K. Padmanabhan Nair, J. 1. The first respondent in A.S. No. 233 of 2000 on the file of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram is the petitioner in both these Writ Petitions. W. P. (C) 35195 of 2003 is filed challenging an order passed by the learned District Judge, by which he had allowed I. A. No. 2668 of 2 002, a petition filed by the third respondent in the appeal to condone the delay of 17 months and 15 days in filing a memorandum of cross objection. W. P. (C) No. 35118 of 2003 is filed against an order passed by the court below by which the learned District Judge had admitted the memorandum of cross objection overruling the objections raised by the writ petitioner. 2. The writ petitioner along with the 5th respondent filed O. S. No. 2 35 5 of 1997 on the file of the IInd Additional Munsiff's Court, Thiruvananthapuram for declaration of title and also for a consequential injunction. His case was that he purchased the property while he was employed in the Territorial Army. According to the writ petitioner, since he was away from the place, he had executed a power or attorney in favour of the second respondent on 17-12-1991 which was subsequently revoked by him as per registered notice dated 12-11-1994. It is alleged that after the revocation of the power of attorney, the second respondent executed a sale deed in respect of the suit properties in favour of the fourth respondent who is none other than his own minor daughter, The Trial Court decreed the suit declaring the title and possession of the petitioner. The third respondent. represented by the fourth respondent filed an appeal as A. S. No. 233 of 2000 before the IInd Additiona1 Court, Thiruvananthapuram. In that appeal, the second respondent filed a memorandum of cross objection after the expiry of the period of limitation with a petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The writ petitioner filed objections to the delay petition, The learned District Judge allowed 'the petition to condone the delay and admitted the memorandum of cross objection. The petitioner filed O. P. No. 35688 of 2002 before this Court challenging those orders. The writ petitioner filed objections to the delay petition, The learned District Judge allowed 'the petition to condone the delay and admitted the memorandum of cross objection. The petitioner filed O. P. No. 35688 of 2002 before this Court challenging those orders. This Court by judgment dated 11-06-2003 allowed the Original Petition, quashed the order passed by the lower appellate court in I. A. No. 2688 of 2002 and remanded that I. A. for fresh disposal. The learned District Judge again passed an order condoning the delay in filing the cross objection. W. P. (C) No. 35195 of 2003 is filed challenging that order. 3. When the cross objection came up for admission, the writ petitioner raised contention that the same is not maintainable in view of the fact that the appeal was filed on 14-12-2000 on payment of one third court fee and the balance court fee was not paid within 15 days from the date of the order admitting the appeal. It was contended that the balance court fee was paid only on 27-9-2002 without any application to enlarge the time or condoning the delay for payment of the balance court fee. It was contended that since the balance court fee was deposited after a lapse of 21 months, there was no payment of court fee and hence there was no properly constituted appeal. It was contended that since there was no properly constituted appeal, no question of entertaining the memorandum of cross appeal in that defective appeal arises. It was also contended that the matter in controversy in the cross objection is a dispute between the writ petitioner and the second respondent who are corespondents in the appeal and the appellants have no case or common contention along with the appellant in the cross appeal and hence the cross appeal itself is not maintainable. The court below overruled those objections and admitted the cross appeal also. In the order it was found that since no direction was issued to the appellant in the appeal to pay the balance court fee and since the balance court fee was received, there is a valid appeal on the file and hence the memorandum of cross objection is also maintainable. W. P . (C ) 35228 of 2003 is filed challenging the order passed by the learned Judge admitting the cross objection. 4. W. P . (C ) 35228 of 2003 is filed challenging the order passed by the learned Judge admitting the cross objection. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has argued that the reasons stated by the learned District Judge for condoning the delay as well as admitting the memorandum of cross objection are illegal. It is argued that the appellant has not stated any reason for condoning the delay in filing the cross appeal. It is vehemently argued that the learned District Judge has not considered whether the principle laid down in Dhangir. v. Madan Mohan ( AIR 1988 SC 54 ) can be applied to the facts of this case. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that there is absolutely no merit in these writ petitions and both these writ petitions are only to be dismissed. 6. I shall consider the petition for condoning the delay first. To appreciate the legal content ion;; raised in these two writ petitions, it is necessary to state few facts of the case also. The writ petitioner and the second respondent are brothers. They are the children of the third respondent. The minor 4th respondent is the daughter of the second respondent. The petitioner was employed in the Territorial Army. He executed a power of attorney in favour of the "'second respondent on 17-12-1991. According to the petitioner, he revoked the power of attorney on 12-11-1994. The second respondent executed a sale deed in respect of the suit property, which, according to the petitioner, belongs to him absolutely on the strength of the power of attorney executed on 17-12-1991. The sale deed was executed in favour of the second respondent's minor daughter. The third respondent - grandfather of the minor was shown as the guardian of the minor in the sale deed. The writ petitioner filed a suit for declaration that the sale deed executed by the second respondent is void and the petitioner still continues to be the owner. In that suit he imp leaded respondents 2 to 4. After taking evidence the suit was decreed by the Trial Court. Challenging that decree the 3rd and 4th respondents filed A. S. No. 233 of 2000. In that appeal the appellants arrayed the petitioner and 5th respondent as respondents 1 and 2 and the second respondent in this petition as the 3rd respondent. After taking evidence the suit was decreed by the Trial Court. Challenging that decree the 3rd and 4th respondents filed A. S. No. 233 of 2000. In that appeal the appellants arrayed the petitioner and 5th respondent as respondents 1 and 2 and the second respondent in this petition as the 3rd respondent. On 29-7-2002 the second respondent filed I. A. No. 2688 of 2002 in the appeal for condoning the delay in filing the cross appeal. Overruling the objection raised by the petitioner, that petition was allowed. 7. The ground stated in the petition to condone the delay was that the judgment of the Trial Court was pronounced on 30-10-2000 . The second respondent filed carbon copy application on 1-11-2002. It. is averred that because of the delay that application happened to be dismissed. It is also averred that on 1-11-2000 the second respondent filed A. No. 4664 of 2000 for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree. It is averred that the copy application filed on 1-11-2002 is still pending and in the meanwhile he received notice in A. S. No. 233 of 2000 on 15-11-2000. It is averred that the petitioner was under the impression that he could also file a separate appeal when he gets the certified copy of the judgment and decree. But the same was not issued to him as the records were called for by the lower appellate court for hearing the appeal. So the only reason stated for filing a regular appeal was the non receipt of the copy of the judgment. According to the 3rd respondent, if he is not able to file a regular appeal before the disposal of the present appeal and in case this appeal is disposed of on merits with him on the party array, he may not be able to challenge the judgment and decree in an appeal filed subsequently. The prayer was opposed by the respondents. 8. According to the petitioner, he filed a copy application (A. No. 4664 of 2000) on 1-11-2000 in the O.S. and the application was pending on the date on which he filed the cross appeal. The petitioner could have very well filed a petition before the lower appellate court to send the original judgment and decree to the Trial Court for complying with the copy application. Nothing prevented him from filing such an application. The petitioner could have very well filed a petition before the lower appellate court to send the original judgment and decree to the Trial Court for complying with the copy application. Nothing prevented him from filing such an application. The mere fact that he did not get a copy of the judgment is not a ground to condone the delay. If the petitioner wanted to get a copy of the order, he could have very well obtained the same. The learned District Judge has not considered any of these aspects while considering whether the second respondent had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay So that order is not legally sustainable. 9. The next question arising for consideration is how far the cross appeal filed by the second respondent is maintainable. As I have already stated the petitioner 'filed the suit for declaration and consequential reliefs. According to him on the strength of a power of attorney, which was already revoked, the second respondent had executed a sale deed in respect of the properties belonging to the petitioner. The vendee is none other than the minor daughter of the power of attorney holder. The contention that can be put; forward by the vendee is she is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the cancellation of the power of attorney. The real dispute is between the petitioner and the second respondent. The question to considered is whether the power given to the second respondent was duly revoked. So there is absolutely no community of interest regarding the pleas that is to be raised by the appellants in the appeal and the cross appellant. The objections are not common as against the appellant and co-respondent. The learned District Judge did not consider whether for an effective disposal of the appeal, it is necessary to consider the plea put forward by the second respondent at all. 10. A larger question also arises in this case. The appeal was filed on 14-12-2000. At the time of filing the appeal, the appellants paid one third court fee. In view of the provisions contained in S.4A of the Court Fees Act, the appellants were bound to pay the balance court fee within 15 days from the date of. admitting the appeal. The appeal was filed on 14-12-2000. At the time of filing the appeal, the appellants paid one third court fee. In view of the provisions contained in S.4A of the Court Fees Act, the appellants were bound to pay the balance court fee within 15 days from the date of. admitting the appeal. There is no provision in S.4A of the Court Fees Act which casts a duty to the court to issue notice to the appellant regarding payment of the balance court fee. It is a duty cast upon the litigant himself to pay sufficient court fee within the time allowed by law. The learned District Judge has taken a view that it is settled position of law that an appeal can be dismissed for non payment of court fee only after giving directions to the appellant in that regard. it was found that no such direction was issued in this particular case. There is no provision to issue any such direction to the litigant. Before the amendment application could be filed, the law was amended incorporating S.4A in the Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act so as to enable a litigant to file an appeal without paying the entire court fee the time of institution of the appeal itself. S.4A provides that at the time of the institution of the appeal, the appellant can pay one third of the court fee and he has to pay the balance two third court fee within 15 days from the date of admission of the appeal. The consequence of failure to pay the court fee is very clear from the section itself. The appeal will have to be rejected. unless the litigant files a petition for enlargement of time as provided under the Act the court is not expected to enlarge the time. In this case the appeal was admitted on 19-10-2002 but the appellant did not pay the balance court fee and did not file any petition for enlargement of time fixed for payment of court fee. 11. unless the litigant files a petition for enlargement of time as provided under the Act the court is not expected to enlarge the time. In this case the appeal was admitted on 19-10-2002 but the appellant did not pay the balance court fee and did not file any petition for enlargement of time fixed for payment of court fee. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the decisions reported in K.C.M. Ltd. v. Padmanabha Pillai ( 1957 KLT 1175 (F.B.), Elizabeth v. Francis ( 1991 (2) KLT 779 , Shajahan v. ( 1997 (1) KLT 569 ), State of, Kerala v. Umesh Rao ( 1998 (2) KLT 541 ) , Mable v. Dolores and Nabeesa v. Ibrahim ( 2002 (3) KLT 209 ) and argued that the appellants have not filed any petition for enlargement of time and the balance court fee was paid only after the lapse of 21 months and due to lapse of time, the appeal automatically stands rejected. It is also argued that the court cannot extend the time suo motu. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decision reported in Superintending Engineer v. B. Subba Reddy ( AIR 1999 SC 1999 ) and argued that right to appeal does not exist unless it is specifically conferred and only in exceptional circumstances, the cross objection can be maintained. The learned District Judge has not considered any of these aspects at all. The appellants have not filed any petition for enlargement of time for payment of the balance court fee. It is true that the appellants have deposited the balance court fee. But the deposit was made after a lapse of 21 months. The court below had taken a view that since no notice was issued to the appellants and the amount was deposited by them that defect is automatically cured. That view is also not. legal and liable to be set aside. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case it is only just; and proper to direct the lower appellate court to reconsider the petition for condoning the delay and also to hear the question of maintainability of the cross appeal afresh and dispose of those petitions in accordance with law. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent has submitted that the second respondent has done everything possible to file an appeal. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent has submitted that the second respondent has done everything possible to file an appeal. It is submitted that he had filed a copy application in time and due to the fact that the original records were forwarded to the lower appellate court, he did not get a certified copy so far and the copy application is still pending. The learned District Judge had noted the fact that though 'the second respondent filed a proper application, no copy was issued as the original records were forwarded to the lower appellate court. According to me, the lower appellate court ought to have sent back the necessary records to the Munsiff Court so as to enable the learned Munsiff to issue copies of. the judgment and decree to the second respondent within a time frame and then return the records to the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court ought to have adjourned the hearing of the appeal, delay petition and memorandum of cross objection for a reasonable time, so as to enable the appellant to get the copies of the judgment and decree and to file an appeal so that both appeals can be disposed of by a common judgment. In the result, the writ petitions are disposed of. in the following manner:- (1) W. P. (C) Nos. 35195 and 35228 of 2003 are allowed in part. The order passed by the learned District Judge allowing I. A. No. 2663 of 200 2 in A. S. No. 233 of 2000 filed under S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act is set aside. The order passed by the District Judge admitting the cross appeal is also set aside. The lower appellate court is directed to take I. A. 2663 of 2002 and the memorandum of cross objection back to file and dispose of the same afresh in accordance with law. (2) The' finding of the court below that the appeal filed by the appellants is competent is set aside. The learned District Judge is directed to reconsider that point afresh in accordance with law. (3) There will be a direction to the lower appellate court to send the necessary records to the learned Munsiff so as to enable the Munsiff to issue copies of the judgment and decree to the second respondent on the copy application he had already filed and pending. (3) There will be a direction to the lower appellate court to send the necessary records to the learned Munsiff so as to enable the Munsiff to issue copies of the judgment and decree to the second respondent on the copy application he had already filed and pending. (4) The records shall be sent to the Trial Court within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The learned District Judge shall adjourn the hearing of the petition to condone delay, cross appeal and the question of maintainability of the appeal for a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. (5) There will be a further direction to the Munsiff, Thiruvananthapuram to issue certified copies of the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 2355 of 1997 to the second respondent as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within two months from the date of receipt of the records from the lower appellate court and to send back the records to the lower appellate court so as to enable the lower appellate court to hear the first appeal. (6) In case the lower appellate court finds that the memorandum of cross objection is not maintainable or barred it shall pass appropriate orders regarding the court fee paid on the cross appeal in accordance with law.