JUDGMENT 1. - Heard.This second appeal arises out of the decision of the first appellate Court namely, Additional District Judge No. 4, Sriganganagar dated 26.4.2003 by virtue of which the first appellate Court reversed the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Sriganganagar dated 18.4.2002. 2. The suit was filed by the landlord against the appellant on various grounds. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. On appeal being filed by the landlord, the first appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial Court on issues No. 4, 5 and 6 and passed a decree in favour of the landlord on the ground of personal necessity. The question of comparative hardship and partial eviction was not gone into by the trial Court because both the parties submitted before the trial Court that by partial eviction, the need of neither of parties would be satisfied. Since, the question of partial eviction was not contested by both the parties. therefore, it is not germane to the facts of this case and partial eviction being not germane, this Court was addressed on the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity only. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that the first appellate Court while reversing the findings of the trial Court has erred in considering the evidence adduced by both the parties in right perspective. The evidence being considered in the fashion in which first appellate Court 20 has considered, that amounts to misreading of evidence and thus, substantial question of law arises in the matter. Plaint, written statement and other parties of the evidence were read to me in extensor and it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff is an old man. He is alleged to have been busy in business. His mode of business has been to 25 roam around and sell paints and hardware. Learned counsel further submitted that plaintiff has submitted that he is now tired and exhausted, therefore, it is not possible for him to go around and do the business, therefore, he bona fidely requires the demised premises. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that in 30 plaint, the plaintiff described the demised premises as a godown. Learned counsel further submitted that plaintiff has submitted that he is now tired and exhausted, therefore, it is not possible for him to go around and do the business, therefore, he bona fidely requires the demised premises. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that in 30 plaint, the plaintiff described the demised premises as a godown. If this premise is a godown, then, there cannot be a personal necessity of the plaintiff as a shop whereas, the case of the defendants is that right from the inception, they have been using the demised premises as a shop for selling electrical goods. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted teat the question of fact having been rightly determined by the trial court, it was not for the first appellate Court to have gone against the findings of the trial Court without there being any substantial error committed by the trial Court. Trial Court on appreciation of evidence, had come to a particular conclusion. 40 Merely because the first appellate Court desires to take a different view on the facts, evidence and the material on record, it gets no jurisdiction to decide differently than what the trial Court has decided. This approach of the first appellate Court in reversing the decree of the trial Court is erroneous and un-supported in law. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has further emphasised that when there are contrary findings and the evidence has not been considered by the Court below in right perspective, High Court in second appeal should correct the error committed by the first appellate Court because High Court has the jurisdiction even in limited jurisdiction conferred on it under section 100 CPC to correct such mistakes committed by the Courts below. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has emphasised that the plaintiff had failed to show that he has the resources to launch a business. It has also not been established by the plaintiff that he has sufficient fund to start his business. This has also been emphasised by the learned counsel for the 5 appellants that he is a sick man. He has admitted that he is suffering from mental disease and for which he was even hospitalised. It has also not been established by the plaintiff that he has sufficient fund to start his business. This has also been emphasised by the learned counsel for the 5 appellants that he is a sick man. He has admitted that he is suffering from mental disease and for which he was even hospitalised. Such being the physical and mental condition of the landlord, learned counsel for the appellants raises the question that this would not confer that agility and competency in the plaintiff to launch a new business at an advanced age of o around 60 years. This is too late in the day to have competitive spirits to launch a new enterprise. The entrepreneurship of such an old man without financial resources and necessary expertise, would not permit him to start a business of the nature he has asked for. 8. In fact, the plaintiff is a greedy man. He has raised the rent in the 15 past which started at the initial rent of Rs. 888/- and has been raised to Rs. 975/-. When the plaintiff has been raising rent in the past. it should be presumed that for future also, he is desirous of only money and he has also demanded Rs. 3,000/- per month. Thus, it is not the personal need which can be said to be a 3,000/- per month. Thus, it is not the personal need which 20 can be said to be a bona fide necessity but the guiding factor of the plaintiff is the greed of the plaintiff to increase the rent. When such ulterior motive forms the basis of the suit filed by the landlord, plaintiff should not be permitted to destabilise the established business of a tenant in which tenant has put his life time achievement and earned goodwill. