Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against order dated 24-6-2002 in Writ Petition No. 1708 of 2002. ( 2. ) THE writ petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the award dated 5-11-2001 of the Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur by which it was held that Malajkhand Copper Project of WCL was justified in terminating the services of the petitioner as he was not the "dependent" of the land oustee. The domestic inquiry was held as proper and valid. The Industrial Tribunal observed that in the domestic inquiry the petitioner did not plead that he was the adopted son of the displaced person. As the petitioner had secured employment on the false pretext that he was dependent of the displaced person, his services were held to have been terminated rightly. The Single Bench while dismissing the writ petition in limine observed that the petitioner had "hood-winked the authorities and obtained appointment and after due enquiry his services were terminated". ( 3. ) A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable. Reliance has been placed on Division Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Rahim Khan v. M. P. S. R. T. C. , 1999 (1) JLJ 173 . On the other hand it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the writ petition filed by him was "both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India" and therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal is not barred. On merits it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that his services have been terminated after five years on the ground that he was not the dependent of the displaced person. It is urged that the matter should be remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. ( 4. ) IN the writ petition the petitioner has mentioned that the petition has been filed "under Articles 226 and 227" of the Constitution of India. He claimed to be the adopted son of displaced person Jhinga. It is urged that the matter should be remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. ( 4. ) IN the writ petition the petitioner has mentioned that the petition has been filed "under Articles 226 and 227" of the Constitution of India. He claimed to be the adopted son of displaced person Jhinga. The relief which was claimed in the writ petition was that the award of the Industrial Tribunal (Annexure P-9) be set aside and the respondent No. 2 be directed to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages from the date of dismissal. The Single Bench dismissed the writ petition upholding the order of the Industrial Tribunal. It was done in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and not in exercise of the original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Umaji v. Radhikabai, AIR 1986 SC 1272 , it has been made crystal clear that a proceeding under Article 226 is an original proceeding and a proceeding under Article 227 is not an original proceeding. In Para 106 it has been observed that the petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and then party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. ( 5. ) THE same view has been taken in Sushilabai v. Nihalchand, AIR 1992 SC 185 , Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, (1999) 6 SCC 275 and Kanhaiyalal v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. , (2001) 9 SCC 609 . ( 5. ) THE same view has been taken in Sushilabai v. Nihalchand, AIR 1992 SC 185 , Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, (1999) 6 SCC 275 and Kanhaiyalal v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. , (2001) 9 SCC 609 . It has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Rahim Khan v. M. P. S. R. T. C. , 1999 (1) JLJ 173 : "it will depend upon the facts of each case what is the nature of the relief sought by the petitioner and the jurisdiction exercised by the learned Single Judge. The ratio is what jurisdiction the learned Single Judge has exercised whether under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The maintainability of LPA will depend on that". ( 6. ) RECENTLY, in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, AIR 2003 SC 3044 , the distinction between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been stated as under :- " the Supreme Court stated the broad general difference in exercise of jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the Inferior Court or Tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the Inferior Court or Tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the Inferior Court or Tribunal should have made. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the Inferior Court or Tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on, behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. " ( 7. ) IN the present case the award of Industrial Tribunal was challenged in the writ petition. The Single Bench agreed with the view taken by the Industrial Court. This was in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction. The Single Bench did not find any error in the award of the Industrial Tribunal. On the facts of the present case it can not be said that in dismissing the writ petition, the original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was exercised. Therefore, this Letters Patent Appeal is legally not maintainable. ( 8. ) ON merits also the petitioner has no case. The Industrial Tribunal found that the petitioner has obtained the employment on false representation. He is admittedly not the son of the displaced person. He has also not shown what is his relationship with the displaced person. The story of adoption was not putforth during the domestic inquiry. That was raised for the first time before the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, it was rightly negatived. The view taken by the Single Bench is correct.