Judgment :- This Crl.R.C. has been filed by the petitioners against the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Officer, Kodaikanal made in M.C.No.1/91-(4) RoC.No.6084/92/A5 dated 24.7.1998. 2. The brief facts of the case that emerges from the materials available on record are as follows: The property known as Loch End at Kodaikanal consisting an extent of 6.48 acres is the subject matter and bone of contention between the petitioners and the respondents who are A parties and B parties in the proceedings before the Sub Divisional Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Officer, Kodaikanal . The said property was purchased by the Missouri Evangelical Lutheran India Mission on 28.11.1912. It consists of 15 buildings which include a Church, Class Rooms for Grade I&II of Kodaikanal International School,class room for Kinder Garden of School, residence of the school staff and also a place for worship. The Missionaries themselves ran Nursery and classes I to V for the education of their children. In 1930, the Missionaries handed over the school to the Kodaikanal International School. In 1947 when the Missionaries moved out of the country, the cottages were handed over to the school for their use and occupation and the Chapel was given to the I.E.L. Church. In 1975, the Missouri Evangelical Lutheran India Mission (MELIM) created a Trust for the properties owned by them in Tamil Nadu. The MELIM and Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association (IELCTA) named as Trustee entered into agreement dated 20.09.1975 with regard to in what manner the Trust properties should be administered. O.P.No.101 of 1975 was filed in the District Court, Madurai under Section-7 of Charitable and Religious Trust Act,1920 by the above bodies seeking a decree of declaration that the Trust was created for the above properties and to appoint Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association as the trustee to administer and manage the trust properties wherein it was mentioned that as per the agreement it was specifically stipulated that the Loch End Property at Kodaikanal would remain with Kodaikanal International School so long the School requires the Loch End for educational purposes. A decree was granted as prayed for on 26.11.1975 in the said O.P. On 26.04.1991 Rev.A.Sundaram, Secretary of IELCTA contrary to the decree in O.P.No.101/75 signed a sale agreement with R.Sivabala Devi-A Party, the revision petitioner herein to sell the Loch End property to her. A decree was granted as prayed for on 26.11.1975 in the said O.P. On 26.04.1991 Rev.A.Sundaram, Secretary of IELCTA contrary to the decree in O.P.No.101/75 signed a sale agreement with R.Sivabala Devi-A Party, the revision petitioner herein to sell the Loch End property to her. It is alleged that when the school closed for summer vacation from 15.05.1991 to 15.07.1991, in the guise of breakdown of electricity and putting the Kodaikanal town and its suburban areas in darkness at the mid night of 30th June and 1st July the henchmen of the agree ment holder Siva Bala Devi trespassed into the Loch End compound and locked the gates. It is also further alleged that Thiru.A.N.Dyaneswaran IAS, a close relative of the first petitioner remained in the Loch End and warned the law enforcing agencies that the close associate of the Chief Executive of the State had purchased the property and effectively prevented the police from taking any action against the trespassers. All the representations submitted by the School to the Chief Secretary, the Home Secretary , the Director General of Police, D.I.G., S.P., D.S.P., and Inspector of Police and the Revenue Officials were not cared for. The Kodaikanal International School filed W.P.No.9551 of 1991 before the High Court seeking for a direction to the Authorities to discharge their duties in accordance with law. On 12.07.1991 Notice of Motion was ordered to the respondents returnable in one week and directed the Government Pleader to get necessary instructions. Immediately the District Authorities in the afternoon of 12th July 1991, directed the Armed Reserve Police to enter Loch End and to remove the trespassers and the school authorities were directed to come and take possession of Loch End and accordingly, the school took possession. By the intervention of the State Administration, in the morning of 13.07.1991 the police authorities directed the school authorities to leave Loch End forthwith as they could not give protection. Once again, the trespassers and their hooligans merrily entered Loch End and the insecurity made the school authorities to leave the property and the developments were reported to the Chief Secretary by telegram. Once again, the trespassers and their hooligans merrily entered Loch End and the insecurity made the school authorities to leave the property and the developments were reported to the Chief Secretary by telegram. On 13.07.1991, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kodaikanal issued notice under section 145 Cr.P.C., to the petitioners herein arraying them as "A" Party and the respondents 1 to 4 as "B" Party directed them to appear before the R.D.O. for enquiry on 19.7.1991 to ascertain the possession of Loch End Property. On 19.7.1991 the "A" Party and their counsel were absent and therefore, the "B" Party was asked to state their case and accordingly they filed affidavits of 20 local residents and the