JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - Appellant was the accused in Sessions Case No. 45 of 1994 (S.C. No. 242/94-GDC) of the Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Berhampur. Charge for the offence u/s 302, I.P.C. was framed against them on the allegation that, on 1.3.1994 at 3 P.M. at Village Haripur in front of the house of Pandab Das he intentionally committed murder of Dambarudhar Das. The Appellant denied to the allegations and claimed for trial. 2. According to the prosecution, because of land dispute between the parties on 1.3.1994 while the deceased was passing on the village street, the Appellant being armed with a 'Farsa' came and inflicted injuries. That occurrence was witnessed by P.Ws. 7, 8 and 10. When P.Ws. 7 and 10 over-powered the accused and snatched away the 'Farsa' (M.O.-I), thereafter the accused went to his house and came with the 'Kati' (M.O.-II) to behead the deceased, but again he was over-powered by P.Ws. 7 and 10 and the 'Kati' was taken away from him. The deceased succumbed to the injuries on his way to hospital. 3. In course of trial, altogether eleven witnesses were examined by the prosecution besides relying on the F.I.R. (Ext.2), Post-Mortem Report (Ext.3), opinion report (Ext.5), report of the Doctor who collected the nail clipping (Ext.6), Inquest Report (Ext.7), Seizure Lists (Exts. 1,8,9, 12 and 13), etc. Trial Court noticed from the Post-Mortem Report (Ext.3) and evidence of P.W. No. 5 that out of nine external injuries, injury No. 1, i.e., the chopped wound of the size of 22 cm. X 10 cm. with the depth up to left thorasia cavity located between left side neck and left shoulder was the trial injury to cause death of deceased and therefore the death of the deceased was homicidal. 4. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge referred to the evidence of eye-witnesses, viz., P.Ws. 7, 8 and 10 and recorded that Appellant is the author of the injuries. 4. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge referred to the evidence of eye-witnesses, viz., P.Ws. 7, 8 and 10 and recorded that Appellant is the author of the injuries. In that respect he also referred to the evidence of P.w. No. 3 Smt. Dukhi Das, a common relative to both the accused and the deceased, P.W. No. 4 Srimati Das who is the daughter of the deceased and discussed their credibility as eye witnesses on the ground that P.w. No. 3 having no enmity with the accused and P.W. No. 4 being the daughter of the deceased, would not have implicated the Appellant with the crime if he is innocent. Accordingly the Trial Court found the Appellant guilty of the offence u/s 302, I.P.C. and convicted him there under with the sentence of imprisonment for life. 5. Mr. S.D. Das, learned Senior Counsel arguing on behalf of the Appellant contends that though the Appellant does not dispute to the finding regarding homicidal death of the deceased, but he changes to the finding recorded by the Trial Court against his conviction for the offence u/s 302, I.P.C. in as much as the evidence on record is full of contradictions and doubtful circumstances and that aspect was not considered by the Trial Court in proper manner. 6. In that respect his first contention is that, in course of his deposition P.W. No. 3 described herself to be an eye-witness to the occurrence. She was confronted with her previous statement made before the police and such confronted statements were also affirmatively confronted to the Investigating Officer (P.W. No. 11). From that evidence it emerges that she could not have been an eyewitness to the occurrence. Learned Standing Counsel, however, argues justifying to the reason assigned by the Trial Court that P.W. No. 3 being a common relation to both accused and deceased, she was neither an interested witness for the deceased nor chemical to the accused and therefore her evidence is credible. On perusual of the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 11, we find no substance in the contention of learned Standing Counsel. P.W No. 3 has stated that accused is her husband's younger brother and the deceased was her husband's elder brother. 7. From the narration of relationship in the cross-examination portions, it appears that the accused and the deceased are the agnatic cousins of her husband. 3 and 11, we find no substance in the contention of learned Standing Counsel. P.W No. 3 has stated that accused is her husband's younger brother and the deceased was her husband's elder brother. 7. From the narration of relationship in the cross-examination portions, it appears that the accused and the deceased are the agnatic cousins of her husband. Simply because of that relationship P.W. No. 3 does not acquire credibility to depose as eye-witness when according to P.W. No. 11, in her statement P.W. No. 3 did not state anything about the assault by 'Farsa' made by the accused on the deceased. No explanation is forthcoming from the side of the prosecution as to why there is material omission in her statement that she saw the accused giving blows to the deceased. Under such circumstance, even the disinterestedness of this witness does not make her credible as eye-witness to the occurrence because of the material omission in her statement. 