N. K. JAIN, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS reference has been placed before the Full Bench as per the order of the Chief Justice dated 26-3-2004. The matter has come up before us on 13-4-2004. ( 2 ) A Division Bench of this Court was considering the appeals. Having heard the submission and considering the case laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties, it formulated certain questions for consideration. The Division Bench found no decision of any Court in the country, which touched the questions formulated by it. It found contrary views expressed by a single bench judgment of the Rajasthan High court in Rajasthan Financial Corporation v. Banwari Lai, AIR 1997 Rajasthan 273 and in the decision in Orissa State Financial Corporation v. Sailendra Narayan Patnaik, (1999) Bank Cas 78 regarding applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act (for short, 'the Act') to applications under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act ('sfc act' for short ). In view of the conflicting decisions, the Division Bench being of the opinion that an authoritative pronouncement on 'the points would be perfectly justified, directed the office to place the matter before the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench, vide order dated 4-2-2004. As stated, the matter is placed before us. ( 3 ) THE questions referred to by the Division Bench for our consideration are as follows : (1) Keeping in view the expression used in Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act and the provisions of sub-section (11) thereof, (seems to be of S. 32) is an application made to the District Judge for one of the reliefs envisaged under the said provision an application made to a Civil court? (2) Is an application under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act governed by any period of limitation stipulated under the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, having regard to the nature of Jurisdiction and the remedy provided under the state Financial Corporations Act ? (3) If applications under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act are held to be governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 what is the limitation prescribed for making of such applications ? (3) If applications under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act are held to be governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 what is the limitation prescribed for making of such applications ? (4) Are the guarantees furnished by the respondents in the instant case continuing guarantees and if so what is the period of limitation if any applicable for recovery of money under Section 31 on the basis of such guarantees ? (5) What is the true and correct purport of the expression 'ordinarily carries on business' appearing in Section 31 (1) of the State financial Corporations Act ? In particular can an application under Section 31 (1) be made to a District Judge within whose territorial Jurisdiction the borrower used to carry on business but is no longer doing so on the date when the application was filed ? ( 4 ) M. F. A. No. 1467/1997 has been filed by the Karnataka State Financial Corporation (for short, 'ksfc') against the order dated 28-1-1997 passed by the VIII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, in Misc. Case No. 430/1988. The KSFC sanctioned a term loan of Rs. 6,50,000/- to M/s. Kam organic Industries (P) Ltd. , for its industrial concern proposed to be engaged in manufacture of Benzyl Group of Chemicals. The respondents are the Directors of the said industry and sureties for the repayment of the term loan. The loan was secured by hypothecation of plant and machinery and by mortgage of land and building by deposit of title deeds. The respondents signed the documents in their capacity as Directors of the Industry and in their personal capacity as sureties for the repayment of loan. The industry committed default and the respondents did not make good the default. The KSFC issued a certificate dated 23-5-1980 for a sum of Rs. 7,89,233-80 ps. and brought for sale in auction the mortgaged and hypothecated assets of the Industry for recovery of dues. Public auction was held. But no bidder was available. Subsequently, a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- was realised by selling the assets to one M/s. Mascot Agro chemicals Pvt. Ltd. The respondents as sureties were jointly and severally liable for a sum of Rs. 7,40,533-37 as on 20-1-1988 and as such' the above Misc. Case was filed for the said amount along with interest. But no bidder was available. Subsequently, a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- was realised by selling the assets to one M/s. Mascot Agro chemicals Pvt. Ltd. The respondents as sureties were jointly and severally liable for a sum of Rs. 7,40,533-37 as on 20-1-1988 and as such' the above Misc. Case was filed for the said amount along with interest. The trial Court found that the petition, which was filed on 31-5-1988, was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the statute and dismissed the petition vide order dated 28-1-1997. Against that order this appeal has been filed. M. F. A. No. 5696/1998 has been filed by the KSFC on 18-12-98 against the order dated 31-10-1998 passed by the II Addizional District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore rural District, Bangalore, in Misc. Case No. 56/1993. The KSFC sanctioned a loan of Rs. 30 lakhs to the 6th respondent-Ittina Printers (P) Limited on 14-3-84 and its Directors, respondents Nos. 1 to 5, executed Exs. P1 to 5 with respect to the loan transaction of the 5th respondent as guarantors. Further loans were sanctioned on different dates. Regarding 4th loan transaction, on 23-6-86 respondents 1 to 5 executed guarantee deeds agreeing to be the guarantors with respect to a particular loan by particular respondents. The