Per S. N. Jha, Chief Justce: 1. This letters patent appeal arises from a writ petition, S WP no. 1312/2004, which the appellant had preferred for quashing the proceedings of Court of Inquiry and Summary of evidence recorded therein, and for a restraint order prohibiting the respondents from acting upon the impugned summary of evidence, He also prayed for an independent probe in the matter by the Central Bureau of Investiatgation (CBI). 2. Before adverting to specific grievance of the appellant the factual background of the case may, briefly, be stated. 3. The appellant is a Major in the Medical Corps of the Indian Army. He joined 166 Military Hospital in June 2001. On the basis of certain irregularities and malpractices in drawal, accounting and issue of rations, fuel, oil, lubricants, firewood, scrapwood etc. in 166 Military Hospital, a Board of Officers was detailed to seize documents and other materials from the Quartermaster office of said Hospital on 18.6.2003. A Court of Inquiry was thereafter convened by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 16 Corps on 19.6.2003 to investiage into the alleged irregularities and malpractices. The Court of Inquiry comprised of a Major General and two Brigadiers. It transpired that upon seizure of documents from the Quartermaster office on 18.6.2003, the appellant had tried to influence Hav. (Store Keeper Technical) Jagdish Chander, offering him bribe of rupees 8 to 10 lakhs as consideration for not disclosing the details and himself owning the responsibility. As the appellant was found to be indulging in activities of tempering with the evidence he was sent to 169 Military Hospital on temporary duty from 24.6.2003 to 14.7.2003. Col. Sunil Mehta, SM, was detailed to seize documents. The Court of Inquiry, constituted in the meantime, examined Col. Sunil Mehta and Hav. (Store Keeper Technical) Jagdish Chander on 10.7.2003. Hav. (Store Keeper Technical) A. K. Maity, Sepoy (Driver) Sanjeev Kumar and Hav. (Store Keeper Technical) C. R. Jagannath, were examined on 11.7.2003 and 12.7.2003. The Court of Inquiry came to the conclusion that the character and military reputation of the appellant as well as said Jagdish Chander, A. K. Maity, C. R. Jagannath and Sanjeev Kumar was likely to be affected and therefore decided to invoke the provisions of Rule 180 of Army Rules 1954 and they were called to appear before the Court of Inquiry on 14th and 15th of July, 2003. We shall refer to Rule 180 later at the appropriate place in this order. The statements of witnesses recorded by the Court of Inquiry earlier were read out in their presence and they were given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The appellant is said to have cross-examined them. He also appeared as witness on 16th of July, 2003 and made a statement. He also answered questions put by the Court and others against whom rule 180 of the Army Rules had been invoked. Upon consideration of the seized documents and other materials as well as statements of the witnesses, the Court of Inquiry concluded that large scale financial irregularities and misappropriations of materials in the stores had occured in 166 Military Hospital since 12.6.2001. In the opinion of the Court of Inquiry, the appellant was blameworthy for the following: - "(a) Dishonestly received monetary gains for stores costing approximately Rs.25,52,106/- during the period 12th June 01 to May, 03 through illegal scales of the following commodities:- (i) FOL. Comprising of petrol: 61400 Itrs. Costing approximately Rs. 18,27,456/-; and diesal: 22800 ltrs costing approximately Rs.4,30,350/-amounting to a total of approximately Rs.22,57,806/-. (ii) DRY RATIONS comprising various commodities amounting to total of approximately Rs. 1,08,000/-. (iii) MILK POWDER: 2,025 Kgs costing approximately Rs. 1,86,300/-. (b) Dishonestly received monetary gains for stores costing approximately Rs. 76,53, 974.07 through civil contractors for the period July 01 to Apr 03, in lieu of excess qty demanded but not collected in respect of the following commodities:- (i) FRESH RATION comprising various items costing approximately Rs. 75,24,551.55. (ii) CHARCOAL 65,991 Kgs. Costing approximately Rs. 1,24,643.53. (iii) FIREWOOD & SCRAPWOOD 16,738 kgs. and 7,260 kgs. Respectively costing approximately Rs. 4,778.99. (c) Dishonestly misppropriated 63 Tons of Steam Coal costing approximately Rs.92,295/- in a signel transaction on 22 Feb.03. (d) Dishonestly received approximately 250 Its of petrol every month from 166 M.H.FOL Stores for his personal use from July 01 to May 03 amounting to approximately Rs. 1,73,245/-. (e) Knowingly and with intent to defraud ordered his subordinate SKTs to com-.mitthefollowing:- (i) prepare falsified RRs for the months of Mar 02 to Mar 03. (ii) Falsify car diaries for Veh. BANos. 