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has emphasised that no documentary evidence has been produced by the plaintiff to establish that in past, he was engaged in any business of hardware and paints. He has not filed any bank statement. He is not even an income-tax prayer and that shows that he is hardly a person who has any competence to undertake a business. He has not even claimed that he has a licence for running a business which has been deposed to be in the name of his spouse. He has not filed any bank statement. He is not even an income-tax prayer and that shows that he is hardly a person who has any competence to undertake a business. He has not even claimed that he has a licence for running a business which has been deposed to be in the name of his spouse. That being the position, the bona fides of the plaintiff in showing that he is in bona fide need of the premises in question to establish his business, are subject to serious doubts and when there are questions about the credentials of the plaintiff, the first appellate Court should agree with the findings arrived at by the trial Court which is the basic Court of facts. 10. No documentary evidence having been given in support of the assertions of the plaintiff, his case is based on oral evidence. There is oath against oath and the appellants have denied the allegations in their 40 statement, therefore, the case is not established by the plaintiff as is required in law to give jurisdiction to the first appellate Court to interfere. The desire of the appellants cannot be equated with the requirement much less bona fide requirement. There is a difference in between desire and actual need. Thus, in the facts of this case, the first appellate Court had only blown out of as proportion an element of desire expressed by the plaintiff to decide the case in his favour. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on a decision rendered by this Court in the matter of J.C. Mandoza v. J.L. Martin reported in 1975 WLN (UC) page 310 . In this case this Court was considering the question of landlord who after retiring from the service at Bombay expressed his desire to shift to Ajmer. This Court did not approve the statement of the learned counsel in the background that the children were staying at Bombay. None of them had shifted to Ajmer. Even the plaintiff had 1 not come to Ajmer. In this background. this Court was of the opinion that it was only a mere desire to shift to Ajmer and there was no real intention. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants speaks writ large that it has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this background. this Court was of the opinion that it was only a mere desire to shift to Ajmer and there was no real intention. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants speaks writ large that it has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. The 5 landlord has not been living outside. He has been living and transacting business in Ganganagar itself as a 'Ferriwaia'. If his statement can be compressed into one single word and if he has been doing business roaming around and has a premise let out to the tenant then, the predicament of such a landlord can be read and understood from the evidence and can put every landlord to an understanding that it is not always advisable to rent out premises. May be that you need it for personal use. If tenant is paying money, then accepting tenant's stand that he will continue to pay money, notwithstanding the landlord being a Terriwala', in my humble opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, will not govern the facts of this case. 15 Therefore, no help is rendered by the law laid down by the case cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. 12. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is in the matter of Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 , wherein, Supreme Court has held as under . "Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business is not decisive. It is for the Court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona tide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and 25 not a subjective one. The word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show-the burden being upon him-that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. The word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show-the burden being upon him-that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. The Additional 30 District Judge did not mis-direct himself in regard to these matters, as for example, by misconstruing the word 'required' or by erroneously placing the burden of proof on the appellant and no error of law was committed by him in arriving at the finding of fact in regard to the question of bona fide requirement of the respondent, which would entitle the High Court in second appeal to interfere with that finding of fact." 13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the finding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Supreme Court says that it is for the Court to determine the truth of the assertions. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff 40 and defendant both that the plaintiff has no premises where he can transact his business. The defendant-tenant has tried to show that neither he has money nor he has the resources or expertise to support his business. These are too mundane considerations to deny the need of the landlord. 