Under challenge is inquiry report dated 21.5.1999, show cause notice dated 17.7.2000 and Order No. MD/PS/2000/207 dated 11.8.2000, by virtue of which the services of petitioner, namely, Daljit Singh Azad, Deputy General Manager (Operations) have been terminated. The challenge to inquiry report, show cause notice and order of termination inter alia is on the ground that the inquiry was in negation of principles of natural justice; that the inquiry was conducted by a person who was in the same rank and grade as that of petitioner; that the Inquiry Officer, Mr. S. C. Dutta, respondent No. 4 was biased against the petitioner; that the Board of Directors had no power delegating its functions as disciplinary authority to the Finance Committee. Briefly stated, the facts are that the petitioner came to be appointed as Assistant Manager on 15.10.1976 in J&K Tourism Development Corporation. On 1.12.1978 he came to be promoted as Manager. It appears that for the period 13.5.1993 to 31.3.1994 at JIC Kot Bhalwal some preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Internal Audit Officer and, as a result of inquiry, he found an overall shortage on account of store/stock items to the tune of Rs.35,101.44, which included shortage of fire wood to the tune of Rs.34,947.36. The Managing Director directed that the amount be recovered in instalments from Store Keeper Bashir Ahmed. However, on the representation made by Bashir Ahmed that he cannot be fastened with the liability without giving him an opportunity of hearing, the Managing Director ordered an inquiry and one Ajay Khajuria, General Manager, J&K Tourism Development Corporation was asked to hold the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer held the Store Keeper and also the petitioner equally responsible for the shortage/misappropriation and recommended that both are equally liable for recovery and any other disciplinary action as may be considered by the competent authority. As a result of finding of the Inquiry Officer, petitioner along with Bashir Ahmed was saddled with the liability. Petitioner challenged this action of the Corporation in SWP No. 1580/95 and vide order dated 27.12.1995 recovery against the petitioner was stayed. As a result of finding of the Inquiry Officer, petitioner along with Bashir Ahmed was saddled with the liability. Petitioner challenged this action of the Corporation in SWP No. 1580/95 and vide order dated 27.12.1995 recovery against the petitioner was stayed. According to the petitioner, Ajay Khajuria, had not associated him with the inquiry and the finding recorded against him by the Inquiry Officer was malafide to deprive him of the promotion, though he was senior most Manager in the Corporation and was next in the line to be promoted to the post of Senior Manager and further to the post of Deputy General Manager, but his junior was promoted initially as Senior Manager (Operations) and thereafter Deputy General Manager (Operations). Further, according to the petitioner, he had no option but to file SWP No. 163/96 challenging the action of Corporation in not promoting him to the post of Sr. Manager and also to the post of General Manager. The writ petitions, i.e., the one in which he had challenged the action of the Corporation in not promoting him to the next higher post and the other burdening him with the liability of shortage of fire wood, came to be decided by the Writ Court on 5.2.1997. Both the writ petitions were allowed and the official respondents were directed to promote the petitioner to the post of Senior Manager with effect from 7.7.1995 and to the post of Deputy General Manager from the date his immediate junior had been promoted as Deputy General Manager with all consequential benefits. In SWP No. 1580/95 the order of the Managing Director, burdening the petitioner with the liability of shortage of fire wood, was quashed and the Corporation was given liberty to conduct any inquiry, is so intended, and to complete and finalize it within four months. Further, according to the petitioner, despite the order in his favour directing the official respondents to promote him to the next higher post, he was not promoted and that led to the filing of Contempt Petition No. 191/97, in which he impleaded the Managing Director and Chairman of the Corporation. According to the petitioner, the filing of contempt petition and arraying the Managing Director and Chairman as the contemnors further annoyed them and they started generating ill-will against him. According to the petitioner, the filing of contempt petition and arraying the Managing Director and Chairman as the contemnors further annoyed them and they started generating ill-will against him. Further, according to the petitioner, because of the contempt proceedings the Corporation vide order dated 27.8.1997 promoted him as Sr. Manager and Deputy General Manager, but that was not the end of his harassment. The petitioner has further averred that in order to deprive him for promotion to the post of General Manager, one Tuffail Mattoo was sought to be brought on deputation from Agro Industries. Petitioner challenged his appointment in SWP No. 1534/98. The Writ Court vide interim order dated 28.8.1998 directed not to promote Tuffail Mattoo as General Manager on deputation. According to the petitioner, in order to render