NARAYAN CHANDRA SIL. J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal was directed against the judgment and order of conviction dated 27-5-1998 passed by Shri S. Mukherjee, learned Additional district and Sessions Judge, Fourth court, Howrah in connection with Sessions trial No. 1 (April) 1996 convicting the appellant, nazima Bibi for committing offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and directing her to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to suffer further imprisonment for a term of two months. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case in brief is that in the night of 20-5-1992 at about 1 a. m. the informant nazrul Molla, son of the victim, nekehar Bibi heard the shouts of the victim and immediately he along with Golamnabi molla, Motiar Rahman Molla and others of the village rushed to the room of the victim and found the door of her room closed from outside. They also found fire through the gaps of the window while her mother was shouting saying Nazima, wife of Karim set her on fire. The informant and others opened the door and brought out the victim on the verandah in burning condition when the victim gave out that Nazima had poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire and thereafter gone outside the room bolting the door from outside. The wearing sari, the mat and the pillow of the victim were burnt. Nazima's husband Karim was not present in the house on that day. The victim was immediately taken to the hospital and ultimately on the following morning she expired. ( 3 ) A written complaint was lodged with the Police Station and the same was treated as F. I. R. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. Thereafter the case was committed to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Howrah who in his turn, transferred the case to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge for trial and disposal. The learned Additional sessions Judge framed the charge against the appellant/accused under Section 302 i. P. C. After examination of the witnesses the learned Judge examined the accused under section 313 Cr. P. C. The defence case as it appears from the trend of cross-examination and that of the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr. The learned Additional sessions Judge framed the charge against the appellant/accused under Section 302 i. P. C. After examination of the witnesses the learned Judge examined the accused under section 313 Cr. P. C. The defence case as it appears from the trend of cross-examination and that of the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. is of denial of the occurrence and that on the fateful night both the appellant and the victim were sleeping in the victim's room. After hearing both sides the learned Judge found the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 I. P. C. and sentenced her in the terms as stated above. ( 4 ) IT appears from the record that as many as 17 witnesses were produced by the prosecution before the learned trial Judge. Thus, Nazrul Molla, the informant is the P. W. 1. It appears from his evidence that at the material point of time the victim was living with her husband and child in separate mess, although the prosecution party and the appellant used the same kitchen. He further stated that Karim, the husband of the appellant had gone to his father-in-law's house on the fateful night. He had supported the prosecution case in his evidence that on hearing the cries of his mother he had gone to the room of his mother and found the same was closed by shakle from outside and his mother was burning inside the room. It is also stated that many of his villagers like Mostakin, Golamnabi, Noor Islam Molla assembled there. The P. W. 1 opened the door when his mother gave out that Nazima poured kerosene oil and set her on fire. The p. W. 1 found Nazima lying on the next room closing the door from inside. The P. W. 1 further stated that his mother was removed to the hospital and admitted there and in the early morning the victim expired. The P. W. 1 further stated that after coming back from the hospital he found Nazima admitting her guilt in presence of many people saying that she set fire. The P. W. 1 stood the test of cross-examination without being shaken. The P. W. 1 further stated that after coming back from the hospital he found Nazima admitting her guilt in presence of many people saying that she set fire. The P. W. 1 stood the test of cross-examination without being shaken. The defence tried to make out a story that both Nazima and the victim had been sleeping in the latter's room in the fateful night but the attempt ended in fiasco by the emphatic denial of the P. W. 1. The P. W. 1 further stated in his cross-examination, "the accused Nazima is now living in her father's house along with her two children". ( 5 ) FAZRUL Haque Molla is the P. W. 2. His house is at a distance of about 100 yards from the house of Karim Molla, husband of the appellant. He stated in his evidence that on the fateful night hearing the shouts from the house of Nazrul (P. W. 1) he woke up at about 1 a. m. and rushed there. He found many other persons there. He also found flame of fire inside the room through the window of the victim. The door of the room was closed from outside by puting up shakle. The P. W. 2 claims that he along with others opened the door and found the victim burning and shouting Karim's