deeds were executed on 11-6-84, 1-2-86, 27-3-86 and 23-6-86. The 6th respondent's asset was taken over by the KSFC and it was sold on 9-8-90. The 6th respondent had paid some amount earlier, but no amount was paid subsequently. The trial court observed that the petition was filed in 1993 seeking recovery of the amount and not for enforcing the liability of guarantors and hence under Article 55 of the Limitation Act, the petition was not maintainable. The trial Court observing that the petition filed in 1993 was beyond the last adjustment of the amount and was barred by time, dismissed the petition. M. F. A. No. 1991/1998 has been filed by the KSFC against the order dated 13-3-1998 passed by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District, bangalore, in Misc. Case No. 54/1992. The ksfc filed the miscellaneous case under section 31 (l) (aa) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 for short, 'sfc Act') seeking direction by way of "enforcement of all the respondents as sureties" to pay jointly and severally a sum of Rs. 54. 58 lakhs and topay interest thereon. Case No. 54/1992. The ksfc filed the miscellaneous case under section 31 (l) (aa) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 for short, 'sfc Act') seeking direction by way of "enforcement of all the respondents as sureties" to pay jointly and severally a sum of Rs. 54. 58 lakhs and topay interest thereon. The II Addl. Dist. and sessions Judge observed that the petition was filed on 25-9-1919; the deed of guarantee was executed on 25-10-82, 14-3-84 and 8-8-86; that the notice recalling the entire loan was issued on 21-5-88, assets of the company were taken over on 21-6-88 and were sold on 21-2-89 and the assets were handed over to the purchaser on 21 -3-1989; that when the entire sale transaction was completed regarding the amounts due, the limitation starts from 21-3-1989 and the petition filed was beyond the limitation period of 3 years and as such dismissed the petition. M. F. A. No. 5021/2000 is filed by one of the guarantors of M/s. Asian Computer Stationery Security Printers (P) Ltd. , against the order dated 13-11-2000 passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural district, Bangalore, in Misc. Case No. 43/ 1992 filed by KSFC under sections 31 (l) (aa) and 32 of the SFC Act. The District and Sessions Judge allowed the petition in part and directed respondents 3, 5 and 7 therein to pay a sum of Rs. 30,66,619. 10 ps. with future interest at the rate of 16. 50% per annum from 21-7-1992 till its recovery. ( 5 ) AS the questions involved in all these matters are common, the appeals are taken together and disposed of by this common judgment. ( 6 ) SRI D. S. Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant-KSFC submits that the liability of principal debtor and surety is co-extensive and the guarantee can be enforced against the surety. He also submits that the courts below erred in considering Article 137 of the Act and in not taking note of section 46-B of the SFC Act and Article 112 of the act. He also submits that the appellant is not seeking any relief nor for a decree, and the question of consideration of Article 137 of the Act does not arise in these cases. He also submits that the appellant is not seeking any relief nor for a decree, and the question of consideration of Article 137 of the Act does not arise in these cases. He further submits that the questions referred by the Division Bench are not necessary and the only question to be considered is whether article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable or not. The learned counsel relied on the decisions in Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufacturing Co. , AIR 1978 SC 1765 ; M/s. Everest Industrial Corporation v. Gujarat State Financial Corporation, (1987) 3 SCC 597 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1950 ); Maganlal v. M/s. Maswal Industries, air 1989 SC 2113 ; M/s. Hotel Vivek Continental Pvt. Ltd. v. M. P. Financial Corporation, Indore, AIR 1991 Madh Pra 156; M/s. Amar Cold Storage and Ice Factory v. Punjab financial Corporation, AIR 1994 P and H 235 and M/s. O. K. Gaur and Co. v. Rajasthan Finance Corporation, AIR 2001 Rajasthan 4. ( 7 ) SRI K. Gopala Hegde, learned counsel for KSFC also submits that the only question to be considered in these cases is whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable or not and the Division Bench without there being any issue nor it being raised, has referred the questions on its own to resolve the controversy. Therefore, the reference is uncalled for except for consideration of Article 137 of the Act. He has relied upon the decision in the case of maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. , (1991) 2 SCC 637 : (1991 AIR SCW 612 ). ( 8 ) SRI D. L. N. Rao, learned senior counsel for Y. H. Ganesh Bhat, appearing for respondents 1, 2 and 4, in M. F. A. 5696/1998, submits that it is not necessary to consider the questions referred by the Division Bench, and the Division Bench has not considered the definition of the word 'suit' under Section 2 (1) of the Act and the savings clause under Section 29 of the Act, Article 137 is applicable and the period of limitation is 3 years. He also submits that the KSFC by virtue of insertion of clause (aa) in section 31 of the SFC Act by Act 43 of 1985 can file suit against principal debtor and if it could not realise the entire amount, the remaining balance can be recovered by filing suit against the surety provided the suit is filed within three years as per Article 137 of the act. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions in The Kerala State Electricity board, Trivendrum v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, air 1977 SC 282 ; Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Finance Corporation, AIR 1972 SC 801 ; and Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. , (1991) 2 SCC 637 : (1991 AIR SCW 612 ). ( 9 ) SRI P. Shivanna, learned senior counsel for Y. H. Ganesh Bhat, appearing for the 3rd respondent, in M. F. A. 5696/1998, submits that if no period of limitation is prescribed in view of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, Article 137 will be applicable. ( 10 ) WE have given anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the relevant provisions of the State financial Corporations Act (for short 'the Act') and the Limitation Act, 1963, the decisions cited and scrutinized the material on record. ( 11 ) IT is well settled that a single Judge is bound to follow the decision of a co-ordinate Bench, so also a Division Bench has to follow the decision of a co-ordinate Bench. Otherwise, the Bench has to refer the matter to a larger Bench setting out the reasons why that view has not been agreed. It is also settled that any Bench hearing the matter is bound to decide the questions of law that arise for determination as per the facts of that case unless the co-ordinate Bench decision requires reconsideration due to inconsistency. The Court should see that the matter should not be referred to a larger bench in a routine manner. In the instant case, no contrary decision of this Court has been shown nor is in issue. However, the division Bench has referred the matter to a larger Bench considering the single Judge decisions of different High Courts without considering the Apex Court decision on this point. Be that as it may. In the instant case, no contrary decision of this Court has been shown nor is in issue. However, the division Bench has referred the matter to a larger Bench considering the single Judge decisions of different High Courts without considering the Apex Court decision on this point. Be that as it may. ( 12 ) NOW we take up some cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties: in Gujarat State Financial Corporation's case ( AIR 1978 SC 1765 ), while considering the issue pertaining to affixing of Court-fees, their Lordships observed as to what is the nature of proceedings contemplated by Sec. 31 (1) if it is not a suit by the mortgagee for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. Section 31 would to some extent provide a clue to this question. The substantive relief in an application under sec. 31 (1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. . (II) In Kerala State Electricity Board, trivandrum v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 sc 282 , their Lordships while considering the application under Sec. 16 (3) of Telegraph act and considering the applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 observed that while the petitioner claiming enhancement of compensation u/s. 16 (3) of Telegraph Act falls within the scope of Article 137. Their Lordships in paras 21 and 22 observed as under:"21. The changed definition of the words 'applicant' and 'application' contained in sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) of the 1963 Limitation Act indicates the object of the Limitation Act to include petitions, original or otherwise under special laws. The interpretation which was given to Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act on the principle of ejusdem generis is not applicable with regard to Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation act. Article 137 stands in isolation from all other Articles in Part I of the third division. This Court in Nityananda Joshi's case ( AIR 1970 SC 209 ) (supra) has rightly thrown doubt on the two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case ( AIR 1969 SC 1335 ) (supra) where this Court construed Article 137 to be referable to applications under the Civil Procedure Code. Article 137 includes petitions within the word 'applications'. Article 137 includes petitions within the word 'applications'. These petitions and applications can be under any special Act as in the present case. 22. The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any act to a Civil Court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case ( AIR 1969 SC 1335 ) (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a Court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act. " (III) In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. , (1991) 2 SCC 637 : (1991 AIR scw 612), their Lordships while considering sections 31 (l) (aa), 32, 46-B and 32-G (as introduced by Amending Act 43 of 1985) of State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 held that liability of surety who has given only personal guarantee and not any property in security can also be enforced with court order in the nature of money decree and provisions of Civil Procedure Code regarding execution of decree are applicable. It was also held that under sections 31 (1) and 31 (2) of SFC Act, the liability of surety is co-extensive with that of the loanee industrial concern and where there is any provision confining the liability of surety, the extent of liability shown in the application under Sec. 31 (1) has to be in conformity with the surety bond. Their Lordships further held that when special statute confers jurisdiction on District Judge, the District judge will not be a persona designata but a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction to which the rules of procedure, order, decree, etc. under Sec. 4 of C. P. C. , 1908 will apply to such Court. Their Lordships further held that when special statute confers jurisdiction on District Judge, the District judge will not be a persona designata but a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction to which the rules of procedure, order, decree, etc. under Sec. 4 of C. P. C. , 1908 will apply to such Court. (IV) In Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. , (2000) 5 SCC 299 : ( AIR 2000 SC 2027 ), on the question whether limitation period for doing or not doing an act has to be enacted and prescribed and cannot be imported by the Courts by implication, their Lordships held that albeit, in absence of a limitation period for exercise of a power affecting the rights of a citizen, courts can hold that the same should be exercised within a reasonable period. (V) In Addl. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas, AIR 1994 SC 2227 , their Lordships considering the decision in Nityanand M. Joshi v. L. I. C. of india, AIR 1970 SC 209 , and in Kerala State electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T. P. K. K. Amson and Besom, Kerala, AIR 1977 SC 282 and the respective defence and the words 'award and application' and respective awards, observed (Para 3) ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the parties though have argued that it would not have been necessary to refer the matter, as referred, by framing issues. At the most, the only question that arises for consideration is regarding applicability of Article 137 of limitation Act to applications under section 31 of SFC Act. ( 14 ) IT is seen that the SFC Act has not provided any period of limitation but in view of Sec. 31 of SFC Act, i. e. , Special provisions for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation that if any industry or concern fails to repay any loan or advance u/s. 30 and where an industrial concern fails to make immediate re-payment of any loan or advance under Sec. 30, without prejudice to provisions of Sec. 29 of this Act, the Financial Corporation may apply to the District judge within whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business, and it can claim any of the reliefs and in view of Sec. 31 (1) (aa) for enforcing the liability of any surety. As per Sec. 31, the KSFC can exercise its rights simultaneously to recover the loan from the principal debtor just like an execution of decree, but it is not the same for that of surety as per the provisions of the act and without prejudice to its rights it has to proceed as per the procedure laid down under Section 32 and also to determine the amount and thereby for recovery, and can only file suit, and in the absence of any specific period of limitation provided in the SFC act, the period of limitation will be attracted as per the residuary clause under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Since the matter has been referred, we have heard the parties at length, we have also considered the various provisions of the acts and the case laws. Under the circumstances, it will be appropriate to narrate the relevant provisions and of Limitation Act to answer the questions : section 31 of S. F. C. Act reads as follows :"31. Special provisions for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation: 1) Where an industrial concern, in' breach of any agreement, makes any default in re-payment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligation in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial corporation or where the Financial Corporation requires an industrial concern to make immediate re-payment of any loan or advance under Section 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment then, without prejudice to the provisions of sec. 29 of this Act and Sec. 69 of the TP Act, any Officer of the Financial Corporation, generally or specially authorised by the board in this behalf, may apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business for one or more of the following reliefs, namely : a) for an order for the sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Corporation as security for the loan or advance; or aa) for enforcing the liability of any surety; or b) for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation; or c) for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the board, where such removal is apprehended. 2) An application under sub-sec. (1) shall state the nature and extent of the liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, the ground on which it is made and such other particulars as may be prescribed. Section 32 of the Act reads as follows : "32. Procedure of District Judge in respect of application under Sec. 31 : l)When the application is for the reliefs mentioned in clauses (a) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 31, the District Judge shall pass an ad interim order attaching the security or so much of the property of the industrial concern as would on being sold realise in his estimate an amount equivalent in value of the outstanding liability of the industrial concern to the Corporation, together with the costs of the proceedings taken under sec. 31, with or without an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment. [ (1-A) : When the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of Section 31, the District Judge shall issue a notice calling upon the surety to show cause on a date to be specified in the notice why his liability should not be enforced. ]2) When the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of sec. ]2) When the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of sec. 31, the District Judge shall grant an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment and issue a notice calling upon the industrial concern to show cause, on a date to be specified in the notice, why the management of the industrial concern should not be transferred to the Financial Corporation. 3) Before passing any order sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) issuing a notice under subsec. (1a) the District Judge may, if he thinks fit, examine the officer making the application. 4) At the same time as he passes an order under sub-sec. (1) the District Judge shall issue to the industrial concern or to the owner of the security attached a notice accompanied by copies of the order, the application and the evidence, if any, recorded by him calling upon it or him to show cause on a date to be specified in the notice why the ad interim order of attachment should not be made absolute or the injunction confirmed. 