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2004 DIGILAW 273 (GUJ)

BANK OF BARODA RETIRED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION v. BANK OF BARODA

2004-04-12

RAVI R.TRIPATHI

body2004
RAVI R. TRIPATHI, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed by Bank of Baroda Retired officers Association as petitioner no. 1 and one mr. S. B. Kemker as petitioner no. 2. It is prayed that the action of the respondents of not giving the gratuity to the members of the petitioner no. 1-association on the basis of their last pay drawn, who have retired from service of respondent no. 1 before 1st November, 1994, be quashed and set aside. It is also prayed that the action of the respondents of fixing 1st November, 1994 as the cut off date for payment of gratuity (even though effect to the revision of pay was given effect along with arrears from 1st July, 1993) be quashed and set aside. It is also prayed that the respondents, their agents and servants be directed to pay the amount of gratuity to petitioner no. 2 as well as the members of petitioner no. 1-association, who have retired before 1st November, 1994; that the respondents be also directed to make the payment of amount of gratuity to the members of the association by calculating the amount of gratuity as per the revised pay under the revision of pay which came into effect on 1st July, 1993. It is also prayed that the `consensus and Clause-7 of Annexure-A, a circular for revision of salary of officers governed by the Bank of baroda (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979, be declared inconsistent with the provisions of Section-4 read with section-14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 ("the act" for short ). Rest of the prayers in clauses 11 (F) and (G) are mere repetition of the prayers contained in earlier clauses. The petitioners have also prayed for the interim relief by way of a direction to the respondents, their agents and servants to release the difference of gratuity on the basis of the revised pay scale. An injunction is also prayed to restrain the respondents from taking 1st november, 1994 as the cut off date, during the pendency and final disposal of the petition. ( 2 ) TO appreciate the controversy involved in the petition, few facts are necessary. The petitioner no. 1 is an association, representing the case of the retired Bank Officers, who retired between 1st November, 1992 to 31st October, 1994. Petitioner no. ( 2 ) TO appreciate the controversy involved in the petition, few facts are necessary. The petitioner no. 1 is an association, representing the case of the retired Bank Officers, who retired between 1st November, 1992 to 31st October, 1994. Petitioner no. 2 is a retired Bank Officer, who retired on 30th November, 1993 on reaching the age of superannuation. The Indian Banks Association and the officers Association took active part in the discussion for revision of pay and allowances for the officers. Ultimately, a consensus was arrived at and accordingly, recommendations were made. This consensus is referred to as `settlement. The settlement was arrived at on 23rd june, 1995. It was circulated on 28th June, 1995. A copy of the said settlement is at Annexure-A. Under the settlement, it was agreed that the salary of the Bank officers shall be revised and they shall be paid various benefits like house rent allowance, city compensatory allowance, provident fund, advance increment/fixed personal allowance, gratuity, medical aid, hospitalisation expenses, second stagnation increment in scale-III, professional qualification allowance, recovery of house/furniture rent, halting allowance, etc. After taking into consideration all relevant factors, both the parties i. e. Indian Banks Association on one hand and the officers association on the other, also agreed to various dates for giving effect to the aforesaid benefits. In the present case, the controversy pertaining to the gratuity is raised. ( 3 ) CLAUSE-7 of the settlement is relevant in this regard, which is as under: "as per the consensus reached, gratuity computed in terms of the Officers Service Regulations to be now amended shall be recalculated and difference paid only to such eligible officer employees, who cease to be in the banks service on or after 1. 11. 1994. No arrears on account of gratuity shall be payable to officers, who ceased to be in banks service in prior to 1. 11. 1994. " clause-15 provides for the date of effect. Sub. clause- (iv) of Clause-15 provides for gratuity and for that, the date is `01. 11. 1994. ( 4 ) THE petitioners are the bank officers, who admittedly have retired between 1st November, 1992 and 31st October, 1994 i. e. prior to 1st November, 1994 and, therefore, under the settlement, they are not entitled to receive any amount under the head of gratuity. ( 5 ) MR. 11. 