JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order, dated 19-12-1995, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nagaon, in Sessions Case No. 64(N) of 1995. 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be stated as follows : On 7-3-1994, at about 9.00 p.m. While Paban Nath (since deceased) went out to attend a marriage, accused Dambarudhar nath Picked up a quarrel with him at a village path and stabbed him with a dagger causing injuries on the person of Paban Nath. On alarm being raised, the informant, namely, Tapan Nath (P.W. 5), who is a younger brother of deceased Paban Nath, and other witnesses rushed to the place of occurrence and saw the accused causing injuries on Paban Nath. On noticing the witnesses, the accused fled away. The injured was brought home and, later, on, he was shifted to a hospital, where he succumbed to the injuries. On the FIR being lodged on the very night of the occurrence by Bakul Nath (P.W. 6), a relative of the said deceased, mentioning the name of the accused-appellant as assailant of the said deceased, the police registered a case against the accused and, upon completion of investigation, the police laid charge-sheet against the accused-appellant under Section 302, IPC. 3. During the trial, when the charge, framed under Section 302, IPC, was explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. In all, prosecution examined 8 witnesses. The statement of the accused was, then, recorded under Section 313, Cr. P.C. In his examination aforementioned, the accused denied that he had committed the offence alleged to have been committed by him, the case of the defence being that of total denial. No evidence was, however, adduced by the defence. 5. On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court found the accused guilty under Section 304, Part-1, IPC and convicted him accordingly and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and, in default, to suffer further imprisonment for a period of one month. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the accused-appellant has preferred this appeal. 6. I have perused the materials on record. I have heard Mr. P. Kataki, learned counsel, appearing as amicus curiae, for the accused-appellant, and Mr. Pran Bora, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam, for the State-respondent. 7. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the accused-appellant has preferred this appeal. 6. I have perused the materials on record. I have heard Mr. P. Kataki, learned counsel, appearing as amicus curiae, for the accused-appellant, and Mr. Pran Bora, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam, for the State-respondent. 7. As the evidence on record discloses, there are, broadly speaking, four incriminating circumstances, which appear against the accused-appellant, namely, (i) eye-witness's account of the occurrence, (ii) oral dying declaration said to have made by the deceased, (iii) the statement leading to the discovery of the weapon of offence and (iv) corroborating medical evidence on record. 8. Let me, first, deal with the evidence of the eye-witnesses. Two persons were altogether examined, at the trial, as eye-witnesses, namely, P.W. 2 (Tapan Nath) and P.W. 5 (Mukut Das). According to the evidence of P.W. 2 (who is younger brother of the said deceased), on the night of occurrence, shortly after Paban Nath (since deceased) went out of the house leaving P.W. 2 and his other relatives at the house, P.W. 2 heard the cries, "I am dying", P.W. 2 came running out of the house with a torch-light in his hand and saw, in the focus of his torch-light, accused Dambarudhar stabbing Paban Nath with a dagger and, on seeing P.W. 2, the accused fled away. Though P.W. 2 was put to cross-examination at length, nothing could be elicited from him to show that what he had deposed was false. This apart, the torch-light (Mat. Ext. 5), which P.W. 2 spoke of, was seized by the police and the name of the accused as the assailant of the deceased Paban Nath found mentioned in the FIR (Ext. 1), which was lodged on the very night of the occurrence by P.W. 6 (Bakul Nath), a relative of the said deceased. 9. It was, indeed, elicited by the defence that though P.W. 2 has claimed, at the trial, that he had seen the accused stabbing Paban Nath on the back, what he had stated before the police was that he had seen the accused stabbing his brother with a dagger. Thus, the only improvement, which P.W. 2 is shown to have made is as regards the location of the part of the body, where P.W. 2 had seen the accused dealing blows with dagger. Thus, the only improvement, which P.W. 2 is shown to have made is as regards the location of the part of the body, where P.W. 2 had seen the accused dealing blows with dagger. This improvement is, undoubtedly, of no material significance inasmuch as it only relates to the place, where the dagger was hit. Such inconsistency is, in fact, hallmark of truth and natural discrepancy. 