MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. GOURANGA CHANDRA DEY — 2004 DIGILAW 290 (SC)

Judgment SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J,- A few facts, which are considered necessary and relevant for disposal of this appeal, in short and substance, are the following: Respondent I filed a petition for eviction under Section 12 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 (for shon "the Act") on the grounds of bona fide requirement and default in payment of rent. The Rent Control Court held that the claim of bona tide requirement was not proved. However, it found that the appellants were defaulters in payment of rent and directed the appellants to hand over the possession of the building in question to Respondent 1. The appellants filed RCC Appeal No. 4 of 1995 under Section 20 of the Act before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), West Tripura against the said order of the Rent Control Court. The learned Civil Judge, a after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal holding that the appellants failed to deposit the arrears of rent as directed by the Rent Control Court and the appeal filed by them without making deposit of arrears of rent was not maintainable in view of Section 13(1) of the Act. Thereafter, the appellants filed revision petition in the Court of the District Judge, Tripura, assailing the order passed by the learned Civil Judge in appeal. The learned District Judge b allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of the Civil Judge in appeal and remanded the case to the appellate court for considering the petition for adducing additional evidence and for deciding the appeal afresh. Respondent I, aggrieved by this order passed in the revision petition, filed a petition as Civil Rule No. 466 of 1997 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Gauhati High Court. Respondent I, aggrieved by this order passed in the revision petition, filed a petition as Civil Rule No. 466 of 1997 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Gauhati High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, after hearing the parties, finding some conflict in the decisions of this Court in Chillnamma v. Gopalanl and of the Division Bench of the High Court in Billapalli Roy v. State of Tripura2 felt that the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Billapani Roy case2 required reconsideration by a larger Bench to decide the following question: "Whether in view of Section 13 of the Act of 1975, the appellate d court is prohibited from entertaining an appeal unless the tenant has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit and continues to payor deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until termination of e the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be?" The Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the parties, concluded that the judgment of the Division Bench in Billapani Roy case2 (aforementioned) did not require any reconsideration and no reference to a larger Bench was called for. It also held that no appeal against the order made f under Section 12 of the Act is competent and aintainable under Section 20 of the Act unless provision of Section 13(1) of the Act is complied with; that fulfilment of the requirement of Section 13(1) is a sine qua non for preferring appeal under Section 20. Hence, aggrieved by the same, the appellant tenants have assai led the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in this appeal. 2. Hence, aggrieved by the same, the appellant tenants have assai led the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in this appeal. 2. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court was not right and justified in taking a technical view in the matter; as in the case of contesting the proceedings before the Rent Controller, opportunity could be given by the appellate court for making payment of admitted rent due or depositing befote the appeal is heard; saying that appeal itself could not be preferred without paying or depositing admitted arrears of rent may not be correct in view of Section 13(3) of the Act; if Section 13 is read as a whole, it will be clear that appeal preferred without payment or depositing of admitted arrears of rent, could not be dismissed. On the other hand, further proceedings in the appeal could be stopped in case admitted arrears of rent were not paid or deposited. He placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Chil1l1amma easel. 3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents landlord made submissions supporting the impugned judgment. It was urged that Section 13(1) in clear and unambiguous terms states that no appeal can be preferred against any order of the Rent Controller without paying or depositing of arrears of rent admitted. 4. Before proceeding to deal with the respective contentions urged on behalf of the parties it would be useful to reproduce the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 20 of the Act to the extent they are relevant for the immediate purpose: "12. 4. Before proceeding to deal with the respective contentions urged on behalf of the parties it would be useful to reproduce the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 20 of the Act to the extent they are relevant for the immediate purpose: "12. Eviction of tenal1ts.-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the State Government or the Central Government or any other public authority notified under this Act: Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and such court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, notwithstanding that such court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. (2)(a) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf. (2)(a) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf. (b) If the Rent Control Court, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due on him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement or tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable and such default has continued for three months within a period of twelve months, it shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, and if it is not satisfied it shall make an order rejecting the application thereof by him: Provided that an application under this sub-section shall be made only if the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant intimating the default and the tenant has failed to payor tender the rent together with interest at six per cent per annum and postal charges incurred in sending the notice within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice or of the refusal thereof. (c) The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent a Control Court may in its discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of proceedings within the said period of one month or such further period, as may be, it shall vacate that order. * * * 13. * * * 13. Payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction.-No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 12 shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that section, or to prefer an appeal under Section 20 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears oftent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to payor to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority as the case may be. (2) The deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the Rent Control Court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred d to in sub-section (4): Provided that the time fixed by the Rent Control Court for the deposit of the arrears oftent shall not be less than forty-five days from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. (3) If any tenant fails to payor to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. (4) When any deposir is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control f Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. * * * 20. * * * 20. Appeal.-(l)(a) The State Government may, by general or special order notified in the Official Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purposes of this Act in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction. Note.-In computing the thirty days in this clause, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the Appellate Authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (3) The Appellate Authority shall call for the record of the case from the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and if necessary, after making such further inqniry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Control Court, shall decide the appeal. Explanation.-The Appellate Authority may, while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. (4) The Appellate Authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. (5) The decision of the Appellate Authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, except as provided in Section 22." (emphasis supplied) 5. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether an appeal can be preferred under Section 20 of the Act aggrieved by the order made under Section 12 of the Act without making the payment or depositing all arrears of rent admitted as required under Section 13(1) of the Act. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether an appeal can be preferred under Section 20 of the Act aggrieved by the order made under Section 12 of the Act without making the payment or depositing all arrears of rent admitted as required under Section 13(1) of the Act. A landlord can seek a direction to evict his tenant under Section 12 of the Act and the Rent Control Court on being satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due in respect of the building shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if it is not satisfied it shall make an order rejecting the application. The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or till such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of the proceedings within the said period. it shall vacate that order. 6. Section 13 makes provision for payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction. In this section it is clearly stated that no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 12 shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that section, or to prefer an appeal under Section 20 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to payor deposit any rent, which may subsequently become due before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. Under sub-section (I) of Section 13 two situations are contemplated - one is contesting the application before the Rent Control Court and the other is preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the Act. Under sub-section (I) of Section 13 two situations are contemplated - one is contesting the application before the Rent Control Court and the other is preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the Act. An embargo is placed on the tenant expressly either to contest the a application under Section 12 before the Rent Control Court or to prefer an appeal under Section 20 of the Act without payment or deposit of arrears of rent. The second part of the same sub-section requires the tenant to continue to payor deposit any subsequent rent before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. From this sub-section it is clear that a tenant cannot prefer an appeal under Section 20 - (1) unless the tenant has b paid or pays to the landlord or deposits the arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, and (2) after preferring an appeal he is required to continue to payor deposit subsequent rent before the Appellate Authority to prosecute the appeal. 7. From the plain language and clear terms of Section 13(1) of the Act it follows that payment or deposit of all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to c be due in respect of the building up to the date of the payment or deposit is a mandatory requirement for preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the Act. The said sub-section declares that no tenant shall be entitled to contest or to prefer an appeal unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. The use of the words "no" and "unless" in sub-section (I) of Section 13 in the d context makes the position clear that the payment or deposit of all arrears of rent is a prerequisite essential condition for preferring an appeal. 8. The use of the words "no" and "unless" in sub-section (I) of Section 13 in the d context makes the position clear that the payment or deposit of all arrears of rent is a prerequisite essential condition for preferring an appeal. 