14. An opportunity to do business for his support, may be in old days, 45 cannot be termed as wishful thinking. The tenant is admittedly running another business. He manages a marriage palace where weddings are held. When the tenant has an alternative source of income, then in believing the words of the landlord, that he is desirous to start some business, cannot be said to be fanciful flight. 15. The first appellate Court has come to the conclusion that assertions of the plaintiff are bona tide. The stand of the landlord has been relied upon in the background that there had been an alternative source of income available with the tenant. In this background, the landlord cannot be deprived of being provided with an opportunity to do some business at a premises which has been constructed for his benefit only because the tenant says that s he wants to remain there. In this background, the landlord cannot be deprived of being provided with an opportunity to do some business at a premises which has been constructed for his benefit only because the tenant says that s he wants to remain there. The law regarding tenancy has never been understood to be that harsh that the tenant will enjoy facilities of running business and the landlord will be a by-stander and will have to satisfy with whatever meagre amount he receives as rent. Thus, the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is of no consequence in the facts and to circumstances of this case. 16. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is in the matter of Ms. Zahed v. K. Raghavan, AIR 1999 SC 219 . It has been held by the Supreme Court as under "In the instant case in the light of the available accommodation with the plaintiff-landlord, it cannot be said that this requirement for additional space is reasonable thought it cannot be doubted that it is a bona fide one. However, for the purpose of applicability of Section 21(1)(h), the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord has to be both bona fide and reasonable. If any of these two elements of requirement is missing or both the elements are missing on the facts of the case, no decree for possession can be passed in favour of the landlord under this provision." 17. Learned counsel for the appellants relying on the aforesaid decision, has submitted that it was required to establish and found by the Court that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide and reasonable. If 25 these elements are missing them, no decree of possession could have been passed in favour of the landlord on appreciation of evidence. The first appellate Court found that the plaintiff is having no premises to transact business. This shows that the plaintiff should ask for a premises. Whether he bona fidely asked for it or not, can be judged from the admitted fact that 30 there is no business being conducted by the plaintiff is any shop. The tenant has set up a case that landlord has no credentials to run business, he has neither licence nor expertise. Whether he bona fidely asked for it or not, can be judged from the admitted fact that 30 there is no business being conducted by the plaintiff is any shop. The tenant has set up a case that landlord has no credentials to run business, he has neither licence nor expertise. This means that as and when a plaintiff is required to do business, he has to first have an expertise and licence and without proving such facts, he cannot ask his premises to be vacated. It cannot be said that the law requires such a strict proof. Thus, the law laid down does not help the appellants in the facts of this case. 18. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is in the matter of Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, JT 2001(5) SC 380 , wherein it has been held as under "There must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bona fide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bona fide requirement' must be in present and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own for his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation. The judgment of the High Court clearly bears out the position that the lower Courts had failed to consider the requirements of the Section regarding availability of reasonable accommodation in occupation of the I landlord-appellant 19. If the ratio of this case is applied, then the first question is whether the landlord has any suitable accommodation available to him. In the instant case, neither it is a case of the appellants nor it was put forward as a 5 defence in his written statement or evidence that the landlord has any suitable accommodation to his credit, therefore, that part of the matter read by the Court goes against the appellants. In the instant case, neither it is a case of the appellants nor it was put forward as a 5 defence in his written statement or evidence that the landlord has any suitable accommodation to his credit, therefore, that part of the matter read by the Court goes against the appellants. If the landlord has no other alternative accommodation and has only premises, then. if he shows his desire to start business. then neither age can be a handicap nor the financial to resources. Sixty years in the present day circumstances, cannot be said to be old age and financial resources are available in abundance. One only has to ask or a bank loan to start a business. Therefore, the ratio of this case is also no consequence to the tenant-appellants. 