wife set her on fire. The victim was brought out of the room and thereafter shifted to the hospital in the cycle van of Golam Nabi. Thereafter, the P. W. 2 and the other villagers started searching nazima and ultimately found her sitting inside her room closing the same from inside. She was asked to open the door but she declined. The P. W. 2 further stated that after sometime Nazima came out and admitted her guilt saying that out of anguish she poured kerosene oil in the body of her mother-in-law and set her in flames. The p. W. 2 wrote the complaint at the dictation of Nazrul. He has proved the complaint (Ext. 1 ). The P. W. 2 also proved his signature as scribe (Ext. 1/2 ). The P. W. 2 took the complaint to the Police Station in the afternoon on the following day of incident. The P. W. 2 is also a witness of the seizure list as regards the articles seized by the police from the place of occurrence (Ext. The P. W. 2 also proved his signature as scribe (Ext. 1/2 ). The P. W. 2 took the complaint to the Police Station in the afternoon on the following day of incident. The P. W. 2 is also a witness of the seizure list as regards the articles seized by the police from the place of occurrence (Ext. 3 ). The evidence of the P. W. 2 was confronted with his statement before the police and it is admitted by the P. W. 2 that he did not state to the police that on the previous night at about 1 a. m. he heard the shouts and went to the house of Nazrul and found Nazrul trying to remove his burnt mother to the hospital. Some of his other evidence was confronted with her statement recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr. P. C. , but to our utter dismay there appears nothing from the evidence of the I. O. that any confirmation of the same was taken by the defence. The P. W. 2 further stated in his cross-examination that on the following morning of the incident Nazima admitted her guilt of her own accord before many persons. ( 6 ) GOLAM Nabi Mollick is the P. W. 2. He also assembled at the place of occurrence on the fateful night hearing the noise. He found flames inside the room when the door of the room was closed from outside by putting up shakle. The P. W. 3 and others opened the door by removing the shakle and the victim came out with flames. The victim gave out that wife of Karim poured kerosene oil on her body and set her on fire. The victim was removed to the hospital and thereafter the P. W. 3 and other villagers found nazima through the window of the next room. After sometime Nazima came out and admitted her guilt saying that out of quarrel she had burnt her mother-in-law by pouring kerosene oil. The P. W. 3 is also one of the signatories of the seizure list. The P. W. 3 stood the test of cross-examination without being shaken. ( 7 ) NOOR Abdin Molla is the P. W. 4. He had also assembled at the place of occurrence on the fateful night. He supported the evidence of his predecessors. The P. W. 3 is also one of the signatories of the seizure list. The P. W. 3 stood the test of cross-examination without being shaken. ( 7 ) NOOR Abdin Molla is the P. W. 4. He had also assembled at the place of occurrence on the fateful night. He supported the evidence of his predecessors. Nothing came out from his cross-examination to help the defence. ( 8 ) GOLAM Nabi Molla, son of late Jalil Ali molla is the P. W. 5. His evidence also stands to support the evidence of other witnesses. ( 9 ) NOOR Islam Molla is the P. W. 6. He was tendered by the prosecution and declined to be cross-examined by the defence. Golam nabi Molla, son of late Ainal Molla is the p. W. 7. He took the victim to the hospital in his cycle van. It appears from his evidence that he was asked to remove the victim to the hospital and he did it with the help of his cycle van. Mostakin Molla is the P. W. 8. He was tendered by the prosecution and declined to be cross-examined. ( 10 ) MOTIAR Rahaman Molla is the P. W. 9. His evidence stands to support the evidence of his predecessors. Dr. Tapas Ranjan Maity is the P. W. 10 who held the post-mortem examination over the corpse of Nekehar Bibi. He found burn injury all over the corpseexcept the backside and in feet. He opined,"cause of death is due to shock and cardiological failure in case of burn which is anti-mortem in nature". He further opined that such types of injuries were expected if kerosene oil is poured on a person who lay on his back facing upside and set on fire. He was also specific to state that the injuries found by him on the body of the victim were sufficient to cause her death. Thereafter he stated, "it is very difficult to say whether it is suicidal, homicidal or accidental in nature". In his cross-examination this witness stated, "generally when a patient with burn injury comes to the emergency of the hospital the history now he got the burn is questioned and the history of hurn if stated by the patient is noted in the injury report and in bed head ticket". In his cross-examination this witness stated, "generally when a patient with burn injury comes to the emergency of the hospital the history now he got the burn is questioned and the history of hurn if stated by the patient is noted in the injury report and in bed head ticket". He further stated that it was not possible for him to state if the patient was in a stage to disclose the history of her receiving the injuries. ( 11 ) SACHI Dulai Pahari, a Forensic Expert is the P. W. 