8. The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants that sub-section (3) of Section 13 provides opportunity to the tenant to show sufficient cause in regard to failure to payor deposit the rent both before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority and by combined reading of e Sections 13(1) and 13(3) it may be construed that there is no bar for preferring an appeal without depositing or paying the arrears of rent; the appeal could be preferred but the further proceedings could be stopped in the appeal in case the tenant fails to payor deposit arrears of rent without any sufficient cause and the appeal being in continuation of the original proceedings, the same powers could be exercised by the Appellate Authority f in granting time to a tenant to payor deposit arrears of rent even after preferring an appeal, cannot be accepted. In the same section the legislature consciously contemplated different situations and different stages in regard to contesting the application under Section 12 of the Act and preferring an appeal under Section 20 and continuing the proceedings in the appeal after preferring an appeal. Sub-section (I) of Section 13 speaks of payment or g deposit of arrears of rent before preferring an appeal and sub-section (3) of the same section speaks of stopping all further proceedings by the Appellate Authority. 9. Under Section 13(1) a tenant is not entitled to contest the application unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control h Court the arrears of rent. He cannot prefer an appeal without payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted. Section 13(3) deals with stopping all further proceedings unless the tenant shows sufficient cause for his failure to payor deposit the rent. Stopping of further proceedings would arise only if the proceedings are pending. Unless an appeal is preferred after complying with the payment of arrears of rent or deposit of the admitted arrears of rent due, the question of either pendency of the appeal or stopping of further proceedings in such appeal does not arise. Stopping of further proceedings would arise only if the proceedings are pending. Unless an appeal is preferred after complying with the payment of arrears of rent or deposit of the admitted arrears of rent due, the question of either pendency of the appeal or stopping of further proceedings in such appeal does not arise. There are two separate aspects in regard to an appeal - one is compliance to be made before preferring an appeal and the other is the tenant has to continue to payor deposit the rent, which may subsequently become due. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 will come into operation on the tenant failing to payor deposit subsequent arrears of rent arising during the pendency of the appeal, so as to stop further proceedings in the appeal. But, it cannot relieve the statutory compulsion or the mandatory requirement of Section 13(1) viz. paying or depositing the arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal. Under Section 20(2) only after an appeal is preferred under Section 20 after complying with Section 13(1), the Appellate Authority may stay further proceedings. Under sub-section (4) of Section 20, no doubt, the Appellate Authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. This sub-section cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with subsections (I) and (3) of Section 13 and sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 20. Under Section 20(4) the Appellate Authority may have the power of fixing of arrears of rent but that is only in relation to arrears of rent that may become subsequently due during the pendency of the appeal. 10. Payment or deposit of alTears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal under Section 20 is a statutory requirement as expressly stated in compulsive language under Section 13(1) of the Act and no discretion is left to the Appellate Authority to say that an appeal could be preferred without satisfying the precondition of deposit or payment of admitted arrears of rent. Under Section 20(1)(b) any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may within 30 days prefer an appeal. Under Section 20(2) on such appeal being preferred, the Appellate Authority may order stay of further proceedings. The appeal could be preferred only on payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent. Under Section 20(1)(b) any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may within 30 days prefer an appeal. Under Section 20(2) on such appeal being preferred, the Appellate Authority may order stay of further proceedings. The appeal could be preferred only on payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent. It also follows that no effective order of stay of further proceedings can be passed by the Appellate Authority unless an appeal is preferred after such payment or deposit of admitted arrears of rent. This is also a factor to indicate that payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent is essential before preferring an appeal. It is to command a tenant to payor deposit arrears of admitted rent to protect the interest of the landlord as in other matters certain provisions are made to protect the interest of the tenant. Remedy of appeal is a creation of statute and it is open to the legislature to provide for an appeal subject to certain conditions. Insistence of payment or depositing of arrears of rent admitted as stated in Section 13(1) of the Act cannot be diluted or defeated merely on the ground of hardship to a tenant more so when the tenant already had one opportunity before the Rent Control Court in regard to making payment or depositing arrears of rent. Perhaps it was considered unreasonable or unnecessary to provide again an opportunity before the Appellate Authority to a tenant that too to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram AgarwaP while dealing with the question of a deposit of arrears of rent and default in depositing the rent within the given time, in para 35 has expressed thus: (SCC p. 588) "35. In a cae where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom." Sub-section (4) of Section 20 also does not help the appellants to say that the b Appellate Authority shall have all powers of the Rent Control Court and in that view an appeal could be preferred without payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent. If it is so read or understood, it will dilute or defeat the clear, express and mandatory requirement of Section 13(1). If it is so read or understood, it will dilute or defeat the clear, express and mandatory requirement of Section 13(1). As already noticed above, in view of the specific provision made in Section 13(1) as regards payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal, the argument based on sub-section (4) cannot be accepted. Under sub-section (4), the Appellate Authority may exercise powers of the Rent Controller as regards arrears of rent that may become due after preferring an appeal and during the pendency of it. But this sub-section cannot render mandatory requirement under sub-section (1) of Section 13 ineffective or otiose. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that every part of the d provision has to be given meaning and effect in the context of a statute. When there is express provision made in Section 13(1) in emphatic terms using negative words indicating mandatory requirements of payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal under Section 20, neither sub-section (3) of Section 13 nor sub-section (4) of Section 20 are of any avail to the appellants. This view is supported by a decision of a Bench of e three learned Judges of this Court in Nasiruddin3 which after considering several decisions dealing with the provisions of the Rent Control Acts of different States, expressed that where statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom; the Rent Control Act is a welfare legislation not an entirely beneficial enactment for the tenant but f also for the benefit of the landlord scope of legislation or its intention cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In para 37 of the said judgment, it is stated thus: (SCC p. 589) "37. The courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must he gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression shall or may is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character." (emphasis supplied) 11. In the same decision, it is also held that where the statute does notprovide either for extension of time or condones the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the court does not have the power to do so. 12. In E. Palanisamy v. PalanisamvA this Court has taken the view that benefits conferred by statutory provisions can be enjoyed only if such provisions are strictly complied with and procedure prescribed is followed step by step. Para 5 of the said judgment reads: (SCC p. 127) "5. Mr Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in court, it should be taken as compliance with Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. According to the learned counsel, the court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance with Section 8 inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand deposited in court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance with the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. to deposit rent in court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat LaP and M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu6." 13. This Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama7 opined that the paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. Such intention is primarily to be a ascertained from the text of an enactment in question and if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the court could discard such interpretation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of legislation. Such intention is primarily to be a ascertained from the text of an enactment in question and if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the court could discard such interpretation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of legislation. In the case on hand, no such anomaly, absurdity or inconsistency would arise even if a plain and grammatical interpretation is given to Section 13(1) of the Act insisting to payor deposit b all the arrears of rent admitted before preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the Act. 14. Yet again in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd8 a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in para 25 has observed that: (SCC p. (21) "25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannotbe enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute." 15. Judged by what is stated above, it cannot be said that the provisions of Sections 13 and 20 of the Act are irreconcilable, unintelligible or absurd so as not to give effect to the plain language of Section 13( I) requiring a tenant to payor deposit arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the Act. 16. The decision of this Court in the case of Chinnammal does not e advance the case of the appellants for reasons more than one. That was a case wherein the question, which has arisen in this appeal neither arose nor was decided. No doubt, provisions II and 12 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 and Sections 12 and 13 of the Act are similar but the question decided in that case is altogether different, as is evident from para 4 f of the said judgment, which reads: (SCC p. 495) "4. We heard counsel. The short question that arises for our consideration is what is the amount that should be deposited by the tenant under Section I I (2)(c) of the Act to set aside the order passed under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. We heard counsel. The short question that arises for our consideration is what is the amount that should be deposited by the tenant under Section I I (2)(c) of the Act to set aside the order passed under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. Should the deposit be only of that amount which was specified as payable in the order of eviction passed 9 under Section I I (2)(b) of the Act or will it take within its fold even the arrears of rent that accrued due subsequent to the said order of eviction and up to the date of deposit? The Rent Controller passed the order of eviction on 22-2-1980. He held that in case the tenant deposits a sum of Rs 540 which is the arrears of rent due as on 1-2-1980 along with the 7 (1990) 1 see 277 8 (2003) 2 see III advocates fee Rs 25 and interest at the rate of 6 per annum on arrears of Rs 540, the tenant will be entitled to get the order of eviction vacated under Section I I (2)(e) of the Act. The learned District Judge has found that the amount of Rs 750 will cover the amount quantified specifically by the Rent Controller in the order dated 22-2-1980. The deposit made along with the application filed under Section 11(2)(e) of the Act complied with the order dated 22-2-1980. Really, no other point arose for consideration on the facts of this case, at that stage. But the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that deposit to be made by the tenant should also include the arrears ofrent that accrued due subsequent to the order of eviction dated 22-2-1980 and should include the dues till the date of deposit i.e. 6-4-1982. The question is whether the view so expressed by the learned Single Judge is in accord with Section 1l(2)(e) and the Scheme of the Act?" 17. In para 7 of the same judgment, this Court has expressed that a mere look at Sections II and 12 of the Kerala Act would show that they operate