JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rajesh Tandon, J.-Heard Sri N and Prasad, Standing Counsel for the appellant on 27.9.2004 and further of his request on 3.11.2004 and Sri D.S. Patni, Advocate for the respondents. 2. The present appeal was filed as back as in the year 1987. The file has been transferred from Allahabad High Court. The counsel for the appellant Sri Nand Prasad has submitted that lower court's record may be made available. Accordingly I summoned the record of case. Both the parties have submitted that since the record is available, the appeal itself may be disposed of under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As both the parties are represented, the appeal is heard under Order 41 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Present appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 16.6.1996 passed by the Civil Judge, Nainital in Civil Appeal No. 113 of 1984. 4. Amongst the questions of law formulated by the State Counsel, he has argued as to whether the suit was barred by the provisions of Limitation Act. Before dealing with the aforesaid submission of the counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to give the following facts. Facts of the case: 5. A perusal of the record shows that the respondents have filed a civil suit No. 174 of 1984 for perpetual and mandatory injunction in the Court of Munsif, Haldwani. The suit of the plaintiffs had been decreed partly. The learned Munsif restrained the defendant from evicting the plaintiffs from the land in dispute. Aggrieved by the judgment and dercee, first appeal has been preferred by the defendant. The lower appellate court has dismissed the appeal and up held the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 6. The case of the plaintiffs are that they are Bhumidhars of the land in suit situated in village Haripur Pargana Bhabhar Chakhata, District Nainital. They are in peaceful possession over the land in dispute since before the Zamindari abolition. Sri Virendra Kumar had sold certain land out of the total holding by a registered sale deed. Some of the land has been acquired by State of U.P. The plaintiffs and their predecessors were recorded tenure holders in the revenue records maintained by the defendant. They are in peaceful possession over the land in dispute since before the Zamindari abolition. Sri Virendra Kumar had sold certain land out of the total holding by a registered sale deed. Some of the land has been acquired by State of U.P. The plaintiffs and their predecessors were recorded tenure holders in the revenue records maintained by the defendant. The plaintiffs have submitted that various proceedings were decided in favour of the plaintiffs, initiated by the defendant for the eviction of the plaintiffs from the land in suit. The plaintiffs have apprehension that the defendant shall deprive them of their rights over the property in question by illegal means. Hence, the suit. 7. The defendant has contested the suit and has filed written statement. According to the defendant, the land in dispute is the property of the State and no rights under the Tenancy Act or under U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act can accrue to any person. One Manohar Lal got his name entered illegally in 1356 F. though the land in dispute was given to one Sri Shan on lease under the Crown Grants Act. The lease was up to the year 1954 and was registered. As the entry in the name of Sri Manohar Lal was against the law, no rights were accrued to him. 8. The plaintiffs have filed the following documents in support of his case: A copy of the case No. 22/17 of 72-73 filed in the court of S.D.M. Bhabar under U.P. Act No. 22 of 72 State v. Didhyaa Raton and others Ex.1, judgment dated 25.3.1975 by S.D.M.N. Bhabar Ex.2, appellate Court's judgment dated 30.7.76 Ex. 3, copy of judgment dated 2.2.79 of S.D. Bhabar in Case No. 51/1 of 77-78 Ex.4, judgment of Kumaon Commissioner dated 7.8.80 Ex.5 and judgment of the commissioner Kumaon dated 31.12.1980 Ex.6, copy of the judgment of Board of Revenue dated 28.1.82 Ex.7, copy of the report of Tehsildar dated 12.8.73 Ex.8, extract of Khasara 1389 Ex.9, extract of Khatauni 1394 F. Ex. 10, Khatauni 1356 F. Ex. 12, Khatauni 1383 to 88 F. Ex. 13, Khatauni 1377 to 79 F. Ex. 14, Khasara 1377 F. Ex. 15 Khasara 1376 F. Ex. 17, Jot Bahi or Manbhar Lal Ex. 18, photo copy of Gazette dated 16.9.82 and receipts of revenue. 9. The defendant has examined Sri Dharni Dhar Tripathi A.R.A. as D.W.1. 10, Khatauni 1356 F. Ex. 12, Khatauni 1383 to 88 F. Ex. 13, Khatauni 1377 to 79 F. Ex. 14, Khasara 1377 F. Ex. 15 Khasara 1376 F. Ex. 17, Jot Bahi or Manbhar Lal Ex. 18, photo copy of Gazette dated 16.9.82 and receipts of revenue. 9. The defendant has examined Sri Dharni Dhar Tripathi A.R.A. as D.W.1. No. documentary evidence has been filed by the defendant. 10. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court has framed as many as ten issues. The plaintiffs have examined Sri Ravi Kumar as P.W.1. and the defendant has examined Sri Dharnidhar Tripathi as D.W1. Both the parties have filed several documents. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record has decreed with the direction to the defendant to restore the name of the plaintiff in the revenue records and they should not be evicted from the land in suit till the decision of Board of Revenue. 11. The defendant has filed appeal against the said judgment and decree before the Civil Judge, Nainital which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 113 of 1984. The appellate Court has also upheld the findings of the trial Court and has dismissed the appeal. 12. The District Judge, Nainital in Eviction Appeal No.7 of 1975 against the order dated 25.3.1975 of the Prescribed Authority, Bhaber has held as under: "The appeal does not appear to have force on merits either. The land was held by the respondents as lessees. There are documents on record to show that in 1366 Fasli the respondents were recorded as occupancy tenants. Similar entries exist in the Khatauni for the year 1375 Fasli and in the khatauni for 1376 Fasli the respondents are recorded Sirdars. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred me to section 2(b) which defines the expression "premises". There ate certain exceptions mentioned and sub section (ii) is in respect of land held by a tenure holder under the U.P. Tenancy. Act, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act and certain other Acts. The respondents being recorded tenure holder under the U.P. Tenancy Act and the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act, the land in dispute has to be excluded from the expression "premises" and the prescribed Authority was justified in holding so." 13. The Commissioner Kumaon Division in Revision no. Act, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act and certain other Acts. The respondents being recorded tenure holder under the U.P. Tenancy Act and the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act, the land in dispute has to be excluded from the expression "premises" and the prescribed Authority was justified in holding so." 13. The Commissioner Kumaon Division in Revision no. 61 of 1981-82 decided on 16.8.1983, has held as under: “At the same time I find that he revisionist were recorded Bhumidhar, that their entries are longstanding and that no opportunity was given to them to place their case. In view of the above the learned collector may perhaps like to consider the feasibility of giving an opportunity to the revisionists to put their case before him." Findings on the question of Limitation: 14. The learned counsel for the State has vehemently argued that the suit filed by the respondents before the trial Court for perpetual and mandatory injunction was barred by limitation. This point has also been raised before the first appellate Court and issue no. 10 was framed by the first appellate Court in this regard. The learned counsel for the State has argued that the collector has passed the order under Government Grant Act and to get such order cancelled, a limitation of one year for filing of the suit is provided under Article 100 of the Limitation Act but the suit was filed much after the period of limitation. The suit has been filed by the respondent for perpetual injunction for which cause of action was survived on the date of filing of the suit. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the State cannot be accepted that the period of limitation should have been counted from the date of passing of the order by the Collector. 15. In this case both the Courts below have given concurrent findings regarding possession and bhumidhari rights of the plaintiffs over the land in suit. The plaintiff no. 2 Ravi Kumar has examined himself on oath and has stated that the plaintiffs are the Bhumidhar of the land in suit and they are in continuous possession over the land in suit since 1948. The names of the plaintiffs were recorded in the settlement of 1960. The version of the plaintiffs is fully supported by the documentary evidence i.e. the extract of revenue records. The names of the plaintiffs were recorded in the settlement of 1960. The version of the plaintiffs is fully supported by the documentary evidence i.e. the extract of revenue records. The plaintiffs also filed copy of the judgment Ex.2 passed by the S.D.O. Bhabar in the eviction case against the plaintiff. The said case of the Defendant State was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs were found recorded tenure holders over the land in suit. The appeal against the said order was also dismissed by the District Judge vide order dated 30.7.1976, copy of which is Ex. 3 on the record. The State Government preferred an appeal against the order of S.D.O. Haldwani dated 30.8.1978 passed in the mutation case by way of family settlement before the Commissioner Kumaon Division. The State has taken all the pleas which have been taken in the instant suit. The learned Commissioner has relied upon the entries of the year 1948 and held that by virtue of the transfer case No. 14-23 dated 6.12.1948 the entries were made in the name of Sri Manohar Lal as occupancy tenant deemed to be true. Originally lease holder Mr. John Vaughon got permission of transfer of lease from Commissioner vide file No. 14/23 dated 6.12.48. Consequently the revenue records were got amended in the year 1948. 