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2004 DIGILAW 32 (JHR)

KARNAL RANJIT KUMAR SINHA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND

2004-01-07

TAPEN SEN

body2004
Judgment : TAPEN SEN, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the parties. ( 2 ) THE petitioners, in the instant case, are the matrimonial relatives of (lie opposite party No. 2 who was married to the petitioner No. 1. It appears that on account of matrimonial discord, a complaint case under Section 498a of the Indian Penal Code was set in motion by the opposite party No. 2 wife. The facts which have been narrated in the instant case may not be relevant in view of the fact that a joint application for divorce by mutual consent was later on filed on 28-8-2002 being Title (Matrimonial) No. 88 of 2002 before the learned District Judge, bokaro and after hearing the parties, the marriage was dissolved by the judgment and decree dated 2-12-2002 decreeing the suit and dissolving the marriage. ( 3 ) MR. Sumir Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 2 supports the contention of the petitioner and also states that the marriage has finally been dissolved and his client i. e. the opposite party No. 2 is no longer interested in pursuing the complaint lodged under Section 498a of the Indian Penal Code. ( 4 ) IT appears that being aggrieved by the order taking cognizance on 24-8-2002 under Section 498a of the Indian Penal code-, the petitioners had come up earlier before this Court vide Cr. M. P. No. 1064 of 2002 and by order dated 26-2-2003, one of us, after having considered the statements of the opposit party No. 2 through her laywer, who had appeared after notice, directed the sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro -to pass an appropriate order on the petition that she had filed under Section 257 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") in which she had requested the withdrawal of the complaint. That order dated 26-2-2003 passed in Cr. M. P. No. 1064 of 2002 is on record as annexure 2. That order dated 26-2-2003 passed in Cr. M. P. No. 1064 of 2002 is on record as annexure 2. ( 5 ) IT appears that pursuant to the aforementioned order passed by this Court, the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, bokaro took up the matter in relation to the application under Section 257 of the Code but by reason of the impugned order dated 28-3-2003, the said learned Sub-Divisional judicial Magistrate proceeded to hold that the application filed under Section 257 (1) of the Code was not applicable, inasmuch as, according to him, the same could not only be made applicable in summons cases and not in relation to warrant cases. ( 6 ) THIS Court does not appreciate the stand of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate because the reasoning given by him appears to be not only in conflict with the earlier order of this Court dated 26-2-2003 but also against the spirit of trying to sort out matrimonial discords. Let it be recorded that while passing the earlier order, one of us had clearly directed the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate to pass an appropriate order on the petition filed by opposite party No. 2 under Section 257 of the code. If that application was not maintainable, the Honble Single Judge would have said so and would not have directed the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate to do the needful as indicated in the aforementioned order because that order was passed on the statement of opposite party no. 2 that on account of the divorce having been granted, she was no longer interested in pursuing the complaint. ( 7 ) APART from the aforesaid facts, it would be relevant and worthwhile to refer to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of india in the case of B. S. Joshi v. State of haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 . In that case, the subject matter involved was also a criminal prosecution under Sections 498a, 323 arid 406 of the Indian Penal Code and the dispute was also between a husband and a wife. At paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment, the Honble Supreme Court stated as follows :"11. In that case, the subject matter involved was also a criminal prosecution under Sections 498a, 323 arid 406 of the Indian Penal Code and the dispute was also between a husband and a wife. At paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment, the Honble Supreme Court stated as follows :"11. In Madhavrao Jlwajlrao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 scc 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234, it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. ""12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. " ( 8 ) IN the backdrop of the aforementioned proposition in relation to matrimonial disputes, the Honble Supreme Court of India at paragraphs 8 and 13 to 15 of the said judgment also held that :"8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case ( (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested In Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. ""13. The observations made by this court, though in a slightly different context, in G. V. Rao v. L. H. V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733) are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the Courts. ""13. The observations made by this court, though in a slightly different context, in G. V. Rao v. L. H. V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733) are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the Courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes In which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about repprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different Courts". "14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical view would be counterproductive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX- a of the Indian Penal Code". "15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code". That is not the object of Chapter XX- a of the Indian Penal Code". "15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code". ( 9 ) IN the instant case, although it is unfortunate that the marriage had to be dissolved by a decree of mutual divorce and although it is equally unfortunate that the parties went into criminal litigation, this court taking into consideration the fact that both the husband and wife are young in age should not be compelled to go on fighting battle after battle within the peripheries of court-rooms and should be left free to choose their own life partners as soon as possible and settle down to a peaceful and harmonious life. That is the least that a Court of equity should be concerned with and technicalities should not be allowed to come in their way. Following therefore, the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India, this court is of the opinion that the impugned order dated 28-3-2003 is inequitable and runs counter to the concept which is being followed by Courts all over the world to bring about amicable settlements to marital discords. ( 10 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the impugned order is set aside and quashed. The matter stands remitted to the same Court i. e. Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law in connection with C. P. Case No. 79 of 2002 (T. R. No. 915 of 2003) after taking into consideration the observations made hereinabove. The application stands disposed off. No order as to costs. Order accordingly. --- *** --- .