20. Next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is 15 that of Iswar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, AIR 2000 SC page 426 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite 20 conclusion. This principle has been laid down in a series of judgments of this Court in relation to Section 100 CPC after the 1976 amendment. In Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, 1988 Supp SCC 710 , while dealing with a second appeal of 1978 decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 20.8.1981, L.M. Sharma, J. (as he then was) observed 25 that "The Court (the first appellate Court) is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refused to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a 30 substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case. In that case, an admission by the defendant-tenant in the reply notice in regard to the plaintiff's title and the description of the plaintiff as 'owner' of the property signed by the defendant were not considered by the first appellate Court while holding that the plaintiff had not proved his title. This is the situation in the present case. In that case, an admission by the defendant-tenant in the reply notice in regard to the plaintiff's title and the description of the plaintiff as 'owner' of the property signed by the defendant were not considered by the first appellate Court while holding that the plaintiff had not proved his title. The High Court interfered with the finding on the ground of non-consideration of vital evidence and this Court affirmed the said decision. That was upheld in Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 with reference to a second appeal of 1978 40 disposed of on 5.4.1991. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) held : "Where the findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings." Again in Surendra Naichka Vadiyar v. Ramaswami Ayyar, 1995 Supple (4) SCC 534 , it was held that where certain vital documents for deciding the question of possession were ignored such as a compromise, an order of the revenue Court reliance on oral evidence was unjustified. In yet another case in Mehrunissa v. Visham Kumari, (1998) 2 SCC 295 : AIR 1998 SC 427 , arising out of Second Appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996, it was held by Venkataswami, J. that a finding arrived at by ignoring the second notice issued by the landlady and without noticing that the suit was not based on earlier notices, was vitiated and the High Court could interfere with such a finding. This was in Second Appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In Sri Chand v. Gulzar Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 143 : AIR 1992 SC 123 , it was held that the High Court was right in interfering in Second Appeal where the lower appellate Court relied upon an admission of a third party treating it as binding on the defendant. The admission was inadmissible as against the defendant. This was also a Second Appeal of 1981 disposed of on 24.9.1985." 21. In this judgment. The admission was inadmissible as against the defendant. This was also a Second Appeal of 1981 disposed of on 24.9.1985." 21. In this judgment. Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down two principles, one is when material is not considered. In the instant case, learned counsel for the appellants has said that material evidence has not been considered. Learned counsel for the appellants states that the landlord was having no licence. He has not produced his income-tax returns and had admitted that he does not pay income tax. He has not shown his bank balance and has not stated that he is engaged in the business of Hardware and paints. Thus, he has no experience of running business. 22. All these facts have not been pleaded in the plaint and have not shown to have been existed in evidence. Thus, these were the factors which were put forward by the appellants. That being no part of the pleadings and 25 evidence, it could not have been argued and this does not fall within the category decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment in question. 23. The second situation narrated by the Supreme Court is to the effect when finding of facts has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on the inadmissible evidence. 24. Per contra, Mr. R.K. Thanvi, appearing for the defendant urged that the case which was not germane from the pleadings and evidence, has been made the basis of dismissing the suit. Learned trial Court has dismissed the suit on the basis of the points formulated by it. The first appellate Court has noticed those questions. Firstly, that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he has sufficient fund for starting a business of hardware and paints. Secondly, the plaintiff has failed to establish any documentary evidence to establish the fact that presently, he is doing business as a 'Ferriwala' going from village to village and he has grown old, therefore, he wants to do business at the shop. The third reason was that the plaintiff has said that he is a sick and infirm man. Apart from these questions, the appellants have also urged that it is not a mere wish but substantial questions should have been pleaded by the plaintiff. The third reason was that the plaintiff has said that he is a sick and infirm man. Apart from these questions, the appellants have also urged that it is not a mere wish but substantial questions should have been pleaded by the plaintiff. According to the learned counsel for the respondent none of these grounds were either pleaded, so much so, that none of the questions was dilated upon and no light was thrown on these issues. If the issues were not the bone of contention between the parties at trial and were not the basis of contest, then it was not open for the trial Court to dismiss the suit on these grounds. These grounds were not the grounds of attack by the defendant to the case of the plaintiff. These were mere fanciful considerations put forward by the appellants in arguments. 