the writ petition infructuous, one S. C. Dutta, Divisional Manager, Agro Industries was brought to function as General Manager (Operations), Jammu. Said S. C. Dutta assumed the charge of General Manager (Operations) on the same very day. According to the petitioner, since the action of the Corporation directing Mr. S. C. Dutta to assume the charge was to deprive him the chance of promotion to the post of General Manager (Operations), he filed CMP No. 2322/98 (in SWP No. 1534/98), seeking intervention of the Court and stay of operation of order dated 19.9.1998, with a further prayer to direct the respondents to make promotion to the post of General Manager (Operations) from amongst the in-service candidates in accordance with rules. It is averred that in order to wreak vengeance the Managing Director vide order dated 3.10.1998 relieved the petitioner from his duty as Incharge Vigilance/Inspection of Units of Jammu Division and he was asked to report to S. C. Dutta, whose appointment he had already challenged in CMP No. 2322/98. Further, according to the petitioner, he was not given any other posting or any other assignment and as a result of which his pay came to be illegally withheld. He was also not allowed to enter his room as his room was locked and he was not permitted to enter the office. Further, according to the petitioner, he was not given any other posting or any other assignment and as a result of which his pay came to be illegally withheld. He was also not allowed to enter his room as his room was locked and he was not permitted to enter the office. This action of the Managing Director led to the filing of another writ petition being SWP No. 2337/98 seeking direction to the respondents to release his pay from the date the same had been withheld, with a further direction to S. C. Dutta, General Manager (Operations), who was impleaded as respondent No. 4, to unlock his room at Tourist Reception Centre, Jammu. The Writ Court vide interim order dated 28.12.1998 directed the respondents to forthwith release the admissible salary to the petitioner and permitted him to discharge his duties as an officer of the Corporation. Further, according to the petitioner, in order to teach him a lesson, S. C. Dutta was appointed as Inquiry Officer to go into the allegation of shortage of fire wood and the petitioner was informed in this regard on 1.5.1999 and was called upon to produce his defence on 8.5.1999. The petitioner filed an application before S. C. Dutta on 8.5.1999 seeking documents, statements of witnesses and stay of proceedings. He also filed similar application before the Managing Director, but neither the Inquiry Officer or the Managing Director stayed the inquiry, instead the Inquiry Officer vide report dated 21.5.1999 held the petitioner equally responsible for the shortage of fire wood. According to the petitioner it is on the basis of inquiry report that order dated 11.8.2000 terminating his services has been passed. The petitioner has challenged the order terminating his services on various grounds including bias of the Inquiry Officer against the petitioner; the inquiry was in violation of principles of natural justice and the Board of Directors had no power delegating its functions as disciplinary authority to the Finance Committee. On the other hand, the case of respondents is that the services of petitioner have been terminated after holding inquiry under the rules. According to the respondents, the charges against the petitioner of misappropriation/shortage of fire wood have been proved and the order impugned is perfectly justified as the same has been passed by the competent authority. On the other hand, the case of respondents is that the services of petitioner have been terminated after holding inquiry under the rules. According to the respondents, the charges against the petitioner of misappropriation/shortage of fire wood have been proved and the order impugned is perfectly justified as the same has been passed by the competent authority. In regard to the allegation of petitioner that different treatment has been meted out to him, inasmuch as Bashir Ahmed though has been held responsible but only the recovery of 50% of the amount has been directed to be recovered from him, whereas the petitioner has been dismissed from service, the respondents have submitted that in the case of Bashir Ahmed the Managing Director was competent to impose the penalty, but in the case of petitioner, the Board of Directors being the competent authority could impose appropriate punishment looking into the misconduct of the petitioner. Filing of various writ petitions and orders passed thereon have been admitted by the respondents. In short, the case of respondents is that the inquiry held against the petitioner was in accordance with rules and, therefore, no interference is called for. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully gone through the record of this case. The first question to be determined is whether the inquiry held against the petitioner was in accordance with the rules of natural justice and whether the Inquiry Officer was biased against the petitioner. It is now well settled that any order or decision in matters involving disciplinary proceedings has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In general, the essential principles of natural justice are that: (i) the person whose rights are to be affected must be given notice of the case or the charges which he is to meet; (ii) he must be given an opportunity to make a representation and to explain the allegations made against him and to have his say in the matter; and (iii) the authority conducting the proceedings must not be biased and should act in good faith. The decision should be made free from bias or partiality and is an important limb of natural justice. The decision should be made free from bias or partiality and is an important limb of natural justice. (underlining supplied) The issue of bias may arise in two contexts, i.e., (i) the decision maker may have some interest of pecuniary or personal nature in the outcome of proceedings; and (ii) there are problems where the decision maker is interested in the result of an inquiry or investigation not in personal essence but because the institution which he represents is desirous of attaining certain objectives. Two tests have been espoused by the Courts in cases other than those concerning pecuniary interest. They are "real likelihood of bias", and that of "reasonable suspicion of bias". The principles governing the doctrine of bias vis--vis judicial tribunals were explained by the Supreme Court in G. Nageswararao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1376, in the following words: "The principles governing the "doctrine of bias" vis--vis judicial tribunals are well-settled and they are: (i) no man shall be a judge in his own cause; (ii) justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The two maxims yield the result that if a member of a judicial body is "subject to a bias 9whether financial or other) in favour of, or against, any party to a dispute, or is in such a position that a bias must be assumed to exist, he ought not take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal"; and that "any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject-matter of inquiry will disqualify a judge, and any interest, though not pecuniary, will have the same effect, if it be sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias." The Supreme Court in G. Nageswararao (supra) also opined that the principles governing doctrine of bias vis--vis judicial tribunals are equally applicable to authorities though they are not courts of justice or judicial tribunals who have to act judicially in deciding the rights of others. In S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459, the Supreme Court in para-16 observed as under: "16. The tests of "read likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The tests of "read likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The Court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the Court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings." In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant, AIR 2001 SC 24, the Supreme Court after quoting from the judgment of S. Parthasarthi (supra) and of the English Courts opined as under: "32. The test, therefore, is as to whether a mere apprehension of bias or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias the administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand, the allegations pertaining to bias is rather fanciful and otherwise to avoid a particular court, tribunal or authority, question of declaring them to be unsustainable would not arise. In the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias the administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand, the allegations pertaining to bias is rather fanciful and otherwise to avoid a particular court, tribunal or authority, question of declaring them to be unsustainable would not arise. The requirement is availability of positive and cogent evidence and it is in this context that we do record our concurrence with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Locabail case (supra)." In State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, AIR 2001 SC 343, the Supreme Court observed that: "the test is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in administrative action, question of declaring them to be unsustainable on the basis therefor would not arise." In Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, (1993) 4 SCC 10, the Supreme Court quashed the inquiry proceedings because a member of Department Enquiry Committee had deposed as a witness against the delinquent and objection taken on behalf of the delinquent in this regard was over ruled by the Committee. The Supreme Court observed that "the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias." In the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court, it is now to be seen whether the petitioner has been able to bring on record cogent evidence to prove that there existed real danger of bias on the part of Inquiry Officer. The facts are no more in dispute. Initially the inquiry regarding shortage of fire wood was conducted by Ajay Khajuria and that too only against Bashir Ahmed, Store Keeper but liability of 50% was fastened on the petitioner. The petitioner successfully challenged the action of the Corporation. During the pendency of writ petition, one N. C. Kohli was appointed as Inquiry Officer, but the inquiry was not proceeded with. The petitioner successfully challenged