VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. ( 1 ) BY this Judgment I shall dispose of two writ petitions filed by Ramditti Jiwandaram Narang Public Charitable Trust (Narang Trust) in respect of Ratification Order dated 16. 1. 2002, The Joint Assessor and Collector had determined the Rateable Value (RV) as Rs. 2,21,300/- with effect from 1. 4. 1997 NR and Rs. 2,29,600/- with effect from 1. 4. 1998 NR. Thereafter, in writ petition No. 2577/2002 the Officer held that - "the Assessee has also requested for exemption from levy of property tax U/s 115 of the DMC Act. Under this order only tax liability has been fixed. The assessee can apply afresh for exemption of the said tax by filing a separate application before the Jt. Assessor and Collector, C-XII who is presently dealing with the exemption case, along with the supporting documents as per the requirement of Section 115 of DMC Act". In the subsequent writ petition bearing No. 5289 of 2003 the Officer came to the conclusion that "in the light of the directions of the High Court in the case of National Institute of Immunology, as reproduced above, the Trust does not fulfill the requirement of Voluntary Donations and, as such, is not liable for grant of exemption of general tax under Section 115 (4) of the DMC Act. Their request is rejected". The legal correctness of these Orders will be determined in this Judgment. ( 2 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that every fiscal or taxing statute perforce contains a charging section . The two municipal Acts applicable to the National Capital Territory of Delhi are no exception. The charging sections so far as property taxes are concerned are to be found in Section 115 of the DMC Act, 1957 and Section 62 of the NDMC Act, 1994, both of which are identical. The statutes firstly promulgate in these sections that all lands and buildings shall be liable to payment of property tax and thereafter immediately carve out three exceptions to this generality. In other words, lands and buildings falling within the exception are not liable for payment of tax; this is not the same as saying that they can be exempted since there is no liability in the first place. It appears to me that there is a widely prevalent misnomer that exemption has to be applied for and thereupon granted or declined by the appropriate authority. It appears to me that there is a widely prevalent misnomer that exemption has to be applied for and thereupon granted or declined by the appropriate authority. We do not come across an assessment of property tax in respect of agricultural lands and its subsequent waiver or `exemption . The misnomer has been conceived, born and nurtured primarily for the reason that it is the assessee who has to bring it to the notice of the Municipality that its land and/or buildings are being used for charitable purposes and consequently are not liable, in contradistinction to being exempt from the payment of property tax. Perhaps this is also because of the use of the word `exempt in Sections 62 (3) and 115 (6) of the said Acts. I cannot locate any statutory sanction for the commonplace practice of determining a rateable value under these two Acts, and thereafter adjudicating upon whether the assessee is entitled to to be exempted from the payment of property tax. In my opinion, lands and buildings used for charitable purposes as envisaged in the Acts, are not exigible to property tax at all. It has often times been found that the RV is determined, demands for taxes raised, whilst the decision on the prayer for the so called exemption is intentionally procrastinated upon by the Authorities. In Jain Sabha Lodhi Colony v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 100 (2002) Delhi Law Times 227, a Learned Single Judge of this Court after quashing the impugned Property Tax demand had directed the Respondents to first decide on the claim of the Temple for `charitable` user after considering the applicability of Section 125 of the DMC Act, and thereafter to reassess the RV of the property. Let us consider the example of property which is found to be impervious to exigibility of property tax for the assessment year 2000-2001. As the statute presently exists, in the event that the Authority is of the view that for the assessment year 2001-2002 the Assessee/owner of the property falls within the first category, i. e. the user is charitable, it shall be ordered that the property in question is not taxable. In such event the fixation of a RV would be a futile and purposeless exercise. In such event the fixation of a RV would be a futile and purposeless exercise. If the user of that very property would cease to be `charitable` in the following year, a notice under Section 124 of the Act would have to be issued and the Assessment List finalised in accordance with the statute. This is because the property then becomes exigible to taxation. Experience indicates that in those instances where the RV is fixed and the `exemption` is simultaneously allowed, the Assessee does not challenge the quantum of the RV, but the assault is immediately made no sooner the `exemption` is recalled. Alternatively, a challenge is vexatiously raised to the RV even though tax is not leviable/recoverable. The RV is subject to change every time improvements are carried out to the property and therefore time is expended superfluously. ( 3 ) THE statutory provisions are reproduced below for facility of reference:- section 62 of the New Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Section 115 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 premises in respect of which property tax is to be levied- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the property tax shall be levied in respect of all lands and buildings in New Delhi except- (A)LANDS and buildings or portions of lands and building exclusively occupied and used for public worship or by a society or body for a charitable purpose. Provided that such society or body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions, applies its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its object and does not pay any dividend or bonus to its members. Explanation- "charitable purpose" includes relief of the poor, education and medical relief but does not included a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching. (B) lands and buildings vested in the Council, in respect of which the said tax, if levied, would under the provisions of this Act be leviable primarily on the Council; (C) agricultural lands and buildings (other than dwelling houses ). (B) lands and buildings vested in the Council, in respect of which the said tax, if levied, would under the provisions of this Act be leviable primarily on the Council; (C) agricultural lands and buildings (other than dwelling houses ). Premises in respect of which property taxes are to be levied.