1994. ( 4 ) THE petitioners are the bank officers, who admittedly have retired between 1st November, 1992 and 31st October, 1994 i. e. prior to 1st November, 1994 and, therefore, under the settlement, they are not entitled to receive any amount under the head of gratuity. ( 5 ) MR. N. K. MAJMUDAR, learned Advocate for the petitioners, strenuously pressed the claim of the petitioners by advancing all available grounds, without being mindful of the fact that some of his submissions were contrary to each other. The learned Advocate firstly submitted that the settlement was arrived at after the petitioners retired from service and, therefore, the settlement is not binding to them. He also submitted that 1st November, 1994, prescribed in the settlement as the cut off date for payment of arrears of gratuity, is unjust and arbitrary and, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. If the first submission of the parties is that, `settlement is not binding to the parties, then, the parties have no reason to challenge the same. Here, the petitioners are the persons, who have received one or more benefits under this very settlement, but, just because, they are not to receive the benefit of the gratuity under the settlement, it is submitted that the settlement is not binding to them. There cannot be a better example of non-application of mind in advancing an argument without being aware to the effect of the same. ( 6 ) IT is well known that when such a `settlement is arrived at, it is always after taking into consideration various factors by the parties to the settlement. In this case also, both the parties i. e. The Indian Banks association and Officers Association, after due deliberation, as a best bargain, reached the consensus/settlement. Only because some individuals are not satisfied by it, the settlement cannot be termed as bad. ( 7 ) AN affidavit-in-reply is filed by one Shri satishchandra Dinkardas Vaishnav, who has stated in paragraph-3. 6 as under:"i submit that it is not always possible to prepare a scheme or arrive at a settlement which will fully satisfy all concerned. It would generally happen that there would be give and take in some aspect or the other. The Honble Supreme Court has, in the case of V. T. Khanzode and others Vs. 6 as under:"i submit that it is not always possible to prepare a scheme or arrive at a settlement which will fully satisfy all concerned. It would generally happen that there would be give and take in some aspect or the other. The Honble Supreme Court has, in the case of V. T. Khanzode and others Vs. Reserve Bank of India and another has inter alia observed that: "no scheme governing service matters can be fool-proof and some section or the other of the employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and malafides will of course render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the scheme does not satisfy the expectations of every employee is not the evidence of these. "thus, merely because some class feels that their expectations with respect to gratuity are not fulfilled, it cannot be said that the scheme is arbitrary or violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. " the learned Advocate for the petitioners vehemently contended that the settlement is not in consonance with the scheme of the Payment of Gratuity Act because, according to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, sub. section (2) of Section-4 of the Act provides that, "for every completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months, the employer shall pay gratuity to an employee at the rate of fifteen days wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by the employee concerned. " (emphasis supplied) he submitted that under the settlement, revised wages are to be paid to the petitioners, with effect from 1st July, 1993 (as provided in Clause-15 ). Therefore, the `last wage drawn of the petitioners is different than the one on which the gratuity is calculated and paid. He submitted that, therefore, the settlement could not have provided for, `not to pay the gratuity on the basis of the revised pay-scale. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate submitted that Section-14 of the Act gives it an overriding effect over other enactments. He submitted that this overriding effect is not only over other enactments, but also, over other instruments or contracts and, therefore, the settlement could not have been in its present form in view of the provisions of the Act. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate submitted that Section-14 of the Act gives it an overriding effect over other enactments. He submitted that this overriding effect is not only over other enactments, but also, over other instruments or contracts and, therefore, the settlement could not have been in its present form in view of the provisions of the Act. To appreciate the submission of the learned Advocate, Section-14 of the Act is reproduced as under:"the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. " (emphasis supplied) the learned Advocate, while making the aforesaid submission, lost sight of sub. section-5 of Section-4 of the Act, which provides that,"nothing in this section shall affect the right of an employee to receive better terms of gratuity under any award or agreement or contract with the employer". (emphasis supplied) under the Bank of Baroda Gratuity Fund Rules and regulations, it is provided in rule-12 (i) that, `each executive/officer/employee whose service with bank ceases for any one the reasons set out below shall be entitled to gratuity at the rate mentioned against each case. (a) in the case of executives/officers (i) On the death of an executive/officer while in the service of the Bank or on his becoming physically or mentally disabled to continue further in the service of the Bank, or on termination of his service by the Bank, in way of punishment. Irrespective of the length of service, gratuity shall be payable at the rate of