10. It is also note worthy that though P.W. 2 is the brother of the deceased, the fact remains that the relationship of the prosecution witness with the deceased cannot, in itself, be a ground for disbelieving his testimony unless the evidence on record makes it possible to infer that the witness was not speaking the truth and/or attempting to spare the real assailant. As a matter of fact, a close relative of a person, who is killed, will be most reluctant to spare the real assailant and falsely implicate another person in place of the real assailant. Relationship, in itself, cannot be a ground for rejecting the testimony of a witness unless there is evidence on record to show existence of animus against the accused. When a witness is a relative of a deceased, his evidence is subjected to careful scrutiny and, on a careful and cautious examination, if his testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable, then, the Court may rely on such evidence. Reference, in this regard, may be made to State of U.P. v. Samman Das and State of U. P. v. Vinod Kumar, reported in. 11. In the case at hand, though P.W. 2 is a brother of the deceased, the fact remains that nothing has been brought on record to show that deceased Paban and/or P.W. 2 were inimical towards the accused. This apart, consistent with the description of the occurrence given by P.W. 2, the police seized, as already indicated above, the torch-light (Mat. Ext. 5). Coupled with this, the FIR, which was promptly lodged on the very night of the occurrence, mentioned the name of the accused as the sole assailant. In the face of these facts, when the evidence of P.W. 2 was found to have remained unshaken by the defence, there is no reason as to why his evidence should not have been relied upon. In the face of these facts, when the evidence of P.W. 2 was found to have remained unshaken by the defence, there is no reason as to why his evidence should not have been relied upon. Viewed from this angle, the reliance placed by the learned trial Court on the evidence of P.W. 2 cannot be said to be erroneous. 12. It may be pointed out, at this stage, that though P.W. 5 (Mukut Das), a neighbour of the said deceased, was examined as an eye-witness, he merely deposed that on hearing hulla, when he came to the house of deceased Paban Nath, he found Paban Nath lying injured there. This witness was declared hostile by the prosecution and put him to cross-examination. It is trite that the evidence of a hostile witness, in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, cannot be used for impeaching the credibility of the evidence of other witnesses, who support the case of the prosecution. Far from this, the evidence of a hostile witness can be relied upon to the extent that the same lends support to other reliable pieces of evidence on record. Reference may be made to Kamljit Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in wherein the Apex Court, while dealing with the evidence of a hostile witness, who had resiled from his statement made during investigation, observed thus, "Though injured (P.W. 6) resiled from the statement during investigation, he clearly supported the presence of P.W. 5. Merely because this witness made a departure from what he stated at the time of investigation, his entire evidence did not get wiped out. It is always open to a Court to act on a portion of evidence tendered by a witness, who does not support the prosecution." 13. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that in the case at hand, P.W. 2, nowhere, deposed that he had seen P.W. 5 at the place of occurrence. Looked at from this angle, when P.W. 5 had claimed that he was not an eye-witness to the occurrence, the evidence of P.W. 5 cannot be said to have adversely affected the credibility of the evidence of P.W. 2. 14. Looked at from this angle, when P.W. 5 had claimed that he was not an eye-witness to the occurrence, the evidence of P.W. 5 cannot be said to have adversely affected the credibility of the evidence of P.W. 2. 14. Because of what has been discussed above, it clearly follows that so far as the evidence of P.W. 2, as an eye-witness, is concerned, the same has remained unshaken and can be safely be relied upon. 15. Coupled with the above, it is in the evidence of P.W. 2 that after the accused had fled away, the injured was brought home and, then, he was taken to hospital on a pulling cart and while he was being shifted from the said hospital to Nagaon Civil Hospital, the injured died. P.W. 2 has also clarified, In his cross-examination, that he was told by deceased Paban Nath that there was an altercation with Dambarudhar Nath over a radio and Dambarudhar Nath (accused i.e. the appellant) assaulted him because of that reason. 16. Close on the heels of the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 6 (Bakul Nath), who is a relative of the said deceased, has deposed that upon hearing the cries, he went to the house of Paban Nath and found him lying injured there and, upon being asked by him (P.W. 6), Paban Nath (deceased) told him that Dambarudhar Nath (i.e., accused-appellant) had assaulted him with a dagger. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 6 that the injured was put on a pulling cart and taken to hospital and the doctors advised P.W. 6 and others, at the hospital, to shift the injured to Nagaon Civil Hospital, but the injured died at that very hospital. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 6 that he lodged the FIR, which is Ext. 2. I have carefully scanned the evidence of P.W. 6, but I find that the defence has completely failed to elicit anything from his cross-examination to show that what P.W. 6 deposed was untrue or false. 17. In the present case, there is, admittedly, no written dying declaration, but the information given to P.W. 6 by the injured as to who had injured him has been treated by the learned trial Court as an oral dying declaration. 