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2004 DIGILAW 276 (PNJ)

Jangir Singh v. Gurdev Singh

2004-03-09

M.M.KUMAR

body2004
Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. (9th March, 2004) - This is defendants appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity the Code) challenging the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below in favour of the plaintiff-respondents holding that Will Ex.D1 dated 9.5.1978 is surrounded by suspicious circumstances which have remained unexplained by the propounder namely defendant-appellants. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Major Singh v. Rattan Singh, 1997(3) S.C.C. 546, the following substantive question of law, which would arise for consideration is as under;- "Whether the reasons given by the Courts below for discarding the will Ex.D1 dated 9.5.1978 are flimsy." 2. In order to appreciate the controversy and the dispute between the parties, the following pedigree table would be helpful:- MN_479.htm 3. The plaintiff-respondents who are grand sons of Gurmukh Singh filed Suit No. 91 of 19.2.1980/T 345 of 28.8.1980 for declaration and permanent injunction to the effect that they have been owners in possession of the suit land to the extent of 2/3rd share and that defendant-appellant No. 1 who is their uncle being the son of Gurmukh Singh is owner in possession to the extent of 1/3rd share. A further declaration was sought that defendant-respondents No. 2 to 5 being minors did not have any concern with the suit land. A prayer for perpetual injunction was also made restraining the defendant-appellants from alienating, mortgaging or transferring the suit land. The case of the plaintiff-respondents is that Gurmukh Singh was owner of the suit land and he expired on 11.8.1979. During his life time, he executed a registered Will dated 9.3.1964 out of his free will and sound disposing mind. He has bequeathed 2/3rd share to the plaintiff-respondents and 1/3rd share to the defendant-appellants their uncle. It was further asserted that on the basis of the Will, the plaintiff-respondents as well as the defendant-appellants had been continuing in their respective possession of the suit land as owner. Defendant-appellants No. 2 to 5 have no concern with the suit land being minors. On the basis of some false Will, the defendant-appellants wanted to claim ownership and attempting to dispossess the plaintiff-respondents from their share. On the same basis, they were trying to alienate the suit land to some other person without holding any title or interest in it. 4. On the basis of some false Will, the defendant-appellants wanted to claim ownership and attempting to dispossess the plaintiff-respondents from their share. On the same basis, they were trying to alienate the suit land to some other person without holding any title or interest in it. 4. The stand taken by the defendant-appellants in their written statement was that Gurmukh Singh had executed Will dated 9.3.1964, according to which 2/3rd share was given to the plaintiff-respondents and 1/3rd given to defendant-appellant No. 1. However, the defendant-appellant propounded another registered Will dated 9.5.1978 claiming that the same was executed by the testator with sound disposing mind by giving one half share to the plaintiff-respondents and one half share to defendant-appellants No. 2 to 5. It was further claimed that the earlier will was cancelled and the later dated 9.5.1978 was the last Will of the testator, which was executed by him with his free Will on account of the services rendered by the plaintiff-respondents as well as defendant-appellants No. 2 to 5. It is further claimed that after the execution of the Will land measuring 23 Kanals 4 Marias was purchased which was given to the plaintiff-respondents No. 1 and 2 and Nand Singh the father of plaintiff-respondents No. 3 and 4 in equal shares. It has further been asserted that as such half share of the suit land was given to defendant-appellants No. 2 to 5 and rest half was given to the plaintiff-respondents. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed;- "1) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the suit land to the extent of 2/3rd share? OPP. 2.) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction prayed for? OPP. 3.) Whether Gurmukh Singh son of Avtar Singh executed a valid Will on 9.5.1978 in favour of the plaintiff and defendants No. 2 to 5 in equal shares? OPD 4.) If issue No. 3 is proved in affirmative whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to challenge the Will? OPD 5.) Relief. 5. On issue No. 3, both the Courts below have recorded the findings that the will dated 9.5.1978 Ex.D1 is surrounded by numerous suspicious circumstances. Therefore, it was held that Gurmukh Singh did not execute the Will Ex.D-1 validly in sound disposing mind. OPD 5.) Relief. 