the action of the Corporation. During the pendency of writ petition, one N. C. Kohli was appointed as Inquiry Officer, but the inquiry was not proceeded with. In the meantime, the petitioner was ignored for promotion to the posts of Senior Manager and Deputy General Manager. It is only because of the order of this Court that the respondents promoted the petitioner to the posts of Senior Manager and Deputy General Manager with effect from the date his immediate junior was promoted. Again one Tuffail Mattoo was sought to be appointed as General Manager, compelling the petitioner to file another writ petition, in which the appointment of Tuffail Mattoo was stayed. It is during the pendency of said writ petition that S. C. Dutta, Divisional Manager, Agro Industries was asked to function as General Manager (Operations). Petitioner challenged the appointment of S. C. Dutta in CMP No. 2322/98. On 3.10.1998 the petitioner, who was functioning as Incharge Vigilance/Inspection of Units of Jammu, was relieved from his duty and was asked to report to Mr. S. C. Dutta for further duties. He, however, did not give any duty to the petitioner nor the petitioner was allowed to enter his office or paid his salary. The petitioner was compelled to file another writ petition and vide interim order dated 28.12.1998 the Corporation was directed to pay salary to the petitioner. S. C. Dutta too was directed to permit the petitioner to discharge his duty. During the pendency of this writ petition, in which S. C. Dutta was respondent No. 4, the petitioner was intimated on 1.5.1999 that S. C. Dutta has been appointed as Inquiry Officer to go into the charges of shortage of fire wood. The record produced before me shows that the petitioner immediately filed an application on 8.5.1999 before S.C. Dutta and Managing Director of the Corporation asking them not to proceed with the inquiry. The reason given in the application was that the petitioner has already challenged the appointment of S. C. Dutta as General Manager (Operations) and it would not be proper for him to be an Inquiry Officer. However, the inquiry was not stayed nor the Inquiry Officer was changed, but within 20 days the inquiry was concluded and the Inquiry Officer in his report dated 21.5.1999 held the petitioner to be guilty of the charge. However, the inquiry was not stayed nor the Inquiry Officer was changed, but within 20 days the inquiry was concluded and the Inquiry Officer in his report dated 21.5.1999 held the petitioner to be guilty of the charge. The chain of events as noticed do not indicate that the apprehension of petitioner in regard to bias of the Inquiry Officer was fanciful. The facts established clearly show that the Inquiry Officer had personal bias against the petitioner, as the petitioner not only had challenged his appointment as General Manager but in SWP No. 2337/98, filed on 24.12.1998, the petitioner had also levelled allegation of malafide against him. The said writ petition came to be filed much before the petitioner was intimated that S. C. Dutta has been appointed as Inquiry Officer. In such circumstances I am of the view that S. C. Dutta was disqualified to enquire into the charges levelled against the petitioner. The subsequent event would further show that there was a mindset to punish the petitioner. On submission of the inquiry report, it was considered by the Managing Director, who accepted the findings of Inquiry Officer and held the petitioner to be guilty of negligence, dereliction of duty, misappropriation of Corporation money and fraud and dishonesty in connection with the Corporation business. The inquiry report then was submitted to the Board of Directors in its 74th meeting, but the Board instead of taking any decision on the inquiry report referred to it to the Personal Administration Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) for consideration. It appears that in the meantime the petitioner made representation to the Chairman, Vice Chairman, ACS(F), PS to Chief Minister and Commissioner/Secretary Tourism. The said representation seems to have been referred to the Board of Directors and the Board of Directors in turn referred the same to the Committee for consideration. Both the matters were dealt with by the Committee under Items 10 & 11 of the agenda. In regard to Item No. 10, i.e., where the Committee was to consider the inquiry report, the proposal before the Committee was to pass the following resolution with or without any modification: "Resolved that the Committee of Board have received considered the enquiry report, the findings and charges established thereon and the recommendation of M.D. as indicated in the agenda. It is further resolved that based on the enquiry report and charges Mr. It is further resolved that based on the enquiry report and charges Mr. D. S. Azad DGMO be reduced to the next lower post/grade of Sr. Manager (O). Resolved further the necessary recovery shall be effected from monthly pay of Mr. D. S. Azad on account of shortage as detected/established." The Committee in its meeting held on 26.10.1999 did not pass the suggested resolution, but took both the items on agenda together for decision and a decision to the following effect was taken: "Item No. S.10 To consider the enquiry report and recommendations thereon regarding shortages at KIC