25. Arguments can be raised only on the basis of contentions raised in pleadings and evidence. If the parties have not pleaded facts and have not led evidence then such arguments are not to be made the basis of arriving at finding in favour of the tenant. The judgment of the trial Court cannot be said to be based on the material on record and would be considered as a judgment based on extraneous considerations. It can be said to be based on such facts, which were not germane to the controversy. Thus. the first appellate Court after having noticed all these considerations, Came to the s conclusion after appreciating evidence. The finding of the trial Court are not based on material on record. The appellate Court has proceeded to record its own findings. Evidence of the plaintiff has been relied upon wherein, he has stated that now my body is tired and he cannot now go out and he needs premises for doing his own business, which he has described to be lo business of hardware and paints. He also said that in case, he is not favoured with an order of eviction then, he will face greater hardship than Jugal Kishore and Narendra Doomra, appellants. 26. The statement of the plaintiff has been noted by the first appellate Court in extenso and a finding has been recorded that the plaintiff is a sick 15 and an infirm man. He has been doing business roaming around here and there. 26. The statement of the plaintiff has been noted by the first appellate Court in extenso and a finding has been recorded that the plaintiff is a sick 15 and an infirm man. He has been doing business roaming around here and there. Now, if he needs a shop then, it cannot be said that his requirement is not bonafide. Since, he has no other premises to his credit, it cannot also be said to be erring the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff needs it reasonably and bona fidely. The defendant has alternative 20 source of income because he has Ganga Palace and Suhag Palace to manage where he rents out these palaces for marriages and other ancillary requirements of marriage and all this has been found on the admission of OW-1 wherein, he claims that the shop in question has become his 'adds' and to run those business of marriage, he needs these premises. If it is held 25 that the plaintiff in this background has bonafide and reasonable necessity then, that would be a contingency where it can be safely said that the law has been understood to be one to the extremities of harshness to the plaintiff. He has premises of his own. His tenant is enjoying, he in his old days cannot even claim possession of the shop. That cannot be the intention 30 of the law. The findings of the first appellate Court if considered, cannot be said to be without foundation. 27. If there are reasonable and sufficient circumstances available on record and if the first appellate Court notices them and finds in favour of the landlord. then in the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the findings are perverse or without any foundation. Thus, it has been canvassed on the part of the respondent that the case as set up by the appellants not only deserves to be dismissed but a stringent view is required to be taken wherein, it has been sought to be challenged on the ground that he needs the shop without any whisper in the statement or cross-examination being directed against the 40 plaintiff, no question was asked. Merely by stating in the written statement, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was desirous of only raising the rent and was not desirous of getting the vacant possession of the shop in question. 28. Learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Har Narain Daga v. Heera Lal & Ors., reported in (2001) 1 SCC page 41 wherein, Supreme Court has held as under : "We have perused the judgments passed by the trial Court, the first appellate Court and the High Court. The question of bonafide personal necessity is essentially a question of fact on which all the three Courts have concurrently held against the appellant. The case of the respondents that he needs the room on the ground floor for use by himself and his four growing children (sons) has been accepted by the Courts below. The Courts nave also accepted the case that the respondent who is an assistant teacher in a Government middle school is often approached by students for giving private coaching, for the purpose of which he needs the room on the ground floor in view of the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, the High Court was justified in not interfering with the finding in the second appeal.' 29. Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has held that the question of bona fide personal necessity is essentially a question of fact on which all the three Counsel have held concurrently against the appellant. in this case, () though the case is of concurrent findings. but the learned counsel for the respondent states that the trial Court had gone astray and has considered regulations which were neither available in the pleadings nor in evidence. That being the position, if the first appellate Court has noticed all those circumstances and then, given a definite finding regarding the facts, then that 15 question of fact cannot be reopened in exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 CPC in second appeal. 