JUDGMENT : V.K. Gupta, J. In this revision petition, the import, applicability and relevance of Section 15 (2) read with sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 16 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 fell for this Court's consideration, but the facts in brief, first. 2. The respondent Om Parkash filed an application, nay an eviction petition in terms of Section 15 (2) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (1987 Act, for short), seeking the eviction of the petitioner Mohar Singh Chopra from a two room residential accommodation on the ground floor of a building known as Prairie Lodge, situated at Kaithu in Shimla town. In the eviction petition the respondent did mention certain facts about himself and his family owning and occupying a small residential set in the first floor of Prairie Lodge, but according to him this accommodation was wholly inadequate qua their actual requirement. It was also mentioned in the eviction petition that he does not own any other residential accommodation except one small residential set in "Akash View" in Lower Kaithu area in Shimla town. It was further averred in the eviction petition that the wife of the respondent owns one building known as "Manohra House", situated in Lower Jakhu, Shimla, but the building was not complete and was still under construction etc. etc. 3. In terms of sub-section (4) of Section 16 of 1987 Act, the petitioner Mohar Singh Chopra filed an application for seeking leave to contest the aforesaid eviction petition in which, inter alia, it was mentioned, that the respondent had failed to show and disclose that his spouse owns and occupies a three storyed newly constructed building known as "Manohra House" and that he also failed to disclose that another residential building known as "Akash View" consists of four residential sets, out of which three sets were sold to different persons in the recent past. For ready reference, averments to the aforesaid effect made in the aforesaid leave application of the petitioner may be reproduced hereunder, which read thus : "(c) That the petitioner/non-applicant has also failed to disclose that his spouse owns and occupies a 3 storeyed newly constructed building known as Manohra House, Jakhoo, Shimla. The building known as Manohra House, Jakhoo, Shimla owned by the spouse of the petitioner/non-applicant has more than sufficient accommodation to accommodate the family of petitioner/non-applicant for the purpose of residence. The building known as Manohra House, Jakhoo, Shimla owned by the spouse of the petitioner/non-applicant has more than sufficient accommodation to accommodate the family of petitioner/non-applicant for the purpose of residence. The said building is shown in photographs annexed herewith as Mark-B and the building is shown at point "A". (d) That the petitioner has failed to disclose that he owns another residential building in Kaithu, Shimla known as "Akash View", which compromises of 4 residential sets out of which petitioner/non-applicant has sold 3 sets to different persons in the recent past. The petitioner/non-applicant has intentionally and deliberately misrepresented the facts from this Hon'ble Court. The father and mother of petitioner does not ordinarily reside with the petitioner at Shimla. The family of petitioner consists only of petitioner, his wife, one son and daughter in law. The accommodation available with the petitioner in 'Prairie-Lodge', as well as in Manohra House, Jakhoo, Shimla is more than sufficient for the requirement of petitioner and his family members. The petitioner/non-applicant has wrongly mentioned the user of Manohra House in order to take undue benefit against the respondent/applicant in the present petition." 4. In reply to the aforesaid specific averments, in so far as "Manohra House", Jakhoo, is concerned, the respondent did admit about this building but stated that the structure was being completed and that the structure was meant to establish a Guest House and Computer business. In so far as "Akash View" is concerned, the respondent had admitted that he had sold the sets "long back", but he did not give the details of the sale transactions. For ready reference, the averments in the reply filed by the respondent with respect to "Manohra House" and "Akash View" are reproduced hereunder, which read thus : "(c) That the contents of sub-para (c) are also wrong and denied. It is denied that the Manohra House, Jakhu is available for occupation as residence to the petitioner and his family. The said structure is being completed by the family establishing the aforesaid son of the petitioner by starting a Guest House and computer business etc. the proof of such business is submitted herewith. (d) That the contents of sub-para (d) are also wrong and denied. The petitioner is owner of only one residential set in building known as Akash View, Kaithu. the proof of such business is submitted herewith. (d) That the contents of sub-para (d) are also wrong and denied. The petitioner is owner of only one residential set in building known as Akash View, Kaithu. Other residential sets in the said building stood sold long back to different persons for raising funds for the family of the petitioner. It is denied that the father and mother of the petitioner are not originally residing with the petitioner at Shimla. The son of the petitioner is a qualified MBA. As per status of the family, the entire accommodation in main building of Prairie-Lodge is bonafide required for the requirement of the family of petitioner. It is denied that the applicant/respondent has wrongly mentioned user of Manohra House." 5. The Learned Rent Controller vide her impugned order passed on 26th April, 2004 refused leave to the petitioner dismissing his leave application ostensibly on the ground that the petitioner could not succeed in establishing any triable issue on the basis of the averments made in the affidavit filed by him. 6. The "specified landlord" has been defined in Section 2(i) of 1987 Act, which reads thus :- "specified landlord" means a person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. 7. Section 15 of 1987 Act is in the nature of a special provision, special because it is distinct and peculiar in contradistinction to Section 14 of the Act which is in the nature of a general provision wherein the Legislature has provided (in section 14) that a tenant in possession of a building cannot be evicted except in accordance with the provisions contained in 1987 Act, such as those found in sub-section (2) and in other sub-sections of Section 14. The Legislature has carved out different and separate grounds entitling the landlord to seek the eviction of a tenant from a premises occupied by the tenant, depending upon the landlord succeeding to prove one or more of such grounds as have been mentioned in sub-section (2) and other sub-sections and various clauses and sub-clauses of various such sub-sections of Section 14. 8. 