A. K. MITRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment and decree dated 15th June, 1999 and 29th June, 1990 respectively as passed in Title Appeal No. 125 of 1985 by the learned Asstt. District Judge 24-Pgns. (S), Alipore, reversing the judgment and decree dated 15th June, 1989 and 22nd June, 1989 respectively as passed by the learned Munsif, 1st Court, Sealdah in connection with the Title Suit No. 425 of 1978. ( 2 ) THIS appeal arises out of suit for eviction, the arrear of rent and for mesne profits. The case as has been made out in the plaint is inter alia as follows :- ( 3 ) THE defendant was a monthly tenant under the plaintiffs Susanta Kumar Banerjee and Sunil Kumar Banerjee in respect of the suit premises at monthly rental of Rs. 20/- payable according to English calendar month. The plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that the defendant was a habitual defaulter in respect of payment of rent and thereby he failed to pay rent from October, 1976. The plaintiffs required the suit premises for their own use and occupation of the plaintiffs for the extension of their business. The tenancy of the defendant was determined by the plaintiffs by sending Lawyer's notice to quit on 21. 5. 78 on the expiry of the last day of June, 1978. The notice was sent to the defendant by registered post but that returned to the plaintiffs with postal mark ?refused?. The defendant did not vacate the suit premises after 1st July, 1978 and he remained, according to the plaintiffs as a trespasser and as such the plaintiffs claimed mesne profits @ Re. 1/- per Diem. The plaintiffs claimed Rs. 420/- from the defendant as arrear rent from October 1976 to June 1978. ( 4 ) THE plaintiffs also alleged that their business is increasing rapidly day by day. At the early stage of business about 20,000 bags used to be handled but at present the plaintiffs have a business for about 60,000 bags. Plaintiff No. 1 is carrying on his business at his previous rooms with great difficulty due to extreme paucity of accommodation in the major portion of the godown, now, absolutely owned and possessed by them at 19a, Canal West Road, adjoining to the suit premises. Plaintiff No. 1 is carrying on his business at his previous rooms with great difficulty due to extreme paucity of accommodation in the major portion of the godown, now, absolutely owned and possessed by them at 19a, Canal West Road, adjoining to the suit premises. The said godowns stands on a lease-hold land in favour of plaintiff No. 1 under the State of West Bengal for a term of 30 years with and other structures in the absolute right. The plaintiff No. 1 requires the godown for his business and so he filed this suit as well as another suit being T. S. 267 of 1982 against other tenant. The plaintiff has no other reasonably suitably accommodation elsewhere. ( 5 ) THE defendant contested the suit by filing a Written Statement admitting himself to be a tenant under the father of the plaintiff's in respect of the suit premises. He has denied that he is ever a defaulter. The defendant has also alleged that the plaintiffs collected rent for the month of October 1976 but did not grant rent receipt on different grounds. Again he refused to accept rent for the month of November 1978. The defendant also alleged that he sent the rent by M. O. which was refused by the plaintiff No. 1, the defendant then started depositing rent before the Rent Controller. The defendant deposited rent month by month before the Rent Controller till July, 1978 and thereafter he used to deposit the rent in the Court below. The defendant filed the petition under Section 17 (2) and 17 (2a) (B) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for determination of arrear and for instalments regarding payment of the arrears. He has further challenged the legality and validity of the notice. The defendant alleged that the notice was not served upon him rightly. The defendant denied that the plaintiffs have requirement of the suit premises for their own use and occupation. The defendant prays for dismissal of the suit with costs. The defendant has categorically stated that the business of the plaintiff no. 1 has not been increased as alleged. He has further alleged that the plaintiff No. 1 cannot be absolute lease holder in respect of the suit property. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the plaintiff filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of plaint. 1 has not been increased as alleged. He has further alleged that the plaintiff No. 1 cannot be absolute lease holder in respect of the suit property. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the plaintiff filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of plaint. The schedule of amendment as the plaintiff wanted to introduce is as follows : ( 7 ) THE following paragraphs should be inserted after the paragraph No. 3 of the plaint: (3a) ?that gradually extend and volume of business have greatly increased and the nature of business has also been diversified. At the early stage of the business about 20,000 old bags used to be handled in the business and now the old bags handled extend to more than 60,000 bags. Now new cement bags are also being manufactured to the extent of 50,000 bags with the help of different machines by employing necessary extra men and huge materials for that purpose. (3b) That the said business of the plaintiff No. 1 is being carried with great difficulty due to extreme paucity of accommodation in the major portion of the godown absolutely owned and possessed by him at 19a, Canal West Road adjoining to the suit premises. The said portion of the godown consists of 3 floor and wooden frame thereon measuring