Kot Bhalwal. Item No. S.11 Submission of direct representation by Mr. D.S. Azad to Chairman, Vice Chairman, ACS(F), PS to Chief Minister and Commissioner/Secretary Tourism. The committee took strong exception to gross misconduct of Mr. D.S. Azad, Dy. General Manager (O). The charges levelled against Mr. Azad having been proved, the committee considered it appropriate to proceed with termination of services of Mr. Azad from the services of Corporation." The aforementioned decision taken by the Committee was placed before the Board in its 75th meeting as a supplementary item and the Members of the Board felt that the decision of the Committee should be ratified in the meeting itself, but the Chairman insisted that he would like to go through the case and, therefore, the Board authorized him to ratify the decision taken in the meeting within 15 days. The decision of the Board taken in its 75th meeting read as under: "The Commr./Secy. Tourism explained the circumstances under which the committee headed by the then Principal Secretary to Govt., Finance Department had taken decision on the case. The majority of Board members felt that the decision of the committee be ratified in the Board meeting itself. However, the Chairman insisted that he would like to go through the case once more. Most of the Directors felt that this shall form a wrong precedent. However, as the Chairman insisted that he would like to go through the case, the Board decided to authorize him to ratify the decision of the committee of the Board within fifteen days time." The order of termination came to be passed subsequent thereto. Most of the Directors felt that this shall form a wrong precedent. However, as the Chairman insisted that he would like to go through the case, the Board decided to authorize him to ratify the decision of the committee of the Board within fifteen days time." The order of termination came to be passed subsequent thereto. A reading of the decisions taken by the Committee and the Board clearly point out that the Board of Directors did not independently apply its mind to the inquiry report but accepted the decision taken by the Committee. The ultimate responsibility for taking decision on the inquiry report was on the Board of Directors and if the Board of Directors was to act on the decision of the Committee, then it was necessary for the Board of Directors to give an appropriate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner was entitled to controvert and challenge the decision given by the Committee, to whom the powers seems to have been delegated by the Board of Directors for taking decision on the inquiry report. Admittedly, neither the petitioner was made aware of the decision given by the Committee nor was given an opportunity of hearing to controvert or challenge the said decision given by the Committee. In fact, the petitioner has been condemned unheard. Further, the decision of the Committee was in regard to two items, (i) to consider the inquiry report and (ii) submission of direct representation by the petitioner to various authorities. Subsequently, the decision of the Committee to terminate the services of the petitioner was ratified by the Board. In a matter of such a serious nature where dismissal of an officer has to be ordered, it is absolutely essential for the disciplinary authority to comply with the rules of natural justice. Moreover, the misconduct, if any, on the part of petitioner to submit direct representation to various authorities was never the subject matter of inquiry nor the petitioner was put to notice of the said misconduct or was given any opportunity of hearing to prove his innocence. In such circumstances, order terminating the services of petitioner cannot be sustained. Moreover, the misconduct, if any, on the part of petitioner to submit direct representation to various authorities was never the subject matter of inquiry nor the petitioner was put to notice of the said misconduct or was given any opportunity of hearing to prove his innocence. In such circumstances, order terminating the services of petitioner cannot be sustained. Finally, it also deserves to be mentioned that regarding shortage of fire wood/stock items, Bashir Ahmed, Store Keeper too has been held responsible but only recovery of 50% of the amount has been ordered against him, whereas the petitioner has been dismissed from service. The respondents have failed to explain why different and most severe treatment of dismissal from service has been meted out to the petitioner. In imposing punishment the authorities cannot discriminate. Thus, where a minor punishment is imposed upon a co-employee involved in the same offence, imposition of major punishment on the other employee is violative of Article 14. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the considered view that the order dismissing the petitioner from service is liable to be quashed with costs and it is so ordered. The inquiry report too shall stand quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service without any further delay. In consequence thereof, he shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, which are directed to be released to him within three months from the date copy of the order is made available by the petitioner to the respondents. Cost is assessed at Rs.5000/-.