5. On issue No. 3, both the Courts below have recorded the findings that the will dated 9.5.1978 Ex.D1 is surrounded by numerous suspicious circumstances. Therefore, it was held that Gurmukh Singh did not execute the Will Ex.D-1 validly in sound disposing mind. In support of the afore-mentioned conclusion, the learned Additional District Judge has given the following reasons:- "a) At the time Gurmukh Singh executed the first Will Ex.P2, he as aged 75 years but in the Will Ex.D1 executed more than 14 years thereafter, he gave his age as only 80 years. This discrepancy in the age is a suspicious circumstance making the genuineness of the Will by Gurmukh Singh of a doubtful nature. According to Jangir Singh who appeared as (DW1), Gurmukh Singh, died at the age of 100 years. Admittedly, he died on 11.8.1979 about 15 months after the execution of the Will Ex.D1. Obviously, the age of Gurmukh Singh as 80 years in Ex.D1 had been deliberately given to conceal the fact of his failing mental faculties. It is doubtful if he was in full senses and he understood the nature and effect of disposition made by him at the time of the execution of Will Ex.D1. b) Chand Kaur is admittedly the daughter of Gurmukh Singh and is equally related to the parties. Appearing as PW2 she stated that her father did not remain in his sense for about one and half or 2 years prior to his death. There is nothing in her cross examination to discredit her. Gurdev Singh plaintiff (PW1), Gurnam Singh (PW4), Chand Singh PW5 and Joginder Singh PW6 have all deposed with one voice that Gurmukh Singh had not been keeping good heath for about one and half two years before his death. Bharpur Singh, one of the attesting witnesses of Will Ex.D1 appearing as PW3 had also corroborated their evidence as to the physical and mental condition of Gurmukh Singh, testator at the time of the execution of Will Ex.D1. c) Shri Beant Singh, Advocate counsel for the appellants has submitted that the endorsement made by the Sub Registrar on the back of the Will as to its execution by Gurmukh Singh conclusively proves that he was in sound disposing mind. c) Shri Beant Singh, Advocate counsel for the appellants has submitted that the endorsement made by the Sub Registrar on the back of the Will as to its execution by Gurmukh Singh conclusively proves that he was in sound disposing mind. The Appellants have not examined the Sub Registrar as witness in this case and the registration of the Will perse is not evidence of sound and disposing mind of testator, as has been observed by Mr. Justice M.L. Verma in Sarwan Singh and Anr. v. Gurdev Kaur and Ors., 1975 Punjab Law Journal 201. d) Even Kartar Singh could not say how many thumb impressions of Gurmukh Singh were obtained or if any thumb impression of Gurmukh Singh had been affixed before the Tehsildar. He himself did not put his signatures before the Tehsildar. It is in the evidence of Lilu DW4 that he had long last cordial relations with Jang Singh, father of the appellants. As such he had soft corner for the defendants. e) It would appear that Jang Singh father of the appellants defendants had taken a prominent part in the getting the Will executed. It was who called Kartar Singh and Lilu DWs. After all why should he take active part in getting the Will executed when he had already been given one third share by Gurmukh Singh under the Will Ex.P2. The answer is obvious. He wanted to get more land for his sons. As already observed, Gurmukh Singh was a grand old man aged about 90 years at the time of the execution of Will Ex.D1 and he was feeble minded person. It is no wonder that he was prevailed upon by Jang Singh to execute the Will Ex.D1. It is not worthy that Gurmukh Singh had no occasion to review his previous decision contained in Will Ex.P2. Where under he had made equal distribution of his property amongst three branches represented by his three sons. There does not appear to be any merit in the contention of the counsel for the appellants that Gurmukh Singh had purchased any land after the execution of Will Ex.P2 and gave the same to the plaintiffs. Where under he had made equal distribution of his property amongst three branches represented by his three sons. There does not appear to be any merit in the contention of the counsel for the appellants that Gurmukh Singh had purchased any land after the execution of Will Ex.P2 and gave the same to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have produced the said sale deed on the file as Ex.P3 and its perusal unmistakably shows that the land was purchased by Nand Singh and the sons of Chand Singh directly from the vendor/s and the consideration for the sale had been provided by the vendees and not by Gurmukh Singh as stated by Gurnam Singh (PW4), the attesting witness of sale deed Ex.P3. The appellants have not produced worth while evidence to show that the consideration for the sale was provided by Gurmukh Singh. Thus, the only ground pressed into service by the appellants in justification of the Will D1 is knocked out of its foundations. As all the grand sons used to render services to Gurmukh Singh. He thought it fit to bequeath the property equally to the three branches represented by his three sons. f) Another suspicious circumstance that surrounds that execution of Will Ex.D1 is that the Will Ex.P2 was not cancelled by Gurmukh Singh while making the Will Ex.D1. It was recited towards the end of the body writing of the Will that the Will in question is his first and last Will but after the body writing was closed, it was stated in that in case any previous Will exists, it stands cancelled. According to Jangir Singh DW1 previous will was also there when the Will in question was executed; Of course, this fact is denied by Sham Lal DW2. Obviously Jang Singh had tried to conceal the factum of previous will at the time of the execution of the Will Ex.D1. Considering the age and health of Gurmukh Singh, it was too, much to expect from him that he himself could give dictation to the scribe or he could state all the facts incorporated in Ex.D1." 