without there being any fault on his part, in receiving such benefit, it would be just and proper to allow him to retain such benefit. 16. Coming to Alam Ali's case the petitioner therein was appointed as Helper, on daily rated, muster-roll basis in the year 1968, then he was promoted as Helper Grade-I, in the year 1989. 16. Coming to Alam Ali's case the petitioner therein was appointed as Helper, on daily rated, muster-roll basis in the year 1968, then he was promoted as Helper Grade-I, in the year 1989. During this period it was stated that the employee was given higher pay scale, and therefore, on 15.2.1999, the order for recovery was made, Writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, and in appeal reliance was placed on the judgments, in Shyam Babu Verma's case, Sahib Ram's case, V. Gangaram's case and Nand Lal's case and on the side of the respondent, a contention was raised, that the power to protect recoveries can only be exercised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, these ruling are not helpful. Then this Court held that the powers of the High Court u/Art. 226 can be exercised for two fold purposes (1) for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as (2) for enforcement of non-fundamental or ordinary legal rights, and for any other purpose. Then the question posed was whether the amount paid to the appellant, wrongly, on his fixation, without his fault, can be permitted to be recovered, and then referring to the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it was held in para-16, that the fixation was made in the year 1989, and the process of recovery was started in the year 1999, "looking to all aspects of the matter". The appellant should have been allowed to retain the benefit. 17. This is the whole long and short of the judgments relied upon on the side of the petitioners. 18. Then I may refer to the judgment cited on the side of the respondents. 19. In V. Gangaram's case, the appellant was originally appointed as a Teacher Headmaster on 9.11.1959 in the scale of 45-120, then after passing of the certain qualification he was granted another scale on 1.12.1967, being that of 80-150, and the appellant went on improving his qualifications, and the authorities went on giving revision of the pay scales, granting advance increments. Then the controversy was as to whether he was entitled to more than two additional increments on acquiring qualification of MA, and M.Ed. In that view of the matter, notice was issued to him, for making the recovery of the amount wrongly paid to him. Then the controversy was as to whether he was entitled to more than two additional increments on acquiring qualification of MA, and M.Ed. In that view of the matter, notice was issued to him, for making the recovery of the amount wrongly paid to him. The Tribunal dismissed the petition, and notices were issued by Hon'ble the Supreme Court confined to the question of recovery of the arrears paid to him from the year 1985. Hon'ble the Supreme Court held, that he is entitled to only two increments and not four, and therefore, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para 7 held as under : "He is not entitled to the four increments, as successively claimed. We hold that he is entitled to only two increments, as indicated above. Since the Department itself has adopted the above approach, we direct that arrears paid prior to 1985 are not to be recovered and excess amount from 1985 is liable to be recovered from the pension payable to the appellant. The installment should be proportionately distributed so as not to cause any undue hardship." 20. This judgment was rendered on 25.4.1997. 21. In Devinder Singh's case, the question involved before Hon'ble the Supreme Court was, about entitlement of the employees to regular pay scale, on the principle of equal pay for equal work, and the High Court, in that case, directed State to pay the salary and allowances, as it was being paid to the regular employees holding similar posts. Hon'ble the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, to the extent employees were held entitled on the principle of "Equal Pay for Equal Work" to get the salary available to Ledger Keepers/Ledger clerks who were regularly recruited, and then it was further positively directed in para-3 as under:- ". . . In view of the present order if in case any amount is found to have been paid to the respondents in excess, it will be adjusted in a phased and reasonable manner so that the respondents may not be out of pocket to a large extent." 22. In Kanhiyalal's case the Division Bench of this Court, precisely deciding the question, as to whether the Government is entitled to recover back the amount of increments, paid during the suspension of the appellant in the light of the Division Bench judgment of this Court, on it reversal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Kanhiyalal's case the Division Bench of this Court, precisely deciding the question, as to whether the Government is entitled to recover back the amount of increments, paid during the suspension of the appellant in the light of the Division Bench judgment of this Court, on it reversal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The contention was that the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision does not contain any direction, enabling the