P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful defendant in both the Courts below is the appellant. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit OS No. 2070/90 on the file of III assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for the relief of specific performance of contract of agreement of sale praying the Court to direct the appellant herein/ defendant to execute the sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule property and also to deliver possession of the said property. The suit was decreed by the learned Judge, with costs by judgment dated 8-7-1996. Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful defendant had carried the matter by way of Appeal A. S. No. 202/96 on the file of n Additional Chief Judge, city Civil Court Hyderabad and by judgment dated 4-8-2000, the Appellate Court had dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the present Second appeal was preferred by the unsuccessful defendant in both the Courts below. ( 2 ) SRI Vedula Venkata Ramana, the learned Counsel representing the appellant had pointed out to the following substantial questions of law:1. Whether a decree for specific performance can be granted on the strength of a document like Ex. A-1 wherein there is no recital about the price at which the property is agreed to be sold and is not such a document hit by uncertainty as contemplated by Section 29 of the Indian Contract act, 1872?2. Whether Ex. A-1 is hit by Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 inasmuch as it does not contain the essential terms, particularly, the price at which the property was agreed to be sold and can a specific performance decree be passed on the basis of Ex. A-3 which is said to be continuation of Ex. A-1 when Ex. A-1 is hit by uncertainty. Can Ex. A-3 stand as a suit document if Ex. A-1 is excluded from consideration ?3. When the terms and conditions of a contract are reduced to writing, can the Courts below go into oral evidence for substantiating the documents which would be contrary to Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ?4. Whether the suit is within limitation ?5. Whether the Courts below had exercised the discretion properly in granting the relief of specific performance in favour of respondent/ plaintiff?6. Whether the suit is within limitation ?5. Whether the Courts below had exercised the discretion properly in granting the relief of specific performance in favour of respondent/ plaintiff?6. Whether the appellate Court had framed the Points for consideration in conformity with Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure ?7. Whether in the light of the findings recorded by the appellate Court it is a fit matter for remand?the learned Counsel after pointing out these questions of law as substantial questions of law, made elaborate submissions about the respective pleadings of the parties and also findings recorded by the court of first instance and also by the appellate Court. The learned Counsel would maintain that though Ex. A-1 is not in controversy, there is dispute relating to ex. A-3 and in fact Ex. A-1 was superseded by Ex. A-3 by virtue of novation of contract and in the light of Ex. A-3, Ex. A-1 would fall into insignificance. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the relevant portions of both Exs. A-1 and A-3 and would maintain that in the light of the terms and conditions it should be taken that these documents cannot be enforced for granting the relief of specific performance in view of section 29 of the Indian Contract Act 1872. The learned Counsel also had taken this court through Exs. A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 and also would contend that Ex. A-1 got merged with Ex. A-3. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the terms and conditions specified in Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-3 and would contend that those terms and conditions alone may have to be looked into for the purposes of deciding the question in controversy and oral evidence cannot be considered in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The learned Counsel also had commented on the question of limitation and would maintain that correct findings had not been recorded in this regard. The learned Counsel also contended that when the first appellate Court had not considered all the aspects as a final court of fact, that itself would be a substantial question of law and on that ground alone the judgment and decree of the appellate Court are liable to be set aside and the matter may have to be remanded. The learned Counsel also contended that when the first appellate Court had not considered all the aspects as a final court of fact, that itself would be a substantial question of law and on that ground alone the judgment and decree of the appellate Court are liable to be set aside and the matter may have to be remanded. The learned Counsel also made elaborate submissions that in general though time may not be the essence of contract, some significance may have to be attached to it and when it is inequitable, taking into consideration the lapse of time also, the relief of specific performance may have to be negatived. The Counsel would contend that the discretion in this regard was not exercised properly especially in the light of section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the Point for consideration which was framed by the appellate Court at Para-7 and had commented that in a suit of this nature, the appellate Court as a final Court of fact had not appreciated all the aspects by framing the necessary Points for consideration and hence the judgment and decree of the appellate Court cannot be sustained. The counsel also maintained that when the plaintiff had approached the Court for the relief of specific performance, the conduct of the defendant or the defendant coming to court with unclean hands may not be of much consequence. The Counsel also placed reliance on the decisions in Manjunath anandappa Urf. Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa, 2003 (2) CCC 177 (SC), K. S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, AIR 1997 SC 1751 and Rattan Devi v. Pasam Devi, (2002) 7 scc 441 . ( 3 ) SRI Waghray, the Counsel representing the respondent/plaintiff would contend that the conduct of the defendant also may have to be taken into consideration and the defendant had denied Ex. A-3 and ex. A-4 and thus had not approached the court with clean hands. The Counsel also had pointed out to the aspect of question of limitation and the findings in relation thereto and had submitted that perfectly the suit is within limitation. The Counsel also had commented that the specific price of Rs. 350. 00 per sq. A-3 and ex. A-4 and thus had not approached the court with clean hands. The Counsel also had pointed out to the aspect of question of limitation and the findings in relation thereto and had submitted that perfectly the suit is within limitation. The Counsel also had commented that the specific price of Rs. 350. 00 per sq. yard had been fixed and the proposed acquisition was within the knowledge of both the parties and hence the necessary terms and conditions had been incorporated and absolutely there is no vagueness or uncertainty in these documents. The learned Counsel also commented that there is no plea relating to uncertainty, but however such contention was advaaeed. At any rate, the Counsel would submit that in the light of the terms and conditions agreed between the parties, the conditions are definitely certain and clear and hence section 29 of the Indian Contract Act is not applicable. The learned Counsel also contended that there is no serious controversy about Ex. A-1 and concurrent findings had been recorded in relation to Ex. A-3 and ex. A-4 and in view of the limitations imposed on this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such findings normally are not to be disturbed. The learned Counsel also would submit that the Courts below had appreciated all the facts and circumstances and had arrived at the correct conclusion granting the relief of specific performance to respondent/ plaintiff which need not be disturbed. The learned Counsel also had commented that the non-impleading of a third party would not arise at all since there is no plea or there is no evidence in this regard and only it was a casual observation made by the court on the strength of the submissions made by the Counsel on record. The learned counsel also contended that while appreciating the granting or negativing the relief of specific performance, an equitable relief, the conduct of both the parties may have to be taken into consideration. The Counsel also placed reliance on the decisions in Shobat Dei v. Devi Phal, AIR 1971 SC 2192 , s. R. Varadaraja Reddiar v. Francis Xavier joseph Periaria, AIR 1991 Kerala 288, rajkishor v. Banabehari, AIR 1951 Orissa 291 and Khiwaraj Chord v. Esso Standard eastern Inc. , 1975 (2) MLJ 65 . The Counsel also placed reliance on the decisions in Shobat Dei v. Devi Phal, AIR 1971 SC 2192 , s. R. Varadaraja Reddiar v. Francis Xavier joseph Periaria, AIR 1991 Kerala 288, rajkishor v. Banabehari, AIR 1951 Orissa 291 and Khiwaraj Chord v. Esso Standard eastern Inc. , 1975 (2) MLJ 65 . ( 4 ) HEARD both the Counsel and perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the Court of first instance and the findings recorded by the appellate Court as well. ( 5 ) THE respondent herein, Kaneez fatima Qureshi, as plaintiff instituted the suit O. S. No. 2070/90 on the file of m Junior civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for the relief of specific performance of contract in relation to plaint schedule property and delivery of possession pleading as hereunder: ( 6 ) THE defendant being absolute owner of H. No. 18-1-367, admeasuring 200 sq. yards situate at Towli Chowkd, Hyderabad offered to sell at the rate of Rs. 350. 00 per sq. yard and the plaintiff agreed to purchase @ Rs. 350. 00 per sq. yard. The defendant had agreed to execute sale deed for the suit land after acquisition of the property as per master plan and she executed an agreement of sale dated 22-5-1986 and received token earnest money of Rs. 101. 00. The said payment had been acknowledged by the defendant in the agreement as well as separate receipt passed by her at the same time and on the same day. It was further pleaded that subsequently in the month of July, 1986 the defendant showing dire necessity and approached the plaintiff to pay a further consideration of Rs. 2000. 00 and thereupon the plaintiff agreed to pay rs. 2,000/- to the defendant on 5-7-1986. The said payment had been made and the defendant had acknowledged in the agreement executed on 5-7-1986 in pursuance of the agreement of sale dated 22-5-1986. Again in the month of June, 1989 the defendant approached the plaintiff and requested to advance a further sum of Rs. 8,000. 00 showing dire necessities. The plaintiff paid Rs. 8,000. 00 on 1-6-1989 for which the defendant had passed receipt acknowledging the said payment. Again in the month of June, 1989 the defendant approached the plaintiff and requested to advance a further sum of Rs. 8,000. 