other documents to prove their possession for more than 60 years and their evidence was also recorded. At 12.00pm the "A" Party appeared before the R.D.O. and represented that their senior counsel is on his way and in the afternoon, the counsel for the "A" Party reported that time should be given to file the statement of "A" Party and hence hearing was adjourned to the next day i.e., 20.07.1991. On the same evening "A" Party filed Suit O.S.No.66 of 1991 before the District Munsif, Kodaikanal for permanent injunction to restrain the school and the IELCTA from interfering with their possession of Loch End from 1.07.91 and the Tahsildar who was in-charge and functioning as District Munsif of Kodaikanal granted exparte interim injunction in the night. On 5.7.1991 Rev.Isaac Moon, the president of IELCTA sent a letter dated 05.07.1991 to the Police repudiating the agreement of sale as the same was void, since the Loch End Trust Property could not be sold. He also gave 2 more statements dated 13.07.1991 and 14.07.1991 to the Authorities with regard to the real state of affairs. The "B" Party school authorities instituted C.R.P.No.1846 of 1991 before the High Court against the exparte order of interim injunction and in the said C.R.P. the exparte interim injunction was stayed. By resolution dated 21.07.1991 the Committee of Management repudiated the agreement of sale dated 26.4.1991 in favour of the first petitioner and also suspended Rev.Sundaram who signed the agreement, from the post of Secretary. On 17.09.1991, the IELCTA issued a Legal Notice to the petitioners "A" Party recording that the agreement of sale executed by Rev. By resolution dated 21.07.1991 the Committee of Management repudiated the agreement of sale dated 26.4.1991 in favour of the first petitioner and also suspended Rev.Sundaram who signed the agreement, from the post of Secretary. On 17.09.1991, the IELCTA issued a Legal Notice to the petitioners "A" Party recording that the agreement of sale executed by Rev. Sundaram was void and the said document was executed without the concurrence of the management of IELCTA and therefore, the cheque and the draft for Rs.10/- lakhs given as advance was returned. The notice so sent by R.P.A.D.was received by the first petitioner. The then R.D.O. by name Antony Raj was transferred and one Gomathinayagam was posted as the R.D.O.Kodaikanal. The new R.D.O., according to the respondents, wilfully delayed the pronouncement of the final orders and a new theory of partial possession to overcome Section 145 (4) Cr.P.C., was conceived and the Inspector of Police, Kodaikanal and the Deputy Superintendent of Police were forced to file petitions mentioning partial possession. Since the final order was delayed, respondents 1 to 4 filed Crl.M.P.No.5587 of 1991 before the High Court praying for appropriate direction and the High Court directed the R.D.O. to pronounce Final Order within the time fixed by the High Court. On 9.12.1991, the R.D.O. passed orders holding that the possession of Loch End was lawfully with the petitioners and it would remain undisturbed. Against the said order, the respondents 1 to 4 filed Cr.R.C.No.113 of 1992 before the High Court. On 11.7.1997 Crl.R.C.113/92, C.R.P.1845 of 1991 were allowed by a common order. On 23.7.97 pursuant to the order of the High Court, the Sub Divisional Magistrate R.D.O., Kodaikanal passed order in M.C.No.1(2)/1991 dated 23.07.1997 directing the delivery of possession of the Loch End property to the Kodaikanal International School and accordingly, on 24.7.1997 the Kodaikanal International School took possession of the above compound. Against the said order of the High Court and the order dated 23.07.1997 of the R.D.O., the petitioners preferred S.L.P(Crl.) Nos.2037 to 2039 of 1997 and S.L.P.(Civil)No.13958 of 1997 and S.L.P.(Crl.) No.2992 of 1997. On 24.3.1997 the above S.L.Ps were disposed of by the Supreme Court by making the following observations in S.L.P.(Crl.)Nos.2037 to 2039 of 1997: "...It, however, appears that, the final order which was passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C., was confined only in respect of 5 items of the property in Loch End. On 24.3.1997 the above S.L.Ps were disposed of by the Supreme Court by making the following observations in S.L.P.(Crl.)Nos.2037 to 2039 of 1997: "...It, however, appears that, the final order which was passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C., was confined only in respect of 5 items of the property in Loch End. In our view, the Magistrate had gone wrong in confining the order in respect of only 5 items of the property because the dispute raised was in respect of the entirety of the property known as Loch End. So far as the impugned order passed by the High Court is concerned, it appears to us that the High Court concentrated more on the title of the parties than on possession at relevant period and made various observations regarding the title even though decision on the question of title was not required to be made for the disposal of the Application under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C.," "..We, therefore, set aside the impugned order. In the facts of the case, it appears to us that the matter should be remitted back to the learned Magistrate for disposal of the said complaint under Section 145 Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate will dispose of the matter within four months from the date