These two appeals under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act are directed against the judgement and decree of the learned. IIIrd Addl. District Judge Srinagar dated 1.1.2000 whereby he has refused to set aside the award passed by Shri H.S.Oberoi, Advocate dated 30.7.1991 in a case titled Arbitration Application No.60/Numbri. 2. Kashmiri Lal Kapoor, (Appellant) and Kailash Chander Kapoor, C.B.Sethi, and Satish Chander Kapoor (Respondents) were carrying on business as commission agents and also as sole commission agents of Raymond Bombay in J & K under the name and style of M/S Kashmir House at Amirakadal, Srinagar. The business also included purchase and sale of cloth and yarn. Their business in fact started in the year 1968 when they entered into partnership with one Harbans Lal Anand who later on expired on 29.9.1976 due to which these partners entered into a fresh partnership and executed a new partnership deed on 29.1.1977. As per the new deed the partnership was deemed to have commenced from 30.9.1976. The shares of the parties in the profit and loss of the partnership business, as per the new partnership deed dated 29-1-1977 were as under: - "Shri Kashmiri Lal Kapoor, party of the Ist Part: 28% Shri Kailash Chander Kapoor, party of 2nd Part: 19% Shri Satish Chander Kapoor, party of the 3rd part: 19% Shri C.B.Sethi, party of the 4th part: 34% 3. It was further provided in the partnership deed that the good will of partnership business shall belong to S/Shri Kashmiri Lal Kapoor, Kailash Chander Kapoor, and Satish Chander Kapoor only and that other parties to the deed shall have no claim or interest whatsoever therein. It was also provided that the business of the partnership shall continue to be of commission agents, purchase and sale of cloth or yarn business or of any other nature which the parties shall decide to do from time to time. The partnership was made as partnership at will and it was provided that all disputes, differences and questions whatsoever regarding the partnership business shall be decided by reference to the Arbitration. 4. It appears that the business went smoothly for some time when in the year 1981 difference emerged between the partners and they fell apart. The partnership was made as partnership at will and it was provided that all disputes, differences and questions whatsoever regarding the partnership business shall be decided by reference to the Arbitration. 4. It appears that the business went smoothly for some time when in the year 1981 difference emerged between the partners and they fell apart. Satish Chander Kapoor sent a notice on 3.7.1981 to other partners of the firm expressing his intention to determine the partnership and asked them to settle the accounts with him failing which he shall be forced to approach the appropriate forum including the Court. The notice was sent through Mr. B.A.Bashir, counsel for Satish Chander Kapoor. The relevant part of the notice reads as under: "My client, Shri Satish Chander Kapoor S/o Shri Gobind Ram Kapoor one amongst the four (4) partners of the Firm "M/S Kashmir House", elects to determine the partnership, entered into on 29th day of January, 1977 with you and other partners, and in stipulation of the said partnership viz clause 10th of the terms and conditions, please take notice of the determination of aforesaid partnership. You please treat the limitation running from the day of issue of this notice and the partnership shall stand determined in any event, on the expiry of the limitation set in the partnership deed. Meanwhile, the accounts should get settled with my client. In the event of shirking from settlement of accounts or in any way mutilating the accounts to the determent of my client, please take further notice that the cost incurred on bringing you to an settlement which may include approaching any forum including Courts, shall be borne by you and the damages incurred in such a process shall be an additional burden to be shared exclusively by you." 5. The partners did not respond to the notice consequently Satish Chander Kapoor filed a suit for rendition of accounts before the Court of District Judge Srinagar on 8.5.1982. The suit was assigned to the Addl. District Judge Srinagar. The defendants in the said suit namely C.B.Sethi and Kashmiri Lal Kapoor appeared before the Court and invoked Arbitration clause in the matter stating that they were willing and ready for the settlement of dispute through Arbitration. Since there was an arbitration clause in the partnership deed, Ld. AddI. The suit was assigned to the Addl. District Judge Srinagar. The defendants in the said suit namely C.B.Sethi and Kashmiri Lal Kapoor appeared before the Court and invoked Arbitration clause in the matter stating that they were willing and ready for the settlement of dispute through Arbitration. Since there was an arbitration clause in the partnership deed, Ld. AddI. District Judge Srinagar stayed the suit of the plaintiff under section 34 of the Arbitration Act and vide his order dated 8.12.1982 asked the parties to give the names of two Arbitrators each. The defendants however raised an objection that the court had no jurisdiction to ask for the names of the Arbitrators as it was for the parties to the suit to move under Arbitration Act for the appointment of Arbitrator in the case. The objection raised by the said defendants prompted Satish Chander Kapoor to file a petition under section 20 of the J & K Arbitration Act before this court on 25.7.1986. This court however, transferred the said petition for its disposal in accordance with law to Ist. Addl. District Judge, Srinagar. 