JUDGMENT - KHANDEPARKAR R.M.S., J.:—The grievance of the petitioner relates to disobedience of the order dated 15-4-1999, passed in Summary Suit Nos. 1794 of 1999, 1985 of 1999, 1792 of 1999 and 1793 of 1999 and breach of undertaking given in the said suits by the respondent Nos. 2 to 4. 2. Few facts relevant for the decision are that certain promissory notes came to be executed by the respondent No. 1 through the respondent No. 3 and the respondents having failed and neglected to pay the amounts on being demanded by the petitioner under the said promissory notes, the suits came to be filed wherein the motions were taken out and the same were disposed of while accepting the statements made by the learned Advocate appearing for the defendants, who are the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, in the said suits, further requiring the defendants to file a written undertaking. The relevant portion of the order which was passed on 15-4-1999 reads thus: "The learned Counsel appearing for defendants 1 and 3 after taking instructions from defendant No. 3, who is present in Court, states that defendant No. 1 will not transfer, dispose of or sell or create any third party interests in respect of the Suit Premises No. 82 described in item No. 1 of the Schedule to the motions. The learned Counsel states that written undertakings to the above effect will be filed within two weeks. In view of the statement and undertakings, Notices of Motion are disposed of. It is clarified that this order is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the main suits. It is also clarified that the above statements and undertakings are relating to shop only and not the stock in trade." The defendant No. 3, who is the respondent No. 3 herein, consequently filed the undertaking on 21-4-1999 which reads thus : "That as per the order of the Honourable Court passed by His Lordship Mr. Justice A.R. Shah dated 15th April, 1999 in the above notice of motion, I hereby give a written undertaking to the effect that the defendant Nos. Justice A.R. Shah dated 15th April, 1999 in the above notice of motion, I hereby give a written undertaking to the effect that the defendant Nos. 1 and I shall not transfer, dispose off, sell or create any third party interest in respect of the suit shop premises i.e. Shop No. 82, Nagdevi Cross Lane, 2nd Floor, Mumbai 400 003." It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 and its partners 2 to 4 inspite of full knowledge of the said order and the undertaking have disposed of and/or transferred their interest in the said premises in favour of the third party i.e. the respondent No. 5 and this was revealed to the petitioner consequent to removal of the board of the respondent No. 1 which was displayed at the said premises till the date of filing of the undertaking and therefore there has been wilful breach of the undertaking as well as wilful violation of the order of the Court. 3. It is not in dispute that the respondent Nos. 2 and 4 were the partners of the respondent No. 1 at the time of filing of the suits as well as when the undertakings were given. The respondent No. 3 retired from the firm since April, 1997. The respondent No. 5 is the landlady in relation to the suit premises. It is also a matter of record that during the pendency of these proceedings before the Court, the respondent No. 3 and the respondent No. 5 expired. 4. On issuance of the show cause notices on prima facie being satisfied about the violation of the order and the breach of the undertaking, the respondents filed their replies and the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have come out with the case that the building wherein the suit premises are situated was in a dangerous state and the said fact was verified by the departmental engineers of the Municipal Corporation and pursuant to their direction to vacate the building for repairs thereof, a letter came to be issued to the said respondents by the respondent No. 5 which was followed by eviction proceedings on the ground of non-user as in fact the said respondents had stopped using the suit premises. In the said eviction proceedings after having brought to the notice of the Court of Small Causes the undertaking given by the respondents to this Court, the said respondents surrendered the tenancy in respect of the said premises to the landlady respondent No. 5. It is also stated by the respondents that they were not using the premises for more than 5-6 months prior to the initiation of the suits for eviction by the respondent No. 5. The respondent No. 5 on her part has stated that she was not a party to the suits wherein the undertaking was given and in her capacity as the landlord she was entitled to evict the respondents for non-user of the premises for more than six months and in the process the said respondents surrendered their tenancy to the respondent No. 5. All the respondents have contended that they have not violated the order of the Court or the undertaking to this Court. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have also sought to tender unconditional apology for any act done by them which can amount to violation of the Courts order or the undertaking. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner while contending that the acts on the part of the respondent Nos. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have also sought to tender unconditional apology for any act done by them which can amount to violation of the Courts order or the undertaking. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner while contending that the acts on the part of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 amounts to wilful disobedience of the order and wilful breach of the undertaking given to this Court by the said respondents on account of surrender of tenancy and divesting of possession of the suit premises to the landlady has submitted that both the said actions amount to either transfer or disposal of the premises in favour of the third party, and in that connection sought to rely upon the decisions in the matters of (The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1008; (Kanagasabhai Pathar v. Poornathammal)2, reported in A.I.R. 1947(34) Madras 458 and (S. Raghbir Singh s/o Milkha Singh Jat v. Union of India and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1954 Punjab 261 and further submitted that the landlady though she was not a party to the suit cannot and even could not have been punished for contempt of Court, could not be allowed to enjoy the benefit of an act which is in violation of the Courts order and the undertaking given to this Court and in that reliance is placed in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company (P) Ltd. and another)4, reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2005. 6. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the respondents has submitted that neither the act of surrendering of tenancy nor the delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord by the tenant can amount to either transfer or disposal of the premises within the meaning of the said expression under the said undertaking or the order passed by this Court and has further submitted that those words are to be understood in the context in which they were used therein. Reliance is sought to be placed in the decision in the matters of (Mst. Reliance is sought to be placed in the decision in the matters of (Mst. Samrathi Devi v. Parasuram Pandey and others)5, reported in A.I.R. 1975 Patna 140, (Palanivelu and others v. Ouseph Mathai)6, reported in A.I.R. 1973 Madras 309, (Makhan Lal Laha and another v. Nagendra Nath Adhicary)7, reported in A.I.R. 1933 Calcutta 467 and (Natvarlal Punjabhai and another v. Dadubhai Manubhai and others)8, reported in A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 61. 7. The point which arises for consideration in the matter is whether the surrender of the leasehold right and interest in the suit premises amounts to transfer or disposal of their right or interest therein in favour of the respondent No. 5 and that therefore in favour of third person, within the meaning of the said expression in the order dated 15-4-1999 read with the undertaking dated 21-4-1999? 8. Perusal of the order dated 15-4-1999 ex facie discloses that the Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 3, upon being instructed by the respondent No. 3, had stated before the Court that the respondent No. 1 will not transfer, dispose of or sell or create any third party interest in respect of the suit premises and written undertaking to that effect would be filed within two weeks from the date of the order and in view of the said statement and the undertaking to be given, the notice of motion was disposed of. It was clarified in the order that the statement and the undertaking related only to the shop premises and not to the stock in trade. Subsequently the respondent No. 3 for himself and on behalf of the respondent No. 1 filed written undertaking to the effect that the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 would not transfer, dispose of, sell or create any third party interest in respect of the suit premises. The fact that there had been undertaking and the order imposing restrain on transfer, disposal, sale or creation of third party interest in the suit premises is therefore apparent on the face of the record, apart from the fact that there is no dispute in that regard. The fact that there had been undertaking and the order imposing restrain on transfer, disposal, sale or creation of third party interest in the suit premises is therefore apparent on the face of the record, apart from the fact that there is no dispute in that regard. The contention of the petitioner is that in violation of the said order and more particularly the undertaking and the order as regards the restrain against the transfer and/or disposal of the suit premises, the respondents have surrendered the leasehold interest in the suit premises in favour of the deceased landlady/respondent No. 5 and in fact transferred their interest and/or disposed of their interest in favour of the deceased respondent No. 5 and hence they are liable to be punished for contempt of Court, as the said act being in wilful disobedience and breach of the said order and the undertaking. 9. It is not in dispute that the premises in question were leased premises and the same belonged to the respondent No. 5 and that the respondent No. 1 was the lessee in respect of the said premises. The undertaking was given and accepted with the full knowledge to the parties that the premises did not belong to the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 but it belonged to someone else i.e., the respondent No. 5 and the occupation of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 therein was that of the lessees. It is not the case of the petitioner that the fact that the suit premises were occupied by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 in their capacity as the lessees of the respondent No. 5 was not known to them either at the time of or prior to the day on which the said undertaking was given or the said order was passed by this Court. Neither the order nor the undertaking had imposed any restrain of whatsoever nature upon the exercise of rights by the landlord in relation to the suit premises or in relation to statutory obligations of the lessee in respect thereof, nor the same curtailed any of the statutory rights available to the landlord under the statute governing the lessor and the lessee relationship, nor did it forbid the performance of obligations of the lessee arising under the contract of lease with the landlord. The undertaking, therefore, has to be understood bearing in mind all these aspects of the matter. It is also to be borne in mind that the undertaking is to be strictly interpreted, if at all the interpretation thereof is required, and the scope thereof cannot be enlarged under the guise of interpretation thereof. 