Judgment :- These revisions have been filed against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu made in Crl.M.P.No.376 of 2003 in C.C.No.85 of 2003 and Crl.M.P.No.377 of 2003 in C.C.No.86 of 2003 dated 6.11.2003. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: In C.C.No.85 of 2003, the complaint was filed on 11.11.1999 by the respondent herein viz., the Inspector of Factories, 5th Circle, Chennai against the petitioner herein the proprietor of M/S.Switching Technologies Gunther Ltd., alleging that in the main entrance gate, a tube light was erected in an iron pipe and tied up with the iron fencing, that there was heavy rain with thunder and lightening between 2 to 4.30 a.m. on 11.8.1999, that due to damaged wires in the iron pipe that has caused death of the security guard who was on duty and that the said defective wiring in the tube light fittings in the main gate is contravention to Section 41 of the Act and Rule 61-E of the Factories Act which is punishable under Section 92 of the Act. In C.C.No.86 of 2003 the complaint was filed on 11.11.1999 against one M.Sukumaran, manager of the same factory on the same occurrence. The complaints were filed on 11.11.1999 and they were returned on 12.11.1999 for rectification of the following defects: 1.To mention the police station limits wherein the occurrence took place. 2.To furnish doctor's name in the witnesses list. 3. To file the Post Mortem report. 4.To obtain the opinion of the doctor as to the cause of death. 5. Visecra Report to be filed. 6. To explain as to how the complaint is maintainable when a case is pending before Tambaram Police Station in Crime No.708/99 on the same cause of action. On 23.07.2002 the complaints were re-presented and once again they were returned by the office of the C.J.M.Chengalpattu stating, 1. that the complaint was re-submitted after a lapse of 33 months and reasons for the long delay in re-submitting the complaints have not been explained. 2. that the name of the doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body should be ascertained and furnished in the list of witnesses. 3. that the opinion as to the cause of death should be obtained and submit to the court. 4. that the original Postmortem certificate may be obtained and submit along with the complaint. 5. 2. that the name of the doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body should be ascertained and furnished in the list of witnesses. 3. that the opinion as to the cause of death should be obtained and submit to the court. 4. that the original Postmortem certificate may be obtained and submit along with the complaint. 5. that the list of witnesses and the documents enclosed alongwith complaint should be incorporated in the copy of the complaint also. After the complaints were returned for the second time as mentioned above, the same were re-presented only on 5.8.2003 i.e., after a delay of 1454 days. On 7.8.2003 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance. The accused in both the cases filed Crl.O.Ps under section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the complaints on the ground that the complaints have been taken cognizance after the lapse of period of limitation. While dismissing the said Crl.O.Ps. this court directed the petitioners to file a petition raising preliminary objections within 15 days from the date of receipt of copy of the orders and accordingly Preliminary Objection Petitions were filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. But, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the same on the ground that the complaints have been filed within three months from the date of occurrence as required under Section-106 of the Factories Act and that therefore, the provisions under Section-468 Cr.P.C., is not applicable to the facts of the case. Aggrieved over the said order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu, these revisions have been filed. 3. A perusal of the materials available on recordes would show that for an occurrence that took place on 11.8.1999, a complaint under section 106 of Factories Act ought to have been filed within three months and in fact the complaint was filed on the last day 11.11.1999. But, the complaint was so defective in nature and hence the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate returned the same on 12.11.1999 to rectify the defects in the complaint. The complaint was re-presented only on 23.7.2002 without rectifying several defects noted earlier by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and therefore the same was returned once again on 30.7.2002. Thereafter, the complaint was re-presented only on 5.8.2003 and thus there is a overall delay of 1454 days and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 7.8.2003. The complaint was re-presented only on 23.7.2002 without rectifying several defects noted earlier by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and therefore the same was returned once again on 30.7.2002. Thereafter, the complaint was re-presented only on 5.8.2003 and thus there is a overall delay of 1454 days and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 7.8.2003. The offence with which the accused are charged is punishable under Section-92 of the Factories Act and if proved, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine upto Rs. One lakh or with both, and if the contravention is continued after conviction, with a further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for each day on which the contravention is so continued . 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the complaint was not filed within time and cognizance was also taken beyond the period of limitation and therefore, both the complaints must be quashed. Both the complaints were filed on 11.11.1999 the last day, within three months from the date of commission of offence. The complaints were so defective in nature and therefore they were returned by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the proper complaint has been filed only after a delay of 1454 days. The complaint which does not contain the required materials like names of witnesses, documents to be relied on by the prosecution cannot be treated as a proper complaint. A valid complaint must be one based on which the magistrate can apply his mind and take cognizance of the offence. A defective complaint which lacks names of witnesses and other particulars and documents to be relied on by the prosecution cannot be considered as a valid complaint. Therefore, even though formal complaint was filed on 11.11.99, it was so defective that it has to be returned at once by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for compliance and to rectify the defects. Therefore, it may be safely held that no proper complaint was filed within three months as required under section 106 of the Factories Act. 5. As already held, the punishment for the offence under section-92 of the Factories Act is imprisonment for two years and also a fine of Rs.One Lakh. Therefore, it may be safely held that no proper complaint was filed within three months as required under section 106 of the Factories Act. 5. As already held, the punishment for the offence under section-92 of the Factories Act is imprisonment for two years and also a fine of Rs.One Lakh. Under Section 468 of