6. Obviously Jang Singh had tried to conceal the factum of previous will at the time of the execution of the Will Ex.D1. Considering the age and health of Gurmukh Singh, it was too, much to expect from him that he himself could give dictation to the scribe or he could state all the facts incorporated in Ex.D1." 6. On the basis of the afore-mentioned suspicious circumstances Will Ex.D1 was discarded and under issues No. 1 to 4 the plaintiff-respondents were held owner in possession of the suit land to the extent of 2/3rd share and under issue No. 2 plaintiff-respondents were held entitled to permanent injunction as they were owner in possession to the extent of 2/3rd by virtue of the Will Ex.P-2 executed in their favour on 9.3.1963 by their grand father. 7. Mr. R.K. Battas, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants has argued that all the reasons recorded by the Courts below are absolutely flimsy and would not meet the test of law. According to the learned counsel once the Will is registered by issuing a certificate of registration under Section 60 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short the Registration Act) then there is always a presumption raised in favour of the validity of the will. According to the learned counsel, the discrepancies in describing the age, which was stated to be 75 in 1964 and 80 years in 1978 would not result into declaring the execution of the Will as illegal. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on judgments of this Court in the cases of Smt. Rami v. Sohan Singh, 1991 P.L.J. 587 and Kartar Kaur v. Bhagwan Kaur, (1993-1)103 P.L.R. 99. The learned counsel has also argued that the doubt raised by the Courts below on the basis of the statement made by Chand Kaur PW2 about the mental weakness of the testator would also be cured once the Will is shown to be registered. He has placed reliance in this regard on the judgment of this Court in Biru Ram v. Barkha Ram, 1997(1) R.C.R. (Civil) 545. He has also argued that active participation by Jang Singh defendant-appellants No. 1 at the time of execution of the will is no ground to hold that the defendant-appellants has influenced the discretion exercised by the testator. He has placed reliance in this regard on the judgment of this Court in Biru Ram v. Barkha Ram, 1997(1) R.C.R. (Civil) 545. He has also argued that active participation by Jang Singh defendant-appellants No. 1 at the time of execution of the will is no ground to hold that the defendant-appellants has influenced the discretion exercised by the testator. The learned counsel maintained that once the defendant-appellants are shown to be serving the testator during his life time, the Will should be considered as genuine his life time, the will should be considered as genuine and registration would cure any defect. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Sundaresa Pai and Ors. v. Sumangala T. Pai, (2002)1 S.C.C. 630 and argued that uneven distribution of assets by the testator is no ground to discard the Will. Learned counsel has further urged that if the Will is not registered, not signed by the testator not scribed by a regular scribe and the testator, has expired soon after execution then these could be considered as suspicious circumstances and not the one listed by the Courts below. 8. Mr. Rakesh Garg, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has argued that the registration will not cure various defects and suspicious circumstances discernible from the will. It is the duty of the propounder of the will to prove that will was not only executed and attested in the manner it is required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short the Succession Act) but it should also be shown that the Will was the result of free volition of the testator and the same has been executed after knowing and understanding its contents. All the suspicious circumstances have to be dispelled by the propounder. According to the learned counsel, the defendant-appellants have failed to dispel the suspicious circumstances in this case. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court by a Constitution Bench in the case of Rani Purnima Devi v. Khagendra Narayan, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 567 and Gurdial Kaur and Ors. v. Kartar Kaur and Ors., (1998-2)119 P.L.R. 524 (S.C.). In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court by a Constitution Bench in the case of Rani Purnima Devi v. Khagendra Narayan, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 567 and Gurdial Kaur and Ors. v. Kartar Kaur and Ors., (1998-2)119 P.L.R. 524 (S.C.). The learned counsel has expressed extreme dissatisfaction about the will Ex.D1 and argued that the testator by no stretch of imagination could have recorded his age as 80 years in 1979 when he had recorded 75 years in 1964. He has further stressed that the testator cannot forget that he had already executed a registered will and recites in Ex.D1 that it was his first and the last will. The learned counsel has maintained that there is no recital with regard to cancellation of earlier will. The mental condition of the testator was extremely weak as per the statement made by Bharpur Singh Lambardar PW3 and Chand Kaur PW2. He has also referred to the active participation of plaintiff-appellant No. 1 Jang Singh who had secured benefits under the Will. 9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and perusing the judgments of both the Courts below. I am of the considered opinion that this appeal is devoid of merit and is, thus, liable to be dismissed. It is trite to record that onus to prove a testamentary present is on the propounder and the onus becomes heavier if there are suspicious circumstances. The propounder has to dispel all the suspicious circumstances by adducing cogent evidence. In this regard, law appears to be well settled and the Supreme Court in the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors., A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 443 has observed that the propounder is under an obligation to show by satisfactory evidence that the testamentary present was signed by the testator and he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind; that he understood the nature and effect of the disposition and put the signatures on the document on his own free will. The aforementioned view has been reiterated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 529. The aforementioned view has been reiterated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 529. The observations of their Lordships in this regard as under;- "The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there are no such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testators mind, the dispositions made in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indications in the will to show that the testators mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicious should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the execution of the will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate even if the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations." 10. Reference may also be made to various other judgments on the point in issue that the onus to remove all the doubts and explain the suspicious circumstances to the full satisfaction of the Court lies on the propounder. The Supreme Court in the case of Indu Bala Bose v. Manindra Chandra Bose, (1982)1 S.C.C. 20; Gurdial Kaurs case (supra) and Vrindavanibai Sambhaji Mane v. Ramchandra Vithal Ganeshkar and Ors., (1995)5 S.C.C. 215 have reiterated the same position. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Indu Bala Bose v. Manindra Chandra Bose, (1982)1 S.C.C. 20; Gurdial Kaurs case (supra) and Vrindavanibai Sambhaji Mane v. Ramchandra Vithal Ganeshkar and Ors., (1995)5 S.C.C. 215 have reiterated the same position. 11. It is equally and commonly known that participation of the propounder in the execution of the will would give rise to a suspicious circumstance which must be satisfactorily explained by the propounder of the will. Ordinarily, the active participation of the propounder of the will in its execution would lead to a suspicious circumstances which in the absence of satisfactory explanation would be considered as fatal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the House of Lords in Fulton v. Andrew, (1875) & HL 448; Barry v. Butlin, (1838)2 Moo P.C. 480; Sarat Kumari Bibi v. Sakhi Chand, 56 IA 62 and Tyrrell v. Painton, 1894, p.151 = 70 L.T. 453. All the aforementioned judgments have been relied upon and followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Gorantla Thataiah v. Thotakura Venkata Subbaiah, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1332. It has been held that those who take benefit under a will and have been instrumental in preparing or obtaining it, have thrown upon themselves the onus of showing the righteousness of the transaction. There is no unyielding rule of law that when it has been proved that a testator competent in mind has had a will read over to him and has thereupon executed it all further enquires are shout out. 12. It may also be pertinent to mention that registration of the will would be prima facie evidence of genuineness of the will but that by itself is not sufficient to dispel all suspicious existing regarding the will without submitting the evidence or registration to a close examination. This principle had been laid down by the Supreme Court in Rani Purnima Debis case (supra); Gurdial Kaurs case (supra) and P.P.K. Gopalan Nambiar v. P.P.K. Balakrishnan Nambiar and Ors., A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1852. 13. This principle had been laid down by the Supreme Court in Rani Purnima Debis case (supra); Gurdial Kaurs case (supra) and P.P.K. Gopalan Nambiar v. P.P.K. Balakrishnan Nambiar and Ors., A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1852. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Bhagyawati v. General Public and Ors., (1994-2)107 P.L.R. 649 had the occasion of considering some of the above mentioned judgments of the Supreme Court which had extracted the following principles of general application:- "(a) the testator must have a disposing mind free from all extraneous influence with sound mental mind; (b) the testator is presumed to be sane having a mental capacity to make a valid Will until contrary is proved; (c) the Will should be executed in accordance with the provisions of the Act as incorporated in Section 63 of the Act read with Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act. In other words, the testator should have signed or affixed his mark to the Will in the presence of the two witnesses who are required to see the testator signing or affixing his mark on the Will and each of the witnesses should sign the Will in the presence of the testator. d) the onus of proof of the Will is on the propounder or beneficiary of the Will; e) the existence of suspicious circumstances make the onus of proof very heavy and such circumstances are required to be removed by the propounder before the document is accepted as a last Will of the testator; f) the mode of proving the Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except me special circumstances as incorporated in Section 73 of the Act, and g) in order to ascertain the free disposing mind free from extraneous considerations, the whole of the attending circumstances in a particular case are required to be taken note of;" 14. When the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments are applied to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that suspicious circumstances have not been dispelled and the doubts remained lurking in the mind of the Court. Both the Courts have concurrently found that testator Gurmukh Singh was not of sound disposing mind. When the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments are applied to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that suspicious circumstances have not been dispelled and the doubts remained lurking in the mind of the Court. Both the Courts have concurrently found that testator Gurmukh Singh was not of sound disposing mind. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the statement made by Chand Kaur daughter of Gurmukh Singh who appeared as PW2 who had stated that her father did not remain in his senses for 1-1/2-2 years preceding his death. Nothing could be extracted from her cross-examination. Moreover, her deposition is supported by plaintiff-respondent Gurdev Singh PW1, Gurnam Singh PW4, Chand Singh PW5 and Joginder Singh PW6. One of the attesting witness of the Will Ex.D1 Bharpur Singh had also corroborated their statements with regard to physical and mental condition of Gurmukh Singh testator at the time of execution of the will. The execution of a will is a solemn affair because a dead man speaks through a document about his desire expressed through a testamentary present. The duty of the Court becomes more onerous because if a genuine will is discarded, it may become unholy act causing discomfort to the heavenly soul. In the present case, two other facts which have been revealed by the alleged testamentary present Ex.D1 itself are that when Gurmukh Sigh testator executed a will Ex.P2 on 9.3.1984 distributing all his property equally in three shares to Chand Singh, Nand Singh and Jang Singh, his age is recorded as 75 years but on 9.5.1978 when the will in dispute is executed which is after 14 years, the age of the testator recorded is 80 years. No explanation has been brought on record to explain the aforementioned discrepancy. Moreover, in Ex.D1 dated 9.5.1978 it has been mentioned that it was the first and the last will of the testator and nothing has been mentioned with regard to cancellation of the earlier will Ex.P2 which is the case set up by the defendant-appellants. This fact has also remained unexplained. The cumulative effect of these two facts would be that the will Ex.D1 raises a suspicious circumstance to a reasonable mind. 15. Another fact which has remained unexplained is that Jang Singh father of the defendant-appellants had actively participated in execution of the will. This fact has also remained unexplained. The cumulative effect of these two facts would be that the will Ex.D1 raises a suspicious circumstance to a reasonable mind. 15. Another fact which has remained unexplained is that Jang Singh father of the defendant-appellants had actively participated in execution of the will. He had gone to call Kartar Singh attesting witness who has appeared as DW3 and Lilu DW4. His active participation in execution of the will from his aged father, who was about 90 years old is obvious that he wanted much more share for his sons than what was already given by the earlier registered will Ex.P2 dated 9.3.1964 which has been duly admitted by the parties to the litigation. It is further appropriate to mention that in accordance with the will Ex.P2 the beneficiaries have been in possession of their respective shares in the property. 16. All the aforementioned circumstances individually as well as cumulatively are such suspicious circumstances that a reasonable person would not be able to take a view that the will is executed by the testator from his free disposing mind and without any influence on him. 17. The argument of learned counsel for the defendant-appellants that once the will is registered by issuing a certificate of registration under Section 60 of the Registration Act then there is a presumption raised in favour of validity of the will. The aforementioned argument does not require any serious consideration in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rani Purnima Debis -case (supra) holding that mere fact that the will is registered will not be sufficient to dispel suspicious circumstances without submitting the evidence with regard to registration to a close examination. It is pertinent to mention that Sub Registrar in this case has not been produced before the Court and the marginal witness DW3 Kartar Singh has not been able to state whether Gurmukh Singh testator put his thumb impressions before the Sub Registrar. The same view has been followed by the Supreme Court in Gurdial Kaurs case (supra). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurdial Kaur s case (supra) has observed as under:- "3. The law is well settled that if there is a suspicious circumstance about the execution of the Will, it is the duty of the person seeking declaration about the validity of the Will to dispel such suspicious circumstances. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurdial Kaur s case (supra) has observed as under:- "3. The law is well settled that if there is a suspicious circumstance about the execution of the Will, it is the duty of the person seeking declaration about the validity of the Will to dispel such suspicious circumstances. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 567. It has been held in the said decision that if a Will being registered and having regard to the other circumstances is accepted to be genuine, the mere fact that the Will is a registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicions regarding the validity of the Will where suspicions exist. It has been held that the broad statement by the witness that he had witnessed the testator admitting execution of the Will was not sufficient to dispel suspicions regarding due execution and attestation of the Will. It has been specifically held that registration of the Will by itself was not sufficient to remove the suspicion. Relying on an earlier decision of this Court reported in H. Venkatachasla Iyengar v. B.B. Thimmajamma, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 443, it has been held in the said decision that where the propounder was unable to dispel the suspicious circumstances which surrounded the question of valid execution and attestation of the Will, no letters of administration in favour of the propounder could be granted. 4. The law is well settled that the conscience of the court must be satisfied that the Will in question was not only executed and attested in the manner required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 but it should also be found that the said Will was the product of the free volition of the executant who had voluntarily executed the same after knowing and understanding the contents of the Will. Therefore, whenever there is any suspicious circumstance the obligations cast on the propounder of the Will to dispel the suspicious circumstance. Therefore, whenever there is any suspicious circumstance the obligations cast on the propounder of the Will to dispel the suspicious circumstance. As in the facts and circumstances of the case the court of appeal below did not accept the valid execution of the Will by indicating reasons and coming to a specific finding that suspicion had not been dispelled to the satisfaction of the Court and such finding of the court of appeal below has also been upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment we do not find any reason to interfere with such decision. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs." 18. The other argument that discrepancy in stating the age of testator Gurmukh Singh to be 80 years in 1978 as against the admitted age of 75 years on 9.3.1964 stated in earlier registered will Ex.P2 would not make any material difference is also devoid of merit because such a discrepancy in itself and standing all alone may not constitute a basis to discard a testamentary present coupled with various other circumstances it has to be given due importance. Along with the discrepancy in the statement of age in Ex.D1. there is no mention of cancellation of earlier registered will Ex.P2 dated 9.3.1964, whereas the pleaded case of the defendant-appellants is that the earlier will was cancelled by executing the new will Ex.D1. On the contrary in the recital of the will, no mention has been made about the cancellation and it has been observed that it was the first and the last will. The judgment of this Court relied upon by the defendant-appellants in this regard would have no application to the facts of the present case. Another argument that active participation of Jang Singh defendant-appellant 1 at the time of execution of the will is no ground to hold that the testator was influenced by him. No evidence has been brought on record showing the reasons of active participation or that Jang Singh was not seeking any favour under the will for his sons. The active participation of Jang Singh coupled with other facts raises serious doubt about genuineness of the will. The mere fact that the will is registered or that the beneficiaries under the will Ex. D1 were serving the testator would not show that the participation by Jang Singh was justified. The active participation of Jang Singh coupled with other facts raises serious doubt about genuineness of the will. The mere fact that the will is registered or that the beneficiaries under the will Ex. D1 were serving the testator would not show that the participation by Jang Singh was justified. Therefore, the aforementioned arguments raised by the learned counsel are liable to be rejected. For the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.