ARUN KUMAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THE hearing stems from an appeal preferred by the convicts Ramji Sonkar, Laljl Sonkar and Sura] Sonkar against the judgrnent and order of conviction and sentence passed by sri S. K. Cangopadhyay, ld. Sessions Judge, 11th Bench of City Sessions Court at Calcutta in Sessions Case No. 2/1994 (S. T. 1/ june/1904) on 28-5-1999. ( 2 ) THE miniaturised version of the prosecution is that on 31-1-1991 at about 10. 30 a. m. when the defacto-complainant was taking tea at the corner of Nawab Lane and maharshi Debendra Road, he found accused ramji Sonkar, Lalji Sonkar and Suraj Sonkar talking in a high offensive tone with jharnalal Sonkar over the issue of some money. After a while, Lalji and Suraj disappeared and came back soon with long knife and chopper. Laljl made over a long knife (sword) to Ramji. Oh seeing it Jharnalal started running towards south along maharshi Debendra Road, and in front of corporation Office they nabbed Jharnalal and started assaulting him resulting in his fall on the road when Ramji pushed a long knife on the back. A police constable, Jha by title, appeared there and caught Ramji red handed with a long knife. Jharnalal was removed to Sri Bisudhananda Hospital and from there to S. S. K. M. Hospital where he succumbed to injuries at about 6. 00 a. m. on 1-2-1991. Hence, all the three accused persons were charged u/s. 302/34, I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE defence case, as suggested to p. Ws. and as contended by the accused persons during their examination u/s. 313. , Cr. P. C. , is that no such incident took place and they have been falsely implicated in this case. ( 4 ) 19 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution, while none was examined on behalf of the defence, and after considering the facts, circumstances and materials on record, the ld. Court below found all the above accused persons guilty u/s. 302/34, I. P. C. , convicted them accordingly and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 5000/-each i. d. to R. I. for one year each. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the above order of conviction and sentence, all the three convicts have preferred the present appeal. 5000/-each i. d. to R. I. for one year each. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the above order of conviction and sentence, all the three convicts have preferred the present appeal. ( 6 ) ALL that now requires to be considered is whether ld. Court 'below was Justified in passing the above order, of conviction and sentence. ( 7 ) OUT of the above witnesses, P. W. 2 (brother), P. W. 3 (cousin brother ). P. W. 4 (defacto-complainant), P. W. 5 (cassette shop-owner), P. W. 8 (police constable) being eye-witnesses, P. W. 9 (M. O. of Bisudhananda hospital), P. W. 16 (autopsy surgeon), P. W. 17 (doctor of S. S. K. M. Hospital) and P. W. 19 (I. O.) are vital, and others are either formal or post-occurrence witnesses. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to the evidence of P. W. 2, on 31-1-1991 at about 10. 30 a. m. when he along with his elder brother Jharnalal (victim) and another brother Satilal (P. W. 3) was proceeding towards posts along M. D. Road, his elder brother demanded money from accused Ramji. He and P. W. 3 went to jagannath Temple at Nawab Lane. There on hearing a cry from M. D. Road, they rushed towards M. D. Road and found accused suraj, Lalji and Ramji chasing his elder brother with awjar (sword like weapon) in their hands, and Suraj to hit with a rod on the back side of his right knee resulting in his fall on the road in front of Corporation building followed by stabbing of Ramji on the left side of back portion of his body by awjar. Lalji and Suraj left the P. O. A fatty constable Jha by title caught hold Ramji with the said awjar (Mst. Ext. III ). They removed their brother to Bisudhananda Hospital where first-aid was given and thereafter he was removed to S. S. K. M. Hospital where he succumbed to injuries. The above evidence is corroborat on material particulars by p. W. 3, P. W. 4, P. W. 8, P. W. 9, P. W. 10, P. W. 16, p. W. 17 and PW. 19. It is the evidence of p. W. 4 that during the period of altercation between the victim Jharnalal on the one side and Ramji, Lalji and Suraj on the other, Lalji and Suraj went towards Ganguly Lane followed by their return. 