State Government to realise the amounts paid by it voluntarily, to all similarly situated employees, on the basis of the Division Bench judgment. The learned Single Judge had held that the amount paid on the basis of the prevalent view of the High Court, could be recovered, on the reversal of the view, by the Supreme Court. The Division Bench held in para-2 as under:- "We are in perfect agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The amount was paid because the current judicial view then was that a suspended employee was entitled to additional allowance or increments during the period of suspension. When that view was reversed by the Supreme Court on an S.L.P. filed against the judgment in Kansingh's case the State Government was entitled to recover back the amounts paid under the earlier view of law." 23. Of course in both these judgments, the various judgments mentioned above, being in Shyam Babu Verma's case, M. Bhaskar's case, Sahib Ram's case, Rekha Majhi's case, andNand Lal's case, Alam Ali's case, and Narain Lai's case have not been considered. 24. In the above background of law, and on the basis of the guidelines given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, the question is required to be decided, as to whether the impugned orders Annexure-4/Annexure-5 should be sustained, or not. 25. Before proceeding to decide this question, I may refer to few judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, wherein sufficient guidelines have been laid as to how the High Court should interpret the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in deciding the matters. 26. I may in the first place, refer to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Rajeshwar Prasad Misra v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1965 SC 1887 , wherein in para-8 Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under : "These arguments disclose a tendency to read the observations of this Court as statutory enactments. 26. I may in the first place, refer to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Rajeshwar Prasad Misra v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1965 SC 1887 , wherein in para-8 Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under : "These arguments disclose a tendency to read the observations of this Court as statutory enactments. No doubt, the law declared by this Court binds Courts in India but it should always be remembered that this Court does not enact." 27. Then, in Haryana Financial Corporation's case, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para-19 held as under : "19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graying Docl. Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 AC 737 at p. 761 Lord Mac Dermot observed:- "The matter cannot of course be settled merely by treating the ipsissima uertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge." In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., 1970 (2) All ER 294 Lord Reld said, "Lord Atkin's speech is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge." In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., 1970 (2) All ER 294 Lord Reld said, "Lord Atkin's speech is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1662 observed : "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herringten v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said : "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." "Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper." 28. Likewise, in Manohar Lal's case Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para-5 has held as under:- "Apparently the learned Judge in the High Court was merely swayed by considerations of judicial comity and propriety and failed to see that merely because this Court has issued directions in some other cases, to deal with the fact situation in those other cases, in the purported exercise of its undoubted inherent and plenary powers to do complete justice, keeping aside even technicalities the High Court exercising statutory powers under the criminal laws of the land, could not afford to assume to itself the powers or jurisdiction to do the same or similar things the High Court and all other Courts in the country were no doubt ordained to follow and apply the law declared by this Court but that does not absolve them of the obligation and responsibility to find out the ratio of the decision and ascertain the law, if any, so declared from a careful reading of the decision concerned and only thereafter proceed to apply it appropriately, to the cases before them..... " 29. " 29. Then the view of Haryana Financial Corporation's case has been consistently reiterated, inasmuch as in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in JT 2003 (Suppl.1) 257 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para 17, has held as under:- "Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a word of difference between conclusions in two cases or between two accused in the same case. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect." 30. Keeping in view the above legal principles, it is to be examined, as to what is the law, that has been laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, viz., as to whether, in all cases, whenever payments has been received by the employee, from the employer, without any mistake of the employee, it should never be recovered back from the employee, or in what circumstances, and on what considerations, it cannot be recovered, and in what circumstances it can be recovered? 