D. P. SINGH, J. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and they agree that the petition may be disposed off finally under the rules of the Court. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 22. 9. 1993 by which the District Inspector of Schools has refused to grant approval to the appointment of the petitioner as ad hoc Lecturer in English. Further a writ of mandamus has been sought for a direction to the respondents not to interfere in the functioning of the petitioner as lecturer in English. 3. Brief facts, as are evident from the record, is that there is a Intermediate College known as Rana Sangram Singh Inter College, Bishara, District Ghaziabad which is a duly recognized and aided institution imparting education up to intermediate classes. An English Lecturer, Sri Chandra Pal Singh retired from service on 30. 6. 1990 causing a substantive vacancy on the post. As there was no qualified person to be appointed by promotion, the management vide letter dated 22-8-1990 addressed to the District Inspector of Schools informed him about the vacancy and also asked him to forward relevant requisition to the Commission. It was also stated in the letter as there was no qualified person, the said post should be filled up by direct recruitment on ad hoc basis. Whereafter, after following due process, the petitioner was selected and an appointment letter dated 10. 1. 1993 was issued to him in pursuance of which, he joined the institution and is working till date. As the salary was not being paid, he filed the present writ petition and during the pendency of the petition, the impugned order was passed whereby the claim of the petitioner was rejected on various grounds. This order dated 22. 9. 1993 has been challenged subsequently by an amendment which was allowed. 4. Another writ petition being writ petition No. 40432 of 1993 was filed by one Dev Raj Sharma claiming the relief for a direction to the respondents to promote the petitioner in the Lecturer Grade in English as he claimed that he was fully qualified to be promoted. Both these writ petitions have been heard together and are being disposed off together. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools and so also on behalf of Dev Raj Sharma. Both these writ petitions have been heard together and are being disposed off together. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools and so also on behalf of Dev Raj Sharma. The stand taken in the counter affidavit of District Inspector of Schools is that there were ten sanctioned posts in the institution of which two posts were declared surplus, therefore, only eight sanctioned posts of lecturer were in the institution. Since two lecturers were being granted salary under the order of this Court, there was no sanctioned post on which the petitioner could have been appointed. It has further been stated in the counter affidavit that the management did not have power to make any appointment on ad hoc basis in view of the aforesaid fact and that is why requisition was not sent to the Commission. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Sri Dev Raj Sharma, it has been stated that the management did not have any power to make an ad hoc appointment directly as the vacancy was not published in daily newspapers and in fact he was qualified to be promoted on the said post as the post was for promotional quota. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has firstly urged that Sri Dev Raj Sharma was not qualified on the date of vacancy or on the date when the management decided to fill the post by direct appointment on ad hoc basis. However, learned counsel for Sri Sharma has urged that he was eligible on the date of appointment and as such his claim could not be brushed aside without considering it. However, Sri Sharma does not dispute that on the date of vacancy i. e. 30-6-1990 he neither had five years continuous service in L. T. Grade nor he was M. A. in English. From the record, it appears that Sri Sharma was working in the L. T. Grade with effect from 1-1-1986 and he passed his M. A. English examination in 1991 and though the management had sent a letter dated 22-8-1990 to the District Inspector of Schools for direct appointment, the appoint itself was made in January, 1993. Thus it has to be seen as to which is the relevant date on which the eligibility for promotion has to be considered. 7. Thus it has to be seen as to which is the relevant date on which the eligibility for promotion has to be considered. 7. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Prem Balika Ram v. R. I. G. S. 1993 E. S. C. 371, after considering Regulation 6 Chapter II read with Section 18 (1) (b) of Act No. 5 of 1982, Rule 9 of the Rules framed thereunder and also the Removal of Difficulties Order, has come to the conclusion that the requirement of five years continuous service in L. T. Grade was sign quo non on the date of the vacancy and not on the date on which the appointment is made. This was also considered in the case of Rakesh Kumar Kaushik v. District Inspector of Schools, Muzaffarnagar, 1993 (2) E. S. C. 450 when it held to the following effect in paragraph No. 16 : ". . . . . As noted above, Regulation 6 of Chapter II of the Regulations framed in the Intermediate Education Act itself provides that the candidate must have been working continuously for five years on the date of occurrence of the vacancy, the general rule, as propounded, by their Lordship of the Supreme Court, is not applicant. This rule specifies eligibility, criteria on the date of occurrence of the vacancy for the purposes of promotion, Regulation 6 has to be adhered to before the candidate is considering for promotion under Section 18 (1) (b) of Act No. 5 of 1982. " 8. The aforesaid has been the consistent view of this Court in several cases including Committee of Management, Sri M. D. Jain Inter College and another v. District Inspector of Schools and others, 1999 (1) U. P. L. B. E. C. 21; Keshav Ram Dargan v. District Inspector of Schools, 1997 (2) E. S. C. 892 and Kripa Shankar Tripathi v. Deputy Director of Education, 1997 (1) LBESR 27 (All) : 1997 (1) UPLBEC 535. 