10. The Apex Court in the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra) has held that "A tenant has both under the Transfer of Property Act and under section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 an interest in the demised premises which squarely falls within the expression property occurring in sub-clause (f) of Clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution." The Apex Court was dealing with a matter wherein the provisions of section 354-R of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 were sought to be challenged being ultra vires the Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution of India. 11. The learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Kanagasabhai Pathars case (supra), while dealing with the issue as to whether the provisions contained in Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Civil P.C. applies to the facts wherein the point for consideration was whether the judgment-debtor had transferred the property to the petitioner therein after the commencement of the respondents suit but wherein no conveyance was executed by the judgment-debtor in favour of the petitioner nor he had purported to transfer or assign any title to the property to the petitioner, held that "The only act which he has done is to quit and deliver possession of the property to the petitioner, after receipt of a notice from him to quit. In my opinion, having regard to the scope of the groups of sections beginning with Order 21, Rule 95, Civil P.C., the words "transferred the property" in Rule 102 should be understood in a wide sense as to include both "transfer of title" as well as "transfer of possession" and therefore it was ruled that: "surrendering possession to the petition therein was to be deemed as having transferred the property to the latter within the meaning of the said Rule". 12. 12. In S. Raghubir Singhs case (supra), the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court while dealing with the question as to whether the provisions of section 9(2) of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 in so far as they would extinguish the mortgagee rights of the petitioner, were ultra vires the Constitution of India, while rejecting the contention that under Entry 41 of List III, Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India the power to make laws concerning the custody, management and disposal of the evacuees property would not include the power to extinguish certain mortgages, held that the expression "disposal" appearing in the said entry is wide enough to cover the extinguishment of a mortgage. It was further observed that it is well known rule that interpretation of the language used in the Constitutional provision should receive a liberal construction so as to cover all contingencies and if therefore a particular word is capable of a narrow and restricted, or a broad and comprehensive meaning it ought to be construed in the latter sense unless the context appears to indicate that a restricted meaning was intended. It was a matter pertaining to interpretation of the constitutional provisions. In Delhi Development Authoritys case (supra), it was ruled by the Apex Court that the contemner should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits of his contempt. 13. In Mst. Samrathi Devis (supra), the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court while dealing with the appeal wherein the trial Court decreeing the suit had declared the deed of surrender executed by the plaintiff in the suit in favour of the defendant No. 1 therein to be invalid and inoperative and therefore had directed delivery of possession of the property to the plaintiff. While dealing with the issue as to whether the title and interest conveyed to the plaintiff under the gift deed relied upon by the parties in the course of the suit could be extinguished or re-transferred in favour of the defendant No. 1 by virtue of the deed of surrender, it was held that "It is well settled that a deed of surrender simpliciter cannot affect any transfer of the title of the releasor in favour of the releasee. This proposition is not disputed." Further dealing with the question whether any title of the plaintiff in the suit land passed in favour of the defendant No. 1 under the deed of surrender, it was observed that :-- "it is manifest from the recital of this document that she had completely disowned her own title in the suit lands. As such, it cannot be contended that she intended to transfer any property under the same. It is well settled that a transfer of property clearly contemplates that the transferror has an interest in the property which is sought to be conveyed. He cannot sever from his rights in the property and yet convey it to the transferee. All that, perhaps, was intended by this document by the defendant No. 1 by taking this document from the plaintiff was to have a declaration that the plaintiff had not derived any title under the deed of gift in her favour, and therefore on execution of the document of surrender no claim might be made by her, or, anybody else on her behalf." (emphasis supplied) The decision was to the effect that the party who had executed the document of surrender had declared severance of her right in the property and yet sought to surrender the right in the property. Once the party declares severance of right in a property, thereafter the question of such party transferring any right in such property cannot arise and therefore there cannot be any surrender of such right and in that context, it was held that the person who had disowned the title could not have transferred any right in the property and therefore surrender of any such non-existing right could not amount to transfer. 