31. In my humble view, there is no legislative provision, as such, whether under any Act of the Parliament, or Legislature or any Service Rules, which may have laid down as a universal rule, that any payment made to the employee, by the employer, without any fault of the employee, should never be recovered back from him. Of course, where the payment has been made to the employee, on account of the active act of the employee, or with his connivance, obviously the things would stand on a different footing, but here I am concerned, precisely, with a situation, where the employee, as such, is not instrumental, in the payment being made to him, by the employer. 32. The problem has various facts, viz can it be said that a payment made to an employee at a time which has lost in its antiquity and it is found after his retirement, rather or even after his death, to have been wrongly paid, should it be allowed to be recovered from the heirs, or from the estate, or from the family pension being paid to the family members. Likewise whether a huge amount, dimensions of the hugeness may be dependent upon facts and circumstances of each case, can, or cannot be allowed to be recovered. Likewise whether a huge amount, dimensions of the hugeness may be dependent upon facts and circumstances of each case, can, or cannot be allowed to be recovered. Conversely whether even in a case where the payment has been made to the employee, on the very next day, it is discovered to have been wrongly paid to him, should it not be allowed to be recovered? Then, whether a small amount should be permitted to be recovered or not? Likewise in case where the amount is liable to be recovered, Has already been recovered, whether by deduction from his salary, or withholding part of his retiral benefits, can be directed to be repaid to the employee, by invoking the principles, that the recovery of the amount paid to the employee, without any mistake on his part cannot be effected? And hereby indirectly creating a right in the employee, to recover amount, from the employer, simply because, it had once been paid to him, despite the fact that he is not entitled to the amount. There may be a case, where immediately after receiving the amount, the very next day, it may be found that the payment was wrongly made to the employee, still should he be allowed to retain the amount, more so when the amount may be substantially huge. A long list of such facts and circumstances, may be there, which may be invoked, as consideration for deciding the question, whether recovery should be made, or not. But then, the principle that is argued before me is, on the authority of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that as an absolute proposition, in no circumstances recovery can be made. In that view of the matter, I am to examine the question. 33. Reverting to Shyam Babu's case, as noticed above, in that case the payments were made to the employees during the period 1973, for a period of 10 years, and it was in the year 1984, that the recovery was sought to be made. In that view of the matter, I am to examine the question. 33. Reverting to Shyam Babu's case, as noticed above, in that case the payments were made to the employees during the period 1973, for a period of 10 years, and it was in the year 1984, that the recovery was sought to be made. The matter was directly taken to the Supreme Court u/Art. 32, which writ petition was decided in the year 1994, holding that the employee was not entitled to the amount paid to him, but it was also held that "it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them". Thus, Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Shyam Babu's case, proceeded on the considerations of "just and proper", obviously in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the given case, where the recovery was sought to be effected by the department, after 10 years. 34. Then in Sahib Ram's case also the payments were made to the employee in the year 1987, and the recovery was sought to be made in the year 1993, which recovery was upheld by the High Court, and Hon'ble the Supreme Court deciding the matter in September, 1994 held, that the employee was not entitled to the revised pay scale, but then, it was held that "benefit of higher pay scale was given to him but by wrong construction made by the Principal for which the appellant cannot be held to be at fault", and then it was directed that "under the circumstances the amount paid till date may not be recovered from the appellant". Thus in this case the considerations taken into account was, firstly that the amount was not paid by the misrepresentation made by the employee, and that the payment was made to him on account of wrong construction made by the Principal, for which the employee was not at fault, and then under the circumstances of that case it was directed that the amount paid may not be recovered. Suffice it to say, that one of the Hon'ble Judges, constituting Bench in Sahib Ram's case, was one of the members constituting the bench in Shyam Babu Verma's case. Suffice it to say, that one of the Hon'ble Judges, constituting Bench in Sahib Ram's case, was one of the members constituting the bench in Shyam Babu Verma's case. But then Shyam Babu's case was not referred as an authority, for the proposition, that recovery should not be made, nor did it lay down as a legal proposition, that in particular category of cases, the recovery cannot be made from the employee. 