JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - The order passed by the District Judge, Khurda in Arbitration Appeal No. 89 of 2003 rejecting a petition filed by the petitioner u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is impugned in this appeal. 2. The question that arises for consideration is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application made u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 3. Admittedly the appellant-Corporation entered into an agreement with the respondents on 26.3.1993. Certain disputes cropped up between the appellant and respondent No. 2 (Indian Oil Corporation) in respect of sell of petroleum products. In consonance with Clause 18 of the agreement the said dispute was referred to a sole arbitrator. The said arbitrator gave his award on 27.2.2002. Being aggrieved by the award, the appellant filed an Appeal u/s 34 of the Act before the District Judge, Khurda on 25.2.2003 with a prayer to set aside the same. According to the appellant, it received a copy of the award on 6.3.2002, but due to certain inadvertent reasons could not file the application u/s 34 till 25.2.2003. The learned District Judge came to a categorical finding that the Appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed u/s 34(3) of the Act. He further held that the period of limitation prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 34 period of limitation prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 34 is absolute and unextendable, and accordingly held that the petition u/s 34 filed by the appellant being grossly barred by time, the Appeal could not be entertained and dismissed the same. The said order of the District Judge is challenged in this appeal invoking jurisdiction of this Court u/s 37(1)(b) of the Act. 4. Mr. Hota, learned counsel for the appellant, forcefully submitted that the appointment of the Arbitrator was contrary to the terms of the agreement and that it was not expected that the said arbitrator should have acted independently and impartially; He further submitted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to arbitration proceedings and the finding of the District Judge that the time prescribed u/s 34 could not be extended under any circumstances js erroneous and it is a fit case where the impugned order should be set aside and so also the award. 5. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this Court should not traverse beyond the order passed by the District Judge. It is further emphatically submitted that Section 34(3) of the Act is very specific and the District Judge has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the appeal filed by the appellant u/s 34 was grossly barred by time and could not be entertained. 6. Section 34(3) of the Act reads as follows : "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award : (1) *** *** *** (2) *** *** *** (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made u/s 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal : Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter." 7. Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribed a period of limitation of thirty days for an application under the Arbitration Act, 1940 for setting aside an award from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. The present Act prescribes in its own provision, i.e. Sub-section (3) of Section 34, the period of limitation for such an application. The limitation prescribed is three months from the date on which the party making the application received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made u/s 33 from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. Under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34, the Court may condone a delay of thirty days in the maximum if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application, within the said period of three months. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34, the Court may condone a delay of thirty days in the maximum if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application, within the said period of three months. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. M/s Popular Construction Co., categorically held that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to an application challenging an award u/s 34 and as such there was no scope for assessing sufficiency of the cause for the delay beyond the period prescribed under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 34. In the said decision it was held : "Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, Sub-section (3) would not be an application "in accordance with" that Sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the Court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed..." Thus by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to Court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period so fixed is emphasized by the provisions of Section 36 which stipulates the time for enforcement of an award. The Section specifies that where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award u/s 34 has expired, or such application has been made which has been refused, the award shall be enforced. 9. The rules of limitation are founded on consideration of public policy and have to be interpreted with the approach which advances the cause of public policy and not otherwise. The intention of the Legislature stipulating a period of limitation is not to give a right where there is none, but to impose a bar after a specific period authorizing a litigant to enforce his existing right within the period of limitation. The object of limitation laws is to compel a litigant to be diligent in seeking remedies in a Court of law and to put a bar on stale claims. The object of limitation laws is to compel a litigant to be diligent in seeking remedies in a Court of law and to put a bar on stale claims. The law assists the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. This being the position, according to me, the period of limitation has to be strictly adhered to. 10. Section 34 of the Act prescribes a definite period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside the award. It obviously and necessarily follows that the Legislature consciously excluded application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Considering the scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is a self-contained one dealing with matters arising out of arbitration proceedings, it should be construed that there has been exclusion of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus the principle that emerges is that if the Legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder, and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient causes being shown may be extended, in the maximum, only up to a specified time limit and not further, then the Court concerned has no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed beyond such maximum time limit prescribed in the statute (See The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow Vs. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, ), 11. Admittedly the award in the present case was passed on 27.2.2002; whereas the petition u/s 34 was filed only on 25th of February, 2003, much after the time stipulated under Sub-section (3) of Section 34, Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in the touch-stone of the decision of the Supreme Court (supra), I find that the petition filed by the appellant u/s 34 to set aside the award was grossly barred by time. 12. Once it is held that the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not available to the proceeding u/s 34 of the Act and the application filed u/s 34 of the Act is to be dismissed on that ground, it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the appeal and other issues. I, therefore, conclude that the Limitation Act cannot be pressed into service in the aid of belated application made u/s 34 of the Act seeking condonation of delay. I, therefore, conclude that the Limitation Act cannot be pressed into service in the aid of belated application made u/s 34 of the Act seeking condonation of delay. The rights to set aside an award u/s 34 of the Act is a statutory right which has to be exercised strictly in terms of the said statute and expanding the principles of equity has no place. In the facts found in this appeal, the application u/s 34 of the Act was not filed within the time limit, but it was filed at a much later date and was hopelessly barred by time. The benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act not being available to the application made u/s 34 of the Act, the application entails rejection. The learned District Judge has therefore not committed any error in not entertaining the said petition. The impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and, accordingly, I am not inclined to interfere with the same. 13. The appeal is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Final Result : Dismissed