Per : Imtiyaz Hussian, J. These three Letters Patent Appeals have been filed against the judgement of Ld. Single Judge passed on 4.6.2002 in SWP Nos. 2312/98 (Bashir Ahmad Allayee & Ors. v. State & Ors.) 3745/97 (Manzoor Ahmad Dar & Ors v. State & Ors.), and 3833/97 (Farhat Sheikh v. State & Ors.). Since the LPAs arise out of one judgement and issues involved are common, these are being disposed of by this judgment. 2. The facts are very short. Jammu & Kashmir Service Selection Board by means of an advertisement Notice No.04 of 1997 dated 29.5.1997 invited applications from permanent residents of J&K State for the posts of physical education teachers. Requisite qualification for the posts was prescribed as Metric with course certificate in physical education. Clause XV of the advertisement notice further provided that no application shall be entertained for District cadre posts from the candidates belonging to other District or who possesses an ambiguous permanent resident certificate. 3. Petitioners in the above mentioned writ petitions also applied but were not selected while as about 21 persons who are arrayed as respondents in the above mentioned writ petition got selected. The selection pertains to District Budgam and both the petitioners and the selectees belong to that district. The appellants Manzoor Ahmed Dar & Ors challenged the selection by means of above mentioned writ petitions on the main grounds that the selected candidates possess BP Ed. and MP Ed qualification as such did not possess the minimum prescribed qualification i.e. Metric with course certificate in physical education as such their selection was not proper. Learned counsel for the appellants in his oral submissions, before Ld. Single Judge also challenged the advertisement notice and selection process being violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution on the ground that it was a district wise selection and a candidate was not allowed to apply in other districts. 4. The respondents-State and the Service Selection Board did not file their reply before Ld. Single Judge but their counsel made oral submissions which were heard and considered by the court. 5. Ld. Single Judge by means of the impugned judgement dismissed the writ petitions. The Ld. Single Judge held that since the petitioners were possessing BPEd and MP Ed. 4. The respondents-State and the Service Selection Board did not file their reply before Ld. Single Judge but their counsel made oral submissions which were heard and considered by the court. 5. Ld. Single Judge by means of the impugned judgement dismissed the writ petitions. The Ld. Single Judge held that since the petitioners were possessing BPEd and MP Ed. Qualifications which were definitely at higher pedestral that the metric with physical education course certificate, their selection could not be said to be bad on the ground that they were not possessing minimum qualification. So far the ground relating to district wise selection was concerned Ld. Single Judge did not agree with the submissions made by the Ld. Counsel on the ground that the condition in the advertisement notice regarding submission of application in ones own district only is construct to mean that those with ambiguous permanent resident certificate shall be excluded from consideration and those who are from other districts shall not be considered for the district other than districts of their domicile. 6. Aggrieved by the findings of the Ld. Single Judge the appellants have moved these LPAs on various grounds; the main ground taken in the memorandum of the appeal is that the Ld. Single Judge has not adopted the correct interpretation to the qualification clause mentioned in the advertisement notice. It is also pleaded that the district-wise selection was in violation of the fundamental rights under Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India. 7. Heard. We have perused the impugned judgement. 8. Mr. S.T.Hussain appearing for the appellants has vehemently argued that the Ld. Single Judge has not taken the correct view in holding that the selectees were possessing higher qualification as the advertisement notification had in imperative language, fixed minimum qualification as matriculation with certificate course in physical education. In this behalf he has referred to an authority of Full Bench of Bombay High Court reported as Jayashree Sunil Chavan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 Bom 394. We have considered the argument but find no force in it. Ld. Single judge has given sufficient reasons to take the view that petitioners were not disqualified in getting consideration for the posts on the ground that they were possessing superior qualification, higher than the prescribed one. We have considered the argument but find no force in it. Ld. Single judge has given sufficient reasons to take the view that petitioners were not disqualified in getting consideration for the posts on the ground that they were possessing superior qualification, higher than the prescribed one. The advertisement notification prescribed matric with certificate course in physical education as the minimum qualification for the post, the selectees were possessing the qualification B.P.Ed and M.P.Ed which according to the Ld. Single Judge convey Bachelor in physical education and Master in physical education respectively. The Ld. Single Judge has found that these higher qualifications (academic/technical) in terms also include physical course also. The Ld. Single Judge in this behalf observed: -- "It cannot be said that these higher academic/technical qualifications do not take within their sweep physical education course aspect of the requirement(s) in the field. The qualification partake the characteristics of both the academic and technical qualifications of physical education course. The qualifications B.P.Ed and M.P.Ed pressed into service by the selection board in fact is covered by the term minimum qualification. Not only matric with certificate course in physical education but B.P.Ed and M.P.Ed as additional qualifications are also covered and can be treated as components of he minimum qualification. After all both these qualifications have the physical education aspect and are definitely at higher pedestral than a Matriculate with physical education certification course. This superior qualification higher than the prescribed minimum is undoubtly qualification which can be treated to be prescribed for the post of physical education teacher." 9. We find ourselves in agreement with the Ld. Single Judge that not only matric with certificate course in physical education but B.P.Ed and M.P.Ed as additional qualifications are also covered and can be treated as components of the minimum qualification. In the backdrop, the authority relied upon by the learned Counsel cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case as in that case it was held by the Court that the mere higher qualification, without having requisite minimum qualification prescribed by rules, cannot be held to be a requisite qualification. 10. It was next argued by Mr. Hussain that the present selection was made by the respondent No. 2 on district wise basis which was in contravention of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 10. It was next argued by Mr. Hussain that the present selection was made by the respondent No. 2 on district wise basis which was in contravention of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. He referred to Clause XV of the advertisement notice and would argue that this clause was in violation of the fundamental right as it expressly prohibits entertaining applications for District cadre posts from the candidates belonging to other Districts as no citizen could be discriminated in the matter of employment in Government service on the ground of place of birth or residence. In this behalf Ld. Counsel relied on a Patna High Court authority reported as Laljee Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2000 Lab. I. C 2554. 11. We are in agreement with the submissions advanced by the Learned Counsel for the appellants that clause XV of the advertisement notice was violative of the Constitution of India. It is now well settled that selection made on the ground of religion, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In Laljee Yadavs case (supra) cited by the Ld. Counsel Patna High Court observed as under: -- "It is well settled that no citizen shall be discriminated in the matter of employment in Government service on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Every citizen has a fundamental right to apply for employment in the Government service within the State of Bihar irrespective of his permanent place of residence in any district in the State of Bihar." 12. Patna High Court in this case relied upon a case reported as P. Rajendran v. State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1012, where a similar question came up for consideration as to whether a rule providing for district wise distribution of seats is violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution, the Apex court declaring such rule unconstitutional held that the object of selection has only to be to secure the best possible material for admission to colleges subject to provision for socially and educationally backward classes. If the seats are allocated district wise, then such object would be defeated. 13. In Nidamarti Maheshkumar v. State of Maharastra and Ors. If the seats are allocated district wise, then such object would be defeated. 13. In Nidamarti Maheshkumar v. State of Maharastra and Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 534, where the Supreme Court was dealing with selection of candidates for medical colleges, the Court held that region-wise reservation of seats for medical college was not permissible. 14. In Radhey Shyam Singh and Ors. v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 60, Apex court was dealing with a case in which selection had been made on zone-wise basis. The court observed as under: -- "The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that this process of zone wise selection has been in vogue since 1975 and has stood the test of time cannot be accepted for the simple reason that it was never challenged by anybody and was not subjected to judicial scrutiny at all. If on judicial scrutiny it cannot stand the test of reasonableness and constitutionality it cannot be allowed to continue and has to be struck down." (emphasis supplied) 15. Similarly the Apex Court in Ramvijay Kumar and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1998) 9 SCC 227 approved the observations of the High Court of Bihar in a case were selection had been made on District wise basis. The High Court had held that the eligible candidates have a right of consideration for their appointment in anyone or the other district cadre. 16. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the impediment contained in clause XV of the advertisement notice reproduced above, was violative of the constitution. The findings of the learned Single Judge on the point cannot, therefore, stand. 17. Since we have settled the question, we are not inclined to disturb the selection on the ground that the appellants have not anywhere alleged that posts were available in other districts too and that due to the condition imposed in the advertisement notice they could not apply for those posts not has any other candidate form other district approached this court with a plea that the impugned condition prevented him from applying for the posts against which the selectees have been appointed. The appellants belong to District Budgam and have applied in the said district where they have been duly considered for the posts. We, therefore, find that the appellants are not entitled to any relief in the present appeal. 18. The appellants belong to District Budgam and have applied in the said district where they have been duly considered for the posts. We, therefore, find that the appellants are not entitled to any relief in the present appeal. 18. In view of this discussion the judgment impugned is modified to the extent indicated but the appellants are held not entitled to any relief. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.