RAJENDRA MENON, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER, father of a young boy, namely, Vinod aged about 6 years at the relevant time when he died because of an accident arising out of electrocution, has filed this petition claiming compensation from the respondents for death of his son. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who are residents of the same village illegally put electric wire from the electric pole for the purpose of running a tube well in their house. ( 3 ) ON 23. 3. 1998 petitioner's son Vinod came in contact with the live electric wire which was hanging from the pole as a result of which he suffered electric shock and died on the spot. F. I. R. , Annexure p-1, was lodged and a case under section 304-A of Indian Penal Code has been registered against respondent Nos. 4 and 5. Copy of the challan and connected papers are filed as Annexure P-1. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that the aforesaid accident occurred because of the negligence on the part of respondent Nos. 1 to 3/board, in not conducting periodical inspection and maintaining electric lines properly. The case of the petitioner is that in view of the alleged act of respondent nos. 4 and 5 coupled with the negligence and inaction of the Electricity Board's officials in preventing illegal theft of electricity by hooking of wire directly from the electric pole the accident arose and, therefore, compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 is claimed. ( 5 ) RESPONDENT Board has refuted the aforesaid and it is submitted by them that the accident arose because of the illegal hooking of wire and theft of electricity committed by respondent Nos. 4 and 5. As the accident was a direct result of the irregularity and breach committed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 Electricity Board and its officials cannot be held responsible for the same. It is the case of the Board that the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were committing theft of electricity and accident was result of the aforesaid theft committed by respondent nos. 4 and 5 for which Board cannot be held responsible. A preliminary objection has also been raised to the effect that the writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution, claiming compensation is not maintainable. 4 and 5 were committing theft of electricity and accident was result of the aforesaid theft committed by respondent nos. 4 and 5 for which Board cannot be held responsible. A preliminary objection has also been raised to the effect that the writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution, claiming compensation is not maintainable. ( 6 ) IT is the case of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that as disputed questions of fact are involved the petitioner is required to file a suit for damages. Initially, arguments were heard by this court and by order dated 27. 9. 2002 after considering the submissions made with regard to maintainability of the petition this court has held that the writ petition claiming compensation is maintainable in this regard the findings recorded in paras 7 to 10 of the order dated 27. 9. 2002 deals with the aforesaid question and concludes the fact with regard to maintainability of the petition. ( 7 ) THEREAFTER, this court has directed the electrical Inspector to conduct an inquiry into the matter and submit his report. The electrical Inspector in pursuance to the order passed by this court has conducted the inquiry and has submitted his report on 19. 12. 2002. ( 8 ) MR. Ankur Mody, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that as the accident was a direct result of inaction, negligence and violation of statutory rules by the respondent Board, petitioner is entitled for compensation. Referring to the provisions of rules 29, 44 and 46 of the indian Electricity Rules and the various provisions of the Electricity Act, 1910, it was submitted by Mr. Mody, the learned counsel for petitioner that the respondent board having failed to discharge its statutory duty in following the safety measures and procedure contemplated for maintenance of electric lines and the poles, they are responsible for the accident and, therefore, compensation is liable to be paid. In support of his contention learned counsel placed reliance on judgments of the Apex court in cases of M. P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, 2002 ACJ 526 (SC); m. S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, 2001 acj 1719 (SC) and D. Chandrashekar v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, karnataka Power Transmission Corporation ltd. , 2002 ACJ 2014 (Karnataka) and harishankar Tiwari v. Jagru, 1987 ACJ 1 (MP), to argue that the petition is liable to be allowed and compensation granted. , 2002 ACJ 2014 (Karnataka) and harishankar Tiwari v. Jagru, 1987 ACJ 1 (MP), to argue that the petition is liable to be allowed and compensation granted. ( 9 ) REFUTING the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Vivek Jain submitted that the Board was not informed at any stage about the theft or illegal activities of respondent Nos. 4 and 5, they had no knowledge about the irregularity being committed by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and, therefore, negligence or carelessness cannot be attributed to the Board or its officials. It was submitted by him that as the accident arose because of irregularity committed by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, as the accident was not a result of any fault in the system being established and maintained by the Board no compensation can be awarded. It was submitted by him that question of negligence is a dispute on fact and, therefore, the same cannot be adjudicated without recording the evidence and there being no evidence attributing negligence to the Board relief cannot be granted in this petition. In support of his contention Mr. Jain has invited my attention to two judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa -Ltd. v. Sukamani Das, (1999)7 SCC 298 and Tamil Nadu Electricity board v. Sumathi (2000) 4 SCC 543 . ( 10 ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the records, it cannot be disputed that on 23. 