one month salary for each completed year of service, subject to the maximum of 15 months salaryafter completion of 10 years service. (ii) On voluntary retirement or resignation of an executive/officer after 15 years of continuous service in the Bank. Gratuity at the rate of one months salary for each completed year of service, subject to the maximum of 15 months salary. " in sub. clause- (II) of Clause-12, the expression, "salary" or "wages" or "pay" is defined, of which clause- (i) pertains to executive and officers and that reads as under: "average basic salary payable during the twelve months next preceding death, disability, retirement, resignation or termination of service as the case may be. " in sub. clause- (II) of Clause-12, the expression, "salary" or "wages" or "pay" is defined, of which clause- (i) pertains to executive and officers and that reads as under: "average basic salary payable during the twelve months next preceding death, disability, retirement, resignation or termination of service as the case may be. " ( 9 ) FROM the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that as the petitioners are getting better benefits than the one which are available under the Act, the provisions of the Act have no role to play. These regulations are further amended by the settlement arrived at. This settlement is to be either accepted or refused. One cannot have the best of both the worlds. Under the regulation, it is provided that an officer shall be paid gratuity at the rate of one months salary for each completed year of service. Along with that, `maximum limit is also provided under the regulation. One, who accepts the earlier provision of the regulation, which is definitely better than the one provided under the Act, cannot say that the provision prescribing the maximum limit is not acceptable to him and it shall be given a go-by, and the provisions of the Act be followed. ( 10 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioners relied upon the following decisions without taking trouble to appreciate as to whether the ratio laid down therein has any application to the facts of this case: (I) 1999 (1) C. L. R. 291; (ii) 2000 (3) C. L. R. 968; (iii) 1998 (7) S. C. C. 221; (iv) A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 1571; (v) Judgement dated 21st February, 1992 of Kerala High Court (Coram:honblemr. Justice M. Ramachandran) in Writ Petition No. 3502 of 2000 (P); (vi) Judgement dated 20th December, 2002 of Karnataka High Court (Coram:honble Mr. Justice N. Kumar) in Writ Petition No. 20780-20789/97 C/w W. P. 13575-13592/97, W. P. 31085/96, W. P. 21610/97 and W. P. 35137/97 (8-Res); (vii) A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1842; (viii) A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 130; and, (ix) A judgement of this Court in the matter of Rajkot Municipal Corporation vs. Anirudh Fulshankar Shukla, reported at 1999-II L. L. J. 830. These judgements are not discussed in detail as the same have no application to the facts of the case on hand. ( 11 ) MR. These judgements are not discussed in detail as the same have no application to the facts of the case on hand. ( 11 ) MR. DARSHAN Parikh, learned Advocate for the respondents, submitted that on one hand, this petition is misconceived, while on the other, it suffers from delay and latches, on the part of the petitioners, in approaching the Court and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. He submitted that the settlement and/or part thereof, which is challenged in this petition, was arrived at on 23rd June, 1995 and was circulated to all the branches/offices in India on 28th June, 1995. The petitioners first wrote a letter on 12th October, 1996 and then, filed the present petition only on 20th April, 1998. Thus, there is delay in approaching this Court and hence, the petition be dismissed on this short ground. ( 12 ) IN the alternative, he submitted that under the settlement, a scheme is formulated on all India basis after careful consideration of all relevant factors, more particularly, the financial implications. He submitted that this aspect is succinctly put by the deponent in the affidavit-in-reply in paragraph-3. 7, which reads as under:"3. 7 i submit that as stated above, the parties to the settlement considering the financial burden that was likely to arise, considering the financial position of the banks, considering the quantum of non-performing assets like over due loans and tremendous outstanding in this behalf and over all benefits which were being given to the employees and capacity of the banks to pay in difficult times, the total out flow by way of payment of arrears and future payments and the paying capacity of the banks at present and may be in the future, various suggestions were made and after proposals and counter proposals, the IBA and the unions came to a conclusion that if the benefits detailed in the joint note are given to the employees, the same would be most appropriate for banks to become viable considering their paying capacity and the employees to get just benefits. Thus the provisions made in the settlement are legal and proper and cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thus the provisions made in the settlement are legal and proper and cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (emphasis supplied) ( 13 ) THE learned Advocate relied upon the following judgements of the Apex