JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This second appeal has arisen out of the judgment and decree, dated 30-11-1999 and 20-12-1999 respectively, passed by the learned Civil Judge {Senior Division), Dhubri, in Title Appeal No. 13 of 1998, reversing the judgment, dated 29-61998. and decree, dated 6-7-1998, passed, in Title Suit No. 303 of 1993, by the learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division) No. 1, Dhubri, decreeing the plaintiff-appellant's suit. 2. The case of the plaintiff-appellant may. in brief, be stated thus : Late Jagdish Chandra Biswas had a homestead land, described In Schedule-A to the plaint. Out of the land of Schedule-A, as much as 15 much as 15 land was gifted by the heirs of Jagadish Chandra Biswas to a Kali Mandir Committee. From the heirs of deceased Jagdish Chandra. Biswas, the plaintiff - appellant purchased, vide a Registered sale deed, dated 3-11-1983, 4 kathas 1 lechas of land and took delivery of possession thereof, the land having been so purchased and taken possession of by the plaintiff-appellant being described in Schedule-B to the plaint. On 30-11-1984/85. the defendants - respondents trespassed into the land of Schedule-B and took forcible possession of s a portion thereof and, constructed, thereon houses, the portion of the land from where the plaintiff-appellant was so dispossessed being described in Schedule-C to the plaint, which formed part of the land of Schedule-B, though the defendants-respondents have no right, over the said land except collecting rent from the plaintiff-appellant. The plaintiff-appellant, then, instituted Title Suit NO. 7.5/1985 in the Court of Munsiff No. 1, Dhubri. praying for declaration of her right, title and interest: over the land of Schedule-B and a decree of Khas possession in respect of the land of Schedule-C by evicting the defendants-respondents therefrom. The defendants respondents contested the suit by filing their written statement, wherein they denied plaintiff s right, title and interest over the land of Schedule-B and also plaintiffs prayer for recovery of khas possession of the land of Schedule-C, By judgment, dated 61-1987, the suit was decreed on contest with cost-in favour of the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants-respondents preferred Title Appeal No. 21/1987, but the game was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants-respondents preferred Title Appeal No. 21/1987, but the game was dismissed. The plaintiff, then, pull the decree into execution and recovered, through Title Execution Case No, 11/1987, khas possession, on 10-6-1987, of the land of Schedule-C by getting the defendants evicted therefrom, the possession of the suit land having been so delivered to the plaintiff by the Nazir of the Court; but on 6-41989, the defendants, again, dispossessed the plaintiff from the said land of Schedule C and constructed thatched houses thereon. The plaintiff, then, instituted Title Suit No. 303/1993 (which has led to the present appeal) seeking decree for khas possession over the land of Schedule-C by demolishing the houses constructed thereon by the defendants and by evicting the defendants therefrom and also for compensation, 3. The defendants-respondents contested Title Suit No. 303/1993 aforementioned by filing their written statement, their case being, in brief, that the defendants have been in possession of the suit land since before the death of late Jagadish Chandra Biswas, the defendants having their dwelling houses standing thereon, the defendants, contrary to what the plaintiff claimed, did not take forcible possession of the land of Schedule-C on 30-4-1984. which allegedly led to the filing of Title Suit No. 75/1985, nor did the defendants, contrary to what the plaintiff alleges, enter into the suit land on 6-4-1989. The suit land belongs to the defendants, who have rights, title and interest and possession over the same; whereas the plaintiff has no right, title and interest over the suit land. The defendants, therefore, sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. The learned trial Court framed the following issues in Title Suit No. 313/1993 :- 1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the suit is under-valued and proper Court-fees are not paid thereon? 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for? 7. To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled? 5 Both sides adduced evidence and on conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for? 7. To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled? 5 Both sides adduced evidence and on conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. The defendants impugned the decree, so passed, in Title Appeal No. 13/1998 aforementioned, By impugned judgment and decree aforementioned, the learned first appellate Court reversed the decree. Hence, the plaintiff-appellant has, now, approached this Court with the help of present second appeal. 6. This second appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law : "1. Whether the appellate Court continued error in opening the issue in respect of title in the subsequent suit for possession which is barred by res judicata as the right, title and interest over the suit land had been decided in the earlier suit, i.e., Title Suit No. 75/1985 and the appellant had got possession of the same by executing the decree passed in the suit affirmed in appeal in Title Execution case No. 11 of 1987? : 2. Whether the appellate Court below erred in law in reversing the decree without considering Exhibits 1 to 16 and without countering the findings of the trial Court and as such the judgment is perverse?" 