4a) If no cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice under sub-sec. (1a), the District Judge shall forthwith order the enforcement of the liability of the surety. 5) If any cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice under sub-sees. (2) and (4) the District Judge shall forthwith make the ad interim order absolute and direct the sale of the attached property or transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Corporation or confirm the injunction. 6) If cause is shown, the District Judge shall proceed to investigate the claim of the corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 insofar as such provisions may be applied thereto. 7) After making an investigation under sub-sec. 6) If cause is shown, the District Judge shall proceed to investigate the claim of the corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 insofar as such provisions may be applied thereto. 7) After making an investigation under sub-sec. (6) the District Judge may a) Confirm the order of attachment and direct the sale of the attached property; b) vary the order of attachment so as to release a portion of the property from attachment and direct the sale of the remainder of the attached property; c) release the property from attachment; d) confirm or dissolve the injunction; da) direct the enforcement of the liability 'or the surety or reject the claim made in this behalf; e) transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Financial corporation or reject the claim made in this behalf; provided that when making an order under clause (c) or making an order rejecting the claim to enforce the liability of the surety under clause (da) or making an order rejecting the claim to transfer the management of the industrial concern or the Financial corporation under clause (e), the District judge may make such further orders as he thinks necessary to protect the interests of the Financial Corporation and may apportion the costs of the proceedings in such manner as he thinks fit. Provided further that unless the Corporation intimates to the District Judge that it will not appeal against any order releasing any property from attachment or rejecting the claim. to enforce the liability of the surety or rejecting the claim to transfer the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, such order shall not be given effect to, until the expiry of the period fixed under sub-sec. (9) within which an appeal may be preferred, or, if an appeal is preferred, unless the High court otherwise directs until the appeal is disposed of. 8) An order of attachment or sale of property under this Section shall be carried into effect as far as practicable in the manner provided in the CPC, 1908 for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. 8) An order of attachment or sale of property under this Section shall be carried into effect as far as practicable in the manner provided in the CPC, 1908 for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. 8-A) An order under this section transferring the management of an industrial concern to the Financial Corporation shall be carried into effect, as far as may be practicable, in the manner provided in the CPC, for the possession of immovable property or the delivery of movable property in execution of a decree, as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. 9) any party aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4a), sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, appeal to the High Court, and upon such appeal the High Court may, after hearing the parties pass such orders thereof as it thinks proper. 10) Where proceedings for liquidation in respect of an industrial concern have commenced before an application is made under sub-section (1) of S. 31. nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to the financial Corporation any preference over the other creditors of the industrial concern not conferred on it by any other law. 11) The functions of the District Judge under this section shall be exercisable; a) in a presidency town, where there is a city Civil Court having Jurisdiction but a judge of that Court and in the absence of such Court, by the High Court; and b) elsewhere, also by an additional District Judge, or by any Judge of the principal court of civil jurisdiction. 12) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that any Court competent to grant an ad interim injunction under this section shall also have the power to appoint a Receiver and to exercise all the other powers incidental thereto. " ( 15 ) IT may be noted at this stage that by virtue of Act 43 of 1985 certain amendments have been introduced under S. 32 of the Act which have already been incorporated in the section culled out above. " ( 15 ) IT may be noted at this stage that by virtue of Act 43 of 1985 certain amendments have been introduced under S. 32 of the Act which have already been incorporated in the section culled out above. Section 32-G which is also introduced by Act 43 of 1985 deals with recovery of amounts due to the Financial Corporation as arrears of land revenue and S. 46-B of the Act deals with the effect of the Act on other laws and reads as follows :"46-B : Effect of Act on other laws : The provisions of this Act and of any rules or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of any industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this act, but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern. " ( 16 ) IT is clear from the above said provisions of the Act that they make special provision enabling the Corporation to recover its dues by resorting to the provisions of S. 31 of the Act and the said provision has now been extended for enforcement of liability of the surety also. The nature and scope of the said provisions of the Act