35. In M. Bhaskar's case also, the impugned circular was interpreted by different Benches of Central Administrative Tribunals, and different High' Courts, and the circular was struck down by Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively in the year 1996, and the direction was given, holding that "we are of the view that the recovery of the amount already paid because of the aforesaid judgments of the Tribunals would cause hardship to the concerned respondents-appellants and, therefore, direct the Union of India and its officers not to recover the amount already paid". The direction was given considering the particular circumstance viz. that it would cause hardship as the amount had been paid in view of the judgments of Tribunals. The matter does not end here. In this judgment a further direction was given as under:- "Thus part of our order shall apply (1) to the respondents-appellants who are before this Court; and (2) to that pre-1987 Apprentices in whose favour judgment had been delivered by any CAT and which had become final earlier because no appeal was carried to this Court or, if carried, the same was dismissed. This benefit would be available to no other." [Emphasis supplied] 36. Thus, the benefit of non-recovery was confined, only to those Apprentices who had approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, or before the Supreme Court, and such other Apprentice who had received the benefits, but were not entitled to the benefit, by virtue of the judgment of para-17 of this judgment, and who had not approached any Court, were not held entitled to those benefits. Obviously, therefore, the recoveries were permitted to be made from them. Obviously, therefore, the recoveries were permitted to be made from them. Making of this direction does clearly show that even according to Hon'ble the Supreme Court the general principle is that the amount paid to the employee to which he is not entitled to, is recoverable, inasmuch by making this direction in latter part of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has itself clarified that the amount stands recoverable from the category of persons to whom the benefit of this principle has not been held to be available. 37. Similarly in Rekha Majhi's case Hon'ble the Supreme Court had considered that rule prohibiting grant of two dearness reliefs came to be promulgated in the year 1993 only, while the benefit of pension was being given to the respondent from the year 1987, and therefore, Hon'ble the Supreme Court directed that the "appellants are not entitled to recover the dearness reliefs on the family pension paid to the respondent between 26.1.1987 to 25.1.1994". This judgment was rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court on 6.4.2000, and in view of the judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal, obviously meaning thereby, that the amount that might have been paid to the respondent after decision of Central Administrative Tribunal dated 28.4.1995, till the date of quashing of judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal, could obviously be recovered, as it has not been found that the amount was not paid thereafter. Not only this, what is still more significant to note is, that the another more important consideration invoked by Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-8 was "Moreover, it is stated that the respondent who is a widow is the lone bread earner of the family and her financial condition is not such as to pay back the excess amount she has already drawn. Under such circumstance, we are of the view that the recovery of excess pension paid to the respondent is not justified on legal and equitable grounds." [Emphasis supplied] 38. In Ram Gopal Agrawal's case also, the question was, as to whether non-gazetted non-combatised staff, when posted in static area, that is to say, non-operational area is entitled to ration allowance or not, and the Central Administrative Tribunal allowed enhancement of the allowance directing to pay 50% of the amount in terms of judgment of Gauhati Bench. In Ram Gopal Agrawal's case also, the question was, as to whether non-gazetted non-combatised staff, when posted in static area, that is to say, non-operational area is entitled to ration allowance or not, and the Central Administrative Tribunal allowed enhancement of the allowance directing to pay 50% of the amount in terms of judgment of Gauhati Bench. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para-14 noticed, that pursuant to the order passed by the Supreme Court 50 per cent of the said allowance was paid by the appellant to the respondents, and similarly by means of interim order in CA, the Tribunal directed to pay this 50 per cent allowance, but then Hon'ble the Supreme Court held the employees to be not entitled to the said amount, and found the orders of the Tribunal to be not sustainable. In that background in para 14 a contention was noticed "that in case the appeal is allowed the recovery will be pressed against the respondents concerned for the amount already paid any it would result in great hardship". Considering this circumstance a direction was given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court that "we make it clear that the amount already paid to them in terms of the order of this Court or by the order of Tribunal as aforesaid would not be recovered." 