Judgment Heard Sri Dharam Veer, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.C. Pande, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By means of present writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders passed by the courts below. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that in mutation case no. 30/ 1981 of 1994-95 order was passed on 29-12-1994. The petitioner has moved an application under Section 201 of the Land Revenue Act and the exparte order was set aside on 18-2-1994. The petitioner thereafter has filed a suit under Section 229-6 / 176 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act before the S.D.O./ Assistant Collector 1st Class, Kashipur on 7th September 1995 for declaring him as the co-sharer of 1/7th share and also for establishing his separate Khata by holding the will as null and void document. 4. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during the proceedings of the revenue suit the respondent nos. 1 to 10 have filed a copy of the will dated 25-9-1994. The suit was dismissed on 21-6-1999. The petitioner has filed an appeal against the said order before the Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital being Z.A. appeal no. 161/173 of 1998-99/ 38/ of 99-2000 Nazar Singh vs. Mukhtiyar Singh and others. The Additional Commissioner vide his order dated 10-8-2001 has dismissed the said appeal. The petitioner has preferred second appeal before the Chief Revenue Commissioner Circuit Court Uttaranchal, Nainital along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act he has mentioned the cause of delay that he was ill. In paragraph-1 of the application it has been stated that within time he has applied for the copies of the judgement and decree and got the appeal prepared but due to non-formation of Rajaswa Parishad the appeal could not be filed. However he also fell ill as he is aged about 80 years and therefore he could not contact his counsel and he was under the impression that the counsel must have filed the appeal. When he met to the Advocate concerned on 16-9-2002 he conveyed to the petitioner that the appeal has been returned back on account of the fact that the appeal could not be filed within time. When he met to the Advocate concerned on 16-9-2002 he conveyed to the petitioner that the appeal has been returned back on account of the fact that the appeal could not be filed within time. The second appellate court has rejected the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that each day's delay has not been explained by the petitioner and 9 months delay was excessive and hence the application U/S 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected, hence the present writ petition. 6. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since he has explained the delay in filing the second appeal and has sufficiently explained it in his affidavit that the could not file the appeal on account of the fact that he was ill and he is aged about 80 years and believing the counsel that the must have filed the same the delay had occurred. Counsel for the respondent Sri M.C. Pande has submitted that the delay was on account of the own latches of the petitioner. He has also submitted synopsis along with the written argument. He has also submitted that valuable right in his favour cannot be disturbed lightly. He has referred the following case laws in support of his connection : (i) Ramlal and others vs. Riwa Cold Field Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court, page 361, paras 7 and 8. (ii) The State of West Bengal vs. The Administrator Hawara Municipality and others; AIR 1972 Supreme Court, page 749 para 26 to 31. (iii) Ram Kala vs. Deputy Director Consolidation (1997) 7 S.C.C. 498, para No.5. (iv) P.K. Ramchandran Vs. State of Kerala and others (1997) 7 SCC page 556, paras 3, 5 and 6. (v) K. Ayya Thaylnayagiammal vs. T. V. Thomas A.L.R. 2000(40) page 519 para-2. (vi) Sohan Vs. Abdul Hameed AIR 1976 All. Page 159 para 2. (vii) State of V.P. and others vs. Harishanker Dubey 2002 (1) A.W.C. 553, para 3 and (viii) State of U.P. vs. Harphool and others 2002 (93) (R.D.) 855, Allahabad High Court, para 9. 7. In the case of Ramlal and others vs. Riwa Cold Field Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court, page 361, the Apex Court has condoned the delay after relying upon the proviso to Section-S of the Limitation Act. 7. In the case of Ramlal and others vs. Riwa Cold Field Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court, page 361, the Apex Court has condoned the delay after relying upon the proviso to Section-S of the Limitation Act. Relevant observations are quoted below :- "The effect of the explanation is that if the party who has applied for extension of period shows that the delay was due to any of the facts mentioned in the explanation that would be treated as sufficient cause and after it is treated as sufficient cause the question may then arise whether discretion should be exercised in favour of the party or not. In the cases to which the explanation applies it may be easy for the Court to decide that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the party and delay should be condoned." 8. In Ram Nath Sao @ Ran Nath Sahu and others vs. Gobardhan Sao and others; 2002 Supreme Court & Full Bench Rent Cases page 440, the Apex Court has observed as under : "7. The expression "sufficient cause " within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code) as well as similar other provisions and the ambit of exercise of powers there under have been the subject-matter of consideration before this Court on numerous occasions. In the case of State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality while considering scope of the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act, this Court laid down that the said expression should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. 8. In the case of Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India the Court was dealing with a case where in a second appeal, the appellant died and application for substitution after condo-nation of delay and setting aside abatement filed after two years by the heirs and legal representatives was rejected on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown and the appeal was held to have abated. When the matter was brought to this Court, the appeal was allowed, delay in filing the petition for setting aside the abatement was condoned, abatement was set aside, prayer for substitution was granted and the High Court was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits and while doing so, It was observed that once an appeal is pending in the High Court, the heirs are not expected to keep a constant watch on the continued existence of parties to the appeal before the High Court which has a seat far .away from where parties in rural areas may be residing inasmuch as in a traditional rural family the father may not have informed his son about the litigation in which he was involved and was a party. It was further observed (at SCC p. 166, para 6) that courts should recall that "what has been said umpteen times that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice and should be so interpreted as not to make them penal statutes for punishing erring parties". (emphasis added) 9. In the case of Rama Ravalu Gavade v. Sataba Gavadu Gavade during the pendency of the appeal, one of the parties died. In that case, the High Court had refused to condone the delay In making an application for setting aside abatement and set aside abatement, but this Court condoned the delay, set aside abatement and directed the appellate court to dispose of appeal on merit observing that the High Court was not right in refusing to condone the delay as necessary steps could not be taken within the time prescribed on account of the fact that the appellant was an illiterate farmer. 10. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy there was a delay of 883 days in filing application for setting aside ex parte decree for which application for condonation of delay was filed. 10. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy there was a delay of 883 days in filing application for setting aside ex parte decree for which application for condonation of delay was filed. The trial court having found that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay, condoned the delay but when the matter was taken to the High Court of Judicature at Madras in revision application under Section 115 of the Code, it was observed that the delay of 883 days in filing the application was not properly explained and it was held that the trial court was not justified in condoning the delay resulting in reversal of its order whereupon this Court was successfully moved which was of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order passed by the trial court whereby delay in filing the application for setting aside ex parte decree was condoned and accordingly order of the High Court was set aside. K.T. Thomas, J., speaking for the Court succinctly laid down the law observing thus in paras 8, 9 and 10 : (SCC p. 127) "8. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay Is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. * * * The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause." (emphasis added) 11. The Court further observed in paragraphs 11,12 and 13 which run thus: (SCC pp. 127-28) "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury the law of limitation fixed a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis lit/um (it is for the general welfare that a period be but to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis lit/um (it is for the general welfare that a period be but to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses." 9. The well established principle as will appear from the reported decision in the matter of N. Balakrishnan vs. Krishnamurthy; AIR 1998 Supreme Court page 3222 is based on the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis Iitium. The observations of the Apex Court are quoted below : "Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The observations of the Apex Court are quoted below : "Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howarh Municipality, AIR (1972)1 SC 749.” 10. A perusal of the order shows that the court below should have decided the case on merits instead of rejecting the application U/s 5 of the Limitation Act. 11. In view of the aforesaid facts, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 23-4-2003 passed by the Additional Commissioner Revenue cannot be allowed to sustain and the matter is to be heard on merits. The matter is therefore remanded to the Chief Revenue Commissioner for deciding it on merits.