11. He examined some materials placed before him and he submitted his report (Ext. 6 ). This witness was declined to be cross-examined by the defence. ( 12 ) CONSTABLE Balaram Dandapat is the p. W. 12. He accompanied S. I. Asish chatterjee to the place of occurrence where the inquest report was prepared. This witness carried the dead body to Uluberia hospital and identified the same to the doctor. Mrinal Kanti Dey, another police officer is the P. W. 13. He received the complaint and started Panchla Police Case No. 28/92 dated 21-5-1992 under Section 302 IPC against the appellant/accused. Ashish Banerjee, the other police officer is the P. W. 14 who prepared the inquest report. Sushil Kr. Kar, the other police officer (P. W. 15) is the I. O. of this case. S. I. Jaydeb Senapati, the other police officer is the P. W. 16 who was declined to be cross-examined by the defence as he was a formal witness. Kamal Dey, the Judicial magistrate is the P. W. 17 who recorded the statement of the appellant/accused under section 164 Cr. P. C. He proved the statement recorded by him under Section 164 cr. P. C. (Ext. 10 ). It appears from Exhibit 10 that in the fateful night the appellant/accused was lying in the room of her mother-in-law along with her child when an altercation started with them as the victim expressed her absolute disapproval for sending karim to his father-in-law's house everyday. The appellant also found that the victim then kept a sharp cutting instrument (banti) and threatened her to murder by pouring kerosene oil. The appellant also found that the victim then kept a sharp cutting instrument (banti) and threatened her to murder by pouring kerosene oil. Thereafter, the lamp was put off and after they had gone to bed a lamp was put on and the victim came to pour kerosene oil on the body of the appellant for which a scuffle ensued and the kerosene oil sprinkled in he bodies of both the appellant and the victim. The scuffle continued and in course of such scuffle the victim caught fire when the appellant pushed the victim down on the ground and the victim was burnt. She also confessed that the kerosene oil was sprinkled all over the body of the victim as the victim was dashed down by her. It is also in Exhibit 10 that many person assembled there and the victim was taken to the hospital. The appellant also stated that it was not her intention to kill the victim. ( 13 ) MR. Joy Sengupta, the learned Advocate appearing her the appellant/convict submitted before us that there is no direct evidence against the appellant and the conviction was based merely on extra-judicial confession and verbal dying declaration both of which are very weak pieces of evidence. In this con nection he has referred to the ratio decided in the case of State of Assam v. Manik Chandra Dey. 1989 Cri LJ 1495 in which it was inter alia held that stereo-type recording of extrajudicial confession without knowing exact words used by the accused and about his rational motive for such confession and without any corroborative evidence to support the same do not rule out the fact and possibility that such confession was extracted from the accused. Mr. Sengupta has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of Sharad Birdhichand sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 : (1984 Cri LJ 1738 ). It was held in that case that proximity test will always remain in order to assess the statement of the deceased relating to the circumstances of transaction resulting his death. Mr. Sengupta has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of State of Orissa v. Parasuram Naik, AIR 1997 SC 3569 : (1997 cri LJ 4404 ). In the said case the accused-husband alleged to have poured petrol on the body of his wife and lit fire. Mr. Sengupta has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of State of Orissa v. Parasuram Naik, AIR 1997 SC 3569 : (1997 cri LJ 4404 ). In the said case the accused-husband alleged to have poured petrol on the body of his wife and lit fire. There was extensive burn injuries on the body of the deceased-wife. It was claimed that the victim made oral dying declaration to her mother. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme court that in the absence of the certificate showing deceased to be medically fit to make statement such dying declaration cannot be relied upon. ( 14 ) THE facts of this case are altogether different from the facts of the cases referred to by the learned Advocate for the appellant. In the instant case the extra-judicial confession of the appellant/convict was made by herself before many villagers which finds indirect support from her judicial confession made before the learned judicial magistrate. The dying declaration of the victim was also made in presence of the members of the village including the de facto complainant and the facts and circumstances of this case suggest that the victim was alive for a considerable period after the occurrence. Besides, the dying declaration of the victim made before the members of the public stands in support of the confessional statement of the victim herself. The judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the different High Courts in various cases as regards the technicalities of the dying declaration are conflicting but all such conflicts have been set at rest in the ratio decided by the five Judge's Bench of the hon'ble Apex Court in the case of laxman