9. 9. However, learned Counsel for Sri Sharma has referred to the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in the case of Yogendra Nath Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur, 1991 (1) U. P. L. B. E. C. 484, wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the eligibility can also be considered on the date when the management decides to make ad hoc appointment, without considering the effect of the aforesaid decision which has been over ruled by the Division Benches of this Court, it can be seen that the management had decided to make ad hoc appointment on 22. 8. 1990 when it sent its decision to the District Inspector of Schools, therefore, this decision is of no help to Sri Sharma. 10. In view of the aforesaid, it can safely be held, as held by several Division Benches of this Court, that the relevant date for examining the eligibility criteria is the date of vacancy and not the date of appointment or the date of advertisement. Thus Sri Dev Raj Sharma was not eligible to be even considered for promotion and as such he has no claim. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that the stand of the District Inspector of Schools that two posts have been declared surplus is without any basis. This stand of the District Inspector of Schools has been taken in the counter affidavit and is based on the order dated 22. 9. 1993. Neither in the counter affidavit nor in the order dated 22. 9. 1993 there is any mention of any order passed by a competent authority declaring two posts as surplus. It is not denied that Sri Chandra Pal Singh retired from service on 30. 6. 1990. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no sanctioned post. Further, averment that two lecturers were being paid salary in pursuance of the direction issued by this Court in different writ petitions, would not ipso facto mean that the sanctioned vacancy would be adjusted for those two persons. The Court is unaware of the facts and ground on which orders have been passed for two other lecturers whose name even have not been disclosed either in the counter affidavit or in the impugned order. The Court is unaware of the facts and ground on which orders have been passed for two other lecturers whose name even have not been disclosed either in the counter affidavit or in the impugned order. Therefore, this stand of the District Inspector of Schools is without any basis and the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted. 12. Learned Standing Counsel has then urged that the management did not have any power to make ad hoc appointment in a substantive vacancy as no requisition was sent by the management. From the letter dated 22. 8. 1990, it is apparent that the management had forwarded the papers to the District Inspector of Schools who was duty bound to further send the requisition to the Commission. In the impugned order in paragraph No. 5 it has been stated that after financial survey of the institution, it was found that the substantive vacancy did not exist and therefore, the requisition was not sent to the Commission. Therefore, this averment proves beyond doubt that the requisition was sent to him for being forwarded to the Commission and the District Inspector of Schools, under misconception did not forward it to the Commission. The procedure which is followed in such situation is that the requisition is sent to the District Inspector of Schools, after examining it and co-relating with his record, is duty bound to forward it to the Commission. Therefore, this argument of the learned Standing Counsel has no merit and thus is rejected. 13. In the end, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that though the papers for approval were sent by the management to the District Inspector of Schools by covering letter dated 15. 1. 1993, no decision was taken by him prior to the filing of the writ petition and the impugned order was passed on 22. 9. 1993 and in view of paragraph 2 (2) (iii) of the Removal of Difficulties Order, the approval would be deemed to have been granted after expiry of the seven days from the receipt of the papers. In support of his contention, he has relied upon decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court rendered in the case of Sukhnandan v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1991 Allahabad Civil Journal 125. In support of his contention, he has relied upon decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court rendered in the case of Sukhnandan v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1991 Allahabad Civil Journal 125. This Court, after relying upon decisions of the Apex Court has held that the provision is mandatory in nature and therefore if no decision is communicated within seven days of receipt of the papers, the approval would be presumed. It is not denied that the papers were sent on 15. 1. 1993 and in the counter affidavit this fact has been admitted. Counter affidavit was filed on 30. 8. 1993. Thus, in my view, this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has also to be accepted. 14. For the reasons given hereinabove, this petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 22. 9. 1993 is hereby quashed. 15. It is admitted to the parties that the petitioner is working on the post of Lecturer in English in the institution but has not been paid his salary. As the impugned order has already been quashed by this Court, the respondents are hereby directed to pay the arrears of salary to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of a certified copy of this order and also to pay him current salary of a Lecturer forthwith. If the arrears of salary are not released within above specified time, the respondents jointly and severally would be liable to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date of service of certified copy of the order till the date of payment. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the petition is finally allowed. No order as to costs. Pettion allowed.