with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier cases relied upon by the learned counsel Sri Joshi appearing for the Corporation with reference to the change brought about by Act 43 of 1985, have been considered by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra state Finance Corporation's case (1991) 2 scc 637 : (1991 AIR SCW 612) and it has been held that the said provisions enable the Financial Corporations established under the SFC Act to recover the dues from the principal-debtor and the guarantor. In the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation (supra ). In the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation (supra ). M/s. Everest Industrial corporation ( AIR 1987 SC 1950 ) (supra) and maganlal's case (supra) it has been held that an application under S. 31 (1) of the Act is neither a plaint as contemplated under Art. 1 of Schedule 1 nor an application in the nature of a plaint as contemplated by Art. 7 or the Court-fees Act, 1870 and the special procedure contained in S. 31 (1) was not even something akin to a suit of a mortgagee to recover mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property, that even if the Corporationapplicant so chooses it cannot pray for a preliminary decree for accounts or final decree for payment of money nor can it seek any personal liability, that the Corporation cannot pray for a decree of its outstanding dues, that the reliefs contemplated by S. 31 (1) on being granted do not result in a money decree or decree for recovery of outstanding loans or advance, that a substantive-relief in an application under S. 31 (1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree and that such relief cannot be valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. However, after referring to the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act 43 of 1985 the Supreme Court observed that after the said amendment the financial Corporation is given power to enforce its liability against the surety also not only when he has furnished security as a guarantor but also to enforce the personal guarantee of the surety and after referring to the various provisions introduced by the amendment Act 43 of 1985 the Supreme court has held that the extent of liability referred to in S. 31 (1) will necessarily have to be in the very nature of things in terms of monetary value even though it may be not possible to call it a decree stricto sensu as defined in S. 2 (2) of the Code for recovery of money. In the said case, the Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Ss. 46-B, 32-G as also S. 32 including sub-section (11) of S. 32 and has explained the nature and scope of proceedings under Ss. 31 and 32 after amendment by Act 43 of 1985. In the said case, the Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Ss. 46-B, 32-G as also S. 32 including sub-section (11) of S. 32 and has explained the nature and scope of proceedings under Ss. 31 and 32 after amendment by Act 43 of 1985. ( 17 ) SECTION 2 (a) and 2 (i) of the Limitation Act, 1963 read as follows : "2. Definitions : In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: a) "applicant" includes; i) a petitioner; ii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply; ill) any person whose estate is represented by the applicant as executor, administrator or other representative; 2 (1) suit: "suit" does not include an appeal or an application. ( 18 ) UNDER Art. 112 where a suit (except a suit filed before Supreme Court) is filed by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir, the period of limitation of 30 years begins to run as against a like suit by a private person. . Article 136 provides for limitation period for the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any Civil Court. Limitation is 12 years and begins when the decree or order becomes enforceable. Under Art. 137, in respect of any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Division, the period of limitation prescribed is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. ( 19 ) QUESTION NO. 1 : This question requires consideration as to whether the district Judge exercising power under S. 32 of the Act while deciding an application filed under S. 31 of the Act is a persona designata or a Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. The matter is no more res Integra. The question had specifically arisen for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Asnew drums Ltd. v. M. S. F. Corporation, AIR 1972 sc 801 decided on 24-8-1971, wherein a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considering provisions of Ss. The matter is no more res Integra. The question had specifically arisen for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Asnew drums Ltd. v. M. S. F. Corporation, AIR 1972 sc 801 decided on 24-8-1971, wherein a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considering provisions of Ss. 31 and 32 of the SFC Act as also the nature and duty exercised by the District Judge under S. 32 and S.-32 (11) of the Act, has specifically held that the District Judge exercising power under S. 32 of the Act is not a persona designata but a Civil Court. The said decision has been reiterated in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (1991) 2 SCC 637 ) : (1991 AIR SCW 612) (supra decided on 19-2-1991) wherein the three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court has clearly observed that "since the term used in S. 31 (1) of the Act is "district Judge" it cannot be doubted that the District Judge is not a persona designata but a Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction while exercising jurisdiction under Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act. " in view of the above said decision of the supreme Court, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative by holding that the District Judge exercising power under S. 32 while considering the