8. In so far as Section 15 of 1987 Act is concerned, whereas sub-section (1) deals with a person who was in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or the State Government or any local authority and such a person was required by or in pursuance of any order of such Government or authority to vacate such residential accommodation, in favour of such a person a right shall accrue to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him to a tenant, sub-section (2) of Section 15 relates to a "specified landlord" as has been defined in Section 2(i) of 1987 Act and it lays down, specifies and stipulates that where a specified landlord at any time within one year prior to, or within one year after the date of his retirement etc. etc. applies to the Rent Controller (stating therein that he or his spouse does not own or possess any suitable accommodation in the local area) for recovery of possession of one residential building for his own accommodation, a right shall immediately stand accrued on and from the date of such application, in favour of such a specified landlord to recover immediate possession of such residential building from such tenant. The relevant part of sub-section (2) of Section 15 is reproduced hereunder, which reads thus : "(2) Where a specified landlord, at any time within one year prior to or within one year after the date of his retirement or after his retirement but within one year of the appointed day whichever is later, applies to the Controller, along with a certificate from the authority competent to remove him from service indicating the date of his retirement and his affidavit to the effect that he or his spouse does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside or to start his own business, to recover possession of one residential building for his own occupation, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such application to such specified landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether expressed or implied), custom or usage to the contrary a right to recover immediate possession of such residential building or any part or parts of such building if it is let out in part or parts." 9. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 lays down that every application by a landlord filed under Section 15 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in section 16. For our purposes, sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 16 are relevant, which are reproduced hereunder and read thus : (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (Whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in Schedule-II shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord or by the specified landlord, or as the case may be, the widow, widower, child, grandchild or widowed daughter-in-law of such specified landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord or the specified landlord or, as the case may be, the widow, widower, child, grandchild or widowed daughter-in-law of such specified landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 14 or in Section 15. 10. What, therefore, emerges clearly from a reading of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Act is that whereas the specified landlord has a right vested in him in sub-section (2) of Section 15 to apply to the Rent Controller for recovery of immediate possession of a residential building let out by him to a tenant on the ground that he intends to reside in such a building and that he or his spouse does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which the building from which the tenant is sought to be evicted is situated, in terms of Section 16 of 1987 Act the tenant upon whom summons has been duly served in the form specified in Schedule-II has a right to file an application to obtain leave from the Controller and an obligation has been cast upon the Controller to grant leave to the tenant to contest the eviction petition of the specified landlord if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the specified landlord for obtaining an order for immediate possession. In other words, what it means is that the tenant after being served with the summons even though has a right of making an application for obtaining leave, the obligation and jurisdiction upon the Rent Controller to grant leave is confined and limited only to the extent of the tenant disclosing facts in his affidavit which would disentitle the specified landlord to recover the immediate possession. In the context of sub-section (2) of Section 15 the only right, therefore, which the tenant has is to disclose the facts disentitling the landlord to recover immediate possession and in the specific context of sub-section (2), the only relevant fact is about the specified landlord or his spouse not owning and possessing any other suitable accommodation in the local area. No other fact in so far as the leave application of the tenant under sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 16 is concerned is relevant or material for granting such leave to the tenant. The only ground, therefore, which is available to the tenant for obtaining leave is to disclose facts in his affidavit, which prima facie convince and satisfy the Rent Controller that the stand taken by the specified landlord that he or his spouse does not own and possess suitable accommodation in the local area is incorrect. If the tenant does not take such a ground or if he takes such a ground and if the Rent Controller is not satisfied about the tenability of such a ground the application is liable to be rejected. At the risk of repetition and reiteration I wish to point out that this is the only right vesting in the tenant in obtaining leave and the only ground, on which the leave can be obtained by the tenant is to prima facie satisfy and convince the Rent Controller that the specified landlord or his spouse owns and possesses other suitable accommodation in the local area. 11. One thing is absolutely clear. It is that an obligation is cast upon the tenant to apply to the Rent Controller and disclose in his affidavit (which he has to mandatorily file) the facts which according to him disentitle the specified landlord to recover immediate possession. If either the affidavit is not filed or the facts disentitling the specified landlord to recover possession are not disclosed, the application of the tenant under Section 16 (4) has to be dismissed. Equally important is the related issue that the disclosure of the facts disentitling the specified landlord to recover possession has a direct bearing with the prescription contained in sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act wherein the specified landlord has been conferred a right of recovering immediate possession only on his statement that he does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside. In the case of Precision Steel and Engineering Works and another v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1518 