39. So far as Nand Lars case is concerned, in para 16, just by referring to the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Shyam Baba Verma's case, Sahib Ram's case and Ram Gopal Agrawal's case it was noticed, that if a higher pay scale has erroneously been given to a person long back, and he had received it out of no fault on his part, it shall not be just and proper to recover the excess amount already paid to him, and then in view of the above, respondents were restrained to take any steps from recovering the amount. 40. 40. Similarly Narain Lal's case also is on the same basis as Nand Lal's case, so much so that by purportedly relying on the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Shyam Babu Verma's case, Sahib Ram's case, Bhagwan Shukla's case, Ramesh Kumar Sharma's case, Nand Lal's case and Lakshmi Narayan Mukhopadhyay's case, this Court has simply held, that in case the Court finds that any benefit was received by a person, without there being any fault on his part in receiving such benefit, it would be just and proper to allow him to retain such benefit. As appears from para-18, that predominant consideration in the mind of the Court was that the person has retired, and after his retirement, to ask such person to pay amount already received, would necessarily cause a legal injury to him, as in the meanwhile, he would have utilised that amount. As noticed above in that case the payments were made in 1967 onwards, and the man had retired in the year 1994. I may observe here that out of the case relied in Narain Lal's case, the judgment in Bhagwan Shukla's case has no bearing whatever, as there the question involved was entitlement of the employer to reduce the basic pay without giving opportunity of hearing. Likewise in Laxmi Narayan Mukhopadhyay's case, on merits it was found, that the basis on which the recovery was sought to be made was not shown to the employee, and he was also not given any opportunity of hearing. Thus, that is not a case, where the Court had come to the conclusion, about employee being not entitled to the amount he had received, and then to have been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, that in any event the amount cannot be recovered. Sufficient discussion has already been made about the other judgments relied on in Narain Lal's case. Thus, in my view this case is also of no help to the petitioner. 41. Thus, in these judgments, the direction was not made as a legal proposition, rather to borrow the expression of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal's case, the judgment in Nand Lal's case has been passed 'by being merely swayed away by the considerations of judicial comity and propriety'. 41. Thus, in these judgments, the direction was not made as a legal proposition, rather to borrow the expression of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal's case, the judgment in Nand Lal's case has been passed 'by being merely swayed away by the considerations of judicial comity and propriety'. While as mandated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, I am under obligation "to see that merely because this Court has issued directions in some other cases, to deal with the fact situation in those other cases. In the purported exercise of its undoubted inherent and plenary powers to do complete justice, keeping aside even technicalities, the High Court exercising statutory powers could not afford to assume to itself the powers or jurisdiction to do the same or similar things . . ." Thus, as per the mandate, I am not absolved from the obligation, and responsibility, to find out the ratio of the decision, and the law if any, so declared from careful reading of the decision concerned, and only thereafter to proceed to apply it appropriately, to the case in hand. 42. So fax Alam Ali's case is concerned, as noticed above, in appeal reliance was placed on the judgments in Shyam Babu Verma's case, Sahib Ram's case, V. Gangaram's case and Nand Lal's case, and on the side of the respondent a intention was raised, that the power to protect recoveries can only be exercised the Hon'ble Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India and, ere fore, these rulings are not helpful. Then this Court held that the powers of he High Court u/Art. 226 can be exercised for two fold purposes (1) for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as (2) for enforcement of non-fundamental or ordinary legal rights, and for any other purpose. Then the question posed was whether the amount paid to the appellant wrongly, on his fixation, without his fault can be permitted to be recovered, and then referring to the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court it was held in para-16 that the fixation was made in the year 1989, and the process of recovery was started in the year 1999, "looking to all aspects, of the matter" the appellant should have been allowed to retain the benefits. Thus, this again is a judgment on facts, having been rendered, looking to all the aspects of the matter, and neither interprets the various judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court referred to above, as laying down the rule of thumb, that in any case the amount should not be recovered simply where the amount has been received by the person without there being any fault on his part in receiving the amount, nor does this judgment even by itself purports to lay down such authoritative pronouncement. 