8. So far as P.W No. 4 is concerned, admittedly she is the daughter of the deceased. It is true that a close relative like a daughter would not like to rope in an innocent person by giving clean chit to the real culprit, but that theory was wrongly applied by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, because in her evidence P.W. No. 4 has admitted in the cross-examination that: 2. It is a fact that I stated before the police that by the time of my arrival at the spot, my father was lying dead near the cowshed of Dhoba Das." It is also born out from the evidence of P.W. No. 11 that she did not state before the Investigating Officer that she saw accused dealing 'Farsa' blows to the deceased. Therefore, in this case it appears that having derived information about accused being the author of the crime, P.W. No. 4 acted interestedly to speak as an eye-witness though she did not see the occurrence as an eye-witness. Therefore, her evidence is not be counted, considered and appreciated as an eye-witness to the occurrence. 9. Be that as it may, it appears from the discussion of the evidence made by the Court below that he did not record the finding of guilt against the Appellant because of such supporting evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4. Therefore, her evidence is not be counted, considered and appreciated as an eye-witness to the occurrence. 9. Be that as it may, it appears from the discussion of the evidence made by the Court below that he did not record the finding of guilt against the Appellant because of such supporting evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4. On the other hand, the Trial Court merely discussed the credibility of such witness because of their status, which has been noted above. For the reason recorded above, this Court finds that for any purpose whatsoever P.Ws. 3 and 4 do not have the credibility of the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and their evidence in that respect is to be discarded. 10. Mr. S.D. Das further argues that, evidence of P.Ws. 7, 8 and 10 also suffers from material contradictions relating to the second 'Farsa' blow said to have been dealt by the Appellant on the waist of the deceased. Accordingly he states that evidence of P.Ws. 7, 8 and 10 be rejected due to such omissions. 'Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' is not a sound principle to be followed in assessing evidenced a criminal trial. Therefore, Courts have been given the obligations to separate the grain from the chaff and to accept the core acceptable evidence, which stands the test of credibility. On perusual of the evidence of P.Ws. 7, 8 and 10, this Court finds that all the three witnesses have categorically and consistently narrated about the incident attributing assault by the accused by means of a 'Farsa' on the left shoulder/left side neck, i.e., the injury No. 1 in the post-mortem report. They have also stated about the second 'Farsa' blow given on the waist while P.Ws. 7 and 10 were in the process of over-powering the accused and snatching away the 'Farsa' (M.O.-I) from him. Though P.w. No. 11 has sated that P. Ws. 7, 8 and 10 did not state about accused giving the 'Farsa' blow on the waist of the deceased, but it appears from the cross-examination of P.Ws. 7, 8 and 10 that accused did not challenge to their evidence that he dealt the 'Farsa' blow on the neck/shoulder region of the deceased. 11. It reveals from the evidence of P.W. No. 5 and the post-mortem report, (Ext.3) that injury No. 1 on the neck/left shoulder region is the fatal injury. 7, 8 and 10 that accused did not challenge to their evidence that he dealt the 'Farsa' blow on the neck/shoulder region of the deceased. 11. It reveals from the evidence of P.W. No. 5 and the post-mortem report, (Ext.3) that injury No. 1 on the neck/left shoulder region is the fatal injury. P.W. No. 5 has catagorically stated in his evidence that injury No. 1 alone was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. After examination of M.O.-I, he gave the opinion that the injury No. 1 was possible by that weapon besides the injury No. 6 on the waist. Under the given facts and circumstances, even if the omission in their statement relating to the injury on the waist is considered, then also that does not shake their credibility as eye-witness to the occurrence to name the accused as the author of the crime. Under such circumstance, the aforesaid argument of the Appellant is of no merit. 12. No other contention is advanced by the Appellant in challenging to the impugned judgment of conviction. None-the-less we considered the fact of enmity between the accused and the deceased because of the land dispute, as highlighted by the prosecution, to find out if the case would be governed by Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C., but looking to the narration of events that accused was determined to kill the deceased, we find no good reason to alter the conviction u/s 302, I.P.C. to one u/s 304, First Part of the I.P.C. Therefore, we confirm the order of conviction and sentence, which is minimum u/s 302 I.P.C. and dismiss the appeal. Final Result : Dismissed