19. It is the evidence of p. W. 4 that during the period of altercation between the victim Jharnalal on the one side and Ramji, Lalji and Suraj on the other, Lalji and Suraj went towards Ganguly Lane followed by their return. The mere fact that a witness is declared hostile by the party calling him and allowed to cross-examine does not make him unreliable so as to exclude his evidence from consideration altogether, and his evidence is to be considered for what it is worth ( AIR 1976 SC 202 : (1976 Cri LJ 203); AIR 1976 SC 294 : (1976 Cri LJ 295)etc. ). In other words, evidence of a hostile witness can be accepted in part and it is to be considered in the light of other evidence on record (1978 Cri LJ 196 ). Here, P. W. 5 who was declared hostile, found an altercation between the victim and Ramji over some money matter, from his cassette shop at nawab Lane and on his return from house after keeping his daughter there saw the victim gasping and the local people shouting "murder taken place". It is his further evidence that Ramji took a sword from Lalji and Suraj, that a police constable caught hold Ramji with a sword which was seen by him from a distance and the police seized the said awjar (sword) under a S. List in his presence. P. W. 8 who was on duty near the crossing of M. D. Road and Nawab Lane found at about 11. 00 a. m. accused Ramji, lalji and Suraj to rush from the side of Corporation Building towards Ganguly Lane. He caught hold accused Ramji with a blood-stained sword, the handle of which was made of wood, near the crossing of M. D. Road and Nawab Lane. Other two accused viz. Lalji and Suraj fled away along Ganguly lane. He noticed Jharna lying with bleeding injury on M. D. Road in front of Corporation office being surrounded by his brothers and others. He advised them to shift jharna to hospital in a rickshaw and requested P. W. 4 to inform Burrabazar P. S. over phone. Other two accused viz. Lalji and Suraj fled away along Ganguly lane. He noticed Jharna lying with bleeding injury on M. D. Road in front of Corporation office being surrounded by his brothers and others. He advised them to shift jharna to hospital in a rickshaw and requested P. W. 4 to inform Burrabazar P. S. over phone. After sometime S. I. D. K. Aich (P. W. 19) with force came, prepared a S. List in presence of witnesses, pasted label on the handle of the sword and directed him (P. W. 8) to go to burrabazar P. S. with accused Ramji. The above evidence of catching hold of accused ramji is supported by P. W. 6 who was declared hostile. P. W. 9 on examination of the victim Jharnalal in the emergency room of bisudhananda Hospital found (1) lacerated cut injury 2" x x " on the right side occipital region of scalp and (2) penetrating injury 3" x 1" lung deep on the back of the left scapular region, gave first aid and referred him to the R. S. Surgeon who in turn referred him to Medical College and Hospital. History of the injuries as reported to him by the patient, is that when he asked Ramji to clear his dues, there was a quarrel between him and Ramji, Lalji and Suraj and he was assaulted with a bhojali by Ramji thereby causing injury. The said injury No. 2, she opined, can be caused by hitting with sword (Mat. Ext. III ). An injury report is admissible and relevant u/s. 32 of the evidence Act ( (1977) 81 Cal WN 724 ). A dying declaration is a statement by a person as to cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances resulting in his death and it becomes relevant u/s. 32 (1) of the Evidence act in a case in which the cause of death of that person comes into question. A dying declaration is admitted in evidence by way of an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence, on the principle of necessity ( AIR 1970 SC 1566 : (1970 Cri LJ 1415) ). So, the said injury report (Ext. 6) of P. W. 9 may be treated as dying declaration which strengthens the testimony of P. Ws. 2 to 4 and 8. So, the said injury report (Ext. 6) of P. W. 9 may be treated as dying declaration which strengthens the testimony of P. Ws. 2 to 4 and 8. P. W. 10 on examination of the victim at about 1. 15 p. m. at S. S. K. M. Hospital found injury on the back of the chest. P. W. 17 who conducted operation of the victim at the Cardio-thoracic unit of S. S. K. M. Hospital found open wound on the left side of the back of the chest, air coming out from the said wound, injury in the interior chest wall which cut the internal mammary, artery and vein, collection of blood at the pleural cavity and profuse bleeding from the body. As there was lung injury, lung was repaired by sutures, said she. The injuries on the body of the patient, especially the back injury, were fatal. At the time of operation she found multiple injuries on the chest cavity and chest wall, and the patient ultimately died at 6. 00 a. m. on 1-2-1991. P. W. 16 who held P. M. Examination over the dead body of the victim on 1-2-1991 found six injuries vi/. (1)an incised wound 1" in length, " in breadth and muscle and rib deep, placed 7 above left iliac crest in the back of left side of chest. terminating by making an incised cut " x 0. 2" x 0. 