Judgment :- V.S. Sirpurkar, J. This judgment will dispose of three Habeas Corpus Petitions, they being H.C.P. Nos.1488, 1489 and 1490 of 2003. All these petitions were filed by one Nallarasu. In H.C.P. No.1488 of 2003 the petitioner seeks for the production of the detenu P. Venkatesan alias Radio Venkatesan before this Court and to set him at liberty while in the other two petitions, he seeks for the quashing of the continuous detention of the detenu Suo alias Sundaram and to set him at liberty. It is a common ground that these detenus are facing criminal prosecutions for the offences under the provisions of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, Indian Penal Code as also the Explosive Substances Act and Arms Act vide C.C. Nos.6 of 1994 and 9 of 1994 and they are in judicial custody. It is also an admitted position that the earlier petition, H.C.P. No.888 of 2003, filed on behalf of P. Venkatesan was withdrawn. It is also an admitted position that both the detenus have been refused bail and are in the jail custody for the last about five years. 2. Learned counsel, Shri Sankarasubbu, appearing on behalf of the petitioner argues that though in case of Venkatesan, his bail application has been granted in another writ petition in respect of C.C. No.9 of 1994, he is also in judicial remand in respect of the case in C.C. No.6 of 1994. 3. At the outset, it must be stated that the present habeas corpus petitions were filed on the ground that the detention of the detenus in judicial custody is more than five and a half years and is, therefore, rendered illegal and is violative of Art.21 of the Constitution of India. It is then suggested that against both the detenus, there is in reality no offence whatsoever. 4. Since the tenability of the habeas corpus petitions was itself doubted, learned counsel relied on the oft-quoted decision of the Apex Court in KARTAR SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (1994-2-L.W. (Crl.) 422) and more particularly on the observations made by the majority judgment by Hon’ble Shri Justice Ratnavel Pandian. Our attention was drawn to paragraphs 263 to 267 wherein, the learned Judge has discussed the powers of the High Court under Art.226. Our attention was drawn to paragraphs 263 to 267 wherein, the learned Judge has discussed the powers of the High Court under Art.226. The contention raised herein is that the detenus deserve to be released on bail and for that purpose, we must entertain this petition under Art.226. The following observations in paragraph 267 are heavily relied upon: “If the High Courts entertain bail applications invoking their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and pass orders, then the very scheme and object of the Act and the intendment of the Parliament would be completely defeated and frustrated. But the same time it cannot be said that the High Courts have no jurisdiction. Therefore, we totally agree with the view taken by this Court in Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed (supra) that if the High Court is inclined to entertain any application under Art.226, that power should be exercised most sparingly and only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances. What those rare circumstances are and what would be the circumstances that would justify the entertaining of applications that would justify the entertaining of applications under Art.226 cannot be put in straight jacket. However, we would like to emphasise and re-emphasise that the judicial discipline and comity of Courts require that the High Courts should refrain from exercising their jurisdiction in entertaining bail applications in respect of an accused indicted under the special Act since this Court has jurisdiction to interfere and correct the orders of the High Courts under Art.136 of the Constitution.” From this, learned counsel very earnestly argues that these are the cases where even applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court above, the detenus would be entitled to be released on bail as they have spent a period of more than five years. Learned counsel stretches his argument further and points out that apart from the fact that there is no prima facie case against the detenus, the very fact that these detenus are incarcerated for the last five and a half years would be enough for us to declare their further detention illegal and that at least this Court be justified in granting bail to them. 5. Learned counsel very heavily relies on the oft-quoted decision in SHAHEEN WELFARE ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (1996 Crl.L.J. 1866). 5. Learned counsel very heavily relies on the oft-quoted decision in SHAHEEN WELFARE ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (1996 Crl.L.J. 1866). There also, according to the learned counsel, the Supreme Court has ordained that the detenus, who have been incarcerated for more than five years, should be released on bail. The Supreme Court had classified the prisoners under TADA, in paragraph 13, as under: (a) hardcore under-trials whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other under-trials whose overt acts or involvement directly attracts Sections 3 and/or 4 of the TADA Act; (c) under-trials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 4, but by virtue of Section 120B or 147 IPC; and (d) those under-trials who were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of TADA.” In paragraph 14, the Supreme Court laid stress on adopting a pragmatic and just approach as all the prisoners in whose case the provisions of Sections 20(8) and 20(9) of TADA could not be dealt with by the same yardstick. The Supreme Court directed that barring the prisoners of group (a), prisoners falling under group (b), who have been in prison for five years or more and their trial is not likely to be completed within next six months, could be released on bail unless the court comes to the conclusion that their antecedents are such that releasing them may be harmful to the lives of the complainant, the family-members of the complainant or the witnesses. Learned counsel very heavily relied on these observations in paragraph 14. 6. As against this, learned senior counsel and Public Prosecutor, Shri I. Subramanian, however, points out that it would not be possible firstly to entertain these petitions as the detenus herein are not under ‘preventive’ detention and cannot be strictly described as ‘detenus’. According to him, the detenus could, at the most, be described as ‘under-trial prisoners’, who have been refused bail. According to him, the detenus could, at the most, be described as ‘under-trial prisoners’, who have been refused bail. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the law laid down in Kartar Singh case, cited supra, as also in Shaheen Welfare Association case, cited supra, would not apply to the detenus herein for the simple reason that dreaded criminals described in group (a) above could not get the advantage of bail on the face of it. Learned Public Prosecutor suggests that both these detenus can be easily described to be the dreaded criminals, whose release could be a menace to the witnesses who are already examined and those to be examined. 7. As regards the contention of the learned counsel, relying on Shaheen Welfare Association case, cited supra, it must be said that the Supreme Court in pargraph 15 has observed that the directions in paragraph 14 were by way of one-time measure meant only to alleviate the current situation available in that case. It is further found that in case of dreaded criminals described in group (a), the Supreme Court had refused to grant bail or any kind of direction in their favour. When we see the case of the prosecution in all these matters, it is obvious that the concerned detenus cannot be said to be the ordinary under-trial offenders. The allegations against them are extremely grave and serious. In one case, the allegations are that these detenus, who are the active supporters of an organisation called ‘Tamilnadu Viduthalai Padai’, which is an outlawed organisation. It is pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor that the said organisation has been declared to be an unlawful organisation under Tamil Nadu Unlawful Activities Act. Learned counsel Mr. Sankarasubbu says that declaration has come after the detenus’ alleged involvement in the offences. That may be so. However, that fact cannot be ignored while considering the bail applications of the members of an outlawed organisation. The facts suggest that in one case, there was a conspiracy to deter the opponent political party like Congress from carrying out its political activities. It was for that purpose that the office of the Congress party was tried to be blown out by exploding country-made bombs. The accused were not contend with restricting themselves to that building alone. The facts suggest that in one case, there was a conspiracy to deter the opponent political party like Congress from carrying out its political activities. It was for that purpose that the office of the Congress party was tried to be blown out by exploding country-made bombs. The accused were not contend with restricting themselves to that building alone. Even the statue of Mahatma Gandhi and other public places were chosen by the accused for planting the bombs with the sole idea of creating unprecedented panic and disturbance in the whole area. In the bomb explosion, some persons got injured seriously. In the other case, the accused persons are said to have overpowered the entire police staff of a police station and took the whole police station in their control and made good with the arms and ammunitions. Not only this but, they also committed murders of the police staff. If this is the range of activities of the outlawed organisation, then the accused, who are the members of that organisation and who have taken part in carrying out the obnoxious objects of that organisation must be treated to be the dreaded criminals. It goes without saying that their being released on bail would be out of question at least on the basis of the law laid down in Shaheen Welfare Association case, cited supra, even if we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the directions issued by the Supreme Court in that case would apply universally. In fact, they do not. Those directions were given strictly in the light of that case, which is clear from the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 15. 8. This takes us to the basic objection raised by Mr. I. Subramanian to the tenability of the present petitions. It cannot be denied that this Court does have the jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. However, the serious tone in which the Supreme Court has cautioned the entertaining of such petitions puts us on guard. In Kartar Singh case, cited supra, from the above quoted observations, it is clear that there would have to be an extremely rare case for the entertainment of the petitions under Art.226. However, the serious tone in which the Supreme Court has cautioned the entertaining of such petitions puts us on guard. In Kartar Singh case, cited supra, from the above quoted observations, it is clear that there would have to be an extremely rare case for the entertainment of the petitions under Art.226. The only ground on which these cases can be treated as rare cases, as canvassed by Shri Sankarasubbu, is the five years incarceration of the detenus. We are afraid that cannot per se make these cases a rare one. Again, before considering the nature of the prosecution, we must put ourselves on guard because our observations are bound to affect the discretion and the judgment of the lower court before whom the prosecutions are in progress. We are told by the Public Prosecutor that in one of the prosecutions, the whole evidence is over and only two witnesses remain to be examined, they being the police witnesses. According to the learned Public Prosecutor that task would be over any time and, therefore, the judgment will be pronounced almost immediately after the case is closed. In the other case, learned Public Prosecutor points out that as many as twenty-six witnesses have been examined and out of the original list of witnesses, ten witnesses have already expired. He points out that though fifty-two witnesses remain to be examined, that would not take more than six to eight months. He points out that once the cases have reached the stage of recording of evidence and where the majority of the serious witnesses have already been examined, it would not be feasible to release the accused/detenus on bail by entertaining their petitions on the sole ground that this happens to be a ‘rare case’. 9. We are inclined to accept this argument. After all, if one of the cases has already reached the final stage and if the other is going on in full swing wherein twenty-six witnesses have already been examined, there would hardly be any reason to interfere at this stage particularly by releasing the accused/detenus on bail. Learned counsel points out that in one of the matters, the accused/detenu Venkatesan has been ordered to be released on bail. That may be so. However, the fact remains that this very accused/detenu is in judicial custody and on judicial remand in another prosecution. Learned counsel points out that in one of the matters, the accused/detenu Venkatesan has been ordered to be released on bail. That may be so. However, the fact remains that this very accused/detenu is in judicial custody and on judicial remand in another prosecution. The very fact that he is involved in two cases and not in one would make all the difference. An order to release him on bail in one of the matters cannot give a licence to get bail in the other matter also and we do not think that on that score, the writ petitions would be entertainable. 