43. Then I may refer to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kanhiya Lal's case (which) D.B. was presided by the same Hon'ble Judge as in case of Alam Ali, which was relied upon by the respondent wherein a Division Bench clearly upheld the right of the employer to recover back the amount, which amount was paid in view of the interpretation of law as prevailed at the relevant time, which was subsequently reversed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Obviously in receiving that amount the employee was not at all at fault, and the Division Bench, upholding the judgment of Single Bench directed that the Government was entitled to recover back the amount. However, bearing compassion, it was directed that since the employee was under suspension since 1989 and from the paltry amount he gets as subsistence allowance, if the entire recovery of arrears is made in a lump sum, he shall be put to hardship, it was directed to the Secretary Finance Department, Rajasthan to consider the Of fixine suitable easy installments for recovery of the amount looking to the financial difficulties of the appellant. 44. Likewise in V. Gangaram's case also, Hon'ble the Supreme Court had clearly made a positive direction, that the excess amount from 1985 is liable to be recovered from the pension, payable to the appellant, installment should be proportionately distributed, so as not to cause any undue hardship. This judgment was rendered on 25.4.1997. Thus, despite the employee having retired, the amount having been paid to him since the year 1985, was still ordered to be recovered, though in easy installment. 45. This judgment was rendered on 25.4.1997. Thus, despite the employee having retired, the amount having been paid to him since the year 1985, was still ordered to be recovered, though in easy installment. 45. Likewise in Devinder Singh's case, as noticed above, rather a positive direction has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, that if in case any amount is found to have been paid to the respondents in excess, it will be adjusted in a phased and reasonable manner, so that the respondents may not be out of pocket to a large extent. 46. Thus, on a collective reading of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it cannot be concluded, that Hon'ble the Supreme Court ever laid down, as an absolute proposition, that no recovery can ever be made from the employee, where the amount has been paid to him without any fault on 1-part. Similarly within the meaning of Art. 141, in none of these judgments, it been expressly laid down, as a legal proposition as to in what circumstances, the recovery cannot be made, and in what circumstances recovery can be made. 47. In that view of the matter, the general principle of restitution of the amount, received under mistake as enshrined u/s. 72 of the Contract Act has to play its role.47-A. There is yet another important aspect of the matter, viz., while exercising Art. 226 jurisdiction, one of the important considerations to be taken into account is of substantial failure of justice. Inherently in the very nature of things, the substantial failure of justice is required to be considered not only from the stand point of the petitioner, but from the stand point of the parties. If the present case is considered from this stand point it is not in dispute, that the petitioners have received the amount, and it is also not in dispute that they are not entitled to the amount received by them. With these facts, the petitioners want the assistance of this Court u/Art. 226 jurisdiction, seeking to prevent the respondents from recovering the amount, so as to enable them to retain the amount to which they are not entitled. This, in my humble opinion, is clearly hit by the principles of unjust enrichment. With these facts, the petitioners want the assistance of this Court u/Art. 226 jurisdiction, seeking to prevent the respondents from recovering the amount, so as to enable them to retain the amount to which they are not entitled. This, in my humble opinion, is clearly hit by the principles of unjust enrichment. I may immediately refer to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Mahabir Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in JT 1989 (3) SC 327 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has dealt with the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Their lordships of the Supreme Court have posed the question, as to what was the law applicable to that case. 'Nulne Joit senrichir aux depens des autres' - No one ought to enrich himself at the expense of others. And in para 11, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has propounded this principle of'unjust enrichment', and has held as under:- "The principle of unjust enrichment requires first, that the defendant has been 'enriched' by the receipt of a "benefit" secondly, that this enrichment is "at the expense of the plaintiff'; and thirdly; that the . retention of the enrichment be unjust. This justifies restitution. Enrichment may take the form of direct advantage to the recipient wealth such as by the receipt of money or indirect one for instance where inevitable expense has been saved." 