of communication of the order on the basis of the existing materials on record. He is directed to make specific finding as to which of parties was in possession of Loch End or some portion thereof and whether or not such possession was forceful within 60 days prior to the date of making such complaint." "...We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. It is also made clear that the learned Magistrate will not be influenced by any observation made by the High Court in disposing of the Revisional Application. It is also directed that the status quo as on today will be maintained by the parties till the disposal of the said proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C.," 3. It is also made clear that the learned Magistrate will not be influenced by any observation made by the High Court in disposing of the Revisional Application. It is also directed that the status quo as on today will be maintained by the parties till the disposal of the said proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C.," 3. On 24.7.1998, the Sub Divisional Magistrate R.D.O. Kodaikanal passed an order holding that the buildings in the property were forcibly opened and the household articles of the inmates and the belongings of the students were removed without their knowledge, resulting in many complaints by the "A" Party and that the Kodaikanal International School was forced to dispossess from the Loch End compound and invoking provisions of Section 145(4) of Cr.P.C., the learned R.D.O. has held that the school was retaining possession of the property is entitled to retain possession of the restored property till the contrary is decided in the appropriate proceedings of the court. Thereafter, on 23.9.98, the "A" Party- the petitioners herein filed S.L.P.No.3791 of 1998 against the order of the R.D.O.to set aside the impugned order as it was passed without affording opportunity to them and to direct re-hearing. They also filed Crl.M.P.Nos.6752 to 6754 of 1998 in S.L.P.No.2037 to 2039 of 1997 to clarify the order dated 24.03.1998 and to direct the Sub Divisional Magistrate to pass fresh orders under section-145 of Cr.P.C., after following the due process and after giving hearing to the parties. On 4.1.1999, the Supreme Court passed the following common order in SLP.No.3791 of 1998 and Crl.M.P.No.6752 to 6754 of 1998: "...The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner states that he will move the High court against the impugned order. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn. The Crl.M.Ps for clarification are also dismissed." Thereafter this revision has been filed before this court. 4. The main contention of the petitioners before this court are as follows: 1. The petitioners "A" Party were in partial possession from the date of agreement, i.e., 26.4.1991. and full possession from 1.7.1991. 2. The Sub Divisional Magistrate R.D.O. did not give opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order and thus, the principles of natural justice have been violated. 3. The agreement dated 26.4.1991 is valid in law and the same is enforceable. 5. and full possession from 1.7.1991. 2. The Sub Divisional Magistrate R.D.O. did not give opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order and thus, the principles of natural justice have been violated. 3. The agreement dated 26.4.1991 is valid in law and the same is enforceable. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the "B" Party would contend, (1) that the direction of the Supreme Court was to pass an order within four months from the existing available materials without influenced by the observations of the High Court in Crl.M.P.No.468 of 1997, Crl.M.P.No.1568 of 1995, Crl.R.C.No.113 of 1992, C.R.P.No.1845 of 1991 and W.P.No.9551 of 1991 dated 11.07.1997, (2) that the "A" Party took forcible possession on the mid-night of 30.6.1991 with the political and muscle power and such forcible possession is against the provisions of Section 145(4) of Cr.P.C., (3) that the fact that the Kodaikanal International School was in possession as lessee of the property till they were forcibly dis-possessed, is not in dispute. (4) that affording of opportunity of hearing is only a ruse for remanding the matter again to the R.D.O., since the same Government with whose influence the "B" Party was forcibly dis-possessed has again come to power and hence once again by using such political power, the “A" Party could successfully influence the R.D.O. to pass an order in their favour against law and the established principles of natural justice. 6. The fact that the Kodaikanal International School was in possession of various buildings in Loch End property such as school, hostel and residence for the staff till they were dis-possessed, is not in dispute. They have produced documents like receipts for having paid the maintenance charges to the IELCTA Ex.B22 for the period upto 30.6.1991 for certain portions of the property. Whether the "A" Party entered into agreement with Sundaram, the secretary of the Trust who handed over possession on 26.4.91 or, whether the "A" Party took forcible possession of the property at the mid-night of 30.6.1991 are vital points to be decided later. Before deciding these points, it is better to have a small discussion about the agreement of sale. Whether Thiru Sundaram, secretary of the Trust had any right to execute the agreement of sale need not be discussed