14. In Planivelus (supra), the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court while dealing with the scope of the term "transfer" in section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, held that: "Cases have uniformly taken the view that a document of release, a document of relinquishment and document of surrender would not amount to a transfer within the meaning of section. The important idea involved in a transfer is that under the transfer a person who got title or right conveys that right or title to the transferee, which right the transferee acquired only in pursuance of the transfer. The important idea involved in a transfer is that under the transfer a person who got title or right conveys that right or title to the transferee, which right the transferee acquired only in pursuance of the transfer. In the case of a surrender by life tenant in favour of the remainderment, there is no transfer of property from the life tenant and there is merely an effacement or extinguishment of the rights of the life tenant with the result the rights of the remainderment get accelerated. The rights of the remainderment are derived only under the document executed by the full owner and when a surrender deed is executed, the full rights accrue to the remainderment only in pursuance of the title derived under the settlement and the remainderment do not derive any title from or through the life tenant who makes the surrender. In other words, there is merely a self-effacement on the part of the surrenderer, life tenant who goes out of the picture." (emphasis supplied) In this case a person had executed settlement under which his grand children derived the title to the property, and had given a life estate to his daughter. The daughter executed a surrender deed in favour of her children who were the grand-children of the said person. A decree holder against the said daughter for recovery of money had sought to challenge the deed of surrender being not bona fide and being fraudulent. In those circumstances, it was held that the grandsons did not occupy the position of the transferees in the sease that no title was transferred to them under the deed of surrender and what had happened was that there was a civil death so far as the life tenant was concerned and the grandsons became absolute owners of the property and, therefore, there was no transfer within the meaning of section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 15. 15. In Makhan Lal Lahas (supra), the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court while dealing with the question as to whether the surrender of the two-third share by the tenant was a transfer within the meaning of section 4, Partition Act, 1893, which speaks of a share of a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family being transferred to a person who is not a member of such family of such transferee suing for partition, and of a member of the family being a share-holder undertaking to buy the share of such transferee, it was held that: "The word transfer has not been defined in any statute law applicable to this country; it has long been recognised to be a technical term of law by the legislature and by the courts of Justice. As pointed out by Parke B., in Burton v. Reevel when the legislature uses technical language in its statutes, it is supposed to attach to it, its technical meaning unless the contrary manifestly appears;" and further it was held that: "So far as the use of the word transfer in the Partition Act is concerned, the reasonable view to take is that it has been used in the same sense and in the same way as it has been used in the Transfer of Property Act, under which enactment transfer includes sale, mortgage, lease, exchange and gift, so far as vesting of title is concerned." Then referring to section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was clearly ruled that there was no indication in the enactment that such a surrender is a mode of transfer, while holding that:-- "The term surrender as distinguished from transfer is very well known in law; a surrender is a yielding up an estate for life or years to him that hath an immediate estate in reversion or remainder wherein the estate for life or years may merge by mutual agreement; it is the falling of a lesser estate into a greater. In our judgment, it is not possible to hold that surrender by a tenant is transfer as contemplated by section 4, Partition Act; there is no accrual of title so far as the landlord is concerned by an act of surrender on the part of the tenant, surrender having only the effect of merging the lesser estate of the tenant into the greater estate of the landlord." (emphasis supplied) The section 4 of the Petition Act, speaks of transfer of share in a dwelling house of an undivided family to the stranger, and consequential right in favour of the joint family member to acquire the same, and in that context it was held that mere surrender of leasehold interest in a house would not create any title in favour of the stranger in relation to such house and therefore surrender of such interest would not amount to transfer within the meaning of the said term under section 4 of the Partition Act. The Calcutta High Court has not laid down any broad proposition of law on the point of meaning of the expression surrender of leasehold interest or right in an immovable property. 16. It is well-settled principle of law that the dictionary meaning of the words are not always useful to understand the exact meaning of the words used in various statutes and instruments. The Apex Court in (The Commissioner of Gift Tax, Madras v. N.B. Getty Chettiar)9, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2410, had held that: "We have to understand the meaning of those words in the context in which they are used. Words in a section of a statute are not to be interpreted by having those words in one hand and the dictionary in the other. In spelling out the meaning of the words in a section, one must take into consideration the setting in which those terms are used and the purpose that they are intended to serve." 17. Words in a section of a statute are not to be interpreted by having those words in one hand and the dictionary in the other. In spelling out the meaning of the words in a section, one must take into consideration the setting in which those terms are used and the purpose that they are intended to serve." 