16. Section 131 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act reads as under: 131. Bhumidhar with non-transferable rights: Every person belonging to any of the following classes shall be called a bhumidhar with non transferable rights, and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon such bhumidhars by or under this act, namely- (a) every person admitted as a Sirdar of any land under section 195 before the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, or as a bhumidhar with non-transferable rights under the said section on or after the said date; (b) Every person who in any other manner acquires on or after the said date, the rights of such a bhumidhar under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (c) Every person who is, or has been allotted any land under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952. (c) Every person who is, or has been allotted any land under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952. (d) With effect from July 1, 1981, every person with whom surplus land is or has been settled under section 26-A or sub section (3) of Section 27 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960. 17. In view of the amended section 131 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act a leaseholder would become a Sirdar on the date of enforcement of the Act viz 1.7.1969. The plaintiff's predecessor Sri Manohar Lal got transferred the lease existing in the name of Mr. John Vaughon with the permission of the Commissioner Kumaon and he was in possession in July 1969 on the land in suit. Thus from the evidence on record it is established that the plaintiffs are the Bhumidhar, and are in possession over the land in dispute and there is no material error in the findings arrived at by both the courts below. 18. The apex Court in Manida vs. Md. Kahlil 2001 (5) SCC 30 has held that no interference can be made in the findings of the first appellate court if the same is neither perverse nor based on no evidence. The observations of the apex court are quoted below: "The High Court has upset the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court, taking a different view merely on reappreciation of evidence in the absence of valid and acceptable reasons to say that the findings recorded by the first appellate court could not be sustained, either they being perverse or unreasonable or could not be supported by any evidence. ******************************************* As can be seen from the para extracted above, the High Court thought that it could reappreciate the evidence and scrutinize the findings recorded by the first appellate court under Section 100 CPC. This approach is plainly erroneous and against law. The High Court was also wrong in saying that the plaintiff did not lead sufficient evidence to establish his bona fide requirement. As observed by the first appellate court and noted above already, there is evidence of the plaintiff, his nephew and the neighbour. This approach is plainly erroneous and against law. The High Court was also wrong in saying that the plaintiff did not lead sufficient evidence to establish his bona fide requirement. As observed by the first appellate court and noted above already, there is evidence of the plaintiff, his nephew and the neighbour. The finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court based on evidence could not be interfered with by the High Court, that too in the absence of any substantial question of law that arose for consideration between the parties.” 19. Further in 2001 (5) JT 537 Pakeerappa Rai and Seethamma Hengsu the apex court has held as under: "The first appellate court, on the basis of the said evidence, come to the conclusion that the action-purchaser was not a stranger to the suit. Under such circumstances, it cannot be urged that the conclusion arrived at by the court below was erroneous. The position would be different if the High Court had the jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence. In such a situation the High Court might have come to a different conclusion. But the High Court in exercise of power under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the errnoeus finding of fact howsoever gross the error seems to be. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant." 20. In view of above proposition of law, I find no substantial question of law in the present appeal so as to interfere under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal thus has no force is hereby dismissed with costs.