v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 SCCL COM 466 : (2002 Cri LJ 4095) Para 3. It was held in that case that a dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. It was also observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that in most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by some one like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. It was also observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that in most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by some one like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. It was also held by the Hon'ble Apex court that there is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, the Hon'ble Apex court further observed, what evidential value of weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the Court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise, the hon'ble Apex Court further held. In the said case the Hon'ble Apex Court while referring the ratio decided by the said Court in the case of P. Rosamma v. State of Andhra pradesh, (1999) 7 SCC 695 : (1999 Cri LJ 4321) observed that it is indeed a hyper-technical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions who had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Thus, it is clear from the above discussion that what is necessary in this regard for the Court to consider is whether such dying declaration inspires the confidence of the Court or not. We do not, in fact, find any reason as to why the statement of the victim fixing the appellant /convict as the person to have set fire on her should be disbelieved. In this connection it deserves mention that the appellant/convict had of course tried faintly to save herself by introducing the story of scuffle and accidental fire but the same appear to have aborted when it was stated by her specifically before the learned Judicial Magistrate that she had no intention to kill the victim. We are also concerned with the undisputed fact that the victim was rescued in burning condition after removing the shakle of the door. Had there no intention of the appellant to kill the victim why the shakle of the door was put leaving the victim burn ing inside the room! There is no answer to this and accordingly we have no hesitation to hold that the appellant not only set fire on the victim but also made it certain that she died out of that. ( 15 ) NOW, the only other question raised by Mr. Sengupta, learned Advocate for the appellant/convict is as regards the minority of the appellant at the time of occurrence. He has pointed out that at the time of recording the statement of the appellant as accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. on 3-4-1998 the appellant/accused stated her age as 20 years and accordingly on the date of occurrence i. e. on 21-5-1992 she was a minor. Thus, the learned Advocate for the appellant goes on arguing, the appellant should have been tried in terms of the Juvenile justice Act, 1986 and as the same was not done the trial and conviction and sentence passed are all absolutely bad in-law. Mr. Kazi saflullah, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents/state submitted that nowhere during the trial the appellant claimed herself to be a minor and it was only in the heading of the form meant for examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. The appellant appears to have stated her age as 20 years which cannot be taken into reckoning by the learned trial Judge. P. C. The appellant appears to have stated her age as 20 years which cannot be taken into reckoning by the learned trial Judge. ( 16 ) IN such position of view Mr. Sengupta has referred to the ratio decided in the case of Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1984 Supp SCC 228 : (1984 Cri LJ 168 ). In the said case an argument was raised on behalf of the appellant for the first time in the Supreme Court that on the date of an offence the appellant was aged below 18 years and was, therefore,a 'child' within the meaning of the expression 'child' as contained in the West Bengal Children Act, 1959 and, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to sentence him to suffer imprisonment after holding a trial. In that case the Supreme Court framed an issue as to what was the age of the appellant on the date of an offence for which he had been tried and convicted and remitted the issue to the learned sessions Judge, Nadia to return a finding on that question. The learned Sessions judge after hearing both the sides certified his finding that the appellant Gopinath ghosh was aged between 16-17 years on the date of offence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then after referring various provisions of the act opined that Section 24 of the Act takes away the jurisdiction of the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment, unless the case falls under the proviso and that Section 25 of the Act forbids any trial of a juvenile delinquent and that only an enquiry can be held in such case in accordance, with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of a summons case. In the said case the claim of minority was raised only before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as below (para 10 of Cri LJ) :"in view of the underlying intendment and beneficial provisions of the Act read with clause (f) of Article 39 of the Constitution which provides that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and