1" over left 10th rib in the back-direction of the wound being from back to front and towards left, (2) an incised penetrating injury, placed 2 left of midline in the back, cutting the skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscle, vessels and nerves of second intercostal space and second and third ribs of left side in the back, entering the thoracic cavity and terminating by making an incised cut over left pluera in the back and left in its upper lobe on the posterior surface measuring 3/4" x 0. 2" lung substance deep with partial collapse of the upper lobe of the left lung, (3) one wound of 2 in length obliquely placed, 7" above left axis. 7" left to the midline in anterior chest wall. 2" lung substance deep with partial collapse of the upper lobe of the left lung, (3) one wound of 2 in length obliquely placed, 7" above left axis. 7" left to the midline in anterior chest wall. cutting the skin in an oblique manner subcutaneous tissues, muscle, vessels and nerves of the intercostal space, 5th and 6th ribs on the front of chest in left side, perforating the lower lobe of left lung from front to back with collapse of that lobe, (4) one obliquely placed transverse wound in layers placed on the posterio-lateral aspect of middle of left side of chest, entering up to left thoracic cavity with evidence of partial resection of left 5th and 6th ribs with evidence of repair of left lung, (5) one lacerated injury 3" x " x 0. 2 0. 3" above the aponurosis (back of the head) deep, placed over back of occipital region in right side and over right parietal bone with bruise and haematoma and (6) multiple abrasion on the lateral aspect of right patella. The death, in his opinion, was due to the effect of injuries as noted above, ante-mortem and homicidal in nature. It is his further opinion that injury Nos. 2 and 3 might have been caused by a weapon like Mat. Ext. III or a weapon of similar nature, injury No. 5 might have been caused with a hard blunt substance like iron rod or due to effect of infliction of injury by hard blunt weapon or object or following fall over hard blunt substance or surface. ( 9 ) MR. Sudipta Maitra, ld. counsel for the appellants, on referring to the evidence of p. W. 2 and formal F. I. R. (Ext.) contended that while the incident is said to have taken place at about 10. 30 a. m. and Burrabazar p. S. is at a walking distance from the P. D. , the matter was reported to the P. S. at about 17. 50 hrs. i. e. after about 7 hours and this unexplained long delay gives rise to a reasonable suspicion about the alleged incident. The question of delay in lodging F. I. R. is to be considered in the background of human factors involved such as the time required by the persons concerned to compose themselves before deciding on their course of action AIR 1981 SC 2073 : 1981 Crilj 1701. The question of delay in lodging F. I. R. is to be considered in the background of human factors involved such as the time required by the persons concerned to compose themselves before deciding on their course of action AIR 1981 SC 2073 : 1981 Crilj 1701. Here, on seeing the incident P. W. 4 reported the matter to Burrabazar P. S. over phone followed by arrival of police after sometime, p. W. 19 (I. O.) on receipt of a telephonic message at about 11. 55 a. m. from one Rajkumar mali (P. W. 4) intimating that a person was assaulted by chopper near C. M. C. Office at Posts recorded G. D. E. No. 2938 dated 31-1-1991. reported the matter to O. C. , burabazar P. S. and to ascertain the fact went to the P. O. on M. D. Road near C. M. C. Office with force, found constable Joy Kumar Jha (P. W. 8) and constable Ganesh Dubey there. Constable Joy Kumar Jha disclosed the name of the miscreant as Ramji who was caught by them. He searched for the Informant Rajkumar Mali and recorded his statement which disclosed a cognisable offence. He sought for instruction from O. C. , burabazar P. S. over phone and started investigation of the case. On directing the said two constables to wait there with the miscreant Ramji he rushed to Sri Bisudhananda hospital for recording the statement of the victim, if available and on coming to learn that the victim was treated there and was shifted to a Govt. Hospital as his condition was serious, he had been to Medical College and Hospital and as no such patient was admitted there, he came back to P. O. , arrested accused Ramji, seized a sword from his possession under a S. List, labelled, packed and sealed the same followed by recording the statement of a few witnesses. He sent accused Ramji with the seized article to burrabazar P. S. , had been to S. S. K. M. Hospital, collected M. C. from Dr. Gobinda mondal (P. W. 10), came to learn from Cardio thoracic Unit that the victim was shifted to o. T. After waiting till 4. 00 p. m. as he could not contact the victim or any of his relatives he returned to Burrabazar P. S. and started p. S. case No. 47 dated 31-1-1991 u/s. 307/ 34 IPC. Gobinda mondal (P. W. 10), came to learn from Cardio thoracic Unit that the victim was shifted to o. T. After waiting till 4. 