00 showing dire necessities. The plaintiff paid Rs. 8,000. 00 on 1-6-1989 for which the defendant had passed receipt acknowledging the said payment. The plaintiff always was ready to pay the balance amount to get sale deed registered in her favour and not only the plaintiff used to make demand orally and also issued notices to the defendant and made citations in the newspaper, but the defendant used to promise but she never fulfilled her promise. The notices issued on behalf of the plaintiffs on 15-4-1987 and 44-1989 were acknowledged but there was no reply and instead of giving reply the defendant approached and promised that at any time she will execute sale deed and that she was in need of money of Rs. 8000. 00, which the plaintiff paid on 1-6-1989. It was learnt by reliable sources that the defendant was trying to sell the suit property for enhanced consideration to some body, whereupon the plaintiff got published a notice in daily newspaper Rahnuma-e-Deccan on 1-5-1990 by way of warning to the public not to purchase the suit property. The defendant got issued a reply in the same newspaper dated 5-5-1990 in which she admitted the agreement, but she purposely failed to mention the other agreements and receipts executed by her and she only stated that rs. 101/- were paid to her. In fact the defendant received Rs. 10,101. 00 (Rupees ten thousand one hundred and one) as per her agreements and receipts. In reply the defendant stated that the agreement stood already cancelled as several times she demanded the plaintiff to get sale deed registered, which is false. It was pleaded that the defendant never demanded the plaintiff to pay the balance and get the document registered. The plaintiff always was ready and still she is ready to get the sale deed registered and to pay the balance amount or deposit the same in Court. The agreement is still in existence and no question of its cancellation arises. It was also further pleaded that no notice was issued at any time by the defendant for cancellation of the said agreement. The agreement is still in existence and no question of its cancellation arises. It was also further pleaded that no notice was issued at any time by the defendant for cancellation of the said agreement. Moreover, it would not be out of place to state here that as per the agreement she had to execute sale deed after deduction of a portion which is as per the master plan going in the road widening, but in order to gain money she is trying to execute sale deed in favour of others misrepresenting that the agreement in favour of the plaintiff had been cancelled. As per the agreement, the plaintiff was ready to get the sale deed registered and there was no fault on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is ready to fulfill all the conditions of the agreement. Therefore, it is just and proper that the defendant be directed to execute sale deed for the remaining portion which remains after road widening, otherwise the plaintiff will sustain irreparable loss and justice will be defeated. ( 7 ) THE appellant herein, defendant in the suit, Sughra Bee filed a written statement in detail denying all the allegations. It was pleaded that the defendant is the absolute owner of House bearing No. 8-1-367, situated at Towlichowki, Hyderabad and it was denied that the defendant is the owner of h. No. 18-1-367 as alleged by the plaintiff admeasuring 200 sq. yards situated at towlichowki Hyderabad at the rate of rs. 350/- per sq. yard. It was further pleaded that she being the absolute owner of the property bearing No. 8-1-367 at Towlichowki, hyderabad had already sold a portion of the same to the plaintiff and the remaining portion is in her possession. It was further pleaded that at the time of execution of the sale deed in respect of the said house in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff had obtained the thumb impression of the defendant on some papers stating that the same are required for the purpose of registration of sale deed. The defendant is an illiterate lady and does not know reading and writing and affixed her thumb impression on the said papers believing the words of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that the plaintiff also agreed to purchase remaining portion of the open land adjoining the H. No. 8-1-367 at the rate of Rs. 350. The defendant is an illiterate lady and does not know reading and writing and affixed her thumb impression on the said papers believing the words of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that the plaintiff also agreed to purchase remaining portion of the open land adjoining the H. No. 8-1-367 at the rate of Rs. 350. 00 per sq. yard and accordingly entered into an agreement dated 22-5-1986 and paid a sum of Rs. 101. 00 as token advance. The plaintiff had specifically agreed that she will pay the entire sale consideration with regard to the above open land within six months from the date of the said agreement and get the registered sale deed and it was also agreed by the plaintiff that in default of payment, the said agreement of sale stands cancelled. The defendant denied the allegations made in Para 3 of the plaint. It was denied that the defendant approached the plaintiff in the month of July, 1986 and showed her dire necessities and accordingly the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 2,000. 