in different situations. Under Section 11(2)(b)the court passes a final order of eviction directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if there is a default as provided therein. The execution of such final order is statutorily suspended for a period of one month. Under Section 11(2)(b)the court passes a final order of eviction directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if there is a default as provided therein. The execution of such final order is statutorily suspended for a period of one month. Within that time or such further time, as the court may allow, the tenant is given an opportunity to pay or deposit the arrears of rent with interest and cost and, if payment or deposit is made, the court shall vacate the order. Whereas the provisions of Section 12 are applicable during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction. In the same paragraph it is made clear that for the applicability of Section 12 the proceedings for eviction should be pending. 18. Hence the said judgment, having regard to the facts of that case and the question that was decided, does not support the contention urged on behalf of the appellants in this appeal. Even the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in Binapani Roy ease2 aforementioned, in a way supports the case of the respondents. 19. The Division Bench of the High Court was right in holding that there was no conflict in the judgments in the cases of Chinnammal and Binapani Roy2. 20. In view of the discussion made and reasons stated, the question set out above is answered in the negative meaning thereby payment or deposit of all arrears of rent admitted is mandatory before preferring an appeal by a tenant under Section 20 of the Act. Hence, the appeal is dismissed finding no merit in it, with no order as to costs. D.M. DHARMADHlKARI, J.- This appeal is directed against the order dated 21-6-2001 passed by the High Court of Gauhati. The appellant is the tenant of the leased premises in dispute. The appeal to the Appellate Authority against the order of eviction from the leased premises on the ground of default in payment of rent passed by the Rent Control Court has been dismissed on the alleged failure of deposit of rent, being a mandatory precondition for preferring appeal under Section 20 read with Section 30 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 (for short hereinafter referred to as the Act). 22. 22. Learned Single Judge of the High Court formed an opinion that a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Binapani Roy v. State of Tripura2 in the light of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court on identical provisions of the Kerala Act in the case Chinnamma v. Gopalan1 requires reconsideration by a larger Bench. The learned Single Judge formulated and referred the following question for decision of the b larger Bench: "Whether in view of Section 13 of the Act of 1975, the appellate court is prohibited from entertaining an appeal unless the tenant has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment C or deposit and continues to payor deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be 23. The Division Bench answered the question against the tenant by holding thus: "Thus, it is clear that payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant and also the future rent to be due is required to enable the tenant to contest the eviction roceedings before the Rent Control Courtor to file appeal against the order of Rent Control Court. This condition is sine qua non for the purpose of contesting the eviction proceedings or filing of an appeal. By no stretch of imagination it can be presumed that tenant may be allowed to contest the eviction proceedings or to file an appeal, without making such deposit as required by law, appeal being a creature of statute, the right conferred by the statute is also subject to any other condition imposed by the statute." 24. The learned counsel appearing for the tenant assailing the correctness f of the judgment of the Division Bench has contended that pre-deposit of arrears of rent and future regular payment of rent during pendency of the appeal may be a mandatory precondition for consideration or hearing of the appeal by the tenant but the filing or presentation of the appeal without deposit cannot be held to be incompetent. It is submitted that until the requisite deposit of rent is made the proceedings in the appeal may be suspended as provided in sub-section (3) of Section 13 hut the tenant would have a right of consideration or hearing of his appeal after he makes good the requisite deposit in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 13 read with sub-section (2) thereof. 25. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the landlord supported the reasoning and conclusion of the Division Bench in the h impugned judgment. 26. The legal question that arises in this appeal before us is on the tenability of the appeal without pre-deposit of arrears till the date of tiling or presentation of the appeal. 27. To answer the above question a critical examination of the provisions of Sections 13 and 20. in the light of the scheme and object of the said provision in the Act, is necessary: "13. (I) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 12 shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court undet that section. or to prefer an appeal under Section 20 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due, in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to payor to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. (2) The deposit under sub-section (I) shall be made within such time as the Rent Control Court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4): Provided that the time fixed by the Rent Control Court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than forty-five days from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. (3) If any tenant fails to payor to deposit the rent as aforesaid. the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority. as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contral), stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. (4) When any deposit is made under sub-section (I), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. * * * 20. (I)(a) The State Government may, by general or special order notitied in the Official Gazette, confer on such ofticers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes as may be specified in the order. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days tram the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction. Note.