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with an analogous provision contained in Delhi Rent Control Act with respect to the obligation upon the tenant to make an application for leave to contest had the following observations to make : "12.... But what happens if the tenant appears pursuant to the summons issued under sub-section (2) of Section 25-B, files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application ? As a corollary it would transpire that the facts pleaded by the landlord are disputed and controverted. How is the Controller thereafter to proceed in the matter ? It would be open to the landlord to contest the application of the tenant seeking leave to contest and for that purpose he can file an affidavit in reply but, production and admission and evaluation of documents at the stage has no place. The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question. Does the affidavit disclose not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) ? The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavits against other set of affidavits. That is not the jurisdiction conferred on the Controller by sub-section (5) because the Controller while examining the question whether there is a proper case for granting leave to contest the application has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as would prima facie and not on contest disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. At the stage when affidavit is filed under sub-section (4) by the tenant and the same is being examined for the purposes of sub-section (5) the Controller has to confine himself only to the averments in the affidavit and the reply if any and that becomes manifestly clear from the language of sub-section (5) that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession etc. The jurisdiction to grant leave to contest or refuse the same is to be exercised on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant. That alone at that stage is the relevant document and one must confine to the averments in the affidavit. If the averments in the affidavit disclose such facts which, if ultimately proved to the satisfaction of the Court would disentitle the landlords from recovering possession, that by itself makes it obligatory upon the Controller to grant leave......... 12. With respect to the right of the landlord who has initiated the action for eviction, their Lordships made the following observations in the same judgment : "18. It is indisputable that while examining the affidavit of the tenant filed under sub-section 25B (4) for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant leave to contest the petition the landlord who has initiated the action has to be heard. It would follow as a necessary corollary that the landlord may controvert the averments made in the affidavit of the tenant but the decision to grant or refuse leave must be based on the facts disclosed in the affidavit. If they are controverted by the landlord that fact may be borne in mind but if the facts disclosed in the affidavit it of the tenant are contested by way of proof or disproof or producing evidence in the form of other affidavits or documents that would not be permissible. It is not the stage of proof of facts, it is only a stage of disclosure of facts. Undoubtedly the rules of natural justice apart from the adversary system we follow must permit the landlord to contest affidavit filed by the tenant and he can do so by controverting the same by an affidavit. It is not the stage of proof of facts, it is only a stage of disclosure of facts. Undoubtedly the rules of natural justice apart from the adversary system we follow must permit the landlord to contest affidavit filed by the tenant and he can do so by controverting the same by an affidavit. Hat would be an affidavit in reply because tenant's affidavit is the main affidavit being treated as an application seeking leave to contest the petition. But, the matter should end there. Any attempt to investigating the facts whether they appear to be proved or disproved is beyond the scope of sub-section (5) of Section 25B. Viewed from this angle the decision in Mohan Lal's case (AIR 1982 Delhi 405) rendered by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court is far in excess of the requirement of Section 25B (5) and the view taken therein does not commend to us." 13. A very delicate balance therefore has to be struck by the Rent Controller in deciding whether to grant or not to grant leave to the tenant and the guiding principle in striking this delicate balance should be the averments made in the Eviction Petition filed by the specified landlord, the disclosure of the facts in the affidavit filed by the tenant and the repudiation of such facts in the affidavit filed by the specified landlord in reply to the leave application of the tenant. While deciding the leave application, of course the Rent Controller cannot lose sight of the fact that sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act is a special provision of law, distinct from Section 14 of the Act because it deals with a special category of persons, namely "specified landlord" who needs a special protection from law because of the fact that the Legislature has decided to treat him differently from other normal landlords. 14. 14. Viewed in the aforesaid background what I find in the present case is that the petitioner-tenant by making the aforesaid averments in his leave application did raise a triable issue, in the sense that he did prima facie disclose certain facts with respect to "Akash View" and "Manohra House" buildings and that these facts should have been sufficient to satisfy or convince the learned Rent Controller in entertaining doubts that the truthfulness or the veracity of the respondent-landlord's claim that he or his spouse did not own or possess any suitable accommodation in the local area. I am saying so because the respondent-landlord did not specifically dispute the facts in the leave application raised by the petitioner tenant with respect to "Manohra House" and "Akash View" buildings even though certain riders were attached with respect to such disclosures by the respondent-landlord. Those riders, to say the least, can be made the subject-matter of trial in the eviction petition upon which, I do not wish to make or offer any comments at this stage since in this petition I am only concerned with respect to grant of leave under sub-section (5) of Section 16, which I think the tenant deserved to be granted. 15. For the foregoing reasons, I allow this revision petition and by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Rent Controller which has been impugned in this petition, hold and declare that the petitioner-tenant being entitled to grant of leave, leave shall be deemed to have been granted in his favour. CMP No. 126/2004 16. In view of the disposal of the revision petition, the present application is also disposed of.