at this stage. Before deciding these points, it is better to have a small discussion about the agreement of sale. Whether Thiru Sundaram, secretary of the Trust had any right to execute the agreement of sale need not be discussed at this stage. But, the fact remains that at the time of entering into agreement, the "A" Party paid Rs.10/- lakhs by means of DD and cheque as advance and promised to pay the balance amount out of the total sale amount of Rs.3,02,00,000/- in instalments within a period of about 27 months. The first instalment starts with Rs.20,00,000/- lakhs within six months from the date of agreement. It is an admitted fact that even this ten lakhs advance was returned by IELCTA along with the notice-dated 17.9.91, which was received by the first petitioner Siva Bala Devi. After entering into agreement, the "A" Party has not paid even a single pie towards the instalment payable by the "A" Party to the Trust in pursuance of the sale agreement. Thus, it is an undisputed fact that the "A" Party was squatting on the property of the Trust from 1.7.1991 till 24.7.1997 on which date Kodaikanal International School took possession of the property. Thus, for nearly seven years, the "A" Party was in possession of the property belonging to the Trust without paying even a single pie. The agreement dated 24.6.1991 has also become unenforceable by efflux of time. In fact, the "A" Party filed a suit for Specific Performance on 21.7.1993 and the plaint was returned several times for non-payment of proper court fee. Even I.A.No.533/93 was also filed before the said court to condone the delay of 1193 days in re-presenting the plaint. The agreement dated 24.6.1991 has also become unenforceable by efflux of time. In fact, the "A" Party filed a suit for Specific Performance on 21.7.1993 and the plaint was returned several times for non-payment of proper court fee. Even I.A.No.533/93 was also filed before the said court to condone the delay of 1193 days in re-presenting the plaint. In I.A.No.689/97 filed by the petitioner "A" Party, the learned Sub Judge has held that Rs.10/- lakhs paid as advance by the "A"Party was not received and accepted by the "B" Party, that in the plaint it is not mentioned that the "A" Party was ready and willing to pay the balance amount of the sale agreement for the purpose of executing the sale deed, that the "A" Party as plaintiff should pay Rs.22,65,000/- as court fee, but so far paid only Rs.9115/- as court fee and in spite of opportunities given for 12 times to pay the court fee, the "A" Party the plaintiff therein did not come forward to pay the court fee and the reasons submitted by the "A" Party as plaintiffs are not acceptable and in such circumstances, it can be presumed that the plaintiffs "A" Party were not willing and ready to pay the balance money under the sale agreement and therefore, there is no need to give further time to the petitioner/plaintiff for payment of court fee and dismissed the petition. As against this order, the "A" Party-plaintiffs have not gone on appeal or revision. Thus, the fact remains that the "A" Party did not come forward to pay the balance of the sale price as per the agreement, that the "A" Party petitioners were not even willing to pay the appropriate court fee to enforce the sale agreement through a court of law and the order of the learned Sub Judge, Palani is binding on the "A" Party since no appeal or was filed against the said order. The High Court has also held that the sale agreement has become invalid in law due to the efflux of time. Therefore, as on date the "A" Party has no right to make any claim on the strength of the sale agreement dated 24.6.1991. 7. The next point that has to be considered is, whether the "A" Party was in possession of the property from the date of sale agreement i.e., 24.6.1991 or from 1-7-1991. 8. Therefore, as on date the "A" Party has no right to make any claim on the strength of the sale agreement dated 24.6.1991. 7. The next point that has to be considered is, whether the "A" Party was in possession of the property from the date of sale agreement i.e., 24.6.1991 or from 1-7-1991. 8. There is no dispute that the Kodaikanal International School, the respondents herein were in possession of the Loch End property upto 30.06.1991 in the capacity as tenants. The petitioners "A" Party themselves filed O.S.No.66 of 1991 before the District Munsif of Kodaikanal. They have also filed I.A.No.75 of 1991 in the said suit for the purpose of injunction against the respondents therein viz., Kodaikanal International School and Rev.J.Issac Moon, Chairman, IELCT. There is a specific averment in para-4 of the plaint that, "as per the terms and conditions of the sale agreement dated 26.4.91 peaceful possession of the premises along with its buildings and fittings and furniture are handed over to the plaintiff on 1.7.1991 onwards. Rev.A.Sundaram, Secretary of the IELC personally came along with the plaintiff and others and made suitable directions and arrangements and handed over possession of the suit property to this plaintiff." In para-11 of the plaint, the same version is repeated and described the cause of action in the following manner: ".... consideration as per the terms and conditions of the sale agreement on 1.7.1991 when this plaintiff was given actual possession of the suit property,..". In the affidavit filed by her in I.A.No.75 of 1991 in O.S.66 of 1991 the petitioner "A" Party Siva Bala Devi, in para-7 has stated as follows: "......As a matter of fact I am in possession and enjoyment of the same from 1.7.1991 onwards as a sale agreement vendee." Thiru.Sundaram the secretary of IELC, who executed sale agreement in favour of the "A" Party, in his statement of objections before the Executive First Class Magistrate in M.C.No.1 of 1991 has mentioned as follows: "It is submitted that though the counter-petitioners received a draft for Rs.Nine lakhs and a cheque for Rs.one lakh, he did not send the same for collection, since one of the condition in the sale agreement is to hand over vacant possession on or before 1.6.91. He had his own doubt whether he will be able to vacate the residents and hostlers in such a short time. He had his own doubt whether he will be able to vacate the residents and hostlers in such a short time. They were in occupation of the place for such a long time. It is submitted that the Loch End boarding home, which is also part of the said property is run by the I.E.L.C. and there are 33 students of the Kodaikanal International School, who are residing there. The monthly bills of the students are directly settled by the School and such payments were made till 30.6.91. One Thiru.Jeyaprakash is the House Parent of the said boarding house. It is submitted that this Counter-petitioner visited Kodaikanal on 29.6.91 and found the dormitory was locked. He ascertained that the students have gone on holidays and that their personal belongings were inside. The House Parent Jeyaprakash was not available and so this Counter-petitioner decided to break open the lock and intimated the Inspector of Police on 30.6.91. Later, he consulted the Vice Principal of the School, since the personal belongings of the school students were inside. The Vice Principal advised him not to do so and hence, the Counter-petitioner returned to Nagercoil." In the same objections, he has narrated the 14 buildings which were in occupation of the Kodaikanal International School and has given details about the occupation of the 14 buildings by the school authorities and other staff as on 30.6.1991 and he has further submitted that neither the Church Council of IELC nor the Management Committee of the IELCTA have powers to sell the Loch End properties. He has also stated as follows: "It is submitted that on returning to Nagercoil, this Counter-petitioner went through the records and also consulted eminent Lawyers. He was informed that the I.E.L.C.T.A. is holding the said property and that they do not have any power to sell or in any way encumber the same. The order in O.P.No.101 of 75 gives only limited powers to the said Trust. As per the order, the said property do vest in the I.E.L.C.T.A. with power to administer and carry out the objects for which the trust was created. The I.E.L.C.T.A has been directed to hold the properties in trust for the objects. It is therefore submitted that neither the Church Council of the I.E.L.C. nor the Management Committee of the I.E.L.C.T.A have powers to sell the Loch End properties. The I.E.L.C.T.A has been directed to hold the properties in trust for the objects. It is therefore submitted that neither the Church Council of the I.E.L.C. nor the Management Committee of the I.E.L.C.T.A have powers to sell the Loch End properties. The relevant resolutions passed by the said committee are not valid or enforceable. It is submitted that this Counter-petitioner executed a sale agreement in respect of the said property on 26.4.1991 in favour of M/S. Sri Bala& Co only in pursuance of the resolutions passed by the Church Council and the Management Committee of the Trust. Since those bodies do no have such powers, the said agreement for sale dt.26.4.91 is null and void. So also, this Counter-petitioner does not have any right to give power of attorney in respect of Loch End property. But as he was then under a bonafide impression, that the resolution have been duly passed and authorised him to negotiate in respect of the said property and hence he has actually executed a power of attorney in favour of M/S.Sri Bala & Co., After realising his mistake, he has revoked the power of attorney and has intimated the same. He has also advertised the said revocation in dailies. It is respectfully submitted that at no point of time this Counter-petitioner handed over the possession of Loch End property to M/S. Sri Bala & Co., Even in the sale agreement, one of the condition was that the vacant possession of the properties, occupied by the tenants should be handed over on or before 1-6-1991. But the earlier agreement between MELIM & IELCTA strictly prohibited such eviction and contemplates that the Kodaikanal Intenational School can occupy as long as they require. Since this counter-petitioner realised that eviction of the tenants is practically impossible, he did not encash the cheque and draft given by M/s. Sri Bala & Co., This counter-petitioner returned to Nagercoil on 30.6.1991 itself and he is not aware as to what happened subsequently. It is absolutely not correct to allege that on 1.7.91 this Counter-Petitioner took possession of the said property and then handed over to Tmt. Siva Bala Devi. It is absolutely not correct to allege that on 1.7.91 this Counter-Petitioner took possession of the said property and then handed over to Tmt. Siva Bala Devi. As already stated on 30.6.91, the said property was under the possession, enjoyment and control of Kodaikanal International School." The very same Sundaram has also filed an affidavit before the R.D.O., Kodaikanal wherein he has entioned as follows: " I had already handed over the possession to the agreement premises to Sri Bala & Co., on 1.7.91. They are in peaceful possession from 1.7.91." 