00 p. m. as he could not contact the victim or any of his relatives he returned to Burrabazar P. S. and started p. S. case No. 47 dated 31-1-1991 u/s. 307/ 34 IPC. So, the said delay for about 7 hours appears to have been duly and satisfactorily explained. When deceased is immediately rushed to hospital seriously injured and the relatives are under shock for sometime and are then mainly concerned with the treatment, and if then F. I. R. is delayed for considerable hours till the police arrived at the hospital, such delay was held to be not fatal, AIR 1981 SC 1237 : 1981 Cri LJ 743. ( 10 ) MR. Maitra, on referring to the evidence of P. W. 5 next argued that he signed the S. List (Ext. 3/2) at about 1. 30 p. m. whereas the case was started at 17. 50 hrs. i. e. process of investigation was started long back and as such the F. I. R. is hit by Sec. 162 Cr. P. C. Section 154 Cr. P. C. is not a mandatory but directory provision. Receipt of every information, as a matter of law, does not start investigation, which commences only if some material step is taken in that direction. In other words, any sort of information vague or indefinite first in point of time is not necessarily "the first information", and whether a particular information amounts to first information or not is essentially a question of fact depending upon circumstances of each case. After removal of the victim to hospital, P. W. 4 reported about the incident without disclosing in detail over phone to the P. S. at about 12/12. 30 hrs. P. W. 9 examined the victim at the emergency room of Bisudhananda Hospital at about 11. 30 a. m. The above reporting time of 12. 00 hrs. appears to tally with the evidence of P. W. 19, but that P. W. 4 informed about a "jhamela" does not appear to be in consonance with the evidence of P. W. 19 whose specific evidence is that on receipt of a telephonic message at about 11. 30 a. m. The above reporting time of 12. 00 hrs. appears to tally with the evidence of P. W. 19, but that P. W. 4 informed about a "jhamela" does not appear to be in consonance with the evidence of P. W. 19 whose specific evidence is that on receipt of a telephonic message at about 11. 55 a. m. from one Rajkumar Mali (P. W. 4) that a person was assaulted by chopper near C. M. C. Office at Posts, he entered the same in g. D. E. No. 2938 dated 31-1-1991, reported about it to O. C. , Burrabazar P. S. , to verify the said information had been to the P. O. with force and after searching out the informant Rajkumar Mali recorded his statement (Ext. 1/1) and as the said statement disclosed a cognisable offence, after seeking instruction from O. C. , Burrabazar P. S. over phone he started investigation. The said g. D. E could not be produced as it was destroyed by fire. The statement to police before commencement of investigation is not inadmissible. In this connection, the decision reported in M. P. Joyraj v. State of karnataka, 1980 Cr LJ (NOC) 13 may be referred to. To bring a document within the mischief of Sec. 162 (1) Cr. P. C. , it must have to be shown that the statement was recorded in the course of investigation which is not the case here. ( 11 ) MR. Maitra on taking us through the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4, 8 and 19 pointed out certain contradictions due to omission. Statements to police are meant to be brief and omission amounts to contradiction when it is in respect of a vital point, AIR 1979 SC 1234 : 1979 Cri LJ 1027, but omission in minor details cannot be utilised as contradiction, AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Cri lj 1231. The crucial test is to see if the two statements cannot stand together. In the present case, some of the statements made before the Court and those recorded by police there do not appear to be difference in meaning and effect, and in respect of some statements before the Court which may be said to be omissions due to contradictions, the gap can be said to have been filled up by the specific evidence on that point on behalf of other witnesses. ( 12 ) MR. Maitra on referring to the evidence P. Ws. contended that the weapon of offence used in assaulting the victim, as deposed by P. Ws. 9 and 10, is bhojali and nepala respectively which is quite contradiction to the evidence of other witnesses, and the P. O. as reported to P. W. 10 and P. W. 17 is Nagina karta and home respectively which is also inconsistent with the evidence of other witnesses as also the sketch map and as such on the face of such vital contradictions his clients are entitled to acquittal on the basis of the rule of benefit of doubt. All the eye-witnesses P. Ws. 2 to 4 and 8 have deposed in the same tune that the victim was assaulted with awjar (sword like weapon) on M. D. Road in front of Corporation