- (4) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the general tax shall be levied in respect of all lands and buildings in Delhi except- (A) lands and buildings or portions of lands and buildings exclusively occupied and used for public worship or by a society or body for a charitable purpose: Provided that such society or body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions, applies its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its object and does not pay any dividend or bonus to its members. Explanation- "charitable purpose" includes relief of the poor, education and medical relief but does not included a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching; (B) lands and buildings vested in the Corporation, in respect of which the said tax, if levied, would under the provisions of this Act be leviable primarily on the Corporation; (C) agricultural lands and buildings (other than dwelling houses ). (2) Lands and buildings or portions thereof shall not be deemed to be exclusively occupied and used for public worship or for a charitable purpose within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (1) if any trade or business is carried on in such lands and buildings or portions thereof or if in respect of such lands and buildings or portions thereof, any rent is derived. (3) Where any portion of any land or building is exempt from the property tax by reason of its being exclusively occupied and used for public worship or for a charitable purpose such portions shall be deemed to be a separate property for the purpose of municipal taxation. (5) Lands and buildings or portions thereof shall not be deemed to be exclusively occupied and used for public worship or for a charitable purpose within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (4), if any trade or business is carried on in such lands andbuildings or portions thereof or if in respect of such lands and buildings or portions thereof, any rent is derived. (6)WHERE any portion of any land or building is exempt from the general tax by reasons of its being exclusively occupied and used for public worship or for a charitable purpose such portion for shall be deemed to be a separate property for the purpose of municipal taxation. ( 4 ) THE power to exempt a person from payment of any tax, in the proper sense of the word, can be located in Section 124 of the NDMC Act, but this power can be exercised only by the Council by its resolution in this behalf. Similar powers of exemption in the classical sense are also traceable to Section 70 of the Punjab Municipal Act, but on the grounds of poverty alone. This provision is reproduced below for ease of reference:- "70. Power of the committee in regard to taxes.- (1) A committee may exempt, in whole or in part, for any period not exceeding one year from the payment of any such tax, any person who by reason of poverty may in its opinion be unable to pay the same, and may renew such exemption as often as may be necessary. (2) A committee, by a resolution passed at a special meeting and confirmed by the [state] Government, may- (a) provide that all or any persons may be allowed to compound for taxes imposed under sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) of clause (1) and under clauses (2) and (3) of section 61; (b) abolish, suspend or reduce in amount any tax imposed under the foregoing sections; or (c) exempt in whole or in part from the payment of any such tax, any person or class of persons or any property or description of property". These questions had arisen before the Hon ble Supreme Court in Indian Red Cross Society v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 545 , where it was observed inter alia as under:- "18. Coming to the alternative case of the appellant viz. These questions had arisen before the Hon ble Supreme Court in Indian Red Cross Society v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 545 , where it was observed inter alia as under:- "18. Coming to the alternative case of the appellant viz. The grant of exemption in respect of the tax leviable on the rented portions, although the Assistant Secretary did not have any other option but to consider the appellant s claim for exemption in view of the direction of the High Court, no discretion is conferred under Section 62 of the NDMC Act on the Assistant Secretary for granting any exemption to the assessee from any portion of the taxes leviable except to the extent the statute itself provides. 19. Section 72 (1) (e) on which the appellant has relied provides: "72. (1) The Chairperson may, at any time, amend the assessment list-- * * * * (e) by making or cancelling any entry exempting any land or building from liability to property tax. " 20. This section also does not confer any discretion on the Chairperson to exempt any property from payment of tax. All that it does is to empower the Chairperson to give effect to any exemption otherwise granted, by amending the assessment list. The power and discretion to grant exemption under the NDMC Act has been conferred on the Council under Section 124. 