9. The petitioners "A" Party filed a suit in the Sub Court without proper court fee and in the plaint she has not impleaded the Kodaikanal International School or the President of the Association, but impleaded only Thiru. Sundaram who was in collusion with her and who executed the agreement of sale. In the said plaint the "A" Party has stated as follows: " 10. The Vendor undertook in paragraph No.9 of the deed to vacate tenants from the properties occupied by them on or before 1.6.91. Accordingly, in terms of the deed partial possession of the property in terms of Sec.53A of transfer of property Act has been given to the plaintiff and full possession was handed over on 1.7.91 after the tenants having vacated the premises and possession was taken over by Rev. A. Sundaram in his capacity as the Secretary cum treasurer of the defendant company and the same was delivered of the defendant company and the same was delivered to the plaintiff in a peaceful manner on 1.7.91." "15. The plaintiff is keeping its money ready and is prepared to proceed with the purchase of the suit property at any time as it was the case in the past also. The prayer for possession is pleaded with abundant precaution even though the plaintiff was put in peaceful possession even as on 1.7.91. 16. The plaintiff is keeping its money ready and is prepared to proceed with the purchase of the suit property at any time as it was the case in the past also. The prayer for possession is pleaded with abundant precaution even though the plaintiff was put in peaceful possession even as on 1.7.91. 16. The cause of action for this suit arose at Kodaikanal wherein the property is situated, the agreement of sale dated 26.4.91 is being entered into in respect of the said property, when the plaintiff was put in possession on 1.7.91 in furtherance of the said agreement, when the plaintiff paid Rs.10 lakhs towards the sale consideration and subsequently." In the quash petition in Crl.O.P.No.6555 of 1991 filed by the petitioners herein the "A" Party against M.C.No.1 of 1991 filed before this court, in para-5 the "A" Party petitioner has stated as follows: "Accordingly, the first petitioner was given vacant possession on 1.7.1991 and from 1.7.1991 the first petitioner alone is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the entire property under the agreement of sale dated 26.4.91, inducted into valid and legal possession by the true and lawful owner." Even in the agreement said to have been executed by the said Sundaram in favour of the petitioner "A"Party, in Clause 7a(ii) it is stated as follows: " Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) to be paid within 3 months from the date of this agreement subject to the condition that the vacant possession of the properties occupied by tenants are handed over to the purchaser on or before 1.6.91 and the following payments are also subject to the same condition." In the letter dated 13.07.1991 of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nilakottai to the Superintendent of Police, Dindigul in para-2 it has been stated as follows: "However, the School authorities were occupying the premises till 30th June 1991 and paid rent." In para 4, 5 & 6 it has been stated as follows: (4) The purchaser M/s.Sri Bala & Co., is represented by Thirumathi R.Sivabala Devi W/o. S.D. Rajendran of Karur. On 1.7.91 the seller Re.Sundaram visited Kodaikanal alongwith the purchaser Tmt. Sivabala Devi and opened the Dormitory and handed over possession to Tmt.Sivabala Devi. He has also pointed out the above said 6 premises mentioned in para 2 has disposed the properties. 5. Mr. On 1.7.91 the seller Re.Sundaram visited Kodaikanal alongwith the purchaser Tmt. Sivabala Devi and opened the Dormitory and handed over possession to Tmt.Sivabala Devi. He has also pointed out the above said 6 premises mentioned in para 2 has disposed the properties. 5. Mr. Peter A. Lugg, Acting Principal, Kodaikanal Intenational School appeared at Kodaikanal Police Station on 1.7.91 at 9.00 hrs. and presented a complaint stating that some strangers were moving inside the church primises on 30.6.1991, at 15.45 hrs. and found that the Church Main Gate was locked by them. He was also asked not to enter the compound. The door of the Main Hostel (Dormitory) was also taken possession by them. On 1.7.91 the Workers of Church informed him that they were denied of their rights to attend to their duties. The houses occupied by the staff were also broke open and new lock put up by the secretary. He further stated that they are the tenants of the said primises and paid rent upto 30.6.91. In this connection 4 cases in Kodaikanal P.S.Cr.No.13/91 u/s.147,448, and 427 I.P.C. was registered and investigated. Both the petitioners were asked to produce their relevant records pertaining to their claims. Further the parties concerned were also asked to appear for enquiry. 