Building which has been shown in the sketch map and accused ramji was caught red handed with the blood stained sword (Mat. Ext. III), and so on the face of the above evidence the said discrepancies in regard to the weapon of offence narrated to the doctor (P. W. 9) by the victim who on being chased by the accused persons was assaulted on back after his fall or of the P. O. by the patient party to the doctors (P. Ws. 10 and 17) being negligible, overmuch importance cannot be attached to it. No animus of those eye-witnesses against the accused persons having been made out, it improbabilises the hypothesis of false implication. Truth suffers from infirmity when projected through human process. Standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline which cannot be twisted into a doctrine of acquittal. Considering the overall evidence when there is general agreement in regard to the substratum of the Prosecution case, the question of invoking the rule of benefit of doubt is out of the way. ( 13 ) THE next argument advanced by Mr. Standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline which cannot be twisted into a doctrine of acquittal. Considering the overall evidence when there is general agreement in regard to the substratum of the Prosecution case, the question of invoking the rule of benefit of doubt is out of the way. ( 13 ) THE next argument advanced by Mr. Maitra is that since according to the evidence of P. W. 2, accused Suraj hit with a rod on the back of the right knee of the victim, accused Ramji stabbed on the left of back of his chest, P. W 8 caught hold accused Ramji with the sword and the victim stated the name of accused Ramji alone before P. W. 9 as is assailant, Section 34 has no manner of application in case of accused Lalji and also accused Suraj, as had Suraj any intention to commit murder of the victim he would not have hit him on his knee. Sec. 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. If participating presence of a plurality of assailants is proved, the conjoint culpability for the crime is inescapable. Common intention may be inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and such other relevant circumstances. The inference can also be gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concept with which the beating was given or the injuries were caused by one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries, the concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence, as, for instance, that all of them had left the scene of incident together and other acts which all or some might have done as would help in determining the common intention of all. In other words, the totality of circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted air 1972 SC 254 : 1972 Cri LJ 227. The pre-arranged plan may develop on the spot during the course of the commission of the offence. In other words, the totality of circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted air 1972 SC 254 : 1972 Cri LJ 227. The pre-arranged plan may develop on the spot during the course of the commission of the offence. In the case on hand, over the issue of demand for re-payment of money by the victim Jharnalal from accused Ramji, there was an altercation between the former and the accused persons. Accused Lalji and Suraj went towards Ganguly Lane and returned. All of them chased the victim with awjar. It is the evidence of P. W. 3 that accused Suraj hit the victim with an iron rod on the back of his left knee resulting in his fall on the road in front of Corporation Building and then all the three accused persons assaulted him with awjar and rod, and accused Ramji stabbed on the back of his chest with awjar. When all the three accused persons rushed from the side of Corporation Building towards Ganguly Lane, P. W. 8 caught hold accused Ramji with the sword. PW 4 stated the names of accused Lalji and Suraj as assailants when the victim fell down on the road which, of course, does not appear to be in consonance with the F. I. R. . As discussed earlier P. W. 16 found as many as six injuries, out of which injury No. 6 relates to right patella which leads to support the above evidence regarding hit by accused suraj with an iron rod on the back of right knee. The victim was assaulted by all the three accused persons, as deposed by P. W. 3 is buttressed by other 5 injuries of the victim. Common intention may be gathered from the nature of weapon carried and the gesture and words used. When more than one person jointly chased a victim and were armed in a manner that enables each to know what the other is carrying, there can be no doubt about the commonness of the intention. So, common intention of all the accused persons is spelt out from the above circumstances. Accordingly the above contention of Mr. Maitra is not at all