21. Section 124 provides: "124. The Council may, by resolution passed in this behalf, exempt either wholly or in part from the payment of any tax levied under this Act, any class of persons or any class of property or goods. " 22. The respondents are correct in their submission that under Section 124, as far as the present controversy is concerned, the Council s power must be exercised, if at all, in favour of a class of persons or a class of property. This power may be contrasted with the Punjab Municipal Act where exemption may have been allowed, even in respect of an individual by the Committee under Section 70 (2) (c) and the State Government under Section 71". ( 5 ) I shall first deal with an objection raised by Mr. Vinay Sabharwal pertaining to the maintainability of the Writ Petition. This power may be contrasted with the Punjab Municipal Act where exemption may have been allowed, even in respect of an individual by the Committee under Section 70 (2) (c) and the State Government under Section 71". ( 5 ) I shall first deal with an objection raised by Mr. Vinay Sabharwal pertaining to the maintainability of the Writ Petition. It is contended by him that so far as the challenge to the impugned Assessment Orders are concerned, an alternate remedy exists in the form of an Appeal under the DMC Act itself. He has cited the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in National Institute of Technology Versus Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 38 (1989) Delhi Law Times 426 wherein it was held that without exhausting the said alternative remedy, the Petitioner cannot be allowed to bypass the right of Appeal and get disputed questions of facts decided in a Writ Petition. Mr. Sabharwal s reliance on this decision cannot be appreciated since this view has not found favour with the Division Bench consisting of Anil Dev Singh and O. P. Dwivedi, JJ. in the Appeal titled as The National Institute of Immunology Versus Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 2002 Delhi 192. While on this subject it would be advantageous to refer to the views of other Division Benches of this Court. In Chemical Sales Corporation Versus NDMC, 1996 V AD (Delhi) 89 a Division Bench consisting of R. C. Lahoti, S. N. Kapoor, JJ. , has observed that in the ordinary course it may not be very appropriate to resort to Article 226 if an alternative efficacious remedy is available. Nevertheless the Division Bench entertained the Writ Petition where the Orders that had been assailed could have been viewed as void and non est and where the adjudication involved the determination of pure questions of law. Yet another Division Bench comprising R. C. Lahoti and Lokeshwar Prasad, JJ. had dealt with this very question in Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal Council, 1996 III AD (DELHI) 299. The Bench noted an earlier Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court which had not been laid before the Apex Court when it had been called upon to decide the appeal in Sham Kishore and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 . Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal Council, 1996 III AD (DELHI) 299. The Bench noted an earlier Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court which had not been laid before the Apex Court when it had been called upon to decide the appeal in Sham Kishore and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 . It was observed by the Division Bench of this Court, inter alia, as follows: "34. Yet another aspect which needs to be taken note of by the legislature is the provisionfor100% deposit of tax before filing and appeal. This provision has been introduced obviously in the interest of revenue, so as to see that unwilling tax payers do not delay payment of tax by filing underserving appeals. Challenge was laid to the vires of Section 170 (b) of DMC Act providing for 100% deposit of tax as a condition precedent to the hearing of the appeal. Challenge has been turned down and the provision upheld as intravires by the Supreme Court in Shyam Kishore and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 . Their Lordships have also held that resort to Articles 226-27 challenging the orders of assessment of property tax should be discouraged when there is an alternative remedy of an appeal - a more satisfactory solution being available on the terms of the statute itself. An earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Himmat Lal Hari Lal Mehta Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954sc 403 was not placed before the Supreme Court deciding Shyam Kishore s case (supra) in Himmat Lat Hari Lal Mehta s case, the Constitutional Bench has held:- "moreover the remedy provided by the Act is of onerous and burdensome character. Before the appellant can avail of it, he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy. " 35. Be that as it may, the fact remains that inspite of availability of alternative remedy of an appeal good number of writ petitions are being filed before the High Court invoking its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 2276 of the Constitution. Some of such writ petitions have to be entertained because in the facts and circumstances of those cases the assessee cannot be left to pursue the remedy of appeal which would prove too onerous. 36. Some of such writ petitions have to be entertained because in the facts and circumstances of those cases the assessee cannot be left to pursue the remedy of appeal which would prove too onerous. 36. A condition requiring 100% amount of tax to be deposited as a condition precedent to hearing by the appellant authority may amount to negation of right of appeal in some cases. To illustrate, a property may be assessed in the name of someone who is neither the owner nor occupier thereof and fixed with liability to pay tax; a property not falling within the limits of the Municipal Corporation may come to be assessed and taxed; property may be grossly overvalued by the Assessing authority attracting an obligation to pay an amount of tax absolutely disproportionate with the value of the property and means of the owner. In all such cases under the present law, the assessee must deposit the tax before he may deserve a hearing from the appellate authority. This provision too deserves to be suitably amended so as to confer a discretionary power on the appellate authority allowing dispensation of the deposit of the amount of tax wholly or partially in very deserving cases made for payment of interest so as to adequately