30. I respectfully agree with the proposition laid by the Supreme Court because if the questions of fact were required to be judged and re-opened in second appeal, then the amendment made in the Civil Procedure Code in 1977 would be defeated and such cannot be the intention of the Courts, which exercise their powers under the law. 31. 30. I respectfully agree with the proposition laid by the Supreme Court because if the questions of fact were required to be judged and re-opened in second appeal, then the amendment made in the Civil Procedure Code in 1977 would be defeated and such cannot be the intention of the Courts, which exercise their powers under the law. 31. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is that of Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC page 134 : 2002(1) CDR 835 (SC) , wherein. Supreme Court has noticed the scope of 25 Section 100 CPC and has found that concurrent findings of fact could not be disturbed in second appeal even prior to amendment made in 1977. Doing so after amendment made in CPC in 1977 would only determine the generous application of Section 100 CPC and such liberal construction by doing appreciation of evidence. would amount to assessment of a jurisdiction by 30 interfering in second appeal because another view is possible on appreciation of evidence. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down in this case that one view having been taken, if the High Court on appreciation of evidence comes to the conclusion that another view is possible, then such interference is impermissible. 32. I have considered the rival submissions and have given my thoughtful consideration. The finding arrived at by the appellate Court is that the plaintiff was not engaged in business of hardware and paints in the past but that has no impediment on starting a new business. That being the position, it cannot be said that the consideration of the first appellate Court is misconceived. Even a man having no experience can always venture for a new kind of business. Experience is always not available to a person starting business afresh. It can be acquired with the passing of time. Therefore, it cannot be said that in absence of having any kind of experience for the proposed business. the plaintiff never needed the shop in question bona fidely. 33. Availability of funds again is a question which is of no significance as far as the plaintiff is concerned because financial situation in the country is so overwhelming that finances are available on asking. Once can see advertisements of Banks in newspapers offering loan at a very low rate of so interest. 33. Availability of funds again is a question which is of no significance as far as the plaintiff is concerned because financial situation in the country is so overwhelming that finances are available on asking. Once can see advertisements of Banks in newspapers offering loan at a very low rate of so interest. Therefore, this stand of the appellants, is of no consequence. The plaintiff having got tired and sick of doing business by circling and roaming around in the villages, at his age he can always look forward to relegate to his own premises for doing business. Therefore. requirement can always be I said to be bona fide. Learned counsel for the tenant has blown out of proportion the question of experience and availability of funds. If these questions are permitted to be raised for judging the bona fides of assertion of the tenant, 5 then apart from proving the required facts, a landlord will always be required to prove collateral facts also. The tenant admits that the landlord is a businessman. A businessman can always be expected to shift his discipline Only because certain details are fancifully ought by the tenant, his competence to run the desired business cannot be doubted. Running of to business and competence of the landlord, when he is already in business without a premises, establishes the bona fides of landlord. It cannot be said that a businessman who is doing business without premises, only has a wishful thinking and not the real desire. 34. The appellants are running a parallel business of two marriage 15 houses. The present premises are being used by them as an operational point to control the functioning of those two marriage houses. The appellants are having an alternative business of a size which by itself puts them in a position where they can comfortably sustain themselves as businessmen. If the present premise are not provided to the landlord then 20 his livelihood will be in jeopardy. Such being the condition, the findings of the Courts below cannot be seen as to be vitiated on any count as suggested by the tenant. The purpose of enacting rent laws cannot be permitted to be defined of a nature. that the landlord will be forced to do his business by roaming and the tenant will enjoy the fruits of his premises. The purpose of enacting rent laws cannot be permitted to be defined of a nature. that the landlord will be forced to do his business by roaming and the tenant will enjoy the fruits of his premises. When the tenant 25 has another suitable business with him and he uses the premises only as an "adda" he cannot be heard to say that landlord is not equipped to do the business desired by him. In the aforesaid circumstances, no merit is seen in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants. The questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are not such which 30 require this Court to go into in second appeal because they are the questions of fact. 35. No substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The appeal having no force, is hereby dismissed at the admission stage.Appeal Dismissed-Decision of First Appellate Court Upheld. *******