6. Contesting defendants 1 and 2 namely C.B.Sethi and Kashmiri Lal Kapoor filed objections to the application resisting it on several grounds. It was pleaded that the partnership stands already dissolved and that the accounts have already been settled. 7. Plaintiff Satish Chander Kapoor filed replica to the objections in which he averred that the said defendants had made a wrong mention of fact of settlement of dispute. He also denied that the accounts had been settled as claimed by the said defendants. 8. Meanwhile the High Court (on Administrative side), vide order No.1076 dated 20.2.1987, withdrew the case alongwith all civil matters from the court of Ist. Addl. District Judge and transferred the same to the Court of AddI. District Judge (Special Judge J&K) Srinagar. 9. The matter was considered by the transferee court and by means of its order dated 29.07.1987 it found that a dispute exists between the parties and that the ingredients of Section 20 of Arbitration Act are fulfilled. The Court therefore allowed the application and ordered that the matter be referred to the Arbitrator for Arbitration. The parties were directed to furnish names of two Arbitrators so that further proceedings are taken in the matter. The Court therefore allowed the application and ordered that the matter be referred to the Arbitrator for Arbitration. The parties were directed to furnish names of two Arbitrators so that further proceedings are taken in the matter. The plaintiff submitted the names of two Arbitrators but the defendants failed to furnish any name, so the Court itself nominated Shri H.S.Oberoi, Advocate and appointed him as Arbitrator in the case. 10. The Arbitrator conducted proceedings in the case and ultimately submitted his Award on 30.7.1991. By the time the Arbitrator completed the proceedings, the file had been transferred to a newly created Court of 3rd AddI. District Judge Srinagar. So the Award was submitted by the Arbitrator to that Court. Before the said Court the defendants 1 and 2 filed an application on 30.7.1998 praying for setting aside the award on various grounds mentioned in the application. The Court framed as many as eight issues in the case; which were as under: -- "1. Whether award, as suffering from serious errors apparent on the fact of record, is liable to be set aside. (OPD 1 and 2) 2. Whether Arbitrator has mis-conducted himself by acting against the principles of natural justice and the committing neglect of duty. If sol whether award has to be set aside on this count. (OPD 1 and 2). 3. Whether Arbitrator has mis-conducted the proceedings and the award being had as such has to be set aside. (O.P.D 1 and 2). 4. Whether without serving any notice, defendants were set exparte and proceedings initiated and conducted in their absence. If so, whether award as such is liable to be set aside. (O.P.D 1 and 2). 5. Whether Arbitrator by allowing time barred claim, misconducted the proceedings. (O.P.D 1 and 2) 6. Whether award has been made on the basis of extraneous material and is as such liable to be set aside. (O.P.D 1 and 2) 7. Whether arbitrator has not taken into consideration loss suffered by the partnership firm, while supplying material. If so, what is its effect on the award. (O.P.D 1 and 2). 8. Relief." 12. Latter application was moved by the non-applicant No.1 (appellant herein) praying for framing of two additional issues namely 9 and 10. "9. Whether the application of the petitioner is time barred and therefore order of reference is invalid. If so what is its effect on the award. (O.P.D 1 and 2). 8. Relief." 12. Latter application was moved by the non-applicant No.1 (appellant herein) praying for framing of two additional issues namely 9 and 10. "9. Whether the application of the petitioner is time barred and therefore order of reference is invalid. If so what is its effect on the award. (OPD 1 and 2) 10. Whether the award is vague, if so what is the effect. (OPD 1 and 2). 13. The Court by means of the impugned order incorporated these two issues also for the just decision of the case. During the proceedings, Satish Chander Kapoor expired and his legal heirs who are respondents 3 to 5 in the present appeal were brought on record. 14. The parties did not adduce any evidence on the issues so the court heard the arguments and decided the issues and disposal of the application by means of the impugned judgement. The court decided all the issues against defendants 1 and 2 and dismissed the application filed by defendant No.1 (present appellant). Award excepting to the extent of granting the interest by the Arbitrator was made rule of the Court and judgement in terms of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act was pronounced. The Court observed as under: -- " .The result is that the finding on all the issues is recorded against the non applicants 1 and 2. Applications filed by these non-applicants under section 30 and section 33 of the Act are dismissed. Award, excepting to the extent of granting the interest by the Arbitrator, is made rule of the; court and judgement in terms of Section 17 of the Act is pronounced, accordingly decree in the amount of Rs.1,24,134.00 by way of claim No.1 Rs.1,00,000 by way of claim No.2 Rs.1,50,000 by way of claim No., 5, Rs.2000 by way of claim No.6 total Rs.3,76,134.00 with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of decree; till the payment is made, is passed in favour of the applicants and against the non-applicants 1 and 2. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly." 15. Accordingly a decree sheet was prepared on the same date. Appeal No. CIMA 15/2000 16. It is this order and the decree prepared by the Learned 3rd AddI. District Judge Srinagar which is under challenge in Appeal No. CIMA 15/2000 titled Kashmiri Lal Kapoor v. Kailash Chander Kapoor & Ors. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly." 15. Accordingly a decree sheet was prepared on the same date. Appeal No. CIMA 15/2000 16. It is this order and the decree prepared by the Learned 3rd AddI. District Judge Srinagar which is under challenge in Appeal No. CIMA 15/2000 titled Kashmiri Lal Kapoor v. Kailash Chander Kapoor & Ors. filed by Kashmiri Lal Kapoor. Various grounds have been taken to assail the judgment and decree under appeal. It is being pleaded that the court of 3rd AddI. District Judge Srinagar had no jurisdiction to hear the matter as the court has assigned the matter to the Ist Additional District Judge Srinagar. It is alleged that the award could not have been made rule of the Court as the reference to arbitration was invalid and that the award suffers from error apparent on the face on record and has been passed in ex-parte. The appellant has further pleaded that the award has been passed in violation and disregard to Section 48 and Section 55 of the Partnership Act. The grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal are thus reiteration of the pleas taken before the trial court which are duly reflected in the issues framed in the case. 17. Heard the learned counsels. Considered. I have gone through the impugned judgment. As said above ten issues have been framed in the case. The learned IIIrd. Addl. District Judge has not given an issue wise finding in the case but has made a general discussion of the case meeting the objections raised by the appellant and has at the conclusion gave its findings on the issues. Once the issues had been framed it was incumbent upon the Court to take up the issues separately, discuss same in light of the rival contentions of the parties and then return a separate finding on each issue. However, since a detailed judgment has been passed, we will take up the issues in seriatim analyzing and appreciating the findings of the trial court on each issue. Issue No. 1: Whether award. as suffering from serious errors apparent on the fact of record, is liable to be set aside.? (O.P.D 1 and 2). 18. However, since a detailed judgment has been passed, we will take up the issues in seriatim analyzing and appreciating the findings of the trial court on each issue. Issue No. 1: Whether award. as suffering from serious errors apparent on the fact of record, is liable to be set aside.? (O.P.D 1 and 2). 18. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the award is suffers from error apparent on the face of record in as much as, the provisions of Section 48 and Section 55 of the Partnership Act, have not been taken into consideration by the Arbitrator. Connected with this issue are issues 3 and 7 which are as under: - Issue No. 3. Whether Arbitrator has mis-conducted the proceedings and the award being had as such has to be set aside. (O.P.D.1 and 2). Issue No. 7. Whether arbitrator has not taken into consideration loss suffered by the partnership firm. while supplying material. If so, what is its effect on the award. (O.P.D.1 and 2)." All the three issues relate to the misconduct of proceedings by the arbitrator. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Section 48 and Section 55 of the partnership Act and submitted that in view of these provisions, the Arbitrator was required to assess the assets of the firm and give due share to each and every partner of the dissolved firm after satisfying liabilities. For that purpose, the Arbitrator was supposed to follow the procedure laid down in Section 48 of the Act. It is only when all the liabilities of the partnership are satisfied, out of partnership assets, the Arbitrator can distribute the residue amongst the partners in the proposition in which they are entitled to share profits. The Arbitrator cannot give the amount only to one partner without setting the share of the other partners. 20. Leaned counsel for the respondents has vehemently repelled this argument on the ground that the Arbitrator has duly given its award and that the appellant has right from the beginning not joined the proceedings but has expressed that he does not want to participate in the same. 21. The ground regarding application of Section 48 of the Partnership Act was raised before the learned trial court also. 21. The ground regarding application of Section 48 of the Partnership Act was raised before the learned trial court also. The trial Court observed that in the present claim, it is no where indicated that partnership firm was in any way in debt with the third person so that the assets of the firm could be made available in liquidating such of the debts in the first instance. It is also observed that there was no claim from any partner regarding satisfaction of debts of 3rd party as such how could the Arbitrator had awarded amount to any partner. The learned trial court has found that according to Section 48 of the Partnership Act, partnership assets have to be made applicable in paying to each partner with double, what is due to him on account of the capital. Capital investment of Rs.1,68,595.07 disclosed in the account books as per the award, has been shrinked by the Arbitrator to the extent of Rs.1,24,134.99 and granted in favour of the applicants. 