compensate the Corporation for the delayed recovery in the event of appeal being dismissed or interim order being vacated. Such a provision would serve the ends of justice giving relief to theassessee/appellants in deserving cases and reduce the filing of writ petitions in superior courts. " another Division Bench of this Court consisting of Y. K. Sabharwal and K. S. Gupta, JJ. in D. R. Aggarwal Versus New Delhi Municipal Committee and another, 1998 (47) DRJ (DB), has rejected a similar objection, and has made the following enunciation of law:- " The Full Bench decision of this Court in Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, AIR 1991 Delhi 104, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1993 (1) SCC 22 , was mainly concerned with the question of validity of the provisions of Section 170 (b) of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Supreme Court while affirming the said Full Bench decision only stated that the resort to Articles 226 and 227 should be discouraged when there is an alternative remedy. The Supreme Court while affirming the said Full Bench decision only stated that the resort to Articles 226 and 227 should be discouraged when there is an alternative remedy. It is one thing to hold that on facts if it is so justified, a petition under Article 226 may be discouraged but it is another thing to hold that the writ petition is not maintainable. In Shyam Kishore s case (supra) the Supreme Court did not hold that the writ petition is not maintainable. It deserves to be emphasised that a statutory law cannot take away the constitutional powers of the Court. Reference may be made to the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Himmat Lal Hari Lal Mehta vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, AIR 1954 SC 403 , which rejected the contention that because a remedy under the impugned Act is available to the assessee, he is disentitled to relief under Article 226. Referring to an earlier decision in the case of State of Bombay vs. United Motors (India) Limited, AIR 1953 SC 252 it was held that the principle that a Court will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate alternative remedy was available does not apply where a party has come to the Court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under Article 226. Moreover, since the remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensome character and before the assessee can avail of it, he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax, such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy. The decision in Himmat Lal s case (supra) was again cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Srikant Lashinnath Jituri and others vs. Corporation of the city of Belgaum, 1994 (6) SCC 572 . In this case the Supreme Court while examining the question whether the remedy of suit and/or petition under Article 226 would be barred, held that such an onerous provision may be a ground for entertaining a writ petition on the ground that alternative remedy provided by the statute is not adequate or efficacious remedy but that can never be a ground for maintaining a civil suit. Both the jurisdictions are different and are governed by different principles. Article 226 provides a constitutional remedy. Both the jurisdictions are different and are governed by different principles. Article 226 provides a constitutional remedy. It confers the power of judicial review on High Courts. The finality clause in a statute is not a bar to the exercise of this constitutional power whereas the jurisdiction of a civil court arises from another statute, viz. , Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our view it has always been the law in our country that a constitutional remedy available to a citizen cannot be barred by a provision regarding finality or alike in a statute". ( 6 ) IT may also be recalled that the Constitution Bench comprising Seven Learned Judges of the Apex Court had clarified, in L. Chandra Kumar Versus Union of India and others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 ; AIR 1997 Sc 1125 that the powers reposed in the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be rendered nugatory by any statutory enactment. It opined that the power is a basic structure of the Constitution and further that- "in view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2 (d) of Article 323a and Clause 3 (d) of Article 323b, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323a and 323b would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basis structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323a and Article 323b of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions ando rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5 (6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated. " ( 7 ) IN this nalysis it is evident that the provisions pertaining to the filing of an appeal cannot oust the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the legal correctness of an assessment order even though the statute provides for the alternate relief of an appeal. The High Court will invariably consider whether it is appropriate to interfere with an appealable order in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It is my understanding that it is impermissible in law to defer the decision regarding non-exigibility from payment of property tax and instead embark on the superfluous and facile exercise of fixing the RV of the property in question. No purpose is served in doing so if there is no liability to tax, and also because the RV itself is not immutable from year to year. Once the question of whether the property owner is using it for charitable purposes is decided against him would it become relevant to determine the RV. ( 8 ) IT will be relevant to note that the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Assessment List) Bye-Laws, 1959 makes no mention of the exemption from payment of tax, but, in my view correctly enumerates as one of the four contents of the Assessment List the mentioning of the reasons of non-liability to be assessed to general tax. ( 9 ) THERE is another legal aspect which demands deliberations. Sections 169 and 170 of the DMC Act, 1957, which correspond verbatim to Sections 115 and 116 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 prescribe that an appeal against the levy or assessment of any tax under the respective statutes shall lie to the Court of District Judge. ( 9 ) THERE is another legal aspect which demands deliberations. Sections 169 and 170 of the DMC Act, 1957, which correspond verbatim to Sections 115 and 116 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 prescribe that an appeal against the levy or assessment of any tax under the respective statutes shall lie to the Court of District Judge. The words `levy` and `assessment` are sometimes treated as synonyms but in instances where they have been employed side by side it is preferable not to treat them so while interpreting the statute. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb `assess` as to evaluate or estimate the nature, value, or quality of or set the value of tax, fine etc. for a person or property at a specified level. The noun `levy` is explained to be the imposition of a tax, fee, fine, or subscription or a sum of money raised by such a levy. The Random House Webster s College Dictionary defines `assessment` as the act of assessing,appraisal, evaluation; an official valuation of property used as a basis for levying a tax. In the same Dictionary the word `levy` is defined as imposing or collecting as of a tax by authority or force. In Stroud s Judicial Dictionary `assessment` for the purpose of a tax code means the fixing of sum taken to represent the actual profit for the purpose of charging tax thereupon. In another context it may mean the actual sum in tax which the taxpayer is liable to pay. This same treatise mentions the taking of all necessary steps to enforce payment. In Modern Legal Usage by Bryan A. Garner it is stated that the word `levy` is usually a verb but may act also as a noun in two senses: (1) the imposition of a fine or the fine so imposed; and (2) the conscription of men for military service. The Hon ble Supreme Court has also considered the meaning to be given to these two words. In its opinion the term `levy` is wider in its import than the term `assessment`. It may include both imposition of a tax as well as assessment. The term `imposition` is generally used for the levy of a tax or duty by legislative provisions indicating the subject matter of the tax and the rates at which it is to be taxed. It may include both imposition of a tax as well as assessment. The term `imposition` is generally used for the levy of a tax or duty by legislative provisions indicating the subject matter of the tax and the rates at which it is to be taxed. The term `assessment`, on the other hand, is generally used in India for the actual procedure adopted in fixing the liability to pay a tax on property (see N. B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise,bombay and others v. The Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. , AIR 1971 SC 2039 and Assistant Collector or Central Excise, Calcutta v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. , AIR 1972 SC 2563 ); on a perusal of Sections170=116 it will be manifestly clear that the question of whether a property owner is not liable for the payment of property tax because he is using it for charitable, religious or agricultural purposes is not strictly a subject which can be taken in appeal for the reason that this determination would not be covered by the authentication of the assessment lists. It seems to me that the alternative remedy of an appeal may not arise where the dispute pertains only to the user of the property for charitable purposes since it would nopartake of the nature of an assessment or a levy. I need not give a definite observations on this question since I am of the view that the writ petitions are maintainable for other reasons also. ( 10 ) THE conundrum of when a particular property can be seen as being used for charitable purposes has received the consideration of the Apex Court on a number of occasions, including in Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad v. Hyderabad Race Club, AIR 1987 SC 92 where the following observations have been made:- "4. WHAT the High Court has completely failed to realize is that the occupation of the land and buildings must be for a charitable purpose and that it is altogether irrelevant as to the manner in which the income of the club is utilised. Section 202 (1) (b) makes no reference to the question as regards the employment of the income of the club or the purpose for which the income is so employed. Exemption is granted only in respect of buildings which are solely used, meaning thereby exclusively used, for charitable purpose. Section 202 (1) (b) makes no reference to the question as regards the employment of the income of the club or the purpose for which the income is so employed. Exemption is granted only in respect of buildings which are solely used, meaning thereby exclusively used, for charitable purpose. For instance, if the premises occupied for the purposes of benevolent activities such as the running of a free dispensary or clinic or for running of a free school for the children, such user of the building would constitute a user for a charitable purpose and entitle the owner of the building to claim exemption. It is impossible to subscribe to the view that occupation or user for any purpose would constitute a user for a charitable purpose provided the income is used for a charitable purpose provided the income is used for a charitable purpose. Clutching at the tail of this reasoning, one would be induced to the conclusion that user of a building for running a common gaming house (or for any immoral or illegal purpose) would be user for a charitable purpose provided the income of the common gaming house is utilised for a charitable purpose. The argument deserves no further scrutiny and must be rejected outright. No further exercise need be undertaken in order to find out whether or not S. 202 (1) (b) is attracted in the facts of the present matter. The judgment of the High Court in so far as the High Court holds that S. 202 (1) (b) is attracted must therefore be reversed and set aside. We are of the opinion that the user of the premises for the Race Course Club will not constitute occupation or user for a charitable purpose within the meaning of S. 202 (1) (b) and the Race Course Club will not be entitled to claim exemption from levy of general tax". Thereafter in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Versus Children Book Trust, AIR 1992 Supreme Court, 1456, the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that:- 66. Therefore, an element of public benefit or philanthropy has to be present. The reason why we stress on this aspect of the matter is if eduction is run on commercial lines, merely because it is a school, it does not mean it would be entitled to the exemption under Section 115 (4) of the Act. . . . . . 