17. In the present case, there is, admittedly, no written dying declaration, but the information given to P.W. 6 by the injured as to who had injured him has been treated by the learned trial Court as an oral dying declaration. While considering this dying declaration, it is of immense importance to note that the prosecution witnesses have clarified that deceased Paban was in a fit condition to make statement and these assertions have not been controverted by the defence by cross-examining the witnesses nor did the defence elicite from the doctor anything to show that with the kind of injuries sustained by the said injured, he could not have made any such statement. 18. Coupled with the above, the medical evidence on record discloses that the injured had received the following injuries : "1. Incised wound over the left shoulder joint. Margin 5" x 2" x 2". 2. Fracture of left clavicle. 3. Fracture wound over the area in between ring finger and little finger (right) 1" x 1"x 1". 4. Incised wound over the right region 4" x 2" x 2" 5. Incised wound over the right side of the thigh cutting the membrane ribs and ventricle. 6. Incised wound over the left index finger". 19. In the opinion of the doctor, the injuries were ante-mortem and homicidal in nature and the same were sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course. The doctor has also opined that the injuries could have been caused by a dagger and that the death, in the instant case, was caused due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries sustained. It needs to be emphasized that the medical evidence on record has not been challenged or disputed by the defence. 20. Thus, the medical evidence on record lends great support to the oral dying declaration inasmuch as the evidence on record clearly shows that deceased Paban Nath sustained multiple incised wounds, which could have been caused by a weapon like a dagger. Furthermore, there was no reason for the deceased to falsely implicate the accused. Hence, I am firmly of the view that the oral dying declaration was truthful version as to the cause of death of the said deceased and the reliance placed thereon by the learned trial Court was not unjustified. 21. Furthermore, there was no reason for the deceased to falsely implicate the accused. Hence, I am firmly of the view that the oral dying declaration was truthful version as to the cause of death of the said deceased and the reliance placed thereon by the learned trial Court was not unjustified. 21. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay the Apex Court has clearly laid down that there is no absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be made the sole basis of conviction, when corroborated. In this case, the Apex Court has clarified that a dying declaration would be subjected to close scrutiny and once the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was a truthful version as to the cause of death, there is no need of further corroboration. Need of corroboration will arise only if the surrounding circumstances are not clear. This principle of law so laid down has been reiterated by the Apex Court in State of U. P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav wherein the Apex Court observed as follows : "It is well settled that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration............ There is not even a rule or prudence, which has been hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. The primary effort of the Court has to be to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no question of corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not clear or convincing that the Court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying declaration." 22. Turning to the case at hand, it may be emphasized that the evidence of dying declaration given by P.W. 6, when put to scrutiny, remains unshaken and transpires to be simple, consistent, coherent and natural. The dying declaration, therefore, inspires great confidence. 23. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that the medical evidence on record amply supports the version of the occurrence, as narrated by the eye-witness, namely, P.W. 2. This apart, the oral dying declaration made by the deceased also lends substantial corroboration to the eye-witness's account of the occurrence. 24. The dying declaration, therefore, inspires great confidence. 23. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that the medical evidence on record amply supports the version of the occurrence, as narrated by the eye-witness, namely, P.W. 2. This apart, the oral dying declaration made by the deceased also lends substantial corroboration to the eye-witness's account of the occurrence. 24. It is also imperative to note that according to the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 7), the accused, soon after the occurrence, absconded and later on, he surrendered before the Court, whereupon the accused was taken into custody by the police and, or interrogation, he made a statement, which was recorded and based on this statement (Ext. 7), he led the police to the recovery of weapon of assault, i.e., dagger (M. Ext. 1), which was found kept hidden under the earth and Ext. 3 is the seizure list in this regard. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 7 that the accused also produced a radio. This radio was also seized, according to the evidence of P.W. 7, on being produced by the accused. 