22. Before going to the provisions of Section 48 and Section 55 of the Partnership Act, it will be beneficial here to reproduce the relevant portion of the award passed by the Arbitrator which is impugned before these proceedings: -- "Claim No. 1 Capital investment as shown in the account books on 1976=Rs.1.68,595.07 (One lac sixty eight thousand five hundred ninety five and paisa seven). This claim No. 1 is only admitted and allowed to the extent of Rs. 1,24,134.99 (One lac twenty four thousand one hundred thirty four and ninety nine paisa,) which claimant is entitled to receive from the respondents. Claim No.2 Claimant claims that as per inventory dated May, 1982 the saleable stocks in the show room of M/S Kashmir House Srinagar were valuing Rs. 15/- Lacs and claimant claims his share of Rs. 3,75 lacs (three lac seventy five thousands). This claim No.2 is only accepted up to Rs.1 lac which claimant is entitled to receive from respondents. Claim No. 3 Claimants claim No.3 is that from the date of dissolution of partnership in the year 1982 the commission earned from M/S Raymond Woolen Mills by M/S Kashmir House comes to Rs. 16/- lacs out of which claimant is entitled to Rs. 4/- lacs as his share. Claim No. 3 Claimants claim No.3 is that from the date of dissolution of partnership in the year 1982 the commission earned from M/S Raymond Woolen Mills by M/S Kashmir House comes to Rs. 16/- lacs out of which claimant is entitled to Rs. 4/- lacs as his share. This claim No.3 of the claimant is not proved and hence he is not entitled to any amount on this count. Claim No. 4 In claim No.4 claimant claims that the commission in terms of goodwill of Raymond Woolen Mill is assessed at Rs. Fifty lacs and share of claimant comes to Rs. 17/- lacs which respondents are bound to pay. Claim No. of claimant is not proved and hence he is not entitled to any among claimed under this item. Claim No. 5 The Claim No.5 of the claimant is that he has assessed the goodwill of the shop situated at Amirakadal in which business of M/S Kashmir House was being conducted and claims his share of goodwill at Rs.3/- Lac (three lacs) on this count. This claim of the claimant is accepted partially and he is held to be entitled to receive Rs. 1.50 lacs ( One lac fifty thousands ) from the respondents. Claim No. 6 In this claim claimant assessed the value of almarahs, telephones and typewriter etc. existing in the shop of M/S Kashmir House at Rs.15000/- and claims his share at Rs. 3000/- (three thousand). This claim of the claimant is accepted to the extent of Rs. 2000/- which he is entitled to receive from respondents. The claimant as per partnership deed is further entitled to the interest at the rate of 6% on his capital amount of Rs.1,24,134.90 (Rupees one lac twenty four thousand one hundred thirty four and paisa ninety nine) from 31.3.1982 till the said amount is paid. (The claim to which he has been held entitled as per claim No.1.) Respondents claim As no reference in respect of assessing claim of any respondent was made to me as such no such claim is determined or decided." 23. Section 48 prescribes the mode of settlement of accounts between the partnership firm when the partnership has been dissolved. The section however states that the mode prescribed therein is subject to the agreement by the parties. In other words the parties may agree that the mode prescribed by the Section need not be followed. Section 48 prescribes the mode of settlement of accounts between the partnership firm when the partnership has been dissolved. The section however states that the mode prescribed therein is subject to the agreement by the parties. In other words the parties may agree that the mode prescribed by the Section need not be followed. 24. It is a settled rule that upto the time of the dissolution of a partnership the partners are regarded as joint owners of the properties. Until an account has been taken, and provision has been made for the discharge of the liabilities, no partner can claim to be entitled to have a definite share in a particular asset. It is here that section 48 of the Partnership comes into play. It provides: -- "48. Mode of settlement of accounts between partners: -- In settling the accounts of a firm after dissolution, the following rules shall, subject to agreement by the partners, be observed: (a) Losses, including deficiencies of capital, shall be paid first out of profits, next out of capital, and lastly, if necessary, by the partners individually in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits. (b) The assets of the firm including any sums, contributed by the partners to make up deficiency of capital, shall be applied in the following manner and order: (i) in paying the debts of the firm to third parties; (ii) in paying to each partner rate-able what is due to him from the firm for advances as distinguished from capital; (iii) in paying to each partner rate- ably what is due to him on account of capital; and (iv) the residue, if any, shall be divided among the partners in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits." 25. While applying the provisions to the business of a particular firm which has been dissolved, the shares of the partners in the profits and losses is to be kept in view. In settling the accounts of such firm therefore the following steps are required to be taken. (a) The assets of the firm are applied first in payment of the debts due from the firm to third parties. In settling the accounts of such firm therefore the following steps are required to be taken. (a) The assets of the firm are applied first in payment of the debts due from the firm to third parties. (b) If, after paying the debts of the firm due to third parties, any surplus is left, or if there are no debts, the assets shall be applied first towards payment of the advances, (as distinguished from Capital) if any, made by the partners to the firm. (c) If, after paying the debts of the firm due to third parties and the advances made by the partners, any surplus is left, or if there are no debts or advances, the assets shall be applied for payment to each partner the amount of capital invested by him. If the assets left are less than the capital invested, the amount is to be reduced rate-ably for payment as per the capital invested. (d) If, after paying the debts of the firm (if any), the advances made by he partners (if any) and the capital invested, any surplus is left out of the assets of the firm, the same is to be given to the partners in the proportion to their share shown in the partnership deed. This exercise can however be dispensed with if there is an agreement for the same between the parties. 26. With regard to settlement of the accounts between the persons there is however no such agreement by the parties in the present case nor has the arbitrator mentioned about the same in his award. It is not in dispute that the award in question is a non speaking award. Though the powers of the court to intervene with a non-speaking award, under the Arbitration Act are very limited, but where there is an express provision of law, the court has to see as to whether the award confirms with such provision. If it is found that the provisions have not been followed in letter and spirit, the award can be said to be non-est as an error in such cases is apparent from the record itself. 27. While going through the award of the Arbitrator, I find that the same is not in conformity with the mode prescribed by Section 48 of the Partnership Act. 27. While going through the award of the Arbitrator, I find that the same is not in conformity with the mode prescribed by Section 48 of the Partnership Act. I find that the award is a cryptic one and has awarded only a particular sum in favour of the respondent while as it has not dealt with all the aspects referred to in Section 48. It does not appear from the award as to whether the Arbitrator has gone through the accounts or has determined any loss incurred. It is also not clear as to whether he has taken the assets of the firm into consideration nor has it made provisions with regard to the payment of debt of the firm to the 3rd party. The arbitrator has also not specified as to whether there was any third party to whom the debts had to be paid nor has it made provisions for other partners of the firm. It has not made the provisions and has not given the manner in which each partner has to be paid from the assets of the firm and that how the division of he assets of the firm are to be effected. 28. Similarly a perusal of the award shows that the provisions of Section 55 of the Partnership Act have not been complied with by the Arbitrator. The Section provides: "In settling accounts of a firm after dissolution, the goodwill shall, subject to contract between the partners, be included in the assets, it may be sold either separately or along with other property of the firm." 29. In dealing with this claim, the Arbitrator has observed that the good will of Raymond Woolen is assessed at Rs. 15 lacs and share of the claimants comes to Rs. 17 lacs which respondents are bound o pay. The Arbitrator has further stated that the claim is not proved and `hence he is not entitled to any amount claimed under this item. 30. The award appears to be a confusing one. The Arbitrator it appears has not taken note of Clause 9 of the partnership agreement which provides as under: -- "That Goodwill of the partnership shall belong to S/Shri Kashmiri Lal Kapoor, Kailash Chander Kapoor and Satish Chander Kapoor only. The other parties to this deed shall have no claim or interest whatsoever therein." 31. The Arbitrator it appears has not taken note of Clause 9 of the partnership agreement which provides as under: -- "That Goodwill of the partnership shall belong to S/Shri Kashmiri Lal Kapoor, Kailash Chander Kapoor and Satish Chander Kapoor only. The other parties to this deed shall have no claim or interest whatsoever therein." 31. While dealing with this claim, the Arbitrator had to take the goodwill of the business styled as M/S Kashmir House into consideration as it was this firm which was under dissolution but the Arbitrator has referred to Raymonds Woolen Mill. It is not clear as to what he means by Raymond Mills. If the Arbitrator meant the very firm which was under dissolution, i.e. M/S Kashmir House then he should have as per the partnership deed given different shares of the partners entitled to the goodwill of the firm. This has not been done as such the award to that extent also is in violation of Section 55 of the Partnership Act. 32. It is now well settled that though an Arbitrator, (under the old Act) is not required to give reasons for his award, unless there is an agreement of the parties to the country, the Arbitrator cannot ignore the law or misapply it. In Associate Engineering Government of A.P.1991 (4) SCC 93, the Apex Court held that the Arbitrators cannot travel beyond the parameters of the contract. In M/s Sudershan Trading Company v. Government of Kerala, 1989 (II) SCC 38, the court observed that: -- "an award may be remitted or set aside on the ground that the Arbitrator in making it, had exceeded his jurisdiction and evidence of matters not appearing on the face of it, will be admitted in order to establish whether the jurisdiction had been exceeded or not, because the nature of the dispute is some thing which has to be determined outside the award, whatever might be said about it in the award or by the Arbitrator". In M/s Sikkim Subha Associates v. State of Sikkim, AIR 2001 SC 2062, the Supreme Court held: "14. It is also, by now, well settled that an arbitrator is not a conciliator and his duty is to decide the disputes submitted to him according to the legal rights of the parties and not according to what he may consider it to be fair and reasonable. It is also, by now, well settled that an arbitrator is not a conciliator and his duty is to decide the disputes submitted to him