74. The reason why we stress on this aspect of the matter is if eduction is run on commercial lines, merely because it is a school, it does not mean it would be entitled to the exemption under Section 115 (4) of the Act. . . . . . 74. In view of the above rulings it would be clear that where the predominant object is to subserve charitable purpose and not to earn profit it would be a charitable purpose. However, the argument of the appellant is as per the Delhi School Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder, if the society cannot utilise the fund and the school cannot be run for private gain in the absence of any profit, it would be a charitable purpose. . . . . . 75. We have already seen that merely because education is imparted in the school, that by itself, cannot be regarded as a charitable object. Today, education has acquired a wider meaning. If education is imparted with a profit motive, to hold, in such a case, as charitable purpose, will not be correct. We are inclined to agree with Mr. B. Sen, learned Counsel for the Delhi Municipal Corporation in this regard. Therefore, it would necessarily involve public benefit. . . . . . . 80. It cannot be gainsaid that the municipal general tax is an annual tax. Therefore, normally speaking, the liability for taxation must be determined with reference to each year. In other words, the society claiming exemption will have to show that it fulfills the conditions for exemption each year. If it shows, for example, that for its support it has to depend on, either wholly or in part, voluntary contributions, in that particular year, it may be exempt. But where in that year, for its support, it need not depend on voluntary contributions at all or again if the society produces surplus income and excludes the dependence on voluntary contributions, it may cease to be exempt. Of course, the word "support" will have to mean sustenance or maintenance. Only to get over this difficulty that the qualitative test is pressed into service. We would consider the reasonable way of giving effect to the exemption, will be to take each case and assess for a period of five years and find out whether the society or body depends on voluntary contributions. Only to get over this difficulty that the qualitative test is pressed into service. We would consider the reasonable way of giving effect to the exemption, will be to take each case and assess for a period of five years and find out whether the society or body depends on voluntary contributions. Of course, at the end of each five year period the assessing authority could review the position. In other words, what we want to stress is, where a society or body is making systematic profit, even though that profit is utilised only for charitable purposes, yet it cannot be said that it would claim exemption. If, merely qualitative test is applied to societies, even schools which are run on commercial basis making profits would go out of the purview of taxation and could demand exemption. Thus, the test, according to us, must be whether the society could survive without receiving voluntary contributions, even though it may have some income by the activities of the society. The word "part" must mean an appreciable amount and not an insignificant one. The "part" in other words, must be substantial part. What is substantial would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. . . . . . . 92. Trade or business can be present in both sub-secs. (4) and (5) of S. 115. But, if the profits or income of trade or business is devoted to a charitable purpose and no part thereof is distributed among the members as dividends or bonus, then that trade or business is a means to an end. It is charity. 93. But, if there is a trade or business carried on in a land or building and its profits are not supplied to a charitable purpose, sub-sec. (6) says that that part of the land or building where a trade or business is carried on or from which rent is derived will be subject to tax. 94. Applying the above propositions, it would only, at best, make the society running the school a charitable purpose, beyond that it does not strengthen its case as it fails to answer the test that it is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions. In Christian Children Fund Inc. 94. Applying the above propositions, it would only, at best, make the society running the school a charitable purpose, beyond that it does not strengthen its case as it fails to answer the test that it is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions. In Christian Children Fund Inc. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 54 (1994) DLT 442, it has been enunciated that Section 115 (4) of the DMC Act requires that - "the lands and buildings or portions of lands and buildings should be exclusively occupied and used for public worship or by a society or body for a charitable purpose and that the society or body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions and that it should apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objectives and that it should not pay any dividend or bonus to its members. The explanation elucidates what the "charitable purpose" means. It defines charitable purpose to include relief of the poor, education and medical relief but dos not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching. There is no dispute that the appellant-organisation is a charitable organisation and that the purpose for which the appellant-organisation is established and run is a charitable one within the meaning of the said provision. However, the only ground on which the appellant is denied the exemption is that the premises in question are being used by the appellant for its office, which according to the municipal authorities and the High Court cannot be said to be used for charitable purpose. We are afraid that both the municipal authorities and the High Court have committed an obvious error of interpreting the provisions of Section 115 (4) narrowly and unrealistically. Every organisation established for a charitable purpose requires some premises to run its administration. Without an administrative office, it is not possible for an organisation to run and manage its charitable activities. The extent of the premises required to run the administrative office would depend upon the nature and the size of its activities. Hence the premises required by an organisation for its administrative office are an essential and an integral part of its charitable activities. The extent of the premises required to run the administrative office would depend upon the nature and the size of its activities. Hence the premises required by an organisation for its administrative office are an essential and an integral part of its charitable activities. Sometimes the administrative office of such organisations may be located where the charitable activity or activities are carried on and sometimes it is located awayfrom such place depending upon the availability of the premises and convenience. So long as the premises in which the administrative office of the charitable organisation is carried on are exclusively used and occupied by its office, the premises would be ones covered by the exemption provided under the said provisions. To hold otherwise, viz. , that it is only the premises where actual charitable activity is carried on alone is qualified for the exemption is to be irrational". ( 11 ) ON an analysis of the above judgment it will be evident that the aspect of education per se falling in the category of a charitable activity has been rejected. Obviously, a Person, Society or Trust which is imparting education by charging tuition fees on a scale calculated to cover all the administrative or capital expenses of the school should also be willing to pay property taxes as one of its manifold outgoings. Learned counsel for the MCD has unduly underscored the observations in the Children Book Trust Case (supra) to the effect that a review could be carried out every five years. Indubitably, this will be a salutary practice, but not to mindlessly determine whether any voluntary contributions have continued to be collected in the Society s coffers. This factor cannot overwhelm the equally important question of the charitable nature of the teaching activity. Let us conceptualise the possibility of a wealthy person giving away enormous funds year after year to an elitist school catering to every luxury of students belonging to his community, or his recommendees. Would this contribution be viewed as a charitable or philanthropic one rendering the educational institution impervious to Municipal/property Taxation. I should think it would not. Let us conceptualise the possibility of a wealthy person giving away enormous funds year after year to an elitist school catering to every luxury of students belonging to his community, or his recommendees. Would this contribution be viewed as a charitable or philanthropic one rendering the educational institution impervious to Municipal/property Taxation. I should think it would not. Equally, if such a person were to purchase land and pay for the costs of a building and thereafter set aside a corpus calculated to cover the revenue expenses of a School catering to the less advantaged members of the general public, would this laudable effort cease to be of charitable or eleemosynary character only because yearly contributions are not being made. The pivotal point would always be which section of society is the beneficiary. Where this section largely and substantially comprises the children of slum-dweller, it would indeed require extremely negative thinking to come to a conclusion other than that a charitable educational avocation is being carried out. On a conjoint reading of the Hyderabad Race Club and the Children Book Trust cases, no other conclusion is possible. Furthermore, in the Children Book Trust case the Bench had specifically taken note of the observations of a coordinate Bench recorded in P. C. Raja Ratnam Institution v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, AIR 1990 SC 816 , holding that if some fee is charged from the students that fact by itself is not decisive or conclusive on the aspect of such activity not to be treated as a charitable one. Even if nominal fees are charged and the management of a Society, because of its parsimonious approach and attitude, manages to collect a surplus which is not distributed directly or indirectly to any of its members, but set apart for the establishment of another school or charitable activity such as the running of a dispensary in the locality, would the society forfeit its right to remain beyond the exigibility to property taxes. Should a spendthrift society enjoy this privilege only because it spends whatever it gathers? In my opinion the answer needs no articulation. Should a spendthrift society enjoy this privilege only because it spends whatever it gathers? In my opinion the answer needs no articulation. ( 12 ) FROM an analysis of the pronouncements of the Hon ble Supreme Court it is clear that it cannot be gainsaid that carrying on of education activity is not per se a charitable vocation, but equally, the charging of tuition fees does not per se, render it a non-charitable pursuit. There is much wisdom in not making education totally free for fear of its losing respect and significance in the minds of those under privileged persons to whom it is endeavoured to reach. On the other end of the spectrum, if the fees are