A. K. MITRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 4th March, 2002 passed by the Disciplinary Authority being the learned District Judge, Midnapur. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was a comparing clerk in the Civil Copying Department in the Court of learned District Judge, Midnapur. One Asim Kr. Das lodged a complaint before the Officer-in-Charge of Tamluk Police Station against the petitioner alleged cheating. On the basis of this said complaint G. R. Case No. 294 of 1994 was started against the petitioner before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Tamluk. Simultaneously a disciplinary proceeding was also started. The petitioner was suspended with effect from January 5, 1994. The petitioner was served with a show-cause notice and a charge-sheet. Subsequently, however, suspension order has been withdrawn as alleged by the petitioner and the disciplinary proceeding continued along with the criminal case. In the criminal case by judgment and order dated 2. 7. 2001 the learned Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court at Tamluk found the petitioner not guilty of the offence and acquitted the petitioner from all the charges. The charges levelled against the petitioner in the criminal case were under sections 406, 420 and 120b of the Indian Penal Code. Though the petitioner was acquitted from the Criminal Court, the departmental proceeding continued. Enquiry was conducted and ultimately final order was passed by the learned District Judge, Midnapur being the Disciplinary Authority on 14. 3. 2002. The Disciplinary Authority imposed penalty to the extent that next one increment of pay of the petitioner be withheld. ( 3 ) THE petitioner moved this writ petition before the Hon'ble Justice Bhaskar Bhattacharya and as per the leave granted by His Lordship the petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit. In the supplementary affidavit the petitioner annexed the show-cause, charge-sheet, Written Statement, the Enquiry Report and the final order passed by the learned District Judge being the Disciplinary Authority. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, on the basis of the criminal complaint, the criminal case was started and on he identical charges the Departmental Proceeding was also initiated. As would appear from the chargesheet the enquiry was proposed under Rule 10 of the West Bengal Service Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1971 against the petitioner. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, on the basis of the criminal complaint, the criminal case was started and on he identical charges the Departmental Proceeding was also initiated. As would appear from the chargesheet the enquiry was proposed under Rule 10 of the West Bengal Service Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1971 against the petitioner. The petitioner in his defence filed a Written Statement and denied the allegations, but the enquiry was started and the Enquiry Officer submitted a report in a mechanical way without applying his mind and submitted his report before the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority also in a biased way, in closed mind mechanically passed the order imposing penalty on the petitioner. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when in the criminal case the petitioner has been found not guilty then on the self-same allegations the disciplinary proceeding should not have been proceeded with and the Disciplinary Authority should not have imposed penalty on the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is a consequential result of bias. The learned counsel further submitted that natural justice has been violated when issuing the charge-sheet when conducting the enquiry and when imposing the penalty. The learned counsel also submitted that though it is a settled principle of law that the departmental proceeding can be carried out simultaneously with the disciplinary proceeding but when on identical charges both the criminal case and the departmental proceeding have been initiated then the Authority should not pass any order imposing penalty in the departmental proceeding inasmuch as after exhaustive trial, the petitioner has been acquitted from the criminal charges. The learned counsel in this context relied on a decision reported in AIR 1999 (3) SCC page 679 (Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr. ). The learned counsel laid stress on paragraph 13 of this judgment. For the sake of discussion, the said paragraph 13 is hereinbelow:-"13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance. " ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the enquiry was conducted in a biased manner and the Enquiry Report was submitted which is devoid of reason and the Enquiry Officer should act in an unbiased manner and should give reasons for his coming to such finding. The learned counsel then submitted that in such circumstances the proceeding should be quashed and the final order should also be set aside. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel Mr. Roy appearing for the State-respondents submitted that the petitioner admitted that part of the allegation that he collected money from different persons and as such on that score no further need be given by the Enquiry Officer. The learned counsel Mr. Roy also submitted that there are decisions that in such case higher punishment has been inflicted and as such the Court should not interfere with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The learned counsel in this regard relied on a decision reported in 2003 (4) SCC page 364 (Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P. C. Kakkar ). The learned counsel submitted that in this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that in case of a misconduct when lesser punishment has been awarded, there is no scope for judicial review or judicial interference with the quantum of punishment. v. P. C. Kakkar ). The learned counsel submitted that in