00 on 5-7-1986. The averment that again in the month of June, 1989 the defendant approached the plaintiff and requested to advance a further sum of Rs. 8,000/- showing her dire necessities and the plaintiff paid the said amount on 1-6-1989 are absolutely false, baseless and the same were denied. It was also denied that the defendant had passed receipts acknowledging the said payment. The allegations in Para 4 of the plaint had been denied. It was also denied that the plaintiff was always ready to pay the balance amount to get the sale deed as per agreement dated 22-5-1986. In spite of repeated requests of the defendant, the plaintiff failed to pay the balance sale consideration amount as agreed and as such the agreement dated 22-5-1986 was cancelled, It was denied that the plaintiff demanded orally and also issued notices to the defendant within six months from 22-5-1986. It was also pleaded that the contents of the notices issued on behalf of the plaintiff were baseless, fictitious and as such no reply was got issued. The plaintiff got published a notice in daily news paper rahnuma-e-Deccan on 1-5-1990 with regard to suit property to which the defendant got issued an effective reply in the same news paper dated 5-5-1990. It was denied that the defendant received Rs. The plaintiff got published a notice in daily news paper rahnuma-e-Deccan on 1-5-1990 with regard to suit property to which the defendant got issued an effective reply in the same news paper dated 5-5-1990. It was denied that the defendant received Rs. 10,0007- as alleged by the plaintiff and the plaintiff was called upon to strict proof of the same. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff was never ready to pay the balance sale consideration as agreed and accordingly the agreement dated 22-5-1986 was cancelled. It was pleaded that due to increasing rates of the property, the plaintiff filed the suit with malice and mala fide intention to cause loss and harass the defendant. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff intentionally and wilfully committed breach of contract dated 22-5-1986 and there was a specific denial relating to the agreement dated 5-7-1986 and receipt of Rs. 2000. 00 as further consideration and the receipt of Rs. 8,000. 00 on 1-6-1989. ( 8 ) ON the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were settled by the Court of first instance : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of sale agreement as prayed in the plaint ? 2. Whether the defendant entered into the agreement of sale with the plaintiff as stated by the plaintiff in the plaint ? 3. Whether the plaintiff paid Rs. 10,101. 00 under receipt signed by the defendant as stated by the plaintiff? 4. Whether there is any cause of action to file this suit ? 5. To what relief ? ( 9 ) THE plaintiff had examined herself as PW-1 and apart from PW-1, PW-2 to pw-4 also were examined through PW-1 and Exs. A-1 to A-13 were marked and on behalf of the defendant, DW-1, the brother of the defendant, and defendant herself as DW-2 were examined and exs. B-1 General Power of Attorney dated 21-8-1991 was marked. The Trial Court had discussed the oral and documentary evidence available on record commencing from Para 5 upto Para 12 and ultimately at para 13 had decreed the suit, with costs. B-1 General Power of Attorney dated 21-8-1991 was marked. The Trial Court had discussed the oral and documentary evidence available on record commencing from Para 5 upto Para 12 and ultimately at para 13 had decreed the suit, with costs. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant had carried the matter by way of Appeal A. S. No. 202/96 on the file of II Additional Chief judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and at para 7 the appellate Court had framed the following Point for consideration : "whether the defendant received rs. 2,000/- under Ex. A-2 and Rs. 8,000. 00 under Ex. A-4 and failed to perform her part of the obligation ? the appellate Court had proceeded to discuss the Point at Paras 8 to 13 and ultimately had confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court by dismissing the Appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the present Second Appeal is preferred. ( 10 ) EXS. A-1 and A-3 dated 22-5-1986 and 5-7-1986 respectively are the crucial documents. Ex. A-2 dated 22-5-1986 and ex. A-4 dated 1-6-1989 are the receipts. Likewise, Ex. A-5 is the office copy of the legal notice dated 15-4-1987 and Ex. A-6 is the office copy of the legal notice dated 4-4-1989. Exs. A-7 to A-ll are paper publications. Ex. A-12 is the original sale deed dated 22-5-1986. Ex. A-12 (a) is the signature of Mohd. Ghouse. Ex. A-13 is the plan. Ex. A-13 (a) is signature in Ex. A-13. Ex. B-1 is the General Power of Attorney dated 21-8-1991. Apart from this documentary evidence, the oral evidence of PW-1 to pw-4 and DW-1 and DW-2 also is available on record. Though Ex. A-1 was admitted in the written statement, Ex. A-3 was specifically denied. It may be appropriate to have a look at the relevant terms and conditions of both exs. A-1 and A-3 before further proceeding to discuss the other aspects involved in the matter, which are as hereunder : 1. That the vendor herein is the sole and absolute owner and in peaceful possession of the property hereby conveyed and that except the above said vendor there is no any other person or persons have any manner of rights, or interests in the same, and the vendor has full authority to convey the same. 2. That the vendor herein is the sole and absolute owner and in peaceful possession of the property hereby conveyed and that except the above said vendor there is no any other person or persons have any manner of rights, or interests in the same, and the vendor has full authority to convey the same. 2. That the first party and second party agreed herein that towards the north of the said plot of land, the vendor house exists which is under acquisition by the Government for road widening whenever the said house is acquired and demolished I shall also sell the balance land to the said purchaser only at the rate of Rs. 350. 