6). Rev. A. Sundaram, secretary of the said Church gave a petition on 30.6.1991 stating that he will take possession of the building aforesaid as he is the authorised person of the IELCA Trust Association governed by the resolution/Proceedings of the Committee of Management of Trust Association. Accordingly, he took possession of dormitory and the other houses relating to the sale deed and handed over to Tmt. Sivabala Devi." 10. The "A" Party petitioners would now claim by putting forth a new theory that they were given partial possession of the property from 26.4.1991, the date of sale agreement, when all the pleadings of the petitioner "A" Party in earlier proceedings was that they took possession on 1.7.1991, now they want to take shelter to over come the provisions of Sec.145 (4) by relying on a letter dated 18.9.91 by the Inspector of Police wherein he has mentioned that "as per sale agreement Sri. Bala & Co is in partial possession from 26.4.1991." There is no such covenant in the agreement itself that partial possession is handed over to the purchaser at the time of agreement. Bala & Co is in partial possession from 26.4.1991." There is no such covenant in the agreement itself that partial possession is handed over to the purchaser at the time of agreement. On the contrary, it is stated in Clause 7(a)(ii) of the agreement that Rs.10 lakhs to be paid within three months subject to the condition that the vacant possession of properties occupied by tenants are handed over to the purchaser on or before 1.6.1991. There is absolutely no basis for the statement of the Inspector of Police dated 18.9.91 to say that the "A" Party was given partial possession from 26.4.1991. The said averment is totally against the statement of the same Inspector of Police dated 8.7.91 wherein he has mentioned that Rev. Sundaram took possession of the property on 1.7.1991 and handed over the same to the "A" Party. The date 22.2.91 appearing in the earlier line of the said statement is a typographical error or one without any basis. The theory of partial possession from 26.4.91 is only an afterthought conceived at the later stage to overcome the provisions of Section 145(4) of Cr.P.C., 11. The pleadings as early as from July 1991 and subsequent thereafter by the "A" Party itself would show that the property was taken possession on 30.6.1991/1.7.1991. The contention of the "B" Party respondents also is that forcible possession was taken during the same period. When forcible possession was taken, the Kodaikanal Intentional School authorities have run from pillars to post, from the Inspector of Police to Chief Secretary by sending petitions, complaints etc., But all such prayers fell into deaf ears, because according to the respondents, the close associate of the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu was interested in grabbing the property as declared by Mr. A.N. Dyaneswaran, IAS., who was physically present and dictated orders to the police and revenue officials. Ex.B14 is the letter dated 5.7.1991 from Rev. Issac Moon, President of IELCTA to the Inspector of Police and Ex.B25 to B33 are complaints of Roger Yeso, Rupen Das, N.Jayaprakash, Ms.Christine Bell, Ms.Leelammma, Peter Lugg, Bernd Plug authorities of the Kodaikanal International School and the acknowledgements given by the police on such complaints, which would further strengthen the contentions of the respondents that forcible possession was taken by "A" Party by using political goondaism and influence over the police and revenue officials. The fact that the belongings and moveables of the inmates who resided there including the students, who have gone on holidays were also looted, is proved by the fact that receipts for some looted properties which were recovered later, were given by the owners of the properties to the police that they were retrieved to them by the police. Such acknowlegements are from Roger Yeso and Jerry Yeso who were students of the Kodaikanal International School., Mr.Rupen Das, dean of students of the same school, etc., For the complaints given by the various authorities of the School, the Police have given receipts bearing serial Nos.319/91, 320/91, 322/91,323/91, 337/91, 338/91,274/91 and 285/91 etc., The particulars, as to whether any case was registered against the trespassers and what was the follow-up action taken by the police are not available before this court. However, the fact that the school was in possession of the Loch End Property till 30.6.1991, is proved by the vouchers for payment of charges to the IELC and the pleadings of both the sides as mentioned earlier, would clearly prove that the Kodai Intenational School was in lawful possession of the property as a tenant, even though the lease was not renewed after 1988. The reason for such non-renewal of the lease is that there were negotiations for the purchase of the said property by the school itself and that therefore, no formal renewal of lease was made. However, the school was in continuous possession. It is not the case of "A" Party that they have taken possession through court, or by any other lawful means, or with the consent of the "B" Party. When a party is in possession of a property by adopting lawful means and methods, such party in possession will not voluntarily go out of possession, unless there is some consideration or understanding. But, no such consideration or understanding is pleaded by the "A" Party. The only contention of the "A" Party is that Rev. Sundaram, who entered into sale agreement, handed over possession to them on 30.6.1991. In the various complaints lodged by the school authorities, it is clearly mentioned that the locks of the buildings which were closed during vacation, were found break-opened and new locks were put up and strangers were found therein who are alleged to be goondas. Sundaram, who entered into sale agreement, handed over possession to them on 30.6.1991. In the various complaints lodged by the school authorities, it is clearly mentioned that the locks of the buildings which were closed during vacation, were found break-opened and new locks were put up and strangers were found therein who are alleged to be goondas. All the complaints, which were made immediately at the time of occurrence and subsequently would clearly prove that "Forcible Possession" was taken by the "A" Party by using influence and goondas. 