pegged at a scale to provide every educational facility for children belonging to affluent backgrounds, whosoever laudatory the enterprise may, it would not partake of a charitable nature. Even if the School or College is run on a very modest and frugal basis, if the tuition fee is fixed with the objective of recouping all or most of the expenses, the activity would not become charitable. The officers of the municipality would have to weigh and balance all these factors in arriving at the conclusion whether or not the educational activity is not charitable, and therefore exigible to property tax. It is well entrenched in our legal framework that educating the citizens at a modicum standard is a state function and responsibility. Where a Society discharges these duties there would be no justification to burden its efforts with liability to pay property taxes and thereby enable the municipality to collect where it ought to be disbursing. This enquiry will become somewhat more difficult once the laudatory insistence on granting admission to the extent of twenty five per cent to the lesser privileged is strictly implemented. If this policy is fulfilled by fixing tuition fees at a high level so as to cover these expenses and burdens, it would appear to me that such schools would nevertheless be exigible to property tax. But a definitive answer can be given only when such a situation presents itself before the Court. ( 13 ) BOTH adversaries have relied upon the Balance Sheets of the Society; Mr. Sabharwal, learned counsel for the MCD to establish that fees are being charged from the students, and that the fees cannot be perceived as nominal. But a definitive answer can be given only when such a situation presents itself before the Court. ( 13 ) BOTH adversaries have relied upon the Balance Sheets of the Society; Mr. Sabharwal, learned counsel for the MCD to establish that fees are being charged from the students, and that the fees cannot be perceived as nominal. The fact remains that the fees collected are roughly one-eighth of the expenditure of the School. The School is avowedly located close to a slum cluster and there is no finding that the students do not belong to this strata of our society. Even if tuition fees are being charged, ipso facto the Petitioner s School does not fail to discharge an eleemosynary objective. The next aspect to be considered is the alleged receipt of rentals by the Petitioner as is stated to be evident from a study of its Balance Sheets. In my opinion such income would not alter the charitable nature of the activity if the rents are ploughed back for covering the revenue expenses of the society. This aspect has already been discussed above and I see no reason why a philanthropist should be seen as unwise and imprudent merely because, instead of making a voluntary contribution each year, he instead dedicates an immovable property yielding recurring rental receipts which are used by the Trust for meeting its expenses. In the present case there could have been a twist in the tale since the Petitioner asseverates that it has entered into an understanding with Deepalaya, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, engaged in spreading education (both formal and non-formal among the poor since 1980), for running the School. The terms of the collaboration have been reduced to writing in terms of an Agreement dated 21st December, 1994. One of its clauses records "that only a token fee and other charges shall be charged from the students to give them a feeling of commitment towards education". Whilst the Petitioner s role is that of making the building available for the School, the salaries etc. are paid by Deepalaya. There are certifications of both parties to the effect that no rent is paid/received in respect of the school building. Counsel for the MCDhas contended that from a perusal of Deepalaya s Income and Expenditure Account for the year ending 31. 3. are paid by Deepalaya. There are certifications of both parties to the effect that no rent is paid/received in respect of the school building. Counsel for the MCDhas contended that from a perusal of Deepalaya s Income and Expenditure Account for the year ending 31. 3. 2001it is manifest that rentals are being received by the Petitioner, I cannot accede to this argument since it has been explained that the rent is in respect of other premises. Even if the certification is ignored for a moment, the Income and Expenditure Account of the Ram Ditti Jr. Narang-Deepalaya School does not show a corresponding entry. On a scrutiny of the Petitioner s account it will be seen that rent has been received in respect of Flat 12, Yusuf Sarai, Delhi. There is nothing on record to support the contention of the Respondent that the Petitioner has let-out the School premises. If, as a consequence of the receipt of rents for the School premises a surplus was available to the Petitioner, it would indeed be difficult for it to sustain its claim for "exemption". This immediately brings us to the aspect of surplus in the Petitioner s accounts. In the decade between 1993 and 2003 the Petitioner has received donations in all but three years. Deficits have been sustained in three years and some surplus has arisen, but often accounting for depreciation when it is kept in perspective that no part of the surplus has been distributed it will be difficult to arrive at any conclusion other than that the property in question is being used for charitable purposes and therefore not exigible to property tax. Indubitably the Petitioner has reaped some surplus over the years, but its extent coupled with the avowed charitable character of the activity and the fact that it is the constitutional responsibility of the State to provide and promote education, the Petitioner is beyond the pale of taxation and therefore the impugned assessment must be set aside. The impugned assessment is accordingly set aside. The Respondents may issue notices to the Petitioner of their intention to assess them for the coming year if circumstances so warrant. ( 14 ) THE writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. Parties to bear their respective costs. --- *** --- .