maternal abandonment, we consider it proper not to allow a technical condition that this contention is being raised in this Court for the first time to thwart the benefit of the provisions being extended to the appellant, if he was other wise entitled to it. " (Emphasis ours)and then went on to direct (para 12 of Cri lj):-"the next question is : What should be the sequel to our decision? The appellant has been in prison for some years. But neither his antecedents nor the background of his family are before us. It is difficult for us to gauge how the juvenile Court would have dealt with him. Therefore, we direct that the appellant be released on bail forthwith by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, nadia", and then proceed in accordance with law keeping in view the provisions of the act. " ( 17 ) MR. Sengupta has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar, 1998 Cal Cri LR (SC) 82 : (1998 Cri LJ 390 ). In the said case the plea that the appellant was a child within the meaning of Section 32 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was taken before the High court and as the correctness of the estimate of their age had not been assailed the hon'ble Apex Court thought it fair to assume that on the date of the offence each one of the appellants separately fell within the definition of the expression "child". It was observed that Section 32 of the said Act casts an obligation on the Court to make due enquiry as to the age of the accused and if necessary by taking evidence itself and record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or not. It was observed that Section 32 of the said Act casts an obligation on the Court to make due enquiry as to the age of the accused and if necessary by taking evidence itself and record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or not. The Hon'ble Apex court further observed that they are reluctant to ignore and overlook the beneficial provisions of the Acts on the technical ground that there is no other supporting material to support the estimate of ages of the appellants as given by the trial Court, though the correctness of that estimate has not been put in issue before any forum. ( 18 ) MR. Sengupta has then referred to the ratio decided in the case of Pradeep kumar v. State of U. P. , 1995 SCC (Cri) 395 : (1994 Cri LJ 148 ). In the said case Pradeep kumar, the appellant was aged about 15 years at the time of occurrence. At the time of granting special leave, the other appellant Jagdish produced High School certificate, according to which he was about 15 years of age at the time of occurrence. The other appellant Krishan Kant produced horoscope which showed that he was 13 years of age at the time of occurrence. So far as the appellant Pradeep is concerned a medical report was called for by the Hon'ble apex Court which disclosed that his date of birth as January 7, 1959 was acceptable on the basis of various tests conducted by the medical authorities. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held as under (paras 3 and 4 of Cri LJ) :"it is thus proved to the satisfaction of this Court that on the date of occurrence, the appellants had not completed 16 years of age and as such they should have been dealt with under the U. P. Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment on conviction under Section 302/34 of the act. Since the appellants are now aged more than 30 years, there is no question of sending them to an approved school under the u. P. Children Act for detention. Accordingly, while sustaining the conviction of the appellants under all charges framed against them, we quash the sentences awarded to them and direct their release forthwith. Since the appellants are now aged more than 30 years, there is no question of sending them to an approved school under the u. P. Children Act for detention. Accordingly, while sustaining the conviction of the appellants under all charges framed against them, we quash the sentences awarded to them and direct their release forthwith. " ( 19 ) IN the instant case only at the time of examination of the appellant/convict under Section 313 Cr. P. C. on 13-5-1997 she got her age recorded as 20 in the formal portion of the West Bengal Form No. 3862/ high Court Criminal Form No. (m) 3. Mr. Kazi Safiullah, the learned P. P. and Mr. Sengupta, the learned Advocate for the appellant/convict both have argued much as regards the acceptability of the statement recorded in the formal portion of the form meant for examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. Thus, it is argued by Mr. Safiullah that the statement of the accused as regards her age recorded in the formal portion of the form is not an evidence and as such the learned trial Court was justified in not taking any cognizance thereof. On the other hand, Mr. Sengupta after citing a number of case laws tries to impress upon us that the statement recorded on such formal portion part particularly in respect of the age is to be reckoned with. ( 20 ) AT this stage the point for consideration before us is whether we would direct ourselves to consider the plea raised by the appellant/convict as regards her age at the time of commission of the offence and the statement as regards the age of the appellant recorded in the formal portion of the form meant for the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. In legion of cases some of