12. Section 145 of Cr.P.C., provides as follows: "145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace: (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1)." The proviso to sub-section (4) is founded on the principle that forcible and wrongful dis-possession is not to be recognised under the criminal law. So that it is not possible to say that such an act of dis-possession was completed before the date of the order. The word "dis-possessed" means to be out of possession, removed from the premises, ousted, ejected or excluded. Even where a person having a right to possession but taking the law in his hands makes a forcible entry otherwise than in due course of law, it could be a case of both forcible entry otherwise than in due course of law, it would be case of both forcible and wrong dispossession. Under this section, a person who was not in possession within two months before the date of initiation of proceedings cannot be declared to be in possession. The proviso to sub section (4) would be successfully invoked only if the party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months from the date of preliminary order and that there is no room for applying any fiction that the date of the preliminary order should be deemed to be the date of petition to give relief even to persons forcibly and wrongfully dis-possessed within 2 months prior to the date of the petition. The word 'forcible' used in this proviso cannot be given a restricted meaning of dis-possession accompanied by the use of criminal force as defined u/s.350 of the Penal Code. It is not necessary that actual force should be used to make dispossession a forcible one. Misrepresentation and improper threats are sufficient to cause forcible dis-possession. In the decision reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1444, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “If the party in defacto possession is found to have obtained possession by forcibly and wrongfully dis-possessing the other party within 2 months next preceding the date of his order, the Magistrate can treat the dispossessed party as if he was in possession on such date, restore possession to him and prohibit the dispossessor from interfering with that possession until eviction of the person in due course of law." 13. The only other contention of the petitioner is that no opportunity was afforded to them by the Revenue Divisional Officer before passing of the order. Petitions have been filed by the "A" Party for grant of copies and fix a date of hearing . Grant of copies was absolutely not necessary, because already all the copies have been taken by the "A" Party based on which they have contested the case in the High Court and the Supreme Court and also the same is proved by the typed set filed before this court. As far as the opportunity of hearing is concerned, the R.D.O. has passed an order on the basis of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed the Magistrate to pass the final order within 4 months from the existing materials available on record. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has not given any direction to give any opportunity of being heard to the parties. Even the clarification petition filed by the "A" Party before the Supreme Court has also been withdrawn. Even assuming that an opportunity of hearing is given to "A" Party, the "A" Party is not going to put forth any better case than what is available now before this court. Even during the course of arguments this court offered the learned counsel for the "A" Party all the opportunities to put forth the entire case and lengthy arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the "A" Party and also the counsel for the other side. Even during the course of arguments this court offered the learned counsel for the "A" Party all the opportunities to put forth the entire case and lengthy arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the "A" Party and also the counsel for the other side. I have already held that the materials available on record would show that the "A" Party has taken forcible possession within 60 days from the date of the preliminary order. The preliminary order was passed on 13.7.1991, the forcible dispossession of "B" Party took place on 30.6.1991/1.7.1991, which is within two weeks of the preliminary order. Therefore, Section 145(4) Cr.P.C., squarely applies to the case. I do not find any infirmity in the order of the R.D.O., since R.D.O., has taken into consideration all the available materials existing on record as directed by order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the R.D.O., For all the aforesaid reasons, the revision is liable to be dismissed.