7. I have heard Mr. N. M. Lahiri, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. A. K. Goswami, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, and Mr. D. C. Mahanta learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. T. J. Mahanta, appearing for the defendants-respondents. , ;, 8. Presenting the case on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Lahiri has pointed out that the learned first appellate Court seriously erred in law in reversing the decree passed by the learned trial Court by not taking into account the fact that the plaintiff had already obtained, in Title Suit No. 75/1985, a decree declaring her rights, title and interest over the suit land of the present suit and also had received; possession thereof in execution of the said decree. It is also curious to note, further points out Mr. It is also curious to note, further points out Mr. Lahiri, that when the plaintiff alleged that she had been dispossessed once again and the defendants contested the' suit by disputing the plaintiffs very title to the suit land, the learned first appellate Court formed the view that an issue with regard to the rights, title, interest and possession of the plaintiff over the suit land ought to have been framed, whereas, contends Mr. Lahiri, the decree, which had been passed in Title Suit No. 75/1985, operated as res judicata under Section 11of the Code of Civil Procedure and the learned first appellate Court could not have, once again, entered into the question of determination of title over the suit land between the same parties in respect of the same land. Once the title of the plaintiff stood decreed in Title Suit No. 78/1985, the defendants were estopped under the law, submits Mr. Lahiri, from disputing the question of title and when the plaintiff had established that she had been put into possession of the suit land by execution of the decree passed in Title Suit aforementioned, there was no reason for the learned first appellate Court not to allow the plaintiff-appellant's prayer for recovery of possession of the suit land by evicting the defendants therefrom. By holding that the defendants are the actual owner of the suit land, the learned first appellate Court, has given, submits Mr. Lahiri, a finding, which is completely perverse and contrary to law as contained in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Mahanta has submitted that a careful reading of the pleadings of the plaint shows that the' plaintiff derived title through the heirs of late Jagadish Chandra Biswas, but Jagadish Chandra Biswas was only a tenant on the suit land and, hence, the decree obtained in Title Suit No. 75/1985 was, at best, a decree of possession of the suit land and not a decree of 'the title thereto. It is also submitted by Mr. Mahant that in the present suit, the plaintiffs case is that she has been, once again, dispossessed on 6-4-1989, but this suit was instituted in 1993, Le. after the period of more than 6 months from the date of alleged dispossession. The suit so instituted, points out Mr. It is also submitted by Mr. Mahant that in the present suit, the plaintiffs case is that she has been, once again, dispossessed on 6-4-1989, but this suit was instituted in 1993, Le. after the period of more than 6 months from the date of alleged dispossession. The suit so instituted, points out Mr. Mahanta, cannot be a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and must be treated as a suit covered by Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963; but a suit under Article 64, further points out Mr. Mahanta, can be based on possession and not on title; whereas in the present case, according to Mr. Mahanta, the suit is based on title and such a suit is not covered by Article 64. Hence, the suit as a whole submits Mr. Mahanta, was not maintainable in law. Reliance in support of this submission is placed on Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander, reported in. Further projecting the case of the defendants-respondents, Mr. Mahanta has submitted that under Section 4 of the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Act, 1951 on issuance of notification under Section 3 thereof, the rights, title and interest over the land gets vested in the State Government. Hence, in the present case, it is the State Government, which owns the suit land and not the plaintiff-appellant. Similarly, the suit land, In question, points out Mr. Mahanta, is a land located in the district of Goalpara and under Section 4 of the Assam Land Holding (Adoption of Relationship under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 in the Acquired Permanently Settled Estates) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred as "the Assam Land holding Act, 1974"), when a notification is issued under this Act, the rayat becomes a tenant of the land. In the case at hand, even If the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land on the date, when the notification came into force, her status was that of tenant and no title could have been given to her in respect of the suit land. In such a situation, points out Mr. In the case at hand, even If the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land on the date, when the notification came into force, her status was that of tenant and no title could have been given to her in respect of the suit land. In such a situation, points out Mr. Mahanta, the defendants were the owners of the suit land Inasmuch as the Jagadish Chandra Biswas was, admittedly, their tenant and, hence, the plaintiff-appellant, by purchasing the land from late Jagadish Chandra Biswas, merely obtained the possessory right over the suit land and no title could have been declared in her favour. 