17. The Apex Court in (Natvarlal Punjabhai another v. Dadubhai Manubhai others)10, reported in A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 61, dealing with the issue relating to the surrender of the widows estate and the life estate held that the widows estate is an interposed limitation or obstruction which prevents or impedes the course of succession in favour of the heirs of her husband and it is open to the widow by a voluntary act of her own to remove this obstruction and efface herself from the husbands estate altogether. If she does that, the consequence is the same as if she died a natural death and the next heirs of her husband then living step in at once under the ordinary law of inheritance. It was further observed that surrender is not really an act of alienation of the widow of her rights in favour of the reversioner. The reversioner does not occupy the position of a grantee or transferee, and does not derive his title from her. He derives his title from the last male holder as his successor-in-law and the rights of succession are opened out by the act of self-effacement on the part of the widow which operates in the same manner as her physical death. A surrender may and in the majority of cases does take the form of transfer, e.g., when the widow conveys the entire estate of her husband, without consideration and not as a mere device to share the estate with the reversioner, in favour of the latter. That it is the self-effacement by the widow that forms the basis of surrender and not the ex facie transfer by which such effacement is brought about. The ruling in this case was given by the Apex Court taking into consideration the true nature of a Hindu widows estate and the right and duties which vest in her under the Hindu Law. The ruling in this case was given by the Apex Court taking into consideration the true nature of a Hindu widows estate and the right and duties which vest in her under the Hindu Law. It was clearly observed that:-- "The Hindu Law certainly does not countenance the idea of a widow alienating her property without any necessity, merely as a mode of enjoyment, as was suggested before us by Mr. Ayyangar. If such a transfer is made by a Hindu widow, it is not correct to say that the transferee acquires necessarily and in law an interest commensurate with the period of the natural life of the widow or at any rate with the period of her widowhood. Such transfer is invalid in Hindu Law, but the widow being the grantor herself, cannot derogate from the grant and the transfer cannot also be impeached so long as a person does not come into existence who can claim a present right to possession of the property." 18. In (Madan Mohan Pathak another v. Union of India others)11, reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 803, the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 had brought about extinguishment or had put an end to the debts from the Life Insurance Corporation to the Class III and Class IV employees. While dealing with the point whether the extinguishment of those debts involve any transfer of ownership of property to the Life Insurance Corporation, rejecting the contention of the learned Attorney General that the extinguishment of debt did not involve the transfer of ownership of debt to the debtor, it was held that :-- "It is not correct to say that there can be no transfer of ownership of a right or interest unless such right or interest continues to have a separate identifiable evidence in the hands of the transferee. It is not difficult to find instances where ownership of a right or interest may be transferred from one person to another by extinguishment. Take for example, a case where the lessor terminates the lease granted by his to the lessee by exercising his right of forfeiture or the lessee surrenders the lease in favour of the lessor. It is not difficult to find instances where ownership of a right or interest may be transferred from one person to another by extinguishment. Take for example, a case where the lessor terminates the lease granted by his to the lessee by exercising his right of forfeiture or the lessee surrenders the lease in favour of the lessor. The lease would in such a case same to an end and the interest of the leasee would be extinguished and correspondingly, the reversion of the lessor would be enlarged into full ownership by the return of the leasehold interest. There would clearly be transfer of the leasehold interest from the lease to the lessor as a result of the determination of the lease and the extinguishment of the interest of the lessee. The same would be the position where a law provides for cancellation of the lease and in such a case, if the lessor is the State or a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, it would amount to compulsory acquisition of the leasehold interest of the lessee within the meaning of Clause (2-A) of Article 31." (emphasis supplied) It was further observed thus : "Where by reason of extinguishment of a right or interest of a person, detriment is suffered by him, and a corresponding benefit accrues to the State, there would be transfer of ownership of such right or interest to the State. The question would always be; who is the beneficiary of the extinguishment of the right or interest effectuated by the law? If it is the State, then there would be transfer of ownership of the right or interest to the State, because what the owner of the right or interest would have lost by reason of the extinguishment would be the benefit accrued to the State." (emphasis supplied) 19. Every word or expression whether it is in a statute or in an instrument, including an order or undertaking, is ordinarily to be understood in its natural, ordinary or popular and grammatical meaning unless such a connotation leads to absurdity or the context or the object of the statute or instrument, and for that purpose even an order or an undertaking, suggest a different meaning. The grammatical meaning is always to be preferred unless the circumstances with reference to which they are used show that they are used in special sense different from the ordinary grammatical meaning. It is well said that "in construing a statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and not the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical or the ordinary sense of the word may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency; but no further." The words used in the order and the undertaking like the transfer and/or disposed of are therefore to be understood in the context in which they are used in the order and the undertaking in question. 