this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that in case of a misconduct when lesser punishment has been awarded, there is no scope for judicial review or judicial interference with the quantum of punishment. The learned counsel also submitted that in paragraph 15 of this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise. For the sake of discussions convenience, the said paragraph 15 is quoted hereinbelow:"15. It needs no emphasis that when a Court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M. R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed: (All ER p. 1154h) "the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration. " In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree it was observed: "failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. But as noted above, the proceedings commenced in 1981. The employee was placed under suspension from 1983 to 1988 and has superannuated in 2002. Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend the facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application. " ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the State then relied on another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2000 (1) SCC page 416 (High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shasikant S. Patil and Anr. ). The learned counsel laid stress on the observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 19 of this judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:"19. The reasoning of the High Court that when the Disciplinary Committee differed from the finding of the enquiry officer it is imperative to discuss the materials in detail and contest the conclusion of the enquiry officer, is quite unsound and contrary to the established principles in administrative law. The Disciplinary Committee was neither an appellate nor a revisional body over the enquiry officer's report. It must be borne in mind that the enquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and also to afford the punishing authority with the materials in such enquiry as well as the views expressed by the enquiry officer thereon. The findings of the enquiry officer are only his opinion on the materials, but such findings are not binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision-making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, that authority can come to its own conclusion, of course bearing in mind the views expressed by the enquiry officer. But it is not necessary that the disciplinary authority should "discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the enquiry officer". Otherwise the position of the disciplinary authority would get relegated to a subordinate level. " ( 9 ) THE learned counsel further relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1995 (6) SCC page 749 (B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India ). Otherwise the position of the disciplinary authority would get relegated to a subordinate level. " ( 9 ) THE learned counsel further relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1995 (6) SCC page 749 (B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India ). The learned counsel submitted that in this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed the scope of judicial review in the case of a disciplinary proceeding. The learned counsel submitted that in this decision the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the High Court cannot as an appellate body over the decision taken by the Disciplinary authority. The learned counsel for the State submitted that mainly on two counts the Court should dismiss the writ petition. Firstly, it is a settled position of law that a criminal trial as well as the departmental proceeding can run simultaneously. Secondly, in case of such a lesser punishment the High Court should not interfere with the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and that apart High Court cannot sit over the decision of the Disciplinary Authority as an appellate body. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated his stand taken in the writ petition and submitted that the proceeding should be quashed and the final order should be set aside. ( 11 ) NOW, on the basis of the averments made in the writ petition and on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel, let me look into the proceeding initiated by the authority against the delinquent employee which culminated in punishment. It is admitted that a criminal case was instituted against the petitioner under sections 406/420/120 of the Indian Penal Code. It is also admitted that on merit in the criminal case the petitioner was acquitted. Now, keeping these facts in mind, let me have a look into the show-cause and charge-sheet. The show-cause notice was issued on 28. 7. 1994. The charge-sheet was issued on 15. 11. 1994 containing the articles of charge. In the meantime the suspension order issued on the petitioner was revoked on 15. 4. 1999. The petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on 2. 7. 2001 and final order in the departmental proceeding was passed on 14. 3. 2002. It will appear from the charge-sheet itself that two charges were framed against the petitioner and both the charges relate to the criminal case initiated against the petitioner. 4. 1999. The petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on 2. 7. 2001 and final order in the departmental proceeding was passed on 14. 3. 2002. It will appear from the charge-sheet itself that two charges were framed against the petitioner and both the charges relate to the criminal case initiated against the petitioner. It, therefore, appears that the charges on which the criminal case was initiated evidence was taken and the petitioner was acquitted on merit (and nod discharged ). Then on the self-same charges the continuance of the departmental proceedings smacks of bias. In the article of charge No. 1 it has been stated "it appears from the copy of the FIR forwarded by the Sub-Divisional Munsif, Haldia. . . . . ". It appears from article of charge No. 2 that there also it has been stated "it transpires from the FIR of Tamluk P. S. Case No. 84/94 dated 4. 