10. In fact, further submits Mr, Mahanta, the documentary evidence on record clarify that the defendants were in possession of the suit land inasmuch as Khatian stood in their names and they also had title to the suit and late Jagadish Chandra Biswas, according to the relevant Khatian, was merely a tenant under the defendants. In a situation, such as this, contends Mr. Mahanta, the learned first appellate Court committed no error in allowing the appeal and in dismissing the suit. 11. Reacting to the submissions made, on behalf of the defendants-respondents, Mr. Lahiri has submitted that there is no bar under the law for institution of a suit for possession only when the plaintiff has already obtained a decree of her title to the suit land. Such a suit is, according to Mr. Lahiri, covered by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 12. It is also pointed out by Mr. Lahiri that under Explanation-IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, any matter, which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially In issue in such suit. 12. It is also pointed out by Mr. Lahiri that under Explanation-IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, any matter, which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially In issue in such suit. In the case at hand, the question as to whether the plaintiff had acquired title to the suit land by way of purchase through the heirs of late Jagadish Chandra Biswas and/or as to whether the defendants were the title-holders thereof in terms of the materials contained in the revenue records and/or by operation of enactments, such as, the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Act, 1951, and the Assam Land Holding Act, 1974, were all questions, which ought to have been made the grounds of defence or attack in the former suit by the defendants, when the plaintiff had sought for declaration of her rights, title and interest over the suit land. As a matter of fact, submits Mr. Lahiri, there were specific issues in Title Suit No. 75/1985 for determination of the question of the plaintiffs rights, title and interest over the suit land and whether the plaintiff was entitled to the decree, as had been sought for by her, and these issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff in the suit and, subsequently, the learned appellate Court upheld the decree. The decree, so passed having remained unchallenged, the same attained, contends Mr. Lahiri, finality and could not have been reopened in the subsequent suit, i.e. the present suit (Title Suit No. 303/1.993) by the learned first appellate Court. Support for his submissions is sought to be derived by Mr. Lahiri from the case of Mohanlal v. Benoy Kis.hria, reported in Talluri Venkata Seshayya v. Thadikonda Kotiswara Rao, reported in KV Narayanan v. State reported in (FB), Marwarl Kumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri, reported in K. Ethirajan v. Lakshimi, reported in and Kunjan Nair Shivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair. 13. Lahiri from the case of Mohanlal v. Benoy Kis.hria, reported in Talluri Venkata Seshayya v. Thadikonda Kotiswara Rao, reported in KV Narayanan v. State reported in (FB), Marwarl Kumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri, reported in K. Ethirajan v. Lakshimi, reported in and Kunjan Nair Shivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair. 13. Before entering into the question as to whether the defendants were the actual owners of the land or not and/or as to whether the plaintiff derived any title to the suit land by way of purchase of the land through the heirs of late Jagadish Chandra Biswas, what is necessary to ascertain is as to what the doctrine of estoppel and the doctrine of res Judicata convey, for, if the doctrine of estoppel and/or doctrine of res judicata debars the defendants from disputing, once again, the plaintiffs title to the suit land, then, the question as to whether the decree passed in Title Suit No. 75/1985 declaring the rights, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land was or was not erroneous is a question, which could not have been entered into by the learned first appellate Court and it would, therefore, be immaterial as to whether the suit land, in question, is or is not covered by a notification issued under Section 3 of the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Act, 1951 and/or Assam Land Holding Act, 1974, particularly, when there is no material on record, to show as to when such a notification was issued, 14. For the sake of brevity, let me, first, quote hereinbelow the relevant portion of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows : "11. Res Judicata - No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court, competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. EXPLANATION - I * * * EXPLANATION - II * * * EXPLANATION - III * * * o Explanation IV : Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." 