88K-5640M, OOK-6788E. 1,73,245/-. (e) Knowingly and with intent to defraud ordered his subordinate SKTs to com-.mitthefollowing:- (i) prepare falsified RRs for the months of Mar 02 to Mar 03. (ii) Falsify car diaries for Veh. BANos. 88K-5640M, OOK-6788E. 85K-3619N (CIV Veh) OOK-00679,4 N, 85K-2587X (CIV Veh) 85 K - 258 X(CI V Veh.), 85 K- 2967 4 N (CI V Veh.) OOK-006803 K. (iii) Inflate ration demands for various items of fresh rations costing approximately Rs. 14,69,910.10 duringJul .01 to Dec .01. (iv) After the already approved quaterly condemmation Bd proceeedings dated 20 Nov. 01 by amending the figures 66 to read as 266 in respect of Cases Mattresses Hospital. (f) Dishonestly stage managed awarding 9 repair contracts amounting to approxmiately Rs. 24,589/- for Desert Collers and other electrical equipments of 166 M.H. to civilian Washerman Rampal, an employee of 166 M.H. who was also illegally working at his residence in respect of the following minute sheets orginated by him:- (aa) 1206/Q/2001 Dt. 19 Jun 01. (ab) 12061/Q/2001 Dt.20Jul01. (ac) 12061206 Q/2001 Dt. 19Jun01. (ad) 1206/Q2001 Dt. 17 Nov. 01. (ae) 1206/Q 2001 Dt. 24 Nov. 01. (af) 1206/Q 2001 Dt. 20 Oct. 01. (ag) 1206/Q 2001 Dt. 20 Dec. 01. (ah) 1206/Q 2001 Dt. 02 Apr. 02. (aj) 1206/Q 2001 Dt. 27 May. 02. (g) In contravention to laid down norms borrowed Rs. 15000/- from Nb Sub SKT Pushpinder Singh." 4. Shri S. S. Lehar, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there has been violation of rule 180 of the Army Rules, vitiating the entire proceedings before the Court of Inquiry and recording of Summary of Evidence. He submitted that the Court of Inquiry commenced on 10.07.2003 whereas the appellant was called to appear for the first time only on 15.7.2003. In terms of rules the statements of the witnesses are to be recorded in presence of the person concerned. Thus there has been violation of not only rule 180 of Army Rules but also rules of natural justice. In support of the contention counsel placed reliance on R. P. Shukla and ors. V. Central Officer Commanding-in-Chief Lucknow and Ors. 1996 MP 233 and Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi V. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1982 SC1413. Shri Lehar also submitted that the real culprits have been left out while the appellant is sought to be punished on the basis of their evidence. V. Central Officer Commanding-in-Chief Lucknow and Ors. 1996 MP 233 and Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi V. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1982 SC1413. Shri Lehar also submitted that the real culprits have been left out while the appellant is sought to be punished on the basis of their evidence. He, in particular referred to Sub. K.S. Katait, Brig. Y. V. Suri, Brig, (now Major General) (Mrs.) P. Arora, Brig. SS Jog, Naib Subedar Pushpendra Singh and Col. V. B. Deshpandey. In other words, according to counsel, the appellant is sought to be made a scapegoat for the acts of omissions and commissions on the part of others. Counsel submitted that fact of the matter is that misappropriation in 166 Military Hospital was going on since 1999 itself while the appellant joined in June, 2001. 5. In order to appreciate the submissions of the counsel, the relevant provisions may be noticed. The offences coming under the purview of Army Act, 1950 are specified in Chapter VI while punishments are specified in Chapter VII of the Act. Under Section 191 of the Army Act, the Central Government is empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. In particular and without generality of the power, the rules may provide for, among other things, removal, retirement, release or discharge from service of persons subject to the Act, assembly and procedure of Court of Inquiry, recording of summaries of evidence, convening and constitution of court-martial, procedure to be observed in trials by the courts-martial etc. Chapter V of the Army Rules 1954 contains provisions relating to investigation of charges and trial by court martial. Under rule 22, the Commanding Officer is required to hear the charge(s) brought against any person subject to the Act, in his presence with opportunity to him to cross-examine any witness against him and to call such witness and make such statement as may be necessary for his defence. If the Commanding Officer is so satisfied, he can dismiss the charge under sub-rule (2) of rule 22. If, on the other hand, at the end of hearing under Rule 22, he comes to the conclusion that the charge ought to be proceeded with, he may, among other option, adjourn the case for purpose of having the evidence reduced to writing, i.e. call for summary of evidence. If, on the other hand, at the end of hearing under Rule 22, he comes to the conclusion that the charge ought to be proceeded with, he may, among other option, adjourn the case for purpose of having the evidence reduced to writing, i.e. call for summary of evidence. Rule 23 lays down the procedure for recording of summary