6. 1994. . . . . . . . . " ( 12 ) BOTH the articles of charges or both the charges were levelled against the petitioner on the basis of the criminal case that is whatever was there in the criminal case the same allegation has been made in the charge-sheet. There is no doubt about it that it is settled proposition of law that a criminal case and a departmental proceeding can run simultaneously. There is also no doubt about it that the Writ Court cannot sit on appeal as an appellate body to the penalty in a departmental proceeding. It is also not disputed that when a small punishment is inflicted normally the High Court should not interfere. But in the instant case this thing is totally different. In my opinion, Paul Anthony's case (supra) is attracted in this case. When in a criminal case a trial is made, there is scope of evidence and the prosecution is to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt, but, in a departmental proceeding the Enquiry Officer keeps in mind different factors that is whether there will be discipline if the employee is exonerated from the charges or whether he should maintain dignity of the office etc. It is no doubt about it that reason should be given by the Enquiry Officer when submitting the Enquiry Report. In the decision reported in 1985 (3) SCC page 378 (Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and Ors. It is no doubt about it that reason should be given by the Enquiry Officer when submitting the Enquiry Report. In the decision reported in 1985 (3) SCC page 378 (Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and Ors. ). The Hon'ble Apex Court observed in a quasi-judicial enquiry, the report of the Enquiry Officer must be based on reasons failing which it amounts to violation of natural justice. It has also been observed in the said judgment that the Enquiry Officer when submitting his report must apply his mind but in the instant Enquiry Report no reasons have been assigned and it also appears that the Enquiry Officer did not apply his mind. In this context observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 5 and 6 of the decision in the matter of Anil Kumar (supra) are quoted hereinbelow:"5. We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear terms the report of the enquiry officer. It is well-settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the enquiry officer has a duty to act judicially. The enquiry officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of the witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not creditworthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the enquiry officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well-settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. This is too well-settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case the enquiry report is an order sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have been a more gross case of non-application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the Labour Court and the High Court. 6. Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable. " ( 13 ) FROM the charge-sheet it ex facie appears that the same is a result of bias, that is, the charge-sheet has been issued in a biased manner on the self-same allegations on which the criminal case was started. " ( 13 ) FROM the charge-sheet it ex facie appears that the same is a result of bias, that is, the charge-sheet has been issued in a biased manner on the self-same allegations on which the criminal case was started. ( 14 ) THE basic principle of service jurisprudence is that when a delinquent employee is found to have committed any act of misconduct normally a preliminary enquiry is called for if there is no such preliminary enquiry at least a show-cause along with the context of the charges need be served on the delinquent employee. Thereafter on receipt of the reply from the delinquent employee the authority is to apply his mind and come to a conclusion as to whether chargesheet will be issued or not. A charge-sheet is a formal accusation made by the competent authority that an employee is guilty of misconduct. The word 'formal' in case of a 'formal' charge-sheet is used in contradistinction to informal it can be generally said that in the Service Rules the word charge is used sometimes in a formal sense and sometimes in an informal sense. It is used in the informal sense in the pre-formal departmental enquiry stage. In the case of Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1964 SC page 72, it has been observed that a 'formal' departmental enquiry is usually initiated after a prima facie case is made out against a Government servant. For the purpose of arriving at this prima facie satisfaction the Government can even hold a preliminary enquiry into the allegations or complaint received against the public servant although these allegations and complaints are also referred to as charges since they are informal in character. The formal charge-sheet is the one which is issued in terms of the provisions of Service Clause and Rules and can be generally referred to as meaning the charges formally framed and communicated to the Government servant with the intimation that a 'formal' departmental enquiry had been initiated against him on those charges. In the decision reported in AIR 1971 SC page 752 (Surath Ch. Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal) the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it is also for the reason it has been held that a finding at variance with the chargesheet is not sustainable. In the decision reported in AIR 1971 SC page 752 (Surath Ch. Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal) the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it is also for the reason it has been held that a finding at variance with the chargesheet is not sustainable. ( 15 ) IT is obvious that a charge-sheet has to be served on the charged employee but the service of a chargesheet is to be distinguished from the issue of a chargesheet. The chargesheet is issued once a decision to initiate disciplinary proceeding is taken. The "issue" of chargesheet in the context of a decision taken to initiate a disciplinary proceeding means the framing of the chargesheet and taking of the necessary action to despatch the chargesheet to the employee. It does not comprehend the further effect of service of the chargesheet on the employee and this is the view of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. H. C. Khurana reported in AIR 1993 SC page 1488. Now, the question arises whether the chargesheet can be assailed and subject to judicial review and is liable to be declared as invalid or not. It is now a settled position of law that the chargesheet can be challenged on any of the following grounds: (1)if it is not in conformity with law. (2)if it discloses bias or pre-judgment of the guilt of the charged employee. (3)there is non-application of mind in issuing the chargesheet. (4)if it does not disclose any misconduct. (5)if it is vague. (6)if it is based on stale allegations. (7)if it is issued mala fide. ( 16 ) NOW in this case it cannot be said that the chargesheet is vague or based on stale allegations or does not disclose any misconduct or not in conformity with law. But touching from the issuance of show-cause notice and the issuance of charge-sheet the steps taken are, show-cause notice was issued then charge-sheet was issued enclosing two articles of charges. The State Government in spite of directions to file affidavit did not choose to file the same and the allegations made by the petitioner in the writ petition as well as the supplementary affidavit (which was filed with the leave of Hon'ble Justice Bhaskar Bhattacharyya) remain uncontroverted and by doctrine of non-traverse the allegations remain unchallenged and consequently admitted. The State Government in spite of directions to file affidavit did not choose to file the same and the allegations made by the petitioner in the writ petition as well as the supplementary affidavit (which was filed with the leave of Hon'ble Justice Bhaskar Bhattacharyya) remain uncontroverted and by doctrine of non-traverse the allegations remain unchallenged and consequently admitted. No records were produced before this Court from which it appears that the authority arrived at his satisfaction on consideration of the show-cause that a charge-sheet need be issued. If that is not done or if the authority does not come to a satisfaction in the above extent three things come out (1) The issuance discloses bias or pre-judgment of the guilt; (2) There is non-application of mind in issuing the charge-sheet and (3) It is issued male fide. ( 17 ) LET us see whether the issuance of the charge-sheet discloses bias or pre-judgment of the guilt of the charged employee. ( 18 ) THE history starts from a judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Khem Chand v. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC page 300 ). Then again the principle evolves out of another Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of H. C. Goel reported in AIR 1964 SC page 364. Then comes another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1974 SC page 1589 (Krishna Chandra v. Union of India ). In this judgment the Hon'ble Court observed that it is very necessary for an authority which orders an enquiry to be satisfied that there are prima facie grounds for holding a disciplinary enquiry and therefore, before he makes up his mind he will either himself investigate or direct his subordinates to investigate in the matter and it is only after he receives the result of these investigations he can decide as to whether disciplinary action is called for or not. But in the instant case it does not appear from the record or rather no record was produced by the State Government to satisfy this Court that a preliminary investigation was conducted to come to a satisfaction that a charge-sheet need by issued and departmental proceeding need be proceeded against the delinquent employee. Consequently a question of mala fide or bias comes. Consequently a question of mala fide or bias comes. There are different kinds of bias that is personal bias, official bias etc. In this case neither it is the case of the petitioner nor it appears from the averments that there is a question of personal bias, but, in the manner in which the quasi-judicial authority proceeded with the departmental proceeding the official bias comes out and also the official mala fide (though not personal mala fide ). If it is shown then obviously the petitioner has got right to challenge the charge-sheet before the High Court and the Writ Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the charge-sheet. In India there is no equity Court and the Writ Court acts both in statutory jurisdiction and equitable jurisdiction. Now, non-satisfaction or rather exposure of the non-satisfaction of the Departmental Authority itself discloses real bias and not mere apprehension bias. ( 19 ) NOW come to the question as to whether the issuance of the charge-sheet suffers from official mala fide or real danger of bias can be ascertained from the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in State of Punjab v. V. K. Khanna and Ors. (AIR 2001 SC page 343 ). In this case the Hon'ble Apex Court has discussed in detail as to the scope of bias in issuance of a charge-sheet and has also discussed in detail regarding the test of bias, real danger of bias and mere apprehension of bias. Their Lordships dealt with the above aspects of Administrative law in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the said decision. The said paragraphs are quoted hereinbelow:"6. In Girija Shankar Pant's case (2000 0 AIR (SCW) 3826) (supra) this Court having regard to the changing structure of the society stated that the modernisation of the society with the passage of time, has its due impact on the concept of bias as well. Tracing the test of real likelihood and reasonable suspicion, reliance was placed in the decision in the case of Parthasarthy (S. Parthasarthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974)3 SCC 459 ( AIR 1973 SC 2701 : 1973 Lab IC 1607) wherein Mathew, J. observed: 16. The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. Tracing the test of real likelihood and reasonable suspicion, reliance was placed in the decision in the case of Parthasarthy (S. Parthasarthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974)3 SCC 459 ( AIR 1973 SC 2701 : 1973 Lab IC 1607) wherein Mathew, J. observed: 16. The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The Court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudged, that is sufficient to quash the decision. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the Court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings. "7. Incidentally, Lord Thankerton in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1948 0 AC 87) opined that the word 'bias' is to denote a departure from the standing of even-handed justice. Girija Shankar's case (2000 0 AIR (SCW) 3826) (supra) further noted the different note sounded by the English Courts in the manner following:"27. Recently however, the English Courts have sounded a different note, though may not be substantial but the automatic disqualification theory rule stands to some extent diluted. The affirmation of this dilution however is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the matter in issue. The Street Metropolitan Stependiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) (2000 (1) AC 119) observed:. . . . . . The affirmation of this dilution however is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the matter in issue. The Street Metropolitan Stependiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) (2000 (1) AC 119) observed:. . . . . . In civil litigation the matters in issue will normally have an economic impact therefore a Judge is automatically disqualified if he stands to make a financial gain as a consequence of his own decision of the case. But if, as in the present case, the matter at issue does not relate to money or economic advantage but is concerned with the promotion of the cause, the rationale disqualifying a Judge applies, just as much if the Judge's decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in which the Judge is involved together with one of the parties. " ( 20 ) LORD Brown - Wilkinson at page 136 of the report stated:"it is important not to overstate what is being decided. It was suggested in argument that a decision setting aside the order of 25 November, 1998 would lead to a position where Judges would be unable to sit on cases involving charities in whose work they are involved. It is suggested that, because of such involvement, a Judge would be disqualified. That is not correct. The facts of this present case are exceptional. The critical elements are (1) that A. I. was a party to the appeal, (2) that A. I. was joined in order to argue for a particular result; (3) the Judge was a director of a charity closely allied to A. I. and sharing, in this respect, A. I. 's objects. Only in cases where a Judge is taking an active role as trustee or director of a charity which is closely allied to and acting with a party to the litigation should a Judge normally be concerned either to recuse himself or disclose the position to the parties. However, there may well be other exceptional cases in which the Judge would be well advised to disclose a possible interest. However, there may well be other exceptional cases in which the Judge would be well advised to disclose a possible interest. " ( 21 ) LORD Hutton also in Pinochet's case (supra) observed:"there could be cases where the interest of the Judge in the subject matter of the proceedings arising from his strong commitment to some cause or belief or his association with a person or body involved in the proceedings could shake public confidence in the administration of justice as much as a share holding (which might be small) in a public company involved in the litigation. "28. Incidentally in Locabail (Locabail (U. K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. , 2000 QB 451), the Court of Appeal upon a detail analysis of the oft cited decision in Reg. G. Gough, (1993) AC 646 together with the Dimes case, 3 House of Lords Cases 759; Pinochet case (2000 (1) AC 119) (supra), Australian High Court's decision in the case of Re. J. R. L. Ex parte C. J. L. : 1986 (161 CLR 342 as also the Federal Court in Re Ebner (1999 (161) AIR 557) and on the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in President of the Republic of South Africa v. South African Rugby Football Union (1999 (4) SC 147) stated that it would be rather dangerous and futile to attempt to define or list the factors which may or not may not give rise to a real danger of bias. The Court of Appeal continued to the effect that everything will depend upon facts which may include the nature of the issue to be decided. The Court of Appeal continued to the effect that everything will depend upon facts which may include the nature of the issue to be decided. If further observed:"by contrast, a real danger of bias might well be thought to arise if there were personal friendship or animosity between the Judge and any member of the public involved in the case; or if the Judge were closely acquainted with any member of the public involved in the case, particularly if the credibility of that individual could be significant in the decision of the case; or if in a case where the credibility of any individual were an issue to be decided by the Judge, he had in a previous case rejected the evidence of that person in such outspoken terms as to throw doubt on his ability to approach such person's evidence with an open mind on any later occasion; or if on any question at issue in the proceedings before him the Judge had expressed views, particularly in the course of