application under S. 31 of the Act is not a persona designata, but a Civil Court of ordinary jurisdiction. ( 20 ) QUESTIONS 2 and 3 : The answer to these questions also need not detain us for long in view of the fact that the said questions have also been answered by the later decision of the Supreme Court. We have already noted the provisions of Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act and also the effect of amendment of S. 32 by Act 43 of 1985 and the nature and scope of the said provisions. The earlier decisions of the Supreme Court were rendered before Amendment Act 43 of 1985. Therefore, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation about the scope and nature of Ss. The earlier decisions of the Supreme Court were rendered before Amendment Act 43 of 1985. Therefore, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation about the scope and nature of Ss. 31 and 32 prior to Amendment Act 43 of 1985, are not helpful to him as the question about the applicability of Limitation Act to an application filed under S. 31 of the Act did not arise for consideration in the said cases. ( 21 ) THE question of applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the applications under the Special Acts wherein no period of limitation is prescribed had specifically come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Kerala state Electricity Board v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 . In the said case, the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the provisions of art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application filed under s. 16 of the Telegraph Act which enables the claimant to make an application to the district Judge for enhancement of compensation awarded by the Electricity Board for cutting of trees in a private land. In the said case, the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier decisions on the point and also having regard to the change brought about by the Limitation Act, 1963 with reference to Art. 137 which corresponds to Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, has held that the earlier decisions rendered with reference to art. 181 of Limitation Act, 1908 holding that art. 137 would apply only to the applications filed under C. P. C. , were no longer good law as the provisions of* Art. 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 were not similar to the provisions of Art. 181 of Limitation Act, 1908 and after noting the difference between the two articles, the Supreme Court specifically observed that under the Limitation Act, 1963 application' has been defined to include a petition under S. 2 (b ). The schedule is divided in three divisions. The first division relates to suits. The second division speaks of appeals and the third division speaks of applications, the third division is in two parts the first part speaks of applications in specified cases and Part II speaks of other applications. The schedule is divided in three divisions. The first division relates to suits. The second division speaks of appeals and the third division speaks of applications, the third division is in two parts the first part speaks of applications in specified cases and Part II speaks of other applications. Having regard to the said change brought about by 1963 Limitation Act the supreme Court observed that the District judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a Civil court In dealing with applications under S. 16 of the Telegraph Act and the provisions of Art. 137 of 1963 Limitation Act would be applicable to the said application and specifically observed in para 21 that "article 137 of 1963 Limitation Act includes petitions within the word "applications" and these petitions and applications can be under any special Act as in the present case" and accordingly concluded "article 137 of the 1963 limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a Civil court. " The decision in the said case is reiterated in the case of the Addl. Special Land acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas. Major, AIR 1994 SC 2227 wherein the ' supreme Court was considering the question as to whether Art. 137 would be applicable to an application filed under S. 18 (3) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act wherein the section itself did not prescribe any limitation for filing the application and in the said case after reiterating the decision of the threejudge Bench decision in Kerala State electricity Board case, the Supreme Court observed as follows :"there is no period of limitation prescribed in sub-section 3 (b) to make that application but it should be done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the limitation Act since no article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary article under Art. 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. " ( 22 ) IN view of the above said decisions of the Supreme Court and the answer given by us to the first question that an application filed to District Judge under S. 31 of the Act is to a Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction and not to District Judge as a persona designata and since no limitation is prescribed under the Act for making any application under S. 31 of the SFC Act it has to be held that the application under S. 31 of the Act is governed by Art. 137 of 1963 limitation Act. Under the circumstances, there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation Sri Joshi that in view of the fact that no period of limitation is prescribed by making an application under S. 31, the Court cannot interpret the section in such a way as to include period of limitation or to infer the period of limitation, as in view of the above said decision of the Supreme Court, and the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the Financial Corporation that in view of S. 46-B of the Financial Corporation Act, limitation Act would not be applicable is also liable to be rejected in view of the above said two decisions of the Supreme Court which have clearly upheld the applicability of the limitation Act, 1963 to application filed under Special Act. A reference can also be made of the decision in Collector of Central excise, Jaipur v. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. ( (2000) 5 SCC 299 ) : ( AIR 2000 SC 2027 ), wherein their Lordships observed that generally limitation period for doing or not doing an act has to be enacted and prescribed and cannot be imported by the Courts by implication. In absence of a limitation period of exercise of a power affecting the rights of a citizen the Courts can hold that the same should be exercised within a reasonable period. In absence of a limitation period of exercise of a power affecting the rights of a citizen the Courts can hold that the same should be exercised within a reasonable period. ( 23 ) UNDER the circumstances, the decision relied on by the learned counsel in M/s. O. K. Gaur v. Rajasthan Finance Corporation, AIR 2001 Raj 4 is not helpful to the corporation to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, are not applicable and the other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation including 1997 AIHC 482 (Guj) (Ambica Vijay Mills v. Gujarat State Financial Corporation) are not helpful to the Corporation. In view of the above said reasoning we have no hesitation to hold that an application under S. 31 of the Act is governed by the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963. ( 24 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the Corporation Sri Joshi, in alternate submitted that, if the Limitation act is held applicable, then the appropriate article prescribing the period of limitation that would be applicable to application filed under S. 31 of the Act is Art. 112 or Art. 136 and not art. 137. There is no merit in this contention as Art. 112 of the Limitation act prescribes the limitation for a suit filed by or on behalf of the Central Government or the state Government including the State of jammu and Kashmir and in view of the definition of suit under the Limitation Act it is clear that suit does not include an appeal or application. Even otherwise, an application filed by the State Financial Corporation which is a statutory body established pursuant to the provisions of the SFC Act cannot be said to be an application filed by the state or Central Government. Similarly, the provisions of Art. 136 prescribing the period of limitation for filing application for execution of any decree or order of any Civil court is also not applicable to an application filed under S. 31 of the SFC Act as the said application so filed cannot be said to be in execution of any decree. Having regard to the nature and scope of the provisions of Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act explained by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State finance Corporation case referred to above. Having regard to the nature and scope of the provisions of Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act explained by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State finance Corporation case referred to above. Therefore the only article that would be applicable to the application filed under S. 31 of the Act would be Art. 137 of the Limitation Act which prescribes limitation of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. The Full Bench decision relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the corporation in the case of Godan Namboothiripad v. Kerala Finance Corporation, air 1998 Ker 31 which deal with the applicability of Art. 112 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Kerala Land Revenue Recovery Act is not helpful to contend that the said article applies to application filed under S. 31 of the SFC Act and the said decision would be helpful to the Corporation only when an application is filed under S. 32-G of the Act for recovery of amount due to the Financial Corporation as. arrears of land revenue if appropriate notifications are issued as in the facts of Full bench decision of Kerala High Court. Accordingly, we answer questions 2 and 3 by holding that the application filed under S. 31 of the Act is governed by the provisions of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. ( 25 ) QUESTIONS 4 and 5 : It is clear from the perusal of questions 4 and 5 that the answer to the said questions would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case to be decided by the bench while hearing the appeal on merits as any finding on the said questions would necessarily depend upon the terms of the contract entered into by the guarantors with the Financial Corporation and terms of the bond and other material on record and no question of law would arise for consideration of the questions as referred. As stated, the answer to the said questions would purely depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case as per the material produced therein. Therefore it will not be appropriate for this Full Bench to go into the merits and to decide the issue without reference to factual aspect. As stated, the answer to the said questions would purely depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case as per the material produced therein. Therefore it will not be appropriate for this Full Bench to go into the merits and to decide the issue without reference to factual aspect. However the appropriate Bench considering the appeal on merits shall consider the same as per the facts of each case and as such we answer questions 4 and 5 accordingly. ( 26 ) IN view of what we have discussed above, we answer the questions referred for consideration of this Bench as stated above. Let the Miscellaneous First Appeals be posted before the appropriate Bench for disposal on merits. Order accordingly. --- *** --- .