of evidence giving opportunity to the person concerned to cross-examine the witnesses. Under rule 24, the summary of evidence so recorded is required to be considered by the Commanding Officer. Upon such consideration he may either remand the accused for trial by a Court Martial or refer the case to the proper superior military authority, or, if he thinks it desirable, re-hear the case and either dismiss the charge or dispose of it summarily. Rule 180 finds mention in Chapter VI of the Army Rules titled Courts of Inquiry Rule 177, which is the first rule in this chapter, provides that" A Court of inquiry is an assembly of officers.............directed to collect evidence, and if so required, to report with regard to any matter which may be referred to them." We have seen above that under Rule 22, every charge against a person has to be heard by the Commanding Officer, in presence of the accused, with liberty to the accused to cross-examine any witness against him and to call such witness and make such statement as may be necessary for his defence. So where the charge against the accused is based on the result of investigation by Court of Inquiry wherein the provisions of rule 180 have been complied with in respect of that accused, it is open to the Commanding Officer to dispense with the procedure relating to the said Inquiry. In order to appreciate the point at issue, it would be proper to quote sub rule (1) of rule 22 along with the proviso as under:- "22. Hearing of Charge: - (1) Every charge against a person subject to the Act shall be heared by the Commanding Officer in the presence of the accused. The accused shall have full liberty to cross-examine any witness against him, and to call such witness and make such statement as may be necessary for his defence. Hearing of Charge: - (1) Every charge against a person subject to the Act shall be heared by the Commanding Officer in the presence of the accused. The accused shall have full liberty to cross-examine any witness against him, and to call such witness and make such statement as may be necessary for his defence. Provided that where the charge against the accused arises as a result of investiation by a Court of Inquiry, wherein the provisions of rule 180 have been complied with in respect of that accused, the commanding officer may dispense with the procedure in sub-rule(l)." 6. Rule 180 provides that where the inquiry is likely to affect the character or military reputation of a person (subject to the Army Act), opportunity should be given to him to participate in the inquiry. Having regard to the submissions of counsel, as to the alleged non-compliance of rule 180, it would be appropriate to quote said rule too as under:- "180. Procedure when character of a person subject to the Act is involved:- Save in the case of a prisoner of war who is still absent, whenever any inquiry affects the character or military reputation of a person subject to the Act, full opportunity must be afforded to such person of being present throughout the inquiry and of making any statement, and of giving any evidence he may wish to make or give, and of cross-examining any witness whose evidence, in his opinion, affects his character or military reputation and producing any witnesses in defence of his character or military reputation. The presiding officer of the Court shall take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that any such person so affected and not previously notified, receives notice of and fully understands his rights under this rule." 7. The scope of rule 180 is not res-integra. In case of Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1413, the Apex Court, considering the scope of relevant provisions, observed:- "Rule 180 sets up a stage in the procedure prescribed for the court of Inquiry, it cannot be construed to mean that whenever or wherever in any inquiry in respect of any person subject to the Act his character or military reputation is likely to be affected setting up of a Court of Inquiry is a sine qua non. Rule 180 merely makes it obligatory that whenever a Court of Inquiry is set up and in the course of inquiry by the Court of Inquiry character or military reputation of a person is likely to be affected then such a person must be given a full opportunity to participate in the proceedings of Court of Inquiry. Court of Inquiry by its very nature is likely to examine certain issues generally concerning a siutation or person. Where collective fine is desired to be imposed, a Court of Inquiry may generally examine the shortfall to ascertain how many persons are responsible. In the course of such an inquiry there may be a distant possibilty of character or military reputation of a person subject to the Act likely to be affected. His participation cannot be avoided on the specious plea that no specific inquiry was directed against the person whose character or military reputation