Cr.P.C., for the offence which can be convicted for more than one year but less than three years imprisonment, the period of limitation for taking cognizance is three years. Section 468 of Cr.P.C., reads as follows: " 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation:- (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the Category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years." Since in this case the punishment for the alleged offence is two years imprisonment, as per the provisions of Section 468 (2) (c) of Cr.P.C., three years is the period of limitation for taking cognizance. In this case, the occurrence has taken place on 11.8.1999 and cognizance has been taken only on 7.8.2003 , which is clearly beyond the three years period of limitation. Thus, in this case the trial court has taken cognizance of the offence after a delay of 1454 days i.e. 3 years and 359 days. In such circumstances, since in this case cognizance has been taken beyond the period of limitation, i.e., three years for the offence punishable with imprisonment for 2 years, the taking of cognizance itself is against law. 6. In the decision reported in Aru Vs. State rep.by S.I. of Police, Pothanur Police Station (1993 L.W.127) this court has held as follows:(Para-9) "9. "Taking cognizance" which is a judicial function means, judicial application of mind by the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action. 6. In the decision reported in Aru Vs. State rep.by S.I. of Police, Pothanur Police Station (1993 L.W.127) this court has held as follows:(Para-9) "9. "Taking cognizance" which is a judicial function means, judicial application of mind by the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action. In other words, these words denote that the Magistrate, after becoming fully aware of the allegations made in the complaint, decides to examine and test the validity of the said allegations and chooses to issue process to the accused. There can be no doubt that the question as to when cognizance is taken of as offence will depend upon circumstances of each case and it will not be possible to attempt to carve out an infalliable formula for universal application on such "taking of cognizance". It can positively be stated, that if the Magistrate had applied his mind judicially to proceed further on the allegations made in the complaint, he had taken cognizance. To put it differently, the Magistrate must have applied his mind to the offences mentioned in the complaint or the report, for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the several provisions concerning trials and enquiries in the Code of Criminal Procedure. All that S.190 Cr.P.C., provides for taking cognizance of offences by Magistrates, is not exhaustive. However, cognizance can be taken on the complaint of an aggrieved person or a police report or upon other information. In Jamuna Singh Vs. Bhadai Shah ( AIR 1964 SC 1541 ), the Apex Court has observed, that when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, a case is instituted in the Magistrate's Court and such a case is one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer, it is a case instituted in the Magistrate's Court on a police report. Thus, as far as cognizance is concerned, be it on a complaint of facts or on a police report, it cannot have different meeting." In the decision reported in Krishna Pillai Vs. T.A.Rajendran (1990 (supp) SCC 121 ), the Apex Court has held as follows: (Paras 2,3 & 4) "2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Thus, as far as cognizance is concerned, be it on a complaint of facts or on a police report, it cannot have different meeting." In the decision reported in Krishna Pillai Vs. T.A.Rajendran (1990 (supp) SCC 121 ), the Apex Court has held as follows: (Paras 2,3 & 4) "2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 provides: " No court shall cognizance of any offence under this Act after the expiry of one year from the date of which the offence is alleged to have been committed." The appellant who is one of the accused persons in the case before the learned Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence challenged the continuance of the prosecution by filing an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court contending, inter alia, that cognizance was bared under Section 9 of the Act. That having not been entertained this Court has been moved in appeal by special leave. 3. It is not disputed that cognizance has been taken by the court more than a year after the offence was committed. Counsel for the respondents has stated that since the complaint had been filed within a year from the commission of the offence it must be taken that the court has taken cognizance on the date when the complaint was filed. In that view of the matter there would be no limitation. 4. Taking cognizance has assumed a special meaning in our criminal jurisprudence. We may refer to the view taken by a five Judge bench of this Court in A.R.Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277. At p.530 (para 31) of the reports this Court indicated: " When a private complaint is filed, the court has to examine the complainant on oath save in the cases set out in the proviso to Section 200 CrPC. After examining the complainant on oath and examining the witnesses present, if any, meaning thereby that the witnesses not present need not be examined, it would be open to the court to judicially determine whether a case is made out for issuing process. After examining the complainant on oath and examining the witnesses present, if any, meaning thereby that the witnesses not present need not be examined, it would be open to the court to judicially determine whether a case is made out for issuing process. When it is said that court issued process, it means the court has taken cognizance of the offence and has decided to initiate the proceedings and a visible manifestation of taking cognizance process is issued which means that the accused is called upon to appeal before the court." The extract from the Constitution Bench judgment clearly indicates that filing of a complaint in court is not taking cognizance and what exactly constitutes taking cognizance is different from filing of a complaint. Since the magisterial action in this case was beyond the period of one year from the date of the commission of the offence the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance when he did in view of the bar under Section 9 of the Act. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the prosecution. The writ petition is permitted to be withdrawn as not pressed." The decisions cited above clearly indicate that filing of complaint is an act of individual and "taking cognizance" of the offence is the duty of the court. In this case, as already held, the proper complaint has not been filed within time and cognizance was taken beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, in both these revisions the impugned orders of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu dated 06.11.2003 are liable to be set aside. 7. In the result, both these revisions are allowed. Consequently the impugned orders of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu dated 6.11.2003 are set aside and the complaints filed by the respondent against the petitioners are quashed.