3. 1998 accident has taken place and Vinod the 6 years old son of petitioner expired. It is also not disputed that from the electric pole and from the system of the Board, respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have illegally pulled a line into their residence for the purpose of running their tube well. The said line was broken as a result of which electricity flew from this live wire and the petitioner's son who had gone to the field came in contact with the same and died because of electrocution. The main defence of the Board is that accident took place not because of their negligence but because of the illegal act of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5. The main defence of the Board is that accident took place not because of their negligence but because of the illegal act of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5. In the inquiry conducted by Electrical inspector, four witnesses were examined, they are Ramesh Singh, the petitioner himself, Hawaldar Singh, Ramveer Singh and k. P. Sodh, Assistant Engineer (Rural), their statement is mainly with regard to the accident taking place and death of Vinod. These facts are not in dispute. However, in the statement of one Munni Singh recorded before the CJM, Morena filed as annexure P-1 by petitioner, Munni Singh s/o Sant Singh Parmar has stated that he has made a complaint to the respondent board with regard to theft of electricity being committed by Mukesh and Narottam, in spite of this, no action was taken by the respondent Board. In the inquiry conducted by Electrical Inspector and in the report submitted by him, no positive finding has been recorded with regard to the negligence on the part of the Board. However, the authorities of the Board have not produced any record before the Electrical inspector to demonstrate that periodical inspection was conducted and all such steps as are required for preventing mishap and theft were taken. On the contrary, K. P. Gupta, Assistant Engineer (Rural), who appeared before the Electrical Inspector stated that he does not know anything about the accident and no records are available with the Board in connection with the accident. It is seen that in the inquiry conducted by the Electrical Inspector, the board and its officials have maintained total silence and they have not even cared to produce the record with regard to the accident, they have only taken a plea that they were not negligent. The Board, being creation of a statute and required to conduct its activities in accordance with law, is duty-bound to maintain the lines and take such precautions as are required for protecting the interest of the public at large. Under the principle of strict liability, the Board becomes responsible for the act of stranger in such circumstances. Even though in the judgment relied upon by Mr. Under the principle of strict liability, the Board becomes responsible for the act of stranger in such circumstances. Even though in the judgment relied upon by Mr. Vivek Jain in the case of Chairman, Grid corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Sukamani das, (1999) 7 SCC 298 , it has been held that writ petition claiming compensation for death due to electrocution of touching snapped live wire is not maintainable without inquiring into disputed questions of fact. In the opinion of this court, the aforesaid judgment will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in view of subsequent law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shall kumari, 2002 ACJ 526 (SC), relied upon by Mr. Ankur Mody learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 11 ) IN the aforesaid case of M. P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, 2002 ACJ 526 (SC), Supreme Court in paras 8, 9 and 10 has observed as under:" (8 ). . . assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of Torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known in law, as 'strict liability'. It differs from the liability which may arise on account of negligence or fault in this way, i. e. , the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. (9) The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330, Blackburn, J. , the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purpose, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril; and, if he does so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. ' (10) There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this: 'act of stranger, i. e. , if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply'. [vide p. 535, Winfield on tort, 15th Edn. ]" (Emphasis added) ( 12 ) THEREAFTER in paras 11 and 12 the hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:" (11) The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc, (1994)1 All ER 53 (HL ). The said principle gained approval in India and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of india, (1990) 1 SCC 613 and a Division bench in Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), had followed with approval the principle in Rylands -v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330. By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. , 2001 ACJ 428 (SC ). Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), had followed with approval the principle in Rylands -v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330. By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. , 2001 ACJ 428 (SC ). (12) In M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1987 ACJ 386 (SC), this court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that: '. . . where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330'. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 13 ) IN para 15, an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court with regard to negligence and illegal hooking for pilferage was considered and it was held by the court that in those cases question of strict liability was not considered. In the present case also similar is the position inasmuch in the case of Grid Corporation of Orissa, (1999) 7 SCC 298 and Tamil Nadