( 1 ) C. R. P. NO. 92 of 2002 is filed by the second respondent in E. P. No. 46 of 1999 against the order dated 17-09-2001 in e. P. No. 46 of 1999 in O. S. No. 319 of 1972 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil judge, Parchur. ( 2 ) C. R. P. NO. 2446 of 2002 is also filed by him against the order dated 17-09-2001 of the same Court in I. A. No. 269 of 1999 in o. S. No. 319 of 1972. ( 3 ) SINCE both the revision petitions relate to the same transaction and in the same suit, the revision petitions are clubbed and this common order is passed. ( 4 ) THE second respondent in C. R. P. No. 92 of 2002 filed O. S. No. 319 of 1972 against the third respondent for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 26-03-1972 and obtained a decree on 12-01-1977. The first appeal covered by a. S. No. 11 of 1977 preferred by the revision petitioner and the second appeal covered by s. A. No. 78 of 1999 preferred by him before the High Court of A. P. were dismissed and the decree became final. ( 5 ) AS per the terms of the decree, the judgment-debtors have to execute a sale deed in favour of the decree holder, on payment of the balance sale consideration by him. The judgment debtors did not execute the sale deed after the disposal of the second appeal also. Therefore, the legal representative of the decree holder filed e. P. No. 46 of 1999 praying to direct the revision petitioner to execute a registered sale deed in respect of the suit property. The revision petitioner resisted the execution petition on the sole ground that it is barred by limitation. The Execution Court after hearing the contentions of bottn parties allowed the execution petition as prayed for through its order dated 17-09-2001. ( 6 ) DURING the pendency of the Execution petition the revision petitioner filed I. A. No. 269 of 1999 under Section 28 of the specific Relief Act praying to rescind the contract dated 26-03-1972 and to restore the suit property to him. The said application was dismissed by the lower Court, in view of the order passed in E. P. No. 46 of 1999. The said application was dismissed by the lower Court, in view of the order passed in E. P. No. 46 of 1999. ( 7 ) THE revision petitioner purchased the suit property through a registered sale deed dated 15-04-1972 from the Judgment debtor which was subsequent to the date of suit agreement. The first Judgment debtor did not contest the matter throughout and failed to succeed. ( 8 ) THE revision petitioner being aggrieved by the order of the lower Court in E. P. No. 46 of 1999 preferred C. R. P. No. 92 of 2002 and also preferred C. R. P. No. 2446 of 2002 against the order in I. A. No. 269 of 1999 filed under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act to rescind the contract dated 26-03-1972. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that since the decree holder did not take any steps to get the decree executed the contract of sale dated 26-03-1972 is liable to be rescinded and further submitted that as the E. P. is barred by limitation, it is liable to be dismissed. ( 10 ) IN the light of the contentions raised by both parties the following are the points for consideration by this Court: (1) Whether the E. P. No. 46 of 1999 filed by the decree holder is beyond the period of limitation? (2) Whether the agreement of sale dated 26-03-1972 is liable to be rescinded? (3) To what relief? ( 11 ) POINT No: 1: the decree holder obtained the decree in o. S. No. 319 of 1972 on 12-01-1977 for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 26-03-1972. As per the terms of the decree, the revision petitioner was directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the decree holder. The revision petitioner preferred A. S. No. 11 of 1997 in the court of the Senior Civil Judge, Chirala and it was dismissed on 31-08-1988. He also preferred S. A. No. 78 of 1989 before the High court of Andhra Pradesh and it was dismissed by the High Court on 16-06-1997. The revision petitioner preferred A. S. No. 11 of 1997 in the court of the Senior Civil Judge, Chirala and it was dismissed on 31-08-1988. He also preferred S. A. No. 78 of 1989 before the High court of Andhra Pradesh and it was dismissed by the High Court on 16-06-1997. Subsequently, the decree holder filed e. P. No. 46 of 1999 on 20-10-1998 by depositing the balance sale consideration with interest, after obtaining an order of extension from the High Court on 09-01-1998, to direct the revision petitioner under Order 21 Rule 34 C. P. C. to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the decree holder after receiving the balance of sale consideration and in the event of the failure of the revision petitioner, the Court to execute the sale deed on their behalf through process of the Court. If the date of the decree of the Junior Civil Judge, Parchur is taken into consideration, the execution petition is beyond the period of 12 years, since the original decree was passed on 12-01-1977. If the decree of the High Court in the Second Appeal is taken as 16-06-1997, the Execution Petition is within time. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the decree holder Sri M. V. S. Suresh Kumar submitted that since the revision petitioner preferred appeals before the Sub-Court and the High court, the decree of the trial Court and the first Appellate Court merged with the decree of the High Court in the second appeal. Therefore, the limitation starts to run from the date of the disposal of the second appeal i. e. , 16-06-1997. Hence, the decree-holder has ample time to file the execution petition within 12 years from the date of the decree of the High Court and as the execution petition was filed on 20-10-1998, it is within time. Therefore, the decree is enforceable against the revision petitioner and the question of rescinding the contract of sale under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act does not arise. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioner Sri T. Jagadish submitted that since the execution petition was filed beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree of the Junior Civil Judge, Parchur, the execution petition could not be maintained. Therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioner Sri T. Jagadish submitted that since the execution petition was filed beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree of the Junior Civil Judge, Parchur, the execution petition could not be maintained. Therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for both parties placed strong reliance on various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts and they requested to pass appropriate orders in the light of the principles laid down in those judgments. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the following rulings and requested to hold that the execution petition is barred by limitation. ( 16 ) IN Ratansingh v. Vijaysing the supreme Court while considering the scope of Article 136 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 held as follows:"article 136 of the Schedule to the limitation Act, 1963 provides 12 years for execution of any decree or order of any Civil Court (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction ). The third column in the Article which indicates the time from which period begins to run, states that "when the decree or order becomes enforceable. . . . . " Normally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date. But cases are not unknown when the decree becomes enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified events. The expression "enforceable" has been used to cover such decrees or orders also which become enforceable subsequently. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate Court! stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower Court and it is the appellate Court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower court decree continues to be enforceable. " ( 17 ) UNDER Article 182 of the old Limitation act, the time from which the period would begin to run was shown as: (1) Date of the decree or order or (2) Whether there has been appeal, the date of final decree or order by the appellate Court or withdrawal of the appeal. " ( 17 ) UNDER Article 182 of the old Limitation act, the time from which the period would begin to run was shown as: (1) Date of the decree or order or (2) Whether there has been appeal, the date of final decree or order by the appellate Court or withdrawal of the appeal. ( 18 ) SECTION 48 of the old C. P. C. prescribed a period of 12 years, before expiry of which, an application could be made for execution. "section 48 (1) Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from (a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or, (b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed (a) to preclude the Court from ordering the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the said term of twelve years, where the judgment debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at sometime within twelve years immediately before the date of the application; or (b) to limit or otherwise affect the operation of Article 180 of the second schedule to the Indian limitation Act, 1877. ( 19 ) THE provision under Article 182 of the old Limitation Act, was quite different from its corresponding Article 136 of the present limitation Act. Now period of execution of a decree starts running from the date when it becomes enforceable. ( 20 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that as per the above decision of the Supreme Court the decree becomes enforceable from the date on which the Appellate Court passed the decree which supersedes the decree of the trial court and as there was no decree passed by the first Appellate Court or second Appellate court altering the decree passed by the trial court it became enforceable from the date of decree of the trial Court. Therefore, the execution petition filed beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree of the trial Court cannot be maintained. ( 21 ) IN Antonysami v. Arulanandam Pillar, the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 held that when a decree of specific performance was passed with a direction that the decree holder should deposit the balance of sale consideration before a particular date and the judgment debtor to measure and demarcate the land before the same date and when the decree holder deposited the amount the limitation for execution starts despite the Judgment debtor failing to demarcate the land, the decree becomes executable when once the decree holder deposits the amount. ( 22 ) IN West Bengal Essential commodities Supply Corporation v. Swadesh Agro Farming and Storage Pvt. Ltd. and another, the Supreme Court held as follows:"the period of limitation for execution of decree under Article 136 of the limitation Act runs from the date of the decree and not from the date when the decree is actually drawn up and signed by the Judge. "23. In Bhuralal v. Jiwansingh and another, Modi, J. , held as follows:"article 182 is not exhaustive in the sense that it is not the only Article which applies to execution applications and that Article 181 may also be applicable to such applications. Article 181 is a residuary Article and will only apply where the application of article 182 is excluded. The correct article applicable to applications for execution in conditional decrees is article 181, Limitation Act and not article 182, and that as there is nothing in law to preclude the decree holder from performing the condition laid down in the decree on the very day the decree is passed, where no date for the performance of the condition is specified in the decree itself, the decree holder has the liberty to perform the condition within three years of the date of the decree at the most but not beyond it, and he cannot be permitted to extend this period by a belated performance of the condition which it was for him to fulfill. " ( 23 ) IN L. Lahori Ram Sangal v. L. Prabhu dayal, a Division Bench of Allahabad High court considered the scope of Section 148 c. P. C. , 1908, regarding the extension of time in a decree for specific performance held as follows:"the decree was to become executable only on compliance of its terms. Failure to comply with the terms would make the decree inexecutable. The decree holder not having fulfilled the terms of the contract had no right to get the decree execuwted. " ( 45 ) THE law laid down in the above decisions, makes it clear that the period for execution of a decree starts running from the date when it becomes enforceable. The above decisions are not helpful to the revision petitioner on the question as to when the limitation for execution of a decree starts to run. ( 25 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand cited the following decisions regarding the starting point of limitation for execution of the decree. ( 26 ) IN Nalluri Veerraju v. Sri Kanchi kamakashammavari Temple at madhavaram, West Godavari Dist. S. Dasaradharama Reddy, J. , of A. P. High court while considering the scope of article 136 of the Limitation Act held that the limitation has to be computed from the date of the appellate decree, in the appeal preferred by one of the defendants, though the petitioner himself did not file the said appeal. The Court further held that when one of the judgment debtors filed appeal against the decree and judgment of the trial Court though dismissed, the Execution Petition filed against the second Judgment debtor is not barred by time, as the limitation has to be computed from the date of the appellate decree. ( 27 ) IN Posani Ramachandraiah v, daggupati Seshamma, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:"where appellate decree is sought to be executed, limitation starts from the date of that decree as decree of the first court merges with the decree of the appellate Court. "the court further held:"article 136 says that the period of limitation begins to run when the decree or order becomes enforceable. It does not say when it becomes enforceable. "the court further held:"article 136 says that the period of limitation begins to run when the decree or order becomes enforceable. It does not say when it becomes enforceable. The repealed Section 48 c. P. C. says, that no order for execution of a decree shall be made after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed. The meaning of the words "from the date of the decree sought to be executed," in Section 48 C. P. C. and the words "where the decree or order becomes enforceable" in Article 136, is practically the same. ""when the Legislature enacted article 136 by omitting Section 48 c. P. C. and re-producing it in Art. 136, they must have been aware of the interpretation of Section 48 by the Courts and approved of it. Consequently, under Article 136 of the present Limitation Act, the period of limitation can be reckoned from the date of the appellate decree, even though there was no stay in the appeal. If there is an appeal, the decree that can be enforced is that of the appellate court, and the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date of that decree. " ( 28 ) IN Thodkamalla Venkata Laxmi narayanarao v. Kishanlap, a Division Bench of this High Court while considering the scope of Section 48 CPC and Article 182 of the old Limitation Act held as follows:"when execution application filed beyond 12 years of original decree but within time from the date of dismissal of appeal by appellate Court, the execution application is not barred by section 48 C. P. C. in view of the unrestricted words "where there has been an appeal" in Article 182 of the old Limitation Act. " ( 29 ) IN Nacharammal and others v. Veerappa Chettiar and others, a Division bench of Madras High Court while dealing with Section 48 C. P. C. held as follows:"where an appellate Court passes a decree it takes the place of the decree of a trial Court, and it is the decree of the appellate Court only which becomes capable of execution, consequently the period of 12 years under Section 48 commences from the date of such appellate decree and not from the date of the decree of the trial court. " ( 30 ) IN S. T. M. Vyravan Chettiar v. R. M. Rayalu Ayyar Nagaswami Ayyar and co. , a Division Bench of Madras High court held as follows:"the period of 12 years under Sec. 48 would be computed from the date of the decree and not from the date when that decree is amerded. " ( 31 ) THE trend of the above decisions leads to a conclusion that irrespective of allowing or dismissing the appeal, the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the appellate decree for filing the execution petition. ( 32 ) IN the present case the appeals preferred by the revision petitioner were dismissed. Therefore, the contention of the revision petitioner that the limitation runs from the date of the original decree cannot be accepted. It is applicable to cases where appeals were entertained at the instance of one of the judgment debtors also. ( 33 ) IN the light of the above legal position it can be safely concluded that from the date of the decree of the High Court dated 16-06-1997, the execution petition was within time. Therefore, it is not barred by limitation. ( 34 ) POINT No: 2: the revision petitioner filed I. A. No. 269 of 1999 under Section 28 of the Specific Relief act requesting to rescind the contract dated 26-03-1972 and to restore the schedule property to the revision petitioner directing the respondent to pay the costs. The revision petitioner in the said application contended that he purchased the schedule property under a registered sale deed dt. 15-04-1972 from the third respondent. The Principal district Munsif Court, Chirala passed a decree on 12-01-1977 for specific performance of the contract of sale dated 26-03-1972, wherein he was directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the first respondent. The first respondent did not file the execution petition to execute the decree within the period of 12 years, therefore, it is barred by limitation. He also contended that since the first respondent failed to pay the balance of purchase money within the period of limitation, the decree for specific performance is barred by limitation, therefore, the contract has to be rescinded by holding that he is entitled for restoration of possession of the property. He also contended that since the first respondent failed to pay the balance of purchase money within the period of limitation, the decree for specific performance is barred by limitation, therefore, the contract has to be rescinded by holding that he is entitled for restoration of possession of the property. The first respondent resisted the application contending that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court settled the issue between the parties regarding the execution of the sale deeds and he further contended that since the High court allowed him to pay the balance of sale consideration by extending time, he is entitled to get the decree enforced through the execution petition. ( 35 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, the High Court directed the revision petitioner to execute proper sale deed in favour of the first respondent in pursuance of the contract of sale dated 26-03-1972. The decree became final. It is also disclosing from the record, this High court permitted the first respondent to pay the balance of sale consideration to the revision petitioner on or before 23-10-1998 through its order in C. M. P. No. 14087 of 1998. ( 36 ) THE revision petitioner contended that the first respondent filed E. P. No. 46 of 1999 and deposited the balance of sale consideration into Court and got issued a notice only one day earlier to the last date i. e. , 23-10-1998 allowed by the High Court, therefore, it amounts to violation of the direction given by the High Court. Hence, the contract is liable to be rescinded. The execution petition was filed on 20-10-1998. The amount was also deposited along with the execution petition. The second respondent being the legal representative of the first respondent obtained permission from the High Court to pay the balance of sale consideration and as the amount was deposited within the time granted by the high Court, the contract is not liable to be rescinded. The revision petitioner further pleaded that the contract is liable to be rescinded due to filing of the execution petition beyond the period of limitation. But after calculating the period of limitation from the date of the decree of the High Court dated 16-06-1997, the execution petition is well within time. Therefore, the rescinding of the contract on the ground of filing of the execution petition beyond the period of limitation does not arise. But after calculating the period of limitation from the date of the decree of the High Court dated 16-06-1997, the execution petition is well within time. Therefore, the rescinding of the contract on the ground of filing of the execution petition beyond the period of limitation does not arise. This point is accordingly answered against the revision petitioner. ( 37 ) POINT No: 3: in the result the revision petitions covered by C. R. P. No. 92 of 2002 and 2446 of 2002 are dismissed as devoid of merits by confirming the orders of the lower Court dated 17-09-2001 in E. P. No. 46 of 1999 and in I. A. No. 269 of 1999. No order as to costs.