10. Learned counsel then very seriously submits that there is no prima facie case and there is no evidence against the accused/detenus. We will desist from going into that aspect in this order for the reasons we have already given. We are of the clear opinion that at this stage, it would not be proper to assess the evidence particularly when the trial has proceeded substantially. In STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. S.B. JOHARI ( AIR 2000 SC 665 ), taking into consideration the law laid down on the subject and also taking a deeper look on the earlier decided cases, the Supreme Court reiterated that: “At the stage of Secs.227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court is required to evaluate the material and the documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offences.” Now that stage has clearly passed because in this case, not only has the charge been framed but there was no application by the accused persons at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for discharge. It is only now for the first time that the accused/detenus are coming before us and that too, at the stage when the trial in one case is almost over and in another, a substantial distance has been travelled by examining as many as twenty-six witnesses. We, therefore, do not think that the plea raised by Shri Sankarasubbu that there was not even prima facie case available against the accused/detenus can be accepted. In fact, the petitions are as bald as they could be. They are almost telegraphic, sketchy and skeleton like. We, therefore, do not think that the plea raised by Shri Sankarasubbu that there was not even prima facie case available against the accused/detenus can be accepted. In fact, the petitions are as bald as they could be. They are almost telegraphic, sketchy and skeleton like. No details are to be seen regarding the available evidence and the facts which can be culled out from the charge-sheet and the prosecution case. Under the circumstances, we do not think that such a plea is acceptable. We, therefore, reject the contention raised in this behalf. 11. Learned counsel then invited our attention to the observations in Kartar Singh case, cited supra, for taking of the exercise of reviewing the pending cases. He points out that barring two cases, the rest of the cases were withdrawn from the TADA Court and made over to the ordinary criminal court by G.O.I(D) No.1180, Home (Police-VII) Department, dated 31-12-1996. We have absolutely no difficulty with that. However, learned counsel goes on to suggest that the prosecution case does not suggest that the accused/detenus have any connection with the outlawed organisation and that there was no material applying the provisions of TADA. Now it is obvious that the exercise of review has been gone into and consequently, some of the cases have been withdrawn from the TADA court and have been made over to the ordinary criminal courts. Very strangely, it is only for the first time in 2004 that the accused/detenus are coming forth before us to say that the provisions of TADA cannot be made applicable to the present situation. The plea is hopelessly belated. We do not want to consider this plea for the simple reason that such a plea would be open to the accused/detenus before the trial court also. They may convince the trial court at the end of the trial that they had nothing to do with the offences particularly under TADA. Both the accused/detenus face the prosecution for the offences under Sec.3 of TADA and other allied offences. It will not be possible therefore to entertain the plea of bail which has been made now through a circuitous route of a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel further pointed out that some of the co-accused have already been released on bail. However, the bail has been refused to the concerned accused/detenus. It will not be possible therefore to entertain the plea of bail which has been made now through a circuitous route of a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel further pointed out that some of the co-accused have already been released on bail. However, the bail has been refused to the concerned accused/detenus. We wonder as to how such a plea can be raised before us. It is well-known that if the bail was refused, the accused/detenus have the remedy to go before the Supreme Court. They have not chosen to do so. Therefore, they cannot claim bail before us in these proceedings. The release of the other accused persons, in our opinion, would be of no consequence. 12. A judgment came to be relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which is rendered in VIOLA SELVIN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (1996-I-L.W. Crl. 138), which was by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of K.A. Thanikkachalam and Jayarama Chouta, JJ., more particularly the observations in paragraph 10 thereof were heavily relied on. We only say that that judgment is in respect of the tenability. We have already given our reasons and we are of the clear opinion that though there lies the jurisdiction in the High Court to entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, it has to be exercised within the parameters given by the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh case, cited supra. In that view, we would not choose to consider the judgment. This is besides the point that even in that case, the Division Bench had held that where the detenu and others forming an unlawful assembly and indulging in activities causing death of few persons and where the accused caused terror and panic in the minds of the general public by using explosives, the provisions of TADA would be attracted. 13. One more judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in DEVI REDDY VENKATA CHELAMA REDDY v. GOVT. OF A.P. rep. by its Secretary, Home Department, Hyderabad and others (1995 (1) An.W.R. 393) was cited before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner to suggest that the provisions of TADA could not be attracted in the abovementioned cases. We only say that that judgment will operate on the facts in that case. OF A.P. rep. by its Secretary, Home Department, Hyderabad and others (1995 (1) An.W.R. 393) was cited before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner to suggest that the provisions of TADA could not be attracted in the abovementioned cases. We only say that that judgment will operate on the facts in that case. We do not find any such observations in the judgment more particularly in paragraph 10 to suggest that even in the given facts of this case, the provisions of TADA could not be invoked. This is apart from the fact that no facts were argued before us. 14. In short, the petitions have no merits. They are dismissed.