about 480 sq. ft. and one mezzanine room measuring about 174 sq. ft. (3c) That the said godown is on a lease hold land of the plaintiff No. 1 under the State of West Bengal which was granted through the Collectorate of 24-Pgns. For a term of 30 years with the option of renewal after the expiry of 30 years and thereafter he has got his own godown and other structures in his absolute right. (3d) That the plaintiff No. 1 now requires for his said business, the entire godown at 19a, Canal West Road but for the present the instant suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises and another suit against one Sri Ganesh Chandra Mallick (Title Suit No. 267/82 of this Court) for his eviction from another portion of the said premises have been instituted. The plaintiffs indispensably require the portion of the said premises for the said business of the plaintiff No. 1 and they have no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. The plaintiffs indispensably require the portion of the said premises for the said business of the plaintiff No. 1 and they have no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. (3e) That the premises in the suit relates to C. C. surplus land holding No. 9a, Division-3, Sub-division-1, Mouza-Bahir Simla. 7. The defendant in the additional W. S. stated in the manner as follows :? (1) that the statement made in para 3a of the amended plaint are absolutely flse and have been introduced for the purpose of the suit. It is deined that the extent and volume of the business greatly increase and the nature of the business has been diversified. It is also denied that 20,000 old bags used to be handled and now the old bags handled extend to more than 60,000 bags and that now cement bags are being manufactured to the extent of 50,000 bags with the help of different machines by employing necessary extra men and huge materials for the purpose. (2) That the statements made in para 3b of the plaint are not true and are denied. The description of the portion of occupation of the plaintiff are not correct. The portion in possession of the plaintiff are quite sufficient for the business of the plaintiff No. 1 who does not reasonably require the rooms in suit. (3) That the statements in para 30 of the plaint are not true and are denied and the plaintiffs are to prove the said fact. The plaintiff no. 1 not the plaintiff No. 2 being the lessee of the lease-hold land under the State of West Bengal is not the absolute owner of the rooms in suit and accordingly the suit is not maintainable. (4) That the statements in para 3d of the plaint are tissues of lies and are manufactured for the purpose of eviction of the defendant on grounds of reasonable requirements. The plaintiff no. 1 does not require at all the room in suit for the purpose of his business as alleged therein. The plaintiff No. 1 has not proper and legal licence for carrying his alleged business and he has also no sufficient fund for the alleged business. (5) That the suit is manufactured, harassing and speculative and is liable to be dismissed with costs. ( 8 ) ON the above pleading the learned trial Judge framed the following issues :-1. The plaintiff No. 1 has not proper and legal licence for carrying his alleged business and he has also no sufficient fund for the alleged business. (5) That the suit is manufactured, harassing and speculative and is liable to be dismissed with costs. ( 8 ) ON the above pleading the learned trial Judge framed the following issues :-1. Is the suit maintainable? 2. Is the defendant defaulter in payment of rent? 3. Is the notice to quit legal, valid and sufficient? 4. Has the plaintiff No. 1 reasonably required the suit property for his own use and occupation? 5. Is the plaintiffs entitled to get a decree as prayed? 6. To what other relief, if any, is the plaintiff No. 1 entitled? ( 9 ) ON the above issues the suit was contested and the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs and allowed the plaintiffs a decree for eviction against the defendant in respect of the suit premises. ( 10 ) CHALLENGING the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge the defendant preferred appeal being Title Appeal No. 121 of 1989 and the learned Asstt. District Judge, Sealdah at Alipore allowed the appeal on contest and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge. ( 11 ) HENCE this second appeal. ( 12 ) BEFORE hearing this appeal, this Court is to formulate the substantial question (s) of law on which the instant appeal is to be decided. On perusal of the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below and the plaint (with its amendment) the W. S. (with additional W. S.) and the evidence on records the following substantial questions are framed on which the appeal is to be heard :1. WHETHER the learned appellate Court made proper scrutiny of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge or the learned appellate court below allowed the appealmechanically on surmise and conjecture? 2. Whether the plaintiffs can be termed as owners of the premises and whether landlord tenancy relation is there in between the plaintiffs and the defendant. 3. Whether the learned appellate Court below applied proper test of law in deciding the appeal? 4. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court below is perverse or not. 2. Whether the plaintiffs can be termed as owners of the premises and whether landlord tenancy relation is there in between the plaintiffs and the defendant. 3. Whether the learned appellate Court below applied proper test of law in deciding the appeal? 4. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court below is perverse or not. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Judge decided the issues on consideration of the evidence on records and on dealing with the entire evidence on records before him but the learned appellate Court below did not look into the same and came to his own finding on the basis of surmise and conjecture. The learned Appellate Court below did not consider the evidence of records nor did he deal with the same as would appear from the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge as well as the evidence on records. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the defendant was a tenant under the father of both the plaintiffs. On his expiry the plaintiffs jointly used to collect rent from the defendant as stated of Birendra Banerjee. Ultimately, leas was granted in favour of the plaintiff No. 1 in the year 1975 with retrospective effect from 1969 and plaintiff No. 1 is still a lessee. The learned Counsel for the appellant in this regard relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC page 2028 (Smt. Shanti Sharma and Ors. v. Smt. Ved Prabha and Ors. ). The learned counsel for the appellant relying on this decision submitted that the person holding land on a long term lease from authority concerned by estate and building, structure thereon can be termed as owner for the purpose of seeking eviction on the grounds of bona fide requirement. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on paragraph 14 of this judgment which is quoted hereinbelow :-?14. The word 'owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word 'owner' has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. The word 'owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word 'owner' has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Government or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term 'owner' in the provision of section 14 (1) (e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term 'owner' has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase 'owner' thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove his bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is vis-a-vis the tenant i. e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is vis-a-vis the tenant i. e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the mater as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term 'owner' as is contemplated under this section. This term came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court and it was also in reference to section 14 (10 (e) and it was held by the Delhi High Court in T. C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, 1971 Ren CJ 322 at p. 326 as under: ?the word ?owner? as used in this clause has to be construed in the background of the purpose and object of enacting it. The use of the word 'owner' in this clause seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of the word 'landlord' as contained in section 2 (e) of the Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Construed in the context in which the word ?owner? is used in Cl. (e), it seems to me to include all persons in the position of Smt. Usha Gujral who have taken a long lease of sites from the Government for the purpose of building houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems now to be eclipsed by its social and political significance and the idea of ownership, in case like the present is one of the better right to be in possession and to obtain it. To accede to the contention raised by Shri Kapur would virtually nullify the effect of Cl. (e) and would render all such landlords remedies against tenants however badly they may need the premises for their own personal residence. I do not think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I repeal the appellant's contention. I consider it proper before passing on the next challenge to point out that the word ?owner? (e) and would render all such landlords remedies against tenants however badly they may need the premises for their own personal residence. I do not think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I repeal the appellant's contention. I consider it proper before passing on the next challenge to point out that the word ?owner? as used in Cl. (e) in S. 14 (1) does not postulate absolute ownership in the sense that he has an absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the property as he likes. To describe some one as owner, and perhaps even as an absolute owner of property is to say two things : it is to assert that his title to the property is indisputable and that he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal system in question. Rights of ownership may, therefore, be limited by special provisions of law and include in those provisions such as are in force in New Delhi according to which citizens are granted long leases of sites for constructing thereon. Now, the words of a Statute, though normally construed in their ordinary meaning, may contain inherent restrictions due to their subject-matter and object and the occasion on which and the circumstances with reference to which they are used. They call for construction in the light of their context rather than in what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from the context. The meaning of the word ?owner? in Cl. (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and the appellant's construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision. ? ( 14 ) IN the relevant context the learned counsel for the appellant relied on another decision reported in 1990 (1) SCC page 193 (Sushil Kr. Mehta v. Govind Ram Bohra ). The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in this judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court held that when there is a lease of municipal land and building is constructed thereon by any person he becomes a landlord and his tenant become the tenant for the purpose of Rent Act. Even though a small portion in the front of the building is left as open land, the entire premises would be governed by the Rent Act. Even though a small portion in the front of the building is left as open land, the entire premises would be governed by the Rent Act. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant then referred to various paragraphs of the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court below. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellate Court below did not apply proper test of law when deciding the appeal on merit. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellate Court below acted on the basis of surmise and conjecture and did not consider the evidence on record. The learned counsel for the appellant then relied on another decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1995 SC page 576 (Raj Kumar Khaitan and Ors. v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun and Anr. ). The learned Counsel for the appellant laid stress on paragraph 3 of the said judgment for the purpose of convenience which is quoted hereinbelow :-?3. It is clear from the averments made in the above quoted paragraphs that the plaintiffs asserted that there was no other means of livelihood with them and as such they wanted to set up their own business in the premises in dispute. The High Court, however, came to the conclusion that apart from above quoted pleadings it was necessary to plead the nature of the business which the appellants-plaintiffs wanted to start in the premises. We are of the view that the High Court fell into patent error. It was not necessary for the appellants-landlords to indicate the precise nature of the business which they intended to start in the premises. Even if the nature of business would have been indicated nobody could blind the landlords to start the same business in the premises after it was vacated. ? ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the landlord asserted that there was no other means of livelihood with them and as such they wanted to set up their own business in the suit premises. The learned counsel further submitted that the landlord need not indicate the precises nature of business which they intend to start in the said premises. The learned counsel further submitted that the landlord need not indicate the precises nature of business which they intend to start in the said premises. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the appellate Court below in its finding held ?so, we are to deal with the solicitory issue as to whether the plaintiffs requires the suit premises on the ground of reasonably requirement for their own use and occupation. The property in question is located at 19a, Canal West Road and admittedly there was another residential house belonging with the present premises at 25b, Rajendra Lal Street and admittedly there is another house at 30a, Canal East Road which is under the occupation of the other tenants at a rental of Rs. 3000/ -. The learned appellate Court below also came to the finding that no commission was held in respect of the residential house located at 25b, Rajendra Lal Street. The learned appellate Court below relied on the defendant version and observed ?the provision defence is that the plaintiffs have got their accommodation elsewhere apart from the suit premises wherein they can safely carry on their business as alleged in the plaint. Secondly, no commission was held in respect of the residential house located at 25b, Rajendra Lal Street and according to the defendant/appellant the entire accommodation now available to the plaintiff is not known to the Court. ? The learned appellant Court below further observed ?the allegation of the defendant is that the suit property at 19a, Canal West Road is leased out property on certain terms and conditions. More over the plaintiff wanted to expand their business by evicting the defendant but no such permission was obtained from the Government for such extension of business. Save and except licence for the year 1984 no other licence is forthcoming to show that there was no increase in the volume of the business. ? The learned appellate Court below also observed ?therefore, according to this defendant/appellant the entire suit of the plaintiffs is based upon some mala fide intention for eviction of the defendant. ? The learned appellate Court below also found ?that the learned Munsif did not consider at all as why no local inspection was done in respect of the other properties owned by the plaintiffs and in the body of the judgment. ? The learned appellate Court below also found ?that the learned Munsif did not consider at all as why no local inspection was done in respect of the other properties owned by the plaintiffs and in the body of the judgment. No discussion has been made as to the requirement of the plaintiffs for increasing the volume of the business. ? ( 17 ) THE learned appellate Court below then found ?it is true that in the learned Court no commission was held in respect of premises 25b, Rajendra Lal Street and 30a, Canal East Road of which the plaintiffs are the owners?. The learned appellate Court below found ?it is further admitted by him that he has no international business licence as he does not require that. ? ( 18 ) THE appellate Court below also observed ?therefore on considering the totality of the evidence of this plaintiff No. 1, it palpably holds goods that he could not produce any documents showing the expansion of his business although he made specific averment from the year 1978, his business was expanded. The learned appellate Court below further observed that ?it is true that the D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 both have stated in their respective statement that the business of the plaintiff is very high and their premises would be insufficient for them. ? - The learned appellate Court below further, found ?the fact remains that the plaintiff have measurably failed to establish the factum regarding the expansion of business. It appears that the plaintiffs are required to have the approval of the Government. Leasor by producing the sanction plan. ? - In the second place the appellate Court below observed ?the structures standing on the land automatically vested to Government and the said structure become the property of the Government. ? ( 19 ) ON such observation the learned appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif. The learned appellate Court below did not at all consider as it appears, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif. The learned appellate Court below also did not scrutiny the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. The learned appellate Court below did not at all consider as it appears, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif. The learned appellate Court below also did not scrutiny the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. The learned appellate Court below did not consider the report of the pleader Commissioner that the plaintiff has a good business of sac and see found clearing, stretching other function in respect of the sac business in going on in the godown of the plaintiffs. The learned appellate Court below also failed to consider that the learned Munsif in his judgment observed ?he has further admitted during his examination-in-chief that the plaintiff has to hire a godown necessary for the purpose of his business. The learned appellate Court below unnecessarily observed ?that no commission has been made in respect of the premises 30a, Canal East Road and 25b, Rajendra Lal Street. The learned appellate Court below itself has observed that the other two premises are tenanted. If admittedly the other two premises are tenanted it cannot be said that these are reasonably suitable accommodation or alternative accommodations for the plaintiffs. Now, the learned appellate Court below acted on surmise and conjecture when it observed that the plaintiff could not produce international trade licence. The learned appellate Court below applied wrong test of law in coming to finding or in coming to conclusion regarding the bona fide requirement or reasonably requirement of the plaintiffs. In this context reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2000 (1) SCC 679 (Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. ). Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff on paragraphs 10 and 13 of this judgment and the said paragraphs 10 and 13 are quoted hereinbelow for the purpose of discussion and convenience. ?10. The learned single Judge of the High Court while formulating the first stanstantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff landlord admitted that there were a number of plots, shops and houses in his possession. We have been taken through the judgments of the courts below and we do not find any such admission. ?10. The learned single Judge of the High Court while formulating the first stanstantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff landlord admitted that there were a number of plots, shops and houses in his possession. We have been taken through the judgments of the courts below and we do not find any such admission. It is true that the plaintiff landlord in his evidence stated that there were a number of other shops and houses belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that the suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for stating his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted. 13. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has found fault as the plaintiff landlord did not give evidence after the above amendment of the plaint. In our opinion it is not necessary as the above amendment was not rebutted by the defendant tenant. ? ( 20 ) IT is settled position of law that if there are more than one tenanted premises belonging to the landlord then the landlord can at his discrimination select which tenant is to be evicted and the tenant cannot say that he should not be evicted when the other tenants are there. Reasonable requirement or bona fide requirement is of the landlord and it is the choice of the landlord where he will reside. ( 21 ) THE learned appellate Court below brought certain unnecessarily facts and acted on the basis of surmise and conjecture when the appellate Court below observed that the landlord/plaintiffs have filed the suit with mala fide intention. On consideration of the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court below it clearly appears that the said judgment and decree is absolutely perverse. ( 22 ) IN view of the discussion made above this second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court below is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge is affirmed. ( 22 ) IN view of the discussion made above this second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court below is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge is affirmed. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are to bear their own costs. The Lower Court Records be sent down to the Courts below forthwith. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, will be supplied to the parties expeditiously. Appeal allowed