-In computing the thirty days ill this clallse, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the Appellate Authority may order stay offurther proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (3) The Appellate Authority shall call for the records of the case from a the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit, either directly or through the Rent Control Court, shall decide the appeal. Explanation.-The Appellate Authority may, while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, grant an extension oftime to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. (4) The Appellate Authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. Explanation.-The Appellate Authority may, while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, grant an extension oftime to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. (4) The Appellate Authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. (5) The decision of the Appellate Authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, except as provided in Section 22." (Underlining for pointed attention) 28. Section 33 confers power on the State Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act including for regulating the procedure to be followed by the Rent Control Courts and Appellate Authorities in performance of their functions under the Act. In exercise of the aforementioned rule-making power the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 have been framed and the relevant rules regulating the procedure of appeals i.e. Rules IS and 16 read as under: "IS. (I) Every appeal against an order either of the Accommodation Controller or the Rent Control Court shall in addition to the grounds of appeal specify the date on which the order was received by the appellant. The memorandum of appeal shall be signed by the appellant or his counsel and presented to the Appellate Authority or to such officer as he appoints in this behalf by the appellant himself personally or by his recognised agent or by counsel at any time during office hours on a working day. The appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the order of the Accommodation Controller or the Rent Control Court as the case may be against which the appeal is made. (2) Every appeal under the Act shall be accompanied by a spare or sufficient number of spare copies thereof for service on the respondent or f respondents mentioned therein. 16. (I) When an appeal under the Act is preferred, the Appellate Authority shall fix a day for hearing the appeal and send notice thereof to the appellant or appellants and the respondent or respondents mentioned in the appeal and shall also send a copy of the appeal along with notice to the respondent or respondents. 16. (I) When an appeal under the Act is preferred, the Appellate Authority shall fix a day for hearing the appeal and send notice thereof to the appellant or appellants and the respondent or respondents mentioned in the appeal and shall also send a copy of the appeal along with notice to the respondent or respondents. (2) The Appellate Authority after hearing the appeal may decide the 9 appeal finally according to law of equity and good conscience or may make further enquiry. The final decision given shall be reduced into writing. In the absence of any party duly summoned to attend, the appeal may be decidedexparte. (3) If the Appellate Authority decides to make further enquiry he may take additional evidence or require such evidence to be taken by the Accommodation Controller or Rent Control Court, as the case may be. * * (Underlining for pointed attention) 29. As has been rightly observed by the Division Bench of the High Court in the decision of Billapalli Roy2: (Gau LR p. 104, para 14) "Section 13 of the Act has been inserted with the intendment to avoid litigations for realization of arrear rents which is likely to accumulate during the long period of litigation and also to deter the tenant from resorting to unfair practice to use and occupy the tenanted premises without payment of rent during the long period of protracted litigation." 30. The decision in Billapalli Roy2 does not directly deal with and answer the question posed before us. In that case the interpretation of the words and expression "admitted by the tenant to be due" as used in sub-section (I) of Section 13, came up for interpretation. To make the said provision workable it was held that the abovementioned expression cannot be given a literal meaning as conveying only the rent which has been admitted in the pleadings by the tenant. It was held that in order to fulfil the object of the provision which is in the interest of the landlord the expression is to be understood reasonably to mean "the rent which can be found to be due from the facts and materials on record". 31. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chillnammal which interprets similar provisions in the Kerala Act also does not deal with the point involved before us. 31. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chillnammal which interprets similar provisions in the Kerala Act also does not deal with the point involved before us. In that case it was held that provisions of Section II (2) of the Kerala Act, which are comparable to Section 13(1) of the present Act, impose an obligation in specified terms on the tenant to enable him to contest the proceedings before the Rent Control Court. He is required to deposit the arrears of rent (along with interest and cost of proceedings) for which the landlord had sent a demand notice on him and on the basis whereof the Rent Control Court had passed an order of deposit under Section 11(2)(b) of the Kerala Act which is comparable to Section 13(2) of the present Act. The Supreme Court held that the arrears of rent to be deposited before the Rent Control Court as a precondition for contesting the case by the tenant are only arrears of rent for which a notice has been served by the landlord and "would not include rent which might become due till the actual date of deposit under the order of the Rent Control Court". The above proposition does not directly answer the question of the nature of the requirement of deposit of arrears as a precondition for preferring appeal under Section 20 of the Act under consideration before us. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment, therefore, was right in observing that the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Billapalli Roy ease2 which was on a different point was not required to be reconsidered by the larger Bench in the light of decision of this Court in Chinnamma casel.