is involved. To ensure that such a person character or military reputation is likely to be affected by the proceedings of the court of inquiry should be afforded full opportunity so that nothing is done at his back and without opportunity of participation. R. 180 merely makes an enabling provision to ensure such participation. But it cannot be used to say that whenever any other inquiry or an inquiry before a commanding officer under R.22 or convening official under Rule 37 of the trial by a Court Martial, character or military reputation of the officer concerned is likely to be affected, a prior inquiry by the court of inquiry is a sine qua non." 8. From the above observations it is evident that rule 180 is only enabling provision which enables the person concerned, whose character or military reputation is likely to be affected, in course of inquiry, to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Inquiry. Depending on the evidence collected in the Course of enquiry, the Commanding Officer under rule 22(3) may choose any of the four options. He may either (a) dispose of the case under section 80 of the Army Act in accordance with the manner and form provided in Appendix III or (b) refer the case to the proper superior military authority or (c)adjourn the case for the purpose of having the evidence reduced to writing or (d) if the accused is below the rank of warrant officer, order his summary court-martial. Thus the proceeding before the Court of Inquiry by itslef means little to the person concerned unless the Commanding Officer decides to proceed further in the matter, choosing option (c) as indicated above, i.e get summary of evidence recorded against the per-son concerned. As held by the Apex Court, prior inquiry by the Court of Inquiry is a sine qua not in all the cases. 9. In the instant case Commanding Officer choose the third option and decided to conduct disciplinary proceedings and directed recording of summary of evidence under rule 23 of the Army Rules. When the matter was brough to this Court, the proceeding was in the stage of rule 23 and statements of Witnesses were being recorded. As seen above, under rule 24 the Commanding Officer may choose one of the three options - (a) he may remand the person for trial by Court Martial, or (b) refer the case to proper superior military authority or (c) dismiss the charge or dispose of it summarily. That stage is yet to come. The grievance of the appellant, it would thus follow, is pre-mature. 10. Notwithstanding the stage of the proceeding, so far as compliance to rule 180 in the instant case is concerned, though a few witnesses were examined between 10th and 13th of July, 2003, after the appellant was called to appear, those witnesses were re-called and appellant cross-examined them. The appellant cannot, therefore, content that there has been violation of rule merely because when the inquiry commenced on 10th of July, 2003 he was not present in the proceedings. The question of giving opportunity to participate in proceedings in terms of Rule 180 arises only when it appears that the proposed or ongoing inquiry is likely to affect the character or military reputation of a person. In the instant case, when the inquiry commenced, the involvement of the particular person(s) was not known and, therefore, there was no occasion to call the appellant to be present in inquiry before or at its commencement. His involvement came to notice in course of recording of statements of witnesses, i.e. enquiry. In the instant case, when the inquiry commenced, the involvement of the particular person(s) was not known and, therefore, there was no occasion to call the appellant to be present in inquiry before or at its commencement. His involvement came to notice in course of recording of statements of witnesses, i.e. enquiry. In any view of the matter, inquiry under rule 22 being in the nature of fact finding inquiry and rule 180 being only an enabling provision, enabling the person(s) concerned to participate in inquiry, here can be no grievance against the commencement of inquiry in their absence, particularly in a case where he has been given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and he availed of such opportunity. 11. In case of S. P. Shukla and ors. V. Central Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Lucknow and ors. AIR 1996 MP 233, the petitioner been denied opportunity to be present at the Court of Inquiry and in the facts and circumstance, the High Court held that where Court of inquiry is held in absence of the person, show cause notice of Court Martial proceeding and all subsequent proceedings based there on would be vitiated and void ab initio. This decsion lends no assistance to the case of this appellant. In the above premises, we find no infirmity in the order of learned Single Judge missing the writ petition of the appellant. The appeal, accordingly, stands dismissed.