00 (Rs. three hundred and fifty) per sq. yard to the second party i. e. , vendee within 2 months from the date of road-widening (acquisition by the government ). 3. That if the Government acquires any portion of the land (full land) of the vendor and if the remaining the land the vendor sell the said land to the vendee (second party) at the rate of Rs. 350. 00 per sq. yd. and the second party hereby agreed and paid a sum of Rs. 101. 00 as advance to the first party and the first party hereby acknowledge the receipt of the said sum and passed a separate receipt of the said amount to the vendee (second party ). 4. That within a period of two months from the road widening (acquisition by the government) if the land remain the vendee, second party pay the remaining balance amount to the vendee and the vendor agree to execute the proper sale deed in favour of the vendee or her nominee or nominees. 5. The purchaser (vendee) shall have to bear the costs and expenses of registration. Likewise, the terms and conditions of Ex. A-3 read as hereunder : 1. That the vendor is owner and possessor of H. No. 8-1-376, Towlichowki, Hyderabad, and he sold one portion of consisting of one room and compound wall to this vendee on 22-5-1986 and he agree to sell the remaining portion of the above said house to this vendee on this day. 2. That if Government required some portion in the above said house, the portion which is left after required by the Government will be sold to this vendee @ Rs. 350. 00 per square yard. 3. 2. That if Government required some portion in the above said house, the portion which is left after required by the Government will be sold to this vendee @ Rs. 350. 00 per square yard. 3. That the vendor received Rs. 2,000. 00 (Rupees two thousand only) from vendee as earnest money on this day for the above sale of agreement and be acknowledge for the same. 4. That within a period of two months from a wide-widening and demolishing (acquisition by the Government) the vendor has agreed to sell the remaining portion to this vendee. 5. That the vendor also agreed not to sale the remaining property (after reacquisition by Government) to anybody else except to this vendee. 6. That if within the above said period, the vendor did not sell the property to the vendee, then this vendee is competent to approach to Court of law and get registered through Court and then vendor alone is responsible for cost and consequences thereof. 7. That the vendee has handed over the link document of H. No. 8-1-367 to the vendor on this day, for the purpose of showing to Master Plan authorities and the vendor is not entitled to Mortgage this property on the basis of this link document. 8. That the vendee shall have to bear the cost and expenses of registration. Exs. A-2 to A-4 are receipts. Though Ex. A-3 was specifically denied and Ex. A-4 also was denied, the evidence of PW-1, PW-3 and pw-4 had been let into establish the same and concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts below in this regard. The evidence of PW-1 to PW-4 had been appreciated in detail and also the evidence of DW-1, the brother of the defendant and dw-2, the defendant also had been appreciated in detail by both the Courts below. Clear findings had been recorded that in the light of the nature of the evidence which had been let in by the appellant/ defendant, both the Courts had arrived at a conclusion that these witnesses are not trustworthy witnesses and were not deposing truth but were making false statements. It is needles to say that these findings had been recorded in relation to Exs. A-1 to A-4 on appreciation of evidence of PW-1 to pw4 and DW-1 to DW-2 and concurrent findings had been recorded by both the courts below. It is needles to say that these findings had been recorded in relation to Exs. A-1 to A-4 on appreciation of evidence of PW-1 to pw4 and DW-1 to DW-2 and concurrent findings had been recorded by both the courts below. The learned Counsel for the appellant was unable to point out any perversity or wrong approach adopted by both the Courts below in appreciation of evidence and hence the said defence cannot be disturbed in any way in the present Second Appeal. In view of the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence in detail, all those aspects again need not be repeated in the present Second Appeal. However, the ground that Exs. A-1 and A-3 cannot be enforced for want of certainty had been seriously canvassed. ( 11 ) THE terms and conditions of both exs. A-1 and A-3 already had been referred to supra. Ex. A-3 was executed in supersession of the prior agreement Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-1 in fact was referred to in ex. A-3. It is not in controversy that the rate was fixed at Rs. 350. 00 per sq. yard, but however in view of the fact that there was a proposal of road widening, the rate was fixed at Rs. 350/- per sq. yard for the extent which would be available after the road widening and the time for the performance of the contract also had been specifically agreed between the parties as reflected from the terms and conditions referred to supra. Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads as hereunder :"agreements, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void. "in the decision referred Khiwaraj Chord v. Esso Standard Eastern Inc. (supra), it was held that a document may have been couched in terms which might have introduced an element of uncertainty, but the Court has to consider all the circumstances to see whether such terms are capable of being made certain. In the decision referred s. R. Varadaraja Reddiar v. Francis Xavier joseph Periaria (supra), it was held as follows :"learned Counsel for respondent also submitted that the agreement is not enforceable in view of Section 29 of the contract Act. In the decision referred s. R. Varadaraja Reddiar v. Francis Xavier joseph Periaria (supra), it was held as follows :"learned Counsel for respondent also submitted that the agreement is not enforceable in view of Section 29 of the contract Act. I have already held, in view of his averment in the earlier suit, O. S. No. 591 of 1971 and the consequential order passed by the Court, it is not open to him to raise such contention. However, since the counsel has raised such a contention, I shall proceed to consider it on merits. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that the exact extent or the boundaries and survey numbers or the location of the property were not mentioned in Ext. A-1. Section 29 of the Contract Act lays down that agreements, the meaning of which is not certain or capable of being made certain, are void. In my view, there is no uncertainty as far as ext. A-1 agreement is concerned. Both parties are well aware of the property to be conveyed. There was only one item of property involved in O. S. No. lll of 1972 and defendant has 171 out of 210 shares in that property and a preliminary decree has been passed for partition and allotment of 171 shares out of 210 shares to defendant. The total extent of the property is only 18 1/ 2 cents in partition. Ext. Al mentions that it is approximately 15 cents to which defendant is entitled, and that it is approximately that extent which was agreed to be sold. In the circumstances, there is no uncertainty about the property to be conveyed. Defendant had at no stage a case that agreement Ext. Al was uncertain. In the earlier suit, O. S. No. 591 of 1977, he filed written statement. Ext. A3 stating that he was willing to sell the property and he had no intention to sell the property agreed to be conveyed under Ext. Al to any other person. As pointed out earlier, it is pursuant to such a representation in his written statement that plaintiff withdrew the suit and it is clear from the decree passed in that suit. He had no case that there is ambiguity in the identity of property or the contract was unenforceable or contingent. Al to any other person. As pointed out earlier, it is pursuant to such a representation in his written statement that plaintiff withdrew the suit and it is clear from the decree passed in that suit. He had no case that there is ambiguity in the identity of property or the contract was unenforceable or contingent. As indicated earlier, preliminary decree was passed allotting 171 out of 210 shares and appeal filed against the preliminary decree was dismissed and the preliminary decree became final. An application was also made for passing final decree. As indicated above, it is only on account of the default of the defendant to pay batta for Commissioner, that the application for appointment of the commissioner was dismissed. As pointed out earlier, the motive of the defendant to protract the proceedings and to avoid contract under some pretext or other is clearly discernible. The defendant did not take any effective steps to fulfil his obligation to get final decree passed and take delivery and in the circumstances, defendant cannot be permitted to plead that the contract was not enforceable. Had the defendant seriously prosecuted the final decree proceedings the final decree would have been passed and delivery would have been obtained. Defendant s deliberate inaction with ulterior motive cannot be permitted to be projected as a shield to defeat the contract. Further, once the plaintiff expressed his readiness to waive his right to insist on getting a final decree passed and delivery of the property notice by the defendant to plaintiff, no plea of contingency would survive. "in the decision referred Shobat Dei v. Devi Phal (supra), the Apex Court held at paras 22 to 25 as hereunder: "regarding the price to be paid by the plaintiff for the implements of the husbandry in the house it is clearly mentioned by her that she will pay the price fixed by the first defendant. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in this term as wrongly assumed by the high Court. In fact the plaintiff has further averred that the price for those items was fixed by the first defendant and his father in the sum of Rs. 787. 00 which amount was paid by her. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in this term as wrongly assumed by the high Court. In fact the plaintiff has further averred that the price for those items was fixed by the first defendant and his father in the sum of Rs. 787. 