20. The section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that the transfer of property means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, to himself and one or more other living persons; and to transfer property is to perform such act. The section 6 thereof provides that the property of any kind may be transferred, except as otherwise provided in the said Act or by any other law for the time being in force, and further enumerates the instances which cannot be said to be a transfer. The section 7 provides that every person competent to contract and entitled to transferable property, or authorised to dispose of transferable property not his own, is competent to transfer such property either wholly or in part, and either absolutely or conditionally, in the circumstances, to the extent and in the manner, allowed and prescribed by any law for the time being in force. The section 8 further provides that unless a different intention is expressed on necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Such incidents include, when the property is land, the easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the earth. Such incidents include, when the property is land, the easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the earth. The section 9 provides a transfer of property may be made without writing in every case in which a writing is not expressly required by law. 21. Considering the law laid down by the Apex Court and the provisions of law contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it is apparent that consequent to surrender of the leasehold right by the lessee it would result in extinguishment of those rights in the lessee and consequently accrual of the benefit in favour of the lessor/owner in as much as that the restrictions suffered by the owner and the obligations of the landlord would cease to exist consequent to the extinguishment of the leasehold right in favour of the lessee. The decision in Mst. Samrathi Devis case was relating to the matter wherein a person had already disowned the property and therefore could not have conveyed or transferred any right in such disowned property. The Palaniverus case was on the point of effect of surrender by a life-tenant in favour of remainderment in as much as that there was merely effacement or extinguishment of his right. The Makhan Lal Singhs case was on the scope of the term "transfer" found in section 4 of the Partition Act and did not lay down any law on the point of meaning of the word "transfer" in general as such in each and every case. The decision in Natvarlal Punjabhais (supra) was in relation to surrender of a widows right in the deceased-husbands estate. It is also to be borne in mind, that the word transfer is not restricted to the transfer of ownership rights. It would include transfer of all types of rights and interest in a property. Such interest would include leasehold interest also. In this regard most important decision is in the matter of Madan Mohan Pathaks case (supra). Therein it has been clearly ruled by the Apex Court that on termination of the leasehold rights of the lessee in whatever form, including surrender of lease by the lessee, there is an end to the interest of the lessee in the property and correspondingly reversion of unencumbered full ownership to the owner/lessor as a consequence of such surrender of the leasehold interest. Being so, when a lessee surrenders the leasehold interest either voluntarily or involuntarily, either on account of statutory obligation or on account of the acts committed by the lessee giving rise for cause of action to the lessor to evict the lessee, the end result of every such surrender would be extinguishment of the leasehold rights of the lessee in the premises and consequently accrual of benefit of unencumbered and full ownership of the premises to the owner. Certainly to that extent there is a transfer of interest and therefore it cannot be said that surrender of leasehold interest does not amount to transfer of right or interest in the premises. 22. It is to the common knowledge that the expression "third party" would mean a person who is not a party to a contract or to an understanding arrived at between the parties arrayed in a case before the Court. Being so, in a dispute, any settlement is arrived at between the parties to the suit, who happen to be the person unconnected to the premises and the lessee of the premises, but without joinder of the lessor or the landlord to such proceedings, in such a situation the lessor or the landlord would always be a third party to such suit or settlement arrived at. The expression "third party" is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as the one not a party to an agreement or a transaction but who may have right therein. 23. Reverting to the facts of the case, admittedly, the respondents surrendered the leasehold interest in favour of the deceased respondent No. 5. Admittedly, the respondent No. 5 was not a party to the proceedings when the said order was passed or the undertaking was given. Being so, she was not a party to the proceedings wherein the said order and the undertaking was given and hence the surrender of leasehold interest in favour of the respondent No. 5 was a transfer in violation of the said order and the undertaking. At the same time, the respondent No. 5 was not a party to the proceedings before this Court wherein the said order was passed and the undertaking was given, and therefore, the surrender of such leasehold rights in favour of the respondent No. 5 would also amount to disposal of the leasehold right of the respondent Nos. At the same time, the respondent No. 5 was not a party to the proceedings before this Court wherein the said order was passed and the undertaking was given, and therefore, the surrender of such leasehold rights in favour of the respondent No. 5 would also amount to disposal of the leasehold right of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 in favour of the respondent No. 5 and that would also be in violation of the order and the undertaking. 