48. Likewise in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in JT 1996(11) SC 283 , dealing with a case of central excise, Hon'ble the supreme Court has held as under:- "The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both the ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from his purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the Sate on the ground that duty it has been collected from contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched." [Emphasis supplied] 49. This judgment has consistently been followed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched." [Emphasis supplied] 49. This judgment has consistently been followed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Thus in view of the above principles, the petitioner cannot be allowed to invoke Art. 226 jurisdiction for seeking unjust enrichment unless of course, by making out equitable considerations, petitioner is able to show, that notwithstanding his not being entitled to the money, on equitable considerations he is entitled to retain it. 50. Similarly while exercising jurisdiction u/Art. 226 larger interests are also not to be ignored, and cannot be ignored inasmuch as, alter all the amount paid to the employee, whether by the Government or by the University, or by the Statutory Corporation, is a money coming from public exchequer, which is tax payer's money a public money, and simply because of the fact that it has traveled to the pocket of the employee, by some error, on the part of some person in the establishment of the employer, though not for any fault of the employee, cannot, and should not, always be allowed to cost the state exchequer public money. In that event, if the state exchequer is not to be allowed to suffer, then the amount is to be recovered from some person, who so ever it be. In that event, may be, that disciplinary proceedings may be required to be initiated against the person at faith in making the payment and on the conclusion of the enquiry, recovery may be ordered to be made from him, and in that process may be that that person either may have retired, or may retire, or in cases even may have died, in that event if recovery is made it would cause far greater hardship, as compared to the one, if the recovery is effected from the employee himself. The principle of'unjust enrichment' is attracted with greater rigor, when the money sought to be retained, is a public money or coming from State Exchequer. The principle of'unjust enrichment' is attracted with greater rigor, when the money sought to be retained, is a public money or coming from State Exchequer. The fact remains that may be that employee may not be at fault, but he has received the amount to which he is not entitled, there is no equitable justification, to entitle him to retain the amount, at the cost of state exchequer, which ultimately adversely affects the public at large, until and unless there are obviously very strong and out weighing equitable considerations in favour of the employee. Otherwise accepting the proposition, as propounded by learned counsel for the petitioner, may result into huge adverse financial implications on the state exchequer public money, simply under the cover of the recipient employee not being at fault. Therefore, even on the larger considerations of public policy also it cannot be ruled as an absolute proposition, that in every case, wherever the amount has been received by the employee,without any fault on his own part, should never be recovered from him. 51. Coming to the factual aspect of the present case, all that has been pleaded is in ground II in Writ Petition No. 1377, and so also in Writ Petition No. 570. For ready reference the precise pleading is reproduced hereunder. 52. In Writ Petition No. 1377/2003 ground II reads as under:- "II. Without prejudice to submissions made hereinabove it is humbly submitted that even taking situation at worse against the Petitioner the Respondent University is not entitled to make any recovery .whatsoever of any amount paid to the petitioner by the Respondent University itself on its own." . In Writ Petition No. 570/2003 ground II reads as under : "II. Without prejudice to submissions made hereinabove it is humbly submitted that even taking situation at worse against the Petitioner the Respondent-University is not entitled to make any recovery whatsoever of any amount paid to the petitioner by the Respondent-University itself." 53. According to the facts of the case, as noticed above, the pay fixation was made in the year 1999, and in the year 2002 itself, the mistake was detected, and the amount was ordered to be recovered, which is not shown, to be requiring to be prohibited, on any of the equitable considerations, that could be allowed to be invoked, u/Art. 226 jurisdiction of this Court. 54. 54. The next result of the aforesaid discussion is, that I do not find any sufficient ground, to quash the impugned orders, and prevent the respondents from recovering the amount. The writ petitions thus have no force, and are hereby dismissed.Writ Petition dismissed. *******