00 which amount was paid by her. The question whether the plaintiff was able to get a purchaser for her properties shown in list B has no relevance in considering the applicability of Section 29 of the Contract Act to the agreement set up by the plaintiff. She has only referred to her owning the items mentioned in list B, and that she was making efforts for the sale of those items. According to the plaintiff the amount that will be realized by her from the sale of those properties will be paid to the first defendant towards the sale consideration. The reference to the proposed sale of the items mentioned in list B is only to indicate the source of fund for payment of part of the sale consideration. Nowhere has she pleaded that the payment of the sale price to the first defendant depends upon her being able to sell her properties in list B, because it is made clear by her that by january, 1956 she will pay the entire amount of consideration and have the sale deed executed by the first defendant. Another circumstance relied on by the High court against the plaintiff is that in the agreement pleaded by her there is no term as to what is to happen if she does not purchase the property from the first defendant. The high Court has missed that if there is no provision made in the agreement, as to what are the rights of parties in such a contingency the aggrieved party will be entitled to seek his remedy available to him in law. This circumstance will also not make the contract void. The high Court has missed that if there is no provision made in the agreement, as to what are the rights of parties in such a contingency the aggrieved party will be entitled to seek his remedy available to him in law. This circumstance will also not make the contract void. From the agreement pleaded by the plaintiff the following facts are clear : (a) price is fixed at Rupees 10,000/- (b) items of properties to be sold are definite; (c) plaintiff being put in possession in pursuance of the agreement; (d) the entire sale consideration to be paid by the plaintiff by January, 1956 and; (e) any amount that is paid by the plaintiff before January, 1956 is to be adjusted towards the sale price and the balance alone is to be paid by January, 1956. On receipt of the balance amount or the full amount of rs. 10,000/- as the case may be the first defendant was to execute the sale deed in january 1956. Ail the above facts establish that the agreement pleaded by the plaintiff cannot be considered to be one the meaning of which is not certain or capable of being made certain. In the decision referred Rajkishor v. Banabehari (supra), it was held :"where a written contract for sale of land is silent about the plea and the time for performance, the contract is not void for uncertainty, if it is one that can be made certain within the meaning of Section 29. If on evidence it is found that the parties agreed to the payment of a reasonable and fair price and complete the contract within reasonable time the Court can imply such terms in the contract and determine what is reasonable price and what is reasonable time. " ( 12 ) AS can be seen from the material available on record, it is clear that the terms and conditions had been agreed between the parties except that they were unable to exactly decide the extent which would be available because of the definite expectation of an event or happening of road widening. On this ground it cannot be said that these documents Exs. A-1 and A-3 suffer from any uncertainty as such. On this ground it cannot be said that these documents Exs. A-1 and A-3 suffer from any uncertainty as such. It appears this question was not specifically pleaded, but however such contention was advanced and at any rate in the light of the clear terms and conditions this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no uncertainty as such so as to render these documents unenforceable in a Court of law by virtue of operation of Section 29 of the indian Contract Act, 1872. ( 13 ) IT is no doubt true that the receipt ex. A-4 also was denied apart from Ex. A-3. But however, the evidence of DW-2 had been discussed in detail and in the light of the nature of evidence which she had given, both the Courts had arrived at a conclusion that she is not a truthful witness. Equally so, the evidence of DW-1, her brother, who had made certain inconsistent statements. It is needless to say that this is all appreciation of evidence. ( 14 ) EVEN on the question of limitation, specifically the Courts below had recorded the finding that the site was acquired in 1989 and the road widening was closed in the year 1990 and hence the period of limitation has to be computed from the year 1990 only and the suit is within the period of limitation. ( 15 ) IT is no doubt true that certain contentions relating to novation of Ex. A-1 by virtue of Ex. A-3 and supresession of ex. A-1 by executing Ex. A-3 also had been advanced. There cannot be any controversy that in view of the fact that subsequent documents Exs. A-3 and A-4 came into existence after Exs. A-1 and A-2, it is to be seen whether on the strength of these documents the relief of specific performance granted by the Courts below can be sustained or the said relief has to be negatived. On the aspect that though the time as such may not be essence of the contract, which would definitely have some bearing, submissions were advanced at length and reliance also was placed on the decision referred Manjunath Anandappa urf. Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa (supra ). On the aspect that though the time as such may not be essence of the contract, which would definitely have some bearing, submissions were advanced at length and reliance also was placed on the decision referred Manjunath Anandappa urf. Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa (supra ). Further, submissions at length were made relating to inflation of prices, delay in approaching the Court, praying for the relief of specific performance and the discretion to be exercised while granting the equitable relief. Reliance also was placed on the decision referred K. S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan (supra ). ( 16 ) THERE cannot be any controversy in relation to the proposition that the relief of specific performance being an equitable relief, the discretion is to be exercised only on the strength of sound judicial principles and the same cannot be exercised in an arbitrary fashion. However, an appreciation of the facts and circumstances would go to show that the respondent/plaintiff always had been ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and non-reply to the legal notices also had been commented by both the Courts below. The paper publications had been discussed in detail and Exs. A-2 and A-13 also had been referred to. Clear findings had been recorded relating to the receipt of consideration both under Exs. Al and A2 and under Exs. A-3 and A-4. The conduct of the parties also may have to be taken into consideration while deciding whether the discretionary and equitable relief of specific performance can be granted or not. The Courts below had recorded concurrent findings after considering all the aspects and had arrived at a conclusion that the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to the relief. It is not as though the appellate Court had not considered the oral and documentary evidence. The appellate court in fact had taken pains in discussing the material available on record commencing from Paras 8 to 13 and ultimately had arrived at the conclusion that tht Appeal is liable to be dismissed, thus confirming the findings recorded by the Court of first instance. ( 17 ) HOWEVER, yet another attempt was made by the Counsel representing the appellant that it is a fit case for remand on the ground that the appellate Court had not framed the Points for consideration in accordance with Order 4i, Rule 31 of the code and definitely there was no proper application of mind. ( 17 ) HOWEVER, yet another attempt was made by the Counsel representing the appellant that it is a fit case for remand on the ground that the appellate Court had not framed the Points for consideration in accordance with Order 4i, Rule 31 of the code and definitely there was no proper application of mind. The Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision referred in rattan Devi v. Pasam Devi (supra) wherein it was held by the Apex Court :"the first appellate Court was bound to apply its mind to all the evidence available on record and then test the legality of the findings arrived at by the Trial Court. While doing so the first appellate Court could have taken the factum of the non-examination of the plaintiff also into consideration. The manner in which the appeal has been disposed of by the appellate Court cannot be said to be satisfactory. Non-application of mind by the appellate Court to other material, though available, and consequent failure of the appellate Court to discharge its judicial obligation, did raise a question of law having a substantial impact on the rights of the parties, and therefore, the second appeal deserved to be heard on merits. "placing strong reliance on this decision, the learned Counsel submitted after pointing out to the Point for consideration framed by the appellate Court at Para-7 that it is a fit case for remand. The Point framed by the appellate Court at Para-7 of its judgment already had been referred to supra and the same need not be repeated again. It is no doubt true that this Point for consideration though in substance would answer Order 41, rule 31 of the Code, the other Points for consideration also are involved. But however. Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code in substance had been complied with and the appellate court had considered all the aspects, both oral and documentary, in detail answering all the Points. The mere fact that the points for consideration had not been framed properly by itself may not vitiate the judgment of the appellate Court. It is no doubt true that there is a mistake in framing the Point for consideration also since receipt of Rs. 2,000. 00 was under Ex. A-3 and not under Ex. A-2. The mere fact that the points for consideration had not been framed properly by itself may not vitiate the judgment of the appellate Court. It is no doubt true that there is a mistake in framing the Point for consideration also since receipt of Rs. 2,000. 00 was under Ex. A-3 and not under Ex. A-2. But, in my considered opinion, this would not alter the situation in any way especially in the light of the reasons in detail recorded commencing from Paras 8 to 13. All the factual aspects involved in the matter had been considered and findings had been recorded confirming the findings of the Court of first instance. Though certain questions purporting to be substantial questions of law had been raised which had been referred supra, all these questions are only questions predominantly relating to the appreciation of facts and when discretion had been exercised in granting the relief of specific performance after recording reasons by both the Courts below in a Second Appeal, this court should be slow in disturbing such concurrent findings recorded unless it is clearly established that the approach itself is totally erroneous or there is perversity in the appreciation of evidence or recording of reasons or any other question of substantial nature. ( 18 ) IN the light of the facts and circumstances which had been discussed supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no merit in the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal shall stand dismissed, with costs.