24. It is well-settled that it is not mere violation of the order of the undertaking that would warrant punishment under the Contempt of Court Act. Such a violation of an order or breach of an undertaking has to be deliberate and wilful and the conduct should be contumacious. In the case in hand, the respondents have come forward with a categorical statement that after obtaining advise from their Advocate they surrendered the leasehold interest as it would not amount to violation of the said order or the undertaking and that they had surrendered the same not to any stranger but to the owner of the premises consequent to initiation of the eviction proceedings under the statutory provisions applicable to the parties. Undoubtedly, before surrendering such interest it would have been appropriate for the respondent to approach this Court to relieve them from the said undertaking as far as the respondent No. 5 is concerned for the purpose of surrender of the leasehold interest in her favour. However, mere failure in that regard would not lead to the conclusion that the respondents lacked the bona fide or that it disclosed any contumacious conduct on the part of the said respondents. Considering the defence taken in the matter and their bona fide belief in the advise given to them, reveals that they did not lack the bona fide in surrendering the leasehold interest in favour of the respondent No. 5. This is not to say that the lawyers are entitled to give any advise contrary to the provisions of law or the judicial pronouncements by the Court or that on such advise a party can evade the proceedings or the punishment under the Contempt of Court Act. It will, however, depend on the facts of each case. It will, however, depend on the facts of each case. It will, however, depend on the facts of each case. It will, however, depend on the facts of each case. In the case in hand, there is a solemn assertion by the respondents that they had acted on the advise given to them by their Advocate. There is no effort on the part of the petitioner to accuse the Advocate of the respondents having given the advise carelessly and/or that the advocate lacked the bona fide in giving the said advise. Besides, undoubtedly the decision of the Madras High Court in Kanagasebhai Pathars case was to the effect that surrender of possession would not amount to transfer of property within the meaning of Rule 95 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, considering the same, it appears that the said advise was given by the Advocate and therefore and it could not be said that it was given carelessly or the Advocate lacked bona fide in that regard. 25. Undoubtedly, the Apex Court in Delhi Development Authoritys (supra) case had held that the contemner should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits of his contempt. However, the respondent No. 5 had obtained the possession of the premises in the course of exercise of her lawful rights assured to her under the statutory provisions governing the lessor-lessee relationship. It is undisputed fact that the respondent No. 5 had filed eviction proceedings against the respondent No. 1 and in the course of the said proceedings the leased premises were surrendered to the respondent No. 5. In other words, the respondent No. 5 has obtained the possession of the premises in due process of law. Admittedly, the respondent No. 5 was not a party to the suit wherein the order was passed and the undertaking was given. There was no order specifically restraining the respondent No. 5 from seeking eviction of the respondent No. 1 from the suit premises. The fact that the premises were leased premises was known to the parties to the suit. Admittedly, the respondent No. 5 was not a party to the suit wherein the order was passed and the undertaking was given. There was no order specifically restraining the respondent No. 5 from seeking eviction of the respondent No. 1 from the suit premises. The fact that the premises were leased premises was known to the parties to the suit. In the back ground of these facts, merely because the possession of the suit premises was obtained by the respondent No. 5, inspite of the said order of the undertaking by the respondent No. 1, it would not lead to the conclusion that there has been wilful violation by the respondent No. 5 of the said order of the undertaking by the respondent No. 1 or that she can be even termed as contemner in the matter. The decision of the Apex Court relates to the contemner and not to a person who cannot be termed as the contemner. Viewed from this angle, the respondent No. 5 cannot be ordered to deliver the possession of the premises back to the respondent No. 1. In any case, question of issuing such direction to the respondent No. 5 at this stage does not arise as she has already expired. 26. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the law on the point, discussed above, since the surrender of the possession of the premises to the lessor/respondent No. 5 by the respondent No. 1 and others cannot be said to be in wilful violation of the order of the Court or deliberate breach of the undertaking by them and the said respondents having acted pursuant to the advise given by their Advocate and the said advise cannot be said to have been given carelessly or that the Advocate lacked bona fide in giving the said advise, there is no case for holding the respondents guilty of contempt of Court. Hence the proceedings against the respondents are liable to be dismissed while discharging the notice issued to them. 27. In the result, the application fails; the notice issued against the respondents stand discharged and the proceedings stand disposed of with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----