according to the legal rights of the parties and not according to what he may consider it to be fair and reasonable. Arbitrator was held not entitled to ignore the law or misapply it and cannot also act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract (See 1999(9) SCC 283: (1999 AIR SCW 3644 : AIR 1999 SC 3627) Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises). If there are two equally possible or plausible views or interpretations, it was considered to be legitimate for the arbitrator to accept one or the other of the available interpretations. It would be difficult for the Courts to either exhaustively define the word `misconduct or likewise enumerate the line of cases in which alone interference either could or could not be made. Courts of law have a duty and obligation in order to maintain purity of standards and preserve full faith and credit as well as to inspire confidence in alternate dispute redressal method of arbitration, when on the face of the award it is shown to be based upon a proposition of law which is unsound or findings recorded which are absurd or so unreasonable and irrational that no reasonable or right thinking person or authority could have reasonably come to such a conclusion on the basis of the materials on record or the governing position of law to interfere. So far as the case before us is concerned, the reference to the arbitrator is found to be a general reference to adjudicate upon the disputes relating to the alleged termination of the agreement by the State and not a specific reference of any particular question and consequently if it is shown or substantiated to be erroneous on the face of it, the award must be set aside." 33. In the present case the matter, which had been referred to the Arbitrator, related to the settlement of accounts on the dissolution of he firm. Once the matter went to the Arbitrator, he had to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Partnership Act. The Arbitrator has ignoring the provisions determined the entitlement of only one partner. In the present case the matter, which had been referred to the Arbitrator, related to the settlement of accounts on the dissolution of he firm. Once the matter went to the Arbitrator, he had to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Partnership Act. The Arbitrator has ignoring the provisions determined the entitlement of only one partner. In Chandrabhan v. Birdichand, 1983 Mh.L.J. 1043, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, Bombay High Court held: " Section 48 in substance requires that the partnership assets should in the first instance be made applicable in paying the debts to the firm to third parties, then next in paying rate ably to each partner what is due to him from the firm for advances as distinguished from capital and thirdly in paying to each partner rate ably what is due to him on account of the capital. It is only after all this is done that the residue, if any left, shall be divided among the partners in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits. As observed by the Division Bench in Sherbanubai, what a Court of law cannot do judicially, an arbitrator also cannot do. Needness to say that section 48 is the sheet anchor of the provisions of the Partnership Act, dealing with the winding up of the affairs of firm after its dissolution. No Court can flout the provisions of this section, while disposing of assets of a dissolved partnership. It follows that an arbitrator also cannot make any award, in breach of section 48 of the Partnership Act, unless all parties have consented to any other method of disposal." 34. Under these circumstances, I find that since the Arbitrator has not complied with the provisions of Section 48 and Section 55 of the Partnership Act his Award cannot stand. The finding of the learned 3rd Addl. District Judge on these issues is set aside and the issues are decided against the respondents. Issue Nos 2 and 4: "2. Whether without serving any notice, defendants were set exparte and proceedings initiated and conducted in their absence. If so, whether award as such is liable to be set aside. (O.P.D 1and 2). 4. Whether without serving any notice, defendants were set exparte and proceedings initiated and conducted in their absence. If so, whether award as such is liable to be set aside. If so, whether award as such is liable to be set aside. (O.P.D 1and 2). 4. Whether without serving any notice, defendants were set exparte and proceedings initiated and conducted in their absence. If so, whether award as such is liable to be set aside. (O.P.D 1 and 2)." Both these issues are inter connected, hence are considered together for adjudication. 35. It is alleged by the Appellants that the Arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings as it has passed the Award in exparte without setting the appellant exparte which was contrary to the provisions of law. According to the appellants, the arbitration proceedings had come to a stand still after Nov. 1988 and no steps had been taken for almost three years as the matter was under appeal before this Court and when on 23.4.1991 the Appeal was dismissed, the arbitrator resumed the proceedings and issued notice to the parties to appear before him on 28.5 1991. The said notice was served on C.B. Sethi only and no notice as such was served upon Kashmiri Lal Kapoor who was out of station at that particular time as is evident from the endorsement of the notice. Consequently, on 28.5.1999 none of the objectors appeared. Under these circumstances, according to the Appellant, the Arbitrator was supposed to issue fresh notice to the parties informing them about the next date of hearing and also the venue. Failure to give second notice has, according to the appellant caused great prejudice to him and that the objectors have been wrongly set exparte which has prevented them to project their cases before the Arbitrator. 