which as discussed by us in the foregoing lines, the Apex Court took cognizance of the plea of age of minority raised there and as such we can very well consider the said plea of the appellant/convict raised at this stage before us ignoring the legal propriety of the statement recorded in the formal portion of the form meant for examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. ( 21 ) NOW from the materials placed before us there appears absolutely no proof of age except the statement of the appellant as accused recorded in the formal portion of the form as stated above. There she got her age recorded as 20 on 13-5-1997. On our further scrutiny it appears that the appellant/convict was examined by the learned trial Judge under Section 313 Cr. P. C. twice; once on 13-5-1997 when the evidence of the p. Ws. 1 to 16 was brought to her notice and then almost after about one year on 3-4-1998 the evidence of the P. W. 17 was brought to her notice again. It appears that on both the occasions she got her age recorded as 20 in the formal portion of the form meant for examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. Admittedly, the appellant/convict is an illiterate and rustic muslim lady. Admittedly, on the date of the occurrence the appellant had one issue and it appears from the cross-examination of the p. W. 1 on 21-6-96 which we have quoted earlier that the appellant was then living in her father's house along with her two children. This was not challenged or disputed by the defence rather it was taken by the defence in the cross-examination of the p. W. 1. Thus, by 21 -6-96 the appellant/convict was having two children arid the date of occurrence was 20-5-1992. On further scrutiny it appears from the record of the learned lower Court that the accused was on bail during the period of her trial. There is no dispute that the second issue of the appellant was not by her husband. It is not at all unusual in the backward muslim illiterate community that underaged young muslim girls are married and gave birth even as a 'child' within the meaning of expression 'child' as contained in the West Bengal Children Act, 1959. ( 22 ) WE have already observed in our foregoing discussions that irrespective of the legal propriety as to whether the statement of the appellant as accused made in the formal portion of the form meant for her examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C. , since the question of minority has been raised at this stage before us, we shall consider the same here in this appeal. P. C. , since the question of minority has been raised at this stage before us, we shall consider the same here in this appeal. ( 23 ) THUS for the purpose of determination of age of the convict-appellant at the time of commission of offence, we asked Smt. N. Chakraborty, learned Additional Sessions judge, 4th Court, Howrah to hold an enquiry in order to determine the present age of the appellant. In fact 4th Court of the additional Sessions Judge, Howrah was the trial Court. ( 24 ) SMT. Chakraborty sent her report. We have gone through the report. She examined the father of the appellant. He stated that his wife is not alive and his daughter, nazima Bibi was married at the age of 14-15 years and four years thereafter the occurrence took place. So according to her father she was about 18-19 years at the time of occurrence. ( 25 ) SMT. Chakraborty also sent the appellant to Medical Board. According to the medical Board "the present age" of the appellant is 20 + years whereas according to the dentist she is 21 years. ( 26 ) IN such back-drop the conclusion of smt. Chakraborty is as follows :"there is no other clear evidence about the present age of the appellant Nazima Bibi save and except the statement of her father. Her father stated specifically that the present age of Nazima Bibi is 28 years. So from the materials on record my humble view about the present age of Nazima bibi is that her age may be around 28 (twenty eight) years. " ( 27 ) IT is thus very much perspicuous that srnt. Chakraborty has ignored the views of the Medical Board. ( 28 ) WE may hark back our observation in the foregoing lines of our judgment that the convict/appellant claimed her age as 20 years during her examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C. on 13-5-1997. But the Medical board found her present age in the year 2003 as 20 + years. Occurrence took place on 21-6-1996. Thus, all these figures suggest and suggest only, because there comes no clear proof of age of the appellant-accused, that with all probability the appel lant-convict was a minor at the time of commission of offence. But the Medical board found her present age in the year 2003 as 20 + years. Occurrence took place on 21-6-1996. Thus, all these figures suggest and suggest only, because there comes no clear proof of age of the appellant-accused, that with all probability the appel lant-convict was a minor at the time of commission of offence. And in such circumstances, we are inclined to follow the ratio decided in the case of Pradeep Kumar, 1994 cri LJ 148 (supra) and feel it expedient for the ends of the justice, while sustaining the conviction of the appellant to quash and set aside the sentences awarded to her and direct her to be released forthwith. ( 29 ) IN view of our observations as mentioned above the convict/appellant be released at once. G. C. DE, J. : ( 30 ) I agree. Order accordingly.