Court: (i) In the matter of State of Rajasthan and Anr. vs. Amrutlal Gandhi and Ors. , reported at 1997 (2) S. C. C. 342; and, (ii) In the matter of State Government Pensioners Association and Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 1907. He relied upon the following observations of the apex Court in the case of State Government Pensioners association (supra):"does that part of the provision which provides for payment of larger amount of gratuity with prospective effect from the specified date offend Art. 14 of the Constitution of India? Whether gratuity must be paid on the steeped up basis to all those who have retired before the date of the upward revision, with retrospective effect even if the provision provides for prospective operation, in order not to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution of India? A Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh says `no. In our opinion it rightly says so. . . . . . . . " ( 14 ) THE learned Advocate submitted that if the plea advanced by the petitioners, that the settlement is not binding to them is accepted, the respondent No. 1-Bank will be in a hostile situation because, according to him, in Clause (e) of Section-2 of the Act, it is provided that: "employee" means any person (other than an apprentice) employed on wages (not exceeding two thousands and five hundred rupees per mensem, or such higher amount as the Central Government may, having regard to the general level of wages, by notification specify ). . . . " mr. Parikh further submitted that the amount specified is omitted w. e. f. 24th May, 1994. He further submitted that in sub. section-3 of section-4 of the Act, the maximum limit of the amount is provided, which can be paid by way of gratuity. It was rs. 50,000=00 prior to 24th May, 1994 and by an amendment dated 24th May, 1995, it was enhanced to Rs. 1 lac. He further submitted that in sub. section-3 of section-4 of the Act, the maximum limit of the amount is provided, which can be paid by way of gratuity. It was rs. 50,000=00 prior to 24th May, 1994 and by an amendment dated 24th May, 1995, it was enhanced to Rs. 1 lac. He submitted that none of the officers of the Bank received the amount by way of gratuity less than Rs. 1 lac and, therefore, the question of settlement being not beneficial than the provisions of the Act, did not arise. The learned Advocate submitted that this Court in the case of State Government Pensioners Association (supra) has observed that:"we fully concur with the view of the High Court. The upward revision of gratuity takes effect from the specified date (April 1, 1978) with prospective effect. The High Court has rightly understood and correctly applied the principle propounded by this Court in Nakaras case AIR 1983 SC 130 . There is no illegality or unconstitutionality ( from the platform of Article 114 of the Constitution of India) involved in providing for prospective operation from the specified date. Even if that part of the Notification which provides for enforcement with effect from the specified date is struck down the provision can but have prospective operation and not retrospective operation. In that event, (if the specified date line is effaced), it will operate only prospectively with effect from the date of issuance of the notification since it does not retrospectively apply to all those who have already retired before the said date. In order to make it retrospective so that it applies to all those who retired after the commencement of the Constitution on 26th January, 1950 and before the date of issuance of the notification on 26th March, 1980, the Court will have to re-write the notification and introduce a provision to this effect saying in express terms that it shall operate retrospectively. Merely striking down (or effacing) the alleged offending portion whereby it is made effective from the specified date will not do. And this, the Court cannot do. Besides, giving prospective operation to such payments cannot by any stretch of imagination be condemned as offending Art. 14. . . . . . . . . Merely striking down (or effacing) the alleged offending portion whereby it is made effective from the specified date will not do. And this, the Court cannot do. Besides, giving prospective operation to such payments cannot by any stretch of imagination be condemned as offending Art. 14. . . . . . . . . " (emphasis supplied) ( 15 ) FROM the aforesaid facts of the case and the rival contentions of the parties and the submissions of the learned Advocates, it is clear that the members of the petitioner no. 1-association and petitioner no. 2 have come to this Court after having retired between 1st november, 1992 and 31st January, 1994, and having received the available benefits under the settlement. It is also clear that the petitioners have challenged the settlement only because their expectations under the head of gratuity were not fulfilled. The submission that the `settlement is not binding to them in the first instance and in the alternative, `the settlement is not in consonance with the provisions of the Payment of the gratuity Act, are not only found to be contradictory in terms, but also, without any merit. In the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioners cannot be heard to contend any of the aforesaid grounds and, therefore, the petition fails and the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. .