36. The trial court has considered this argument of the appellant and has written a detailed order on it. According to the learned trial court, K.L. Kapoor was stated to be ill by his son who was approached by the process server. The court has further observed that no body on the date fixed informed the Arbitrator to say so and it only indicated that neither of the two were in any mode to appear before the Arbitrator, therefore, there was no useful purpose to issue a fresh notice to them. According to the trial court, it is to be seen as to whether any prejudice was caused to the non-applicants by the order of the arbitrator setting them exparte. According to the trial court, it is to be seen as to whether any prejudice was caused to the non-applicants by the order of the arbitrator setting them exparte. The trial has after going through various dates observed as under: -- " True, non-applicants being in exparte, they could not address their arguments before the Arbitrator at the final hearing, but no prejudice could be said to have been caused to them, because they could not afford to raise any other argument before the Arbitrator assailing the award on merits, which they did not raise before this court at this stage. The arguments raised before this court, failed on merits and not on any other ground. So clearly the fate of the said arguments if raised before the Arbitrator could not be any different than what it has been here. Resultantly it has to be held that even if Arbitrator had issued another notice to the non-applicants, things would have remained unchanged and no purpose would have been served. Further, no prejudice in fact is shown to have occurred to the non-applicants by setting them exparte. So the argument of the learned counsel though permissible by law is not applicable to the facts of the present case in view of the conduct of his clients, which they displayed right from the inception of the proceedings in the form of civil suit, till the passing of the award." 37. On going through the minutes of the proceedings and also reasons arrived at by the trial court, I do no find any justification in the order of the Arbitrator in proceeding in exparte. The proceedings had virtually come to a halt for about three years as the matter was under appeal and when the matter was revived by the Arbitrator, he rightly issued a notice to the parties to appear before him on 28.5.1991. The notice was served by the Arbitrator on the parties through the Nazir, 3rd Addl. District Judge Srinagar. The process server, however, reported that son of Kashmiri Lal had reported that he was ill and out of station and this fact is depicted in the order of the learned Arbitrator dated 28.5.1991. The Arbitrator did not take any proceedings on that date but adjourned the case for 1.6.1991 and directed that the same will come up for proceedings at 4.30 PM in his office chamber at Shivpora. The Arbitrator did not take any proceedings on that date but adjourned the case for 1.6.1991 and directed that the same will come up for proceedings at 4.30 PM in his office chamber at Shivpora. There is no record on file to show that second notice had gone to the parties informing them about the change in date and venue. Since it is not on record that any notice has been duly served on the parties, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant gets support and I find substance in the same. The Arbitrator should not have, in such an important issue where the rights of eh parties were to be determined and their respective shares were to be set out, proceeded exparte without due notice and heard the matter in exparte. Calcutta High Court in Juggilal v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd., AIR 1955 Cal. 354 dealt with the question as to the right of an arbitrator to proceed exparte. The Court laid down the broad principles which govern the issue. The Court observed: "(14)..If a party to an Arbitration agreement fails to appear at one of the sittings, the arbitrator cannot or, at least, ought not to, proceed exparte against him at that sitting. Where in such a case it does not appear that the non-appearance was anything but accidental or casual, the arbitrator ought ordinarily to proceed in the ordinary way, fixing another date of hearing and awaiting the future behaviour of the defaulting party. If, on the other hand, it appears that the defaulting party had absented himself with a view to preventing justice or defeating the object of the reference, the arbitrator should issue a notice that he intends at a specified time and place to proceed with the reference and that if the party concerned does not attend, he will proceed in his absence. But if after making such a peremptory appointment and issuing such a notice, the arbitrator does not in fact proceed exparte on the day fixed, but fixes another subsequent date, he cannot proceed exparte on such subsequent date unless he issues a similar notice in respect of that date as well. If he issues a similar notice and the party concerned does not appear, and award made exparte, will be in order. If he issues a similar notice and the party concerned does not appear, and award made exparte, will be in order. But if he does not issue such a notice on the second occasion, but nevertheless proceeds exparte, the award will be liable to be set aside in spite of a notice of a peremptory hearing having been given in respect of the earlier date, subject, however, to the condition that prejudice was caused to the party against whom the