sustainable. ( 14 ) LAST but not the least, Mr. So, common intention of all the accused persons is spelt out from the above circumstances. Accordingly the above contention of Mr. Maitra is not at all sustainable. ( 14 ) LAST but not the least, Mr. Maitra contended that as demand of money by the victim from accused Ramji followed by altercation between the parties gave rise to the occasion of committing the crime, the offence comes within Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC and as such the provision of Section 304, Part II and not Section 302 IPC is attracted. Out of four conditions to invoke the said Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, two are (1) it was a sudden fight and (2) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The word "fight" is used to convey something more than a verbal quarrel and it postulates a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged which is not involved here. An assailant cannot but be said to have taken undue advantage of his victim if the latter is taken completely unaware and is struck when he does not even suspect that he is about to be struck. Furthermore, no reasonable person can expect that as man would whip out a knife and struck another on a vital part of the body with it on account of a petty quarrel. If the weapon or manner of attack by the assailant is out of all proportion to the offence committed, the assailant must also be held to have acted in an unusual manner. When a victim fell down and the accused inflicted two more blows on him, the third one being proved to be fatal, it was held that he acted cruelly with no justification and was not entitled to the benefit of exception 4. In this connection, the decisions, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1982 : (1978 cri LJ 995) and AIR 2000 SC 1271 : (2000 cri LJ 1778) may well be referred to. In another case, which involved a sudden quarrel between the accused, assailant and the victim who was unarmed and the assailant and co-accused injured him fatally by axe, it was held that the accused is not entitled to Exception 2 or Exception 4 of Section 300, i. P. C. , AIR 1979 SC 133 : (1979 Cri LJ 49 ). In another case, which involved a sudden quarrel between the accused, assailant and the victim who was unarmed and the assailant and co-accused injured him fatally by axe, it was held that the accused is not entitled to Exception 2 or Exception 4 of Section 300, i. P. C. , AIR 1979 SC 133 : (1979 Cri LJ 49 ). Here, not only the unarmed victim was chased, but even after his fall on the road on account of hit with rod on the back of his knee, he was assaulted by the accused persons on the left side of back of his chest causing fatal injuries, and as such the question of invoking the provision of Section 304, part II, I. P. C. is redundant. In the case of murder, the offender has a positive intention and knowledge. He assaults on the victim with the intention of causing death or with a definite knowledge that (i) the bodily injuries inflicted by him would cause death or (ii) the injury would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (iii) the injuries were so imminently dangerous that it must cause death. Motive prompts a man to form an intention. Intention and knowledge in many cases merge into each other and intention can be presumed from knowledge ( AIR 1956 SC 488 : (1956 Cri LJ 919 (2) ). Intention to cause death is not always necessary. Intention to cause injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is enough to bring the accused within the ambit of Section 302, i. P. C. , AIR 1979 SC 1006 : (1979 Cri LJ 883 ). Considering all the above aspects the present case is pure and simple a case of murder coming within the ambit of Section 302 read with Section 34, I. P. C. ( 15 ) IN the premises, in the light of the above discussion, there being no material to Interfere with the findings of the ld. Court below, the present appeal be dismissed on contest. ( 16 ) THE impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the ld. Sessions Judge, 11th Bench of City Sessions Court at Calcutta in Sessions Case No. 2/94 (S. T. 1/june/1994) on 28-5-1999 be confirmed. ( 17 ) ALAMATS, if any, be destroyed after the period of appeal is over. ( 16 ) THE impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the ld. Sessions Judge, 11th Bench of City Sessions Court at Calcutta in Sessions Case No. 2/94 (S. T. 1/june/1994) on 28-5-1999 be confirmed. ( 17 ) ALAMATS, if any, be destroyed after the period of appeal is over. ( 18 ) CONVICTS Lalji Sonkar and Suraj sonkar who are on bail are directed to surrender before the ld. Court below at once to serve out the sentence. ( 19 ) LET a copy of this judgment along with the L. C. R. be sent down at once to the ld. Court below. NURE ALAM CHOWDHURY, J. : 20. I agree. Appeal dismissed.