the hearing, in such extreme and unbalanced terms as to throw doubt on his ability to try the issue with an objective judicial mind; or if, for any other reason, there were real ground for doubting the ability of the Judge to ignore extraneous considerations, prejudices and predictions and bring an objective judgment to bear on the issues before him. The mere fact that a Judge, earlier in the same case or in a previous case, had commented adversely on a party witness, or found the evidence of a party or witness to be unreliable, would not without more found a sustainable objection. In most cases, we think, the answer, one way or the other, will be obvious. But if in any case there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of refusal. We repeat, every application must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. The greater the passage of time between the even relied on as showing a danger of bias and the case in which the objection is raised, the weaker (other things being equal) the objection will be. ""29. We repeat, every application must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. The greater the passage of time between the even relied on as showing a danger of bias and the case in which the objection is raised, the weaker (other things being equal) the objection will be. ""29. The Court of Appeal judgment in Locabail (2000 QB 451) (supra) though apparent as noticed above sounded a different note but in fact, in more occasions than one in the judgment itself, it has been clarified that conceptually the issue of bias ought to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case - a slight shift undoubtedly from the original thinking pertaining to the concept of bias to the effect that a mere apprehension of bias could otherwise be sufficient. ""8. The test, therefore, is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in administrative action, question of declaring them to be unsustainable on the basis therefor would not arise. " ( 22 ) NOW comes the Enquiry Report. On the face of the Report it clearly appears that the Enquiry Authority did not apply his mind when submitting the Enquiry Report inasmuch as at the very outset of the Enquiry Report, the Enquiry Authority observed that the charges levelled against Sri Maity has been proved in prima facie manner or not. It is now settled position of law that an Enquiry Report must disclose reasons. But here in this case the Enquiry Report observed that the charges have been proved prima facie and on the said Enquiry Report the Disciplinary Authority acted upon. It also appears from the conclusion of the Enquiry Report that the Enquiry Officer there also observed "i, therefore, hold that prima facie charge of misconduct against the delinquent Sri Dipak Kr. Maity has been proved by sufficient evidence on record. " Now, if the Enquiry Report says that it is prima facie finding then the Disciplinary Authority cannot act upon a prima finding. Maity has been proved by sufficient evidence on record. " Now, if the Enquiry Report says that it is prima facie finding then the Disciplinary Authority cannot act upon a prima finding. The Enquiry Officer has come to a conclusion give reasons of his arrival at such conclusion and submit it before the Disciplinary Authority and that is Administrative law. Here the authority is acting as a quasi-judicial body and the Disciplinary Authority cannot also rely upon or act upon such an Enquiry Report which suffers from non-application of mind. ( 23 ) THIRD comes the question as to whether a criminal trial and a departmental proceeding can continue side by side or rather simultaneously. There is no doubt about it that in the decision reported in 1996 (6) SCC page 417 (State of Rajasthan v. B. K. Meena ). The Hon'ble Apex Court reviewed all the earlier decisions and has observed that the departmental enquiry and the criminal proceedings can run side by side and there is no legal bar and the same principle has been adopted in the decision reported in AIR 1984 SC page 626 (Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Ram Chandra ). That is also reported in the decision in 1992 (4) SCC page 711 (Nelson Motis v. Union of India ). But all these decisions when taken into consideration it comes out that in these cases where the Hon'ble Apex Court made such observations the criminal case and the departmental proceeding were in two different contests and nowhere it has been observed that if the chargesheet becomes the replica of the gist of FIR of a criminal case then the departmental proceeding should not be proceeded with and when the delinquent employee brings it to the notice of the Authority before the final order being passed in the departmental proceeding the authority should have considered his such representation and should have looked into the aspect that whether a person can be tried twice on the self-same allegations. Once the delinquent employee has faced exhaustive trial and came out successfully being acquitted on merit he should not have been pushed to another trial which is departmental proceeding in the self-same allegations made in the FIR. If the FIR and the charge-sheet are compared, it will on plain reading show that the charge-sheet is the replica of the gist of the FIR. If the FIR and the charge-sheet are compared, it will on plain reading show that the charge-sheet is the replica of the gist of the FIR. In that view of the matter the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M. Paul Anthony (supra) is attracted. ( 24 ) IN view of the discussions made above, I, therefore, hold that the chargesheet suffers from bias, the Enquiry Report from non-application of mind and the final order also appears to be a result of non-application of mind and official mala fide. In that view of the matter and in view of the discussions made above, I set aside the charge-sheet the Enquiry Report as well as the final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, will be supplied to the parties expeditiously. Application allowed