exparte order was made. But this duty to give notice of an intention to proceed exparte is not absolute duty. If it appears from the circumstances of the case that a particular party is determined not to appear before the arbitrators in any event, as when he has openly repudiated either the reference itself or the particular arbitrators and has shown no desire to recant, the arbitrators are not required to issue a notice of an intention to proceed ex-parte against such a recusant person and may proceed ex-parte and make a valid award without issuing a notice. The better course, however, even in such a case is to issue a notice and give the party concerned a chance to change his mind." 38. Applying these principles to the present case, we find that the Arbitrator has failed to observe these requirements. The Court below too has failed to appreciate these facts. The finding of the trial court on these issues cannot stand and is set aside. Both the issues are therefore decided in favour of the appellant. ISSUE No.5 and 9. 5. Whether Arbitrator by allowing time barred claim, misconducted the proceedings. (O.P.D 1and 2) 9. Whether the application of the petitioner is time barred and therefore order of reference is invalid. If so what is its effect on the award. (OPD 1 and 2) Both these issues relate to the limitation in filing the claim. It is alleged by the appellant that more than 3 years after date of dissolution of partnership, the partner filed the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act on 29.5.1986 seeking appointment of an arbitrator and that the Arbitrator has acted against the statue and misconducted himself by allowing a claim, which ex facie was barred by Limitation Act. 39. This plea cannot be accepted on the ground that this Court has in Jammu Forest Co. 39. This plea cannot be accepted on the ground that this Court has in Jammu Forest Co. v. State, AIR 1968 J & K 86 held that there is no provision in the Arbitration Act, which lays down within which time an application for arbitration should be made and that the application for arbitration can be made only when a dispute arises between the parties to the arbitration agreement. The Court went to the extent of saying that even a time barred claim can be referred to arbitration. The issues are therefore decided against the appellants. Issue No. 6 Whether award has been made on the basis of extraneous material and is as such liable to be set aside. (O.P.D 1 and 2). There is nothing on record to show that the award has been based on extraneous material as such this issue is decided against the appellants. Issue No. 10 Whether the award is vague, if so what is the effect. (OPD 1 and 2) 40. I have reproduced the relevant portion of the award above. The Arbitrator has fixed certain amount under various heads and observed that the claimant is entitled to receive from the respondents. On the face of it, the award is vague and not specific. Claimant before the Arbitrator was Satish Chander Kapoor and respondents namely Kashmiri Lal Kapoor (appellant) and Kailash Chander Kapoor and C.B.Sethi were other partners of the firm. From the award it is not clear as to how much amount was to be paid by the appellant namely Kashmiri Lal Kapoor and how much by other two partners. 41. There can be no doubt on the principle that an award by an Arbitrator must be a complete decision and must be certain. If it is not a complete decision which is unexecutable or is vague, it is no award in the eye of law. Russell on Arbitration says: (at page 280 (1997. Ed.) " An award must be final in the sense that, in relation to the issues or claims with which it deals, it is a complete decision on the matters requiring determination. A tribunal cannot reserve to itself, or delegate to another, the power of performing in future any act of a judicial nature in relation to matters dealt with in the award. A tribunal cannot reserve to itself, or delegate to another, the power of performing in future any act of a judicial nature in relation to matters dealt with in the award. The tribunals duty is to make a complete and final decision by its award, and it is a breach of that duty to leave any part of the decision to be determined subsequently or by another. The tribunal may however reserve to itself or delegate to another purely ministerial acts, even after the time limited for making the award has expired, though care should be taken to ensure that the act is not in fact the collation of further evidence." Similarly it is mentioned (at page 284) "An award must be certain in the sense that the tribunals decision on them matters dealt with must be clear from its face, as must the nature and extent of the duties it imposes on the parties. If the effect of the award is uncertain or ambiguous, it will be susceptible to challenge." The award being uncertain and vague cannot be acted upon. This issue is decided in favour of the appellant. 42. In view of the above discussions and the findings on the issue, I find that the judgment and decree under challenge cannot stand. The award has been passed by the Arbitrator in contravention of the provisions of law indicated above. It is therefore, set aside. APPEAL No: 37/2002: Cross Appeal has also been filed by the contesting respondents, but in view of the fact that the award is set aside, the same does not need consideration. Disposed of accordingly. 43. The matter is remanded and withdrawn from the Court of IIIrd Additional District Judge Srinagar and sent to the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge Srinagar, who shall hear it now and initiate Arbitrator proceedings afresh and appoint a new Arbitrator under law. Parties shall appear before the said Court on 15.12.2002.