J. N. PATEL, J. ( 1 ) ALL these petitions, except Special Civil application Nos. 2786 of 2004 to 2789 of 2004, are yet not admitted and, therefore, Rule. Mr. M. D. Pandya, learned Counsel, waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent. In all other matters, Rule has been served and mr. M. D. Pandya, learned Counsel appears on behalf of the gujarat Electricity Board, and with the consent of the parties, whole this group is decided with the other matters, which are being considered today for final hearing. ( 2 ) IN all these petitions, the facts are common and common questions are involved and, therefore, they are being dealt with by this common order. ( 3 ) THE short facts appears to be that the petitioners are the employees, who have retired from 1st april, 1995 to 23rd September, 1997. There is no dispute on the point that a settlement was entered into between the respondent, Gujarat Electricity Board ("the Board" for short), and its union on 24th July, 1988 and the said settlement, inter alia, provided for Condition No. 24. 0 for gratuity, which reads as under: "the maximum financial ceiling on the amount of gratuity payable will be revised on State Govt. lines, which is at present Rs. 1 lakh. This will have effect from 1-10-1987. " there is also no dispute on the point that after the settlement, General Standing Order ("the G. S. O. " for short) came to be issued by the Board on 24th August, 1988 and Condition No. 29 of the G. S. O. reads as under: "29. Gratuity: The maximum financial ceiling on the amount of gratuity payable will be revised on State Government lines, which is at present Rs. one lakh. " as per the petitioners, right to receive the gratuity had accrued on the basis of the settlement and the G. S. O. may not be of much relevance. It is the further case of the petitioners that the State government, thereafter, has revised the ceiling limit of the gratuity from time to time i. e. from Rs. 1 lakh to rs. 2. 50 lakhs and thereafter, it is further revised to rs. 3. 50 lakhs. It is the further case of the petitioners that the State government, thereafter, has revised the ceiling limit of the gratuity from time to time i. e. from Rs. 1 lakh to rs. 2. 50 lakhs and thereafter, it is further revised to rs. 3. 50 lakhs. It is also the case of the petitioners that at the time when the matter was considered by the honourable Finance Minister of the State Government on 6th March, 1993, it was represented on behalf of the board to the State Government that the gratuity is being paid on the same scale as that of the Central Government. The petitioners concerned have retired from service. It is an admitted position that they have been paid the amount of gratuity by the Board taking as the basis being the ceiling limit of Rs. 1 lakh. 3. 1 all the petitioners approached the Controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for short) and the basis of the application was that as per the settlement, the ceiling limit stands revised as being revised by the state Government from time to time and when they retired from service, the ceiling limit prevailing was Rs. 3. 50 lakhs and the amount of gratuity is not accordingly paid and, therefore, the application is made to direct the respondent-Board to make the payment accordingly. It appears that the Controlling Authority considered respective applications made by the employee concerned and found that the revision in the ceiling limit, as decided by the State Government from time to time, would not automatically apply and when the employee concerned retired from service, the ceiling limit prevailing of the gratuity was Rs. 1 lakh and as the payment is already made, the concerned petitioner employee would not be entitled for the additional amount of gratuity and, therefore, all the applications came to be dismissed by the Controlling Authority. 3. 2 all the concerned petitioners have carried the matter in appeal before the Appellate Authority and the appellate Authority has also ultimately concurred with the reasoning given by the Controlling Authority and has confirmed the order passed by the Controlling Authority by dismissing the appeal. It is under these circumstances that all the concerned petitioners have approached this Court by respective petitions. ( 4 ) MR. It is under these circumstances that all the concerned petitioners have approached this Court by respective petitions. ( 4 ) MR. PANKAJ R. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, at the outset, submitted that the present petitions are also under Article 226 of the constitution of India and, therefore, he submitted that the petitions may not be treated as the petition under article-227 of the Constitution of India. ( 5 ) AS such, if the prayers made in the petitions are considered, they are essentially for quashing of the order passed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the controlling Authority and for consequential prayer for payment of the amount of gratuity, as prayed before the controlling Authority, has been made and, therefore, the petitions can be said as essentially under Article-227 of the Constitution of India. However, Mr. Desai for the petitioners made an attempt to submit that since the writ of certiorari has been prayed, the petitions can be said as the petitions under Article-226 of the Constitution of India. Iam afraid such a contention can be accepted because the petitions are essentially for quashing of the orders passed by both the lower quasi judicial authorities under the Act and as such, there is no ground invoking violation of any fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) LEAVING aside the aforesaid, even if the matter is concerned for examining the legality and validity of the impugned orders passed by both the authorities, for the reasons recorded hereinafter, it cannot be said that both the authorities have committed any jurisdictional error or have exercised the discretion so perversely which would attract the power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Apart from the above, even if the action of the Board of making the payment of the gratuity is examined, for the reasons as stated hereinafter, it cannot be said that the action for not paying the amount of gratuity on the basis that the maximum ceiling limit is Rs. 3. Apart from the above, even if the action of the Board of making the payment of the gratuity is examined, for the reasons as stated hereinafter, it cannot be said that the action for not paying the amount of gratuity on the basis that the maximum ceiling limit is Rs. 3. 50 lakhs is arbitrary or unreasonable and, therefore, I find that it may not be necessary for this Court to finally conclude on the point as to whether the petitions would be falling under the jurisdiction of Article 226 or 227 as the said aspect would be of no relevance because even if the matters are considered under Article-226 of the Constitution of india, then also, it would make no difference in the final outcome of all the petitions. ( 7 ) ON perusal of the orders passed by the controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority, it appears that both the lower authorities have taken a view in substance that the language used in the settlement is "will be revised" and is with the language that "at present, it is Rs. 1 lakh". Normally, when a literal interpretation of any of the conditions of the settlement is possible, it will not be required for the Court or any authority to add the word and to extract the meaning of the terms of the settlement. In my view, as per the plain and simple reading of the relevant term of the settlement, the interpretation, as sought to be canvassed by Mr. Desai on behalf of the petitioners, cannot be accepted. The language used is "the maximum financial ceiling limit on the amount of gratuity payable will be (emphasis supplied) revised on State Government lines, which is at present Rs. 1 lakh. " therefore, the words, "will be revised", cannot be read or equated giving the same meaning as the words, "will stand revised", or "will be revised from time to time". Therefore, even if the g. S. O. , which came to be issued on 24th August, 1988 is not taken as the basis, for considering the right of gratuity, the only simple, literal and plain construction of the term of settlement would be that the maximum limit shall be Rs. 1 lakh. Therefore, even if the g. S. O. , which came to be issued on 24th August, 1988 is not taken as the basis, for considering the right of gratuity, the only simple, literal and plain construction of the term of settlement would be that the maximum limit shall be Rs. 1 lakh. ( 8 ) THIS does not mean that there is no power or authority with the Board to revise the gratuity, as may be revised by the Government from time to time, but, the fact remains that it has not been revised subsequently on account of revision of the ceiling limit by the State government. It is also an admitted position that the petitioners are the employees of the Board, which is a statutory Board and they are not the employees of the state Government as it is. It may be that the Board as an employer may take a decision of adopting the benefits, which are being given to the Government employees, at the time when the settlement took place, but, the interpretation cannot be stretched to the extent that such benefit shall stand conferred upon the employees, as prevailing from time to time unless and until there are express words incorporated therein. This Court, in the case of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Chandrakant Tapubhai Vyas, reported at (2004) 5 Gujarat high Court Judgements 618, while considering the scope and ambit of the power of the authority under the Act, has observed at paragraphs 5 and 6 as under:"5. THE first question which is required to be considered is the scope and ambit of section 4 (2) of the act. The said sub-section reads as under:- " (2 ). For every completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months, the employer shall pay gratuity to an employee at the rate of fifteen days wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by the employee concerned: xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx xxx "5. 1 the language used by the legislature is the "rate of fifteen days wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by the employee concerned". There is no dispute on the point that on the date when the respondent employees retired from service, gratuity is not paid to them on the rate of wages last drawn. 1 the language used by the legislature is the "rate of fifteen days wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by the employee concerned". There is no dispute on the point that on the date when the respondent employees retired from service, gratuity is not paid to them on the rate of wages last drawn. On the date on which the employee concerned retired, there was no revision of payscale in existence. Section 7 of the Act provides for the determination of the amount of gratuity. Sub-section (3) of section 7 provides that the employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. Sub-section (3-A) provides that if the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, with simple interest at such rate not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time. Sub-section (4) of section 7 provides that if there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to admissibility of any claim under the Act, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. Clause (c) of sub-section 4 of section 7 provides that the controlling authority shall after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such inquiry, any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount. Sub-section (7) of section 7 provides for appeal. Therefore, it appears that if there is non-payment of the amount of gratuity, then the power is attracted. Similarly, if there is any dispute on the question of admissibility of any claim of gratuity, then also, the power would be attracted. 6. Sub-section (7) of section 7 provides for appeal. Therefore, it appears that if there is non-payment of the amount of gratuity, then the power is attracted. Similarly, if there is any dispute on the question of admissibility of any claim of gratuity, then also, the power would be attracted. 6. The employees concerned in the present case asserted their right for admissibility of the payment of gratuity upon revision of payscale whereas the employer-petitioner has denied the liability on the question of not providing by way of settlement expressly for payment of gratuity. As such, on a conjoint reading of sections 4 and 7 it appears that the jurisdiction of the controlling authority would be attracted only if there is statutory liability to pay the amount of gratuity, and there is non-payment by the employer concerned. Further, even if the power under section 7 are construed for entertaining the claim of gratuity in purported exercise of the right to receive gratuity, then also the controlling authority, while exercising the admissibility of the claim will have to decide as to whether such claim is legally admissible or not. At the time when such aspect is to be considered, the authority shall be guided by the provision of the Act for accrual of liability to pay the gratuity and for accrual of the right to receive the amount of gratuity. "therefore, in view of the aforesaid decision, it is for the authority to consider the right to receive the amount of gratuity at the relevant point of time. In the very decision, at paragraph 7, it was observed as under: ". . . . . . As such, in the matter of revision of payscale, it may have various facets. No doubt, employees concerned of any institution may have a right to represent and may have a right to participate in the deliberations and discussions and also, to some extent, in the finalization in the matter of payscale, however, the decision to revise the payscale is essentially a policy decision of the employer, taking into consideration various aspects including the financial, the cost structure, cost of living, profit generation, reserves/surplus and such other aspects. At the time when the decision is taken for revision of the payscale by an employer, more particularly in the present case a Public Corporation, it may include various packages and it may also include various modes of making payment. . . . . . . . . . " therefore, two aspects appear to be clear. One is that the settlement was as a package including various other benefits. So far as the gratuity is concerned, there was a clause for enhancing the maximum financial ceiling limit of Rs. 1 lakh. Such a decision of Rs. 1 lakh, at the relevant point of time, may be on the basis of the ceiling limit fixed by the State Government, but thereby, it cannot be said that there will be an automatic revision of the ceiling limit as and when so revised by the State Government. The second is that even otherwise also, when the settlement is entered into between the Union and the employer, Board, as back as in the year 1988, of revising the limit of the gratuity and when such settlement is actually acted upon, it cannot be said that any action taken by the Board based on the said settlement would be rendered unreasonable or arbitrary. ( 9 ) KEEPING the aforesaid aspects in mind, if the impugned orders passed by both the authorities are examined, it cannot be said that the Controlling authority or the Appellate Authority have committed any jurisdictional error or have exercised the discretion so perverse which would call for interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the constitution of India. It further transpires that the interpretation given by both the authorities appears to be just and reasonable and is, in effect, a correct interpretation of a particular clause of the settlement and admissibility or non-admissibility of the amount of gratuity claimed. ( 10 ) MR. PANKAJ R. Desai, learned Counsel for the petitioners, made an attempt to submit that at one point of time, the G. S. O. was amended, as per G. S. O. No. 229, on 7th May, 1992 interpreting that the ceiling limit shall stand revised, as revised by the Government and, therefore, he submitted that the said G. S. O. shows that even the Board considered the term of the settlement qua gratuity accordingly. ( 11 ) I am afraid that such a contention can be accepted when a plain and simple meaning can be extracted from the term of the settlement for gratuity. Any interpretation or action de hors the same cannot be considered as a valid ground for asserting the right of receiving additional amount of gratuity. It is well settled that any illegal action by any authority cannot be made as the basis for the purpose of either claiming discrimination or for asserting the right thereon, otherwise it would result into perpetuating the illegality and, therefore, the said contention of mr. Desai cannot be accepted. ( 12 ) MR. P. R. DESAI, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has relied upon the decisions in the matter between The Manager, East Donger Chickli Colliery of western Coalfields Ltd. vs. D. D. Dubey and Ors. , reported at 1998 F. L. R. 649, and in the matter between R. Nagaraju vs. Managing Director, A. P. State Warehousing corporation, Hyderabad, reported at 1998 II C. L. R. 985, for contending that if there is a better term of the settlement, such right can always be asserted. In my view, both the said decisions are not at all connected with the subject matter or the issue which is to be considered by the Court and, therefore, the said decisions have no applicability and even if the principles, as laid down, are considered and accepted, then also, the same would be of no help to the petitioners in the present case. ( 13 ) MR. DESAI, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rameshbhai M. Makwana, reported at 2002 (3) G. L. H. 282, for contending that any G. S. O. will not nullify the object or effect of the settlement. As observed earlier, even if the G. S. O. is not considered when the term of the settlement itself is self explanatory, and plain and literal interpretation and meaning can be extracted. Further, it is found by this Court that there shall not be any automatic revision of the ceiling limit and, therefore, the said decision would be of no help to the petitioners. Further, it is found by this Court that there shall not be any automatic revision of the ceiling limit and, therefore, the said decision would be of no help to the petitioners. ( 14 ) IF the matter is examined even from the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of india, keeping in view the observations made by this court in the case of the Gujarat State Road Transport corporation vs. Chandrakant Tapubhai Vyas (supra), it cannot be said that the action of not paying the gratuity, taking the basis as revised by the State government for its employees, is arbitrary or unreasonable. As observed earlier, if the Board has acted under the settlement strictly, as per the language employed in the settlement, the action cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Further, it is not the case of the petitioners that any of the employees, who have retired from 1st April, 1995 to 23rd September, 1997, are paid the amount of gratuity taking as the basis of the revision of the ceiling limit by the State government. So far as the amendment in G. S. O. dated 7th may, 1992 is concerned, as observed earlier, the same cannot be said to be a valid action in accordance with the terms of the settlement. Moreover, as observed earlier, any settlement resulting into additional financial burden can always be with a reasonable classification by putting a cut off date. It is not even the case of the petitioners that any date fixed in the settlement for giving effect to the settlement, is, in any manner, unreasonable or arbitrary. When the Gujarat electricity Board has treated all those employees, who are covered by the settlement at par, and the payment of the gratuity is accordingly made, it cannot be said that the action would be rendered unreasonable or arbitrary. ( 15 ) IN view of the above, all the petitions fail and are dismissed. Rule is discharged. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. .