25. The evidence of the witnesses to the seizure as well as the Investigating Officer remained wholly unshaken in cross-examination by the defence. The relevant portion of the statement, marked as Ext. 7, which is claimed to have led to the discovery of the weapon of assault runs thus ; "I told the police that I would produce the dagger from the place, where I have kept the same hidden". 26. It may be pointed out that a careful reading of Section 27 of the Evidence Act shows that when a fact Is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person, who is accused of an offence and is in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. The discovery of fact is not to be confused or equated with the recovery of incriminating material object, such as, weapon of assault, etc. The fact discovered embraces the place from where the object was produced/recovered and the knowledge of the accused on such subject matter. The discovery of fact is not to be confused or equated with the recovery of incriminating material object, such as, weapon of assault, etc. The fact discovered embraces the place from where the object was produced/recovered and the knowledge of the accused on such subject matter. Information supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed tin the roof of my house" does not really lead to the discovery of a knife; what such information does it to lead to the discovery of the fact that a knife is kept concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and If the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered become very relevant. Reference may, in this regard, be made to Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67 : 1947 Cri LJ 533.......... In State of Maharashtra v. Damu wherein the accused had told the police, "Dipak's dead body was carried by me and Guruji (A-2) on his motorcycle and thrown in the canal," Supreme Court treated the statement as admissible because of the recovery of broken pieces of the tail lamp of the motor cycle of the accused holding that the police had thereby discovered that the accused had carried the dead body on that motorcycle to the spot. 27. In the case at hand too, the discovery is not of the dagger, for, dagger was discovered centuries back. The fact discovered is really the fact that it was the accused, who had kept the said dagger concealed under the earth and the same was recovered on being produced by the accused himself. In view of the fact that the place from where the weapon was recovered is the house of the accused; hence, in the light of the statement (Ext. 7) given by the accused, there can be no escape from the conclusion that it was the accused, who had kept the dagger concealed there. This statement was, indeed, admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the same was a serious incriminating circumstance against the accused; but this circumstance too has remained wholly unshaken. Moreover, the accused also produced the radio, which, in the light of the evidence of P.W. 2, as indicated hereinabove, had led to the quarrel between the accused and the said deceased. Moreover, the accused also produced the radio, which, in the light of the evidence of P.W. 2, as indicated hereinabove, had led to the quarrel between the accused and the said deceased. This is yet another serious incriminating circumstance, which the defence failed to shake or impeach. 28. What, thus, emerges from the above discussion is that the eye-witness's account of the occurrence as well as the oral dying declaration remained unshaken and the medical evidence on record lent material support to their unimpeachable evidence. This apart, the statement made by the accused leading to the recovery of the dagger amply demonstrates that it was the accused, who had kept the dagger, in question, hidden in his house and had produced the same before the police. The facts, which so emerge, leave no room for doubt and it was none, but the accused, who had assaulted and injured the said Paban Nath. 29. In the present case, although the weapon of assault used was a dagger, which can be a lethal weapon, and the doctor found as many as 6 injuries on the person of the deceased, the fact remains that none of these injuries was on any vital part of the body inasmuch as the same remained confined within the hands and feet of the deceased. This apart, the entire occurrence took place, as revealed from the evidence on record, on a petty quarrel over a radio. Considering all these facts, I am of the view that the learned trial Court was wholly correct in concluding that the offence, which was proved to have been committed by the accused, fell within the ambit of the provisions of Section304, Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. 30. I have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that the evidence on record proved the accused-appellant guilty of an offence under Section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, I see no reason to interfere with the conviction of the accused-appellant. So far as the sentence passed against the accused-appellant is concerned, the same too, in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, cannot be said to be unreasonable or harsh. Thus, in short, the conviction as well as the sentence passed against the accused-appellant deserve no interference by this Court. 31. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this appeal. Thus, in short, the conviction as well as the sentence passed against the accused-appellant deserve no interference by this Court. 31. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this appeal. Hence, the appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. 32. Send back the LCR.