15. What the doctrine of res judicata conveys has been succinctly laid down by the Apex Court in Hope Plantation Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, reported in wherein the Court observed and laid down as follows : ; "It is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res judicata are based on public policy and justice. Doctrine of res judicata is often treated a branch of the law of estoppel though these two doctrines differ in some essential particulars. Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue which was necessary for decision, in the earlier litigation. These two aspects are "cause of action estoppel" and 'issue estoppel'. These two terms are of common law origin. Again, once an issue has been finally determined, parties cannot subsequently in the same suit advance arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher forum if available. The determination of the issue between the parties gives rise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between the same parties in which the same issue arises." 16. The Apex Court has recently in Kunjan Nair Shivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair (supra) described the object and ambit of the doctrine of res judicata; in the following words (Paras 12 and 13 of AIR) : ; o "Res judicata pro veritate accipitur" is the full maxim which has over the years, shrunk to mere res judicata", ',..', Section 11 contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment which is - basedpartly on the maxim, of Roman junsprudenced. "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (It concerns the State that there be an end to law suits) and partly on the maxim "nemo debet bis vexarl pro Una eft leaden causa" (mo man should be vexed Lwice: over for the same cause). The section does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court but operates as a bar to the trial of the suit or issue, if the matter in the previous suit between the same parties litigating under the same title in a Court, competent to try the subsequent suit in which such issue has been raised." 17. In, Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee (supra), reported in (at page 72 para 23) the Supreme Court clarified the sweep of the doctrine of res judicata in the following words :- "There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as 'res judicata' between the parties to It. The correctness or otherwise of judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as 'res judicata'. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing Court even though erroneous is binding, on the parties, see Abhoy Kanta v. Gopinath Deb. 18. In the case of Talluri Venkata Seshayya v. Thadikonda Kotiswara Rao (supra), reported in (AIR PC) 1937 (at page 4) the Privy Council observed as follows : "The provisions of Section 11, Civil P.C, are mandatory; and the ordinary litigant, who claims under one of the parties to the former suit can only avoid its provisions by taking advantage of Section 44, Evidence Act, which defines with precision the grounds of such avoidance as fraud or collusion. It is not for the Court to treat negligence, or gross negligence, as fraud or collusion, unless fraud or collusion is the proper inference from the facts." 19. From a combined reading of the decisions in Talluri Venkata Seshayya V. Thadikonda Kotiswara Rao Mbharilal v. Benoy Kishna Marwari Kumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpiiri K. Ethirajan v. Lakshmi ( AIR 2003 SC 4295 )and Kunjan Nair Shivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair (supra), It clearly follows that the rule of res judicata disallows the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question again and again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment rendered therein and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate, again, on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue, which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. Section 11 of the CPC does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court but operates, In subsequent suits, as a bar to the trial of the issue, which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them litigate under the same title and if the issue has been heard and finally decided. Hence, the fact that a defence, though available, was not taken inadvertently or through negligence would be immaterial. In fact, in the light of Explanation IV to Section 11, even if a defence has not been taken in the former suit, yet if such a defence could have been taken in the former suit, then, too, the same shall be deemed to have been "directly and subsequently" in issue in the former suit and the party concerned will be debarred from raising such an issue. The provisions of Section 11, Civil P.C., are mandatory, and the ordinary litigant, who claims under one of the parties to the former suit can only avoid its provisions on grounds of fraud or collusion. Even in erroneous decision law operates as "res judicata' between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as ' res judicata'. 20. In the case of Marwari Kumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru, reported in which Mr. Lahiri relies upon, the 1st respondent pleaded that the earlier judgment was not binding on him. However, since the respondents were parties to the earlier proceedings, the 1st respondent was properly represented by his mother, the 2nd respondent and the earlier suit had been hotly contested, the earlier judgment was, according to the Apex Court, binding on both the respondents. The Apex Court, therefore, held that both the first appellate Court and the second appellate Court had failed to appreciate that on principles of res judicata, the respondents were precluded from denying the appellants' title to the suit property. 21. In K. Ethirajan (Dead) by LRs. The Apex Court, therefore, held that both the first appellate Court and the second appellate Court had failed to appreciate that on principles of res judicata, the respondents were precluded from denying the appellants' title to the suit property. 21. In K. Ethirajan (Dead) by LRs. v. Lakshmi, reported in the earlier suit was filed by predecessor of respondents for eviction of predecessor of appellants claiming exclusive title to the suit property. The suit was resisted by predecessor of the appellants claiming adverse possession and, alternatively, as co-owner on the basis of a joint patta. The trial Court dismissed the suit taking the view that predecessor of the appellants had perfected their title by adverse possession, while the appellate Court concluded that the parties were co-owners. The decision of appellate Court, thus, became final in absence of further appeal. Subsequently, suit for partition was preferred by predecessor of the appellants. On the basis of the decisions in the earlier litigation coupled with the joint patta, trial Court and first appellate Court granted a preliminary decree for partition, but in second appeal, High Court, reversing the findings and judgments of the two Courts below, dismissed the partition suit on the grounds that the joint patta cannot be treated to be a foundation to claim joint ownership and that in the previous litigation, predecessor of the appellants had based their case on adverse possession and not on co-ownership. 22. In the context of the above facts, the Apex Court held as follows (Paras 16 and 19 of AIR): "The dispute of title to the suit properties between the parties was an issue directly and substantially involved in the earlier suit and on the principle of res judicata in the present suit defendant (predecessor of the respondents) is estopped from questioning the claim of co-ownership urged by the plaintiff (predecessor of the appellants). Although the joint patta granted by the Settlement Authorities in the proceedings under the Act of 1948 cannot itself by a source of title to claim ownership and right of partition but as has been found by the trial Court and the first appellate Court, the plaintiffs claim for partition is not based on joint patta alone but judgments rendered between the same parties in the previous suit and appeal have also been relied on wherein the claim of the present plaintiff to remain in possession of the suit property without any interference by the present defendant had been cryastallised by decree of dismissal of suit for eviction against him. Based on the judgment in the previous litigation, an indefeasible right to continue to occupy the suit property as owner had been created in favour of the present plaintiff and the said judgment has attained finality between the same parties and their LRs." 23. Bearing in mind the position of law as delineated in the authorities cited above, when I revert to the case at hand, what emerges is that in Title Suit No. 75/1985. the plaintiff-appellant's rights, title and interest stood decreed in respect of the suit land. This position is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the decree, so passed, was challenged in appeal, but the decree was maintained. No further appeal having been preferred against the decrees so passed, the decrees so granted attained finality. As held in K. Ethirajan ( AIR 2003 SC 4295 ) (supra), based on the judgment in the previous litigation, an indefeasible right to continue to occupy the suit property as owner had been created in favour of the present plaintiff-appellant and the said Judgment had attained finality between the same parties and their legal representative. Thus, the rights, title and interest of the plaintiff-appellant lo the suit land and every piece and parcel thereof stood decreed and her possession over the staid suit land stood confirmed. Whether the decision so reached was erroneous or not is a question, which cannot be, gone Into, once again, in any subsequent suit between the same Parties. The question as to whether the suit land is covered by any notification issued under the Assam Stale Acquisition of Zamlndaris Act and/or under the Assam Land Holding Act, 1974 are mixed questions of facts and law. The question as to whether the suit land is covered by any notification issued under the Assam Stale Acquisition of Zamlndaris Act and/or under the Assam Land Holding Act, 1974 are mixed questions of facts and law. This apart, there is no bar for institution of suits for possession based on title. Such a suit, in fact, falls within the ambit of Art, 05 of the Limitation Act. Since the plaintiff appellant's title to the suit land already stood declared in the former suit, there was no legal bar in instituting a suit fur mere possession based on earlier declaration of her title to the suit laud. Such a suit Is squarely covered by Article 65, Hence. Article 64 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act have no application in the present case. 24. Thus, the defences, which are, now. ' being offered by Mr. Mahanta, were all available lo the defendants, when Title Suit No. 75/1985 was contested. Even if those defences were not taken by the defendants, these defences must, according to Explanation IV to Section 11, be deemed to have been directly and substantially In Issue in Title Suit No', 75/1985 and these issues cannot be gone into in a subsequent suit between the same parties inasmuch as the decision given earlier, even If erroneous, is binding on the parties and so long as the earlier decree remains binding the plaintiff's title to the suit land cannot be challenged by the defendants-respondents. 25. In the above drop, the learned trial Court observed and held as follows : "The plaintiff exhibited decree of T.S. 75/85 and T.A, 21/87 as Ext. 4(2) and Ext. 5(2) respectively to establish the alleged fact that she got contested decree of declaration of her title and consequently relief of recovery of khas possession of the present suit land against the defendants. Perused the aforesaid two exhibited decrees and conclude that, plaintiff got the contested decree against the defendants for recovery of khas possession of-the present suit land. The Court Nazir the P.W.2 also deposed that he executed the decree of T.S. No. 75/85 by demolishing structure of the defendants. Ills report is Ext.2(3). Perused the aforesaid two exhibited decrees and conclude that, plaintiff got the contested decree against the defendants for recovery of khas possession of-the present suit land. The Court Nazir the P.W.2 also deposed that he executed the decree of T.S. No. 75/85 by demolishing structure of the defendants. Ills report is Ext.2(3). As per his report he handed over possession of the suit land I.e. Dei-rectal land to husband of the plaintiff on 10-6-1987 in present of P.W. l. The P.W.l and P.W. 3 supported the P.W. 2. Therefore, 1 further conclude that the plaintiff got the recovery of khas possession on 10-61987 by evicting the defendants from the Hull land. Now the plaintiff Instructed this suit against the said defendants for second time dispossession as she, alleged that she was dispossessed again after execution of decree. The defendants did not specifically denied the above allegation although told during hearing that they did not dispossess the plaintiff from the decretal land. If they want to say that the decretal land Is not the suit land the defendant should come forward to establish their plea, But they did not adduce any evidence on that aspect. Hence, I decided that the present suit land is the Decretal land the above findings is given in view of Ext. 4(2) and Ext. 5(2). As the suit land and the. land which had been recovered through execution of Decree of T.S. 75/85 are one and same and the defendants did not specifically denied the allegation of subsequent dispossession of the plaintiff from the suit land, I decided that the suit was Instituted within a period of limitation of 12 years from the date of actual dispossession for second time, In view of the above evidence and find lugs I hold that the plaintiff has established her claims and accordingly this issue Nos. 3 and 6 are decided in allinualive in favour of the plaintiff." 26. Thus, the finding of the learned trial Court was that the plaintiff, having been put Into possession of the suit land in execution of the decree passed in Title Suit No. 75/1985, is entitled to be put back into possession thereof, when she was out of possession of the suit, laud by conduct of the defendants. I find no fault in the reasoning so assigned by the learned trial Court. I find no fault in the reasoning so assigned by the learned trial Court. In fact, this aspect of the matter has not been taken into account by the learned first appellate Court. Inasmuch as the first appellate Court took the view, as Is reflected from the impugned judgment, that there was no issue In the present suit with regard to the rights, title, interest and possession of the plaintiff over the suit land, though such an Issue, according to the learned first appellate Court ought to have been framed. The learned first appellate Court, further held that defendants were the actual owners of the suit land. Both these findings of the learned first appellate Court are unsustainable in law Inasmuch as the issue of rights, title, interest and possession over the suit land stood already decided in the former suit between the parties and In the face of the decree, which the plaintiff had obtained in the earlier suit and which operated as res Judicata, the question of treating the defendants as owner of the suit land did not arise at all. 27. For what have been discussed above, I find that the learned first appellate Court gravely erred in law in not treating the decree passed in Title Suit No. 75/1985 as res judicata and In not concluding that in the subsequent suit, I.e., in the present suit the defendants were not entitled to agitato the question of rights, title, interest and possession over the suit land, The learned first appellate Court, thus, erred in law in reversing the decree passed by the learned trial Court. 28. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal succeeds. The Impugned Judgment, dated 30-11-1999 and the decree, dated 20-12-1999 aforementioned shall accordingly stand set aside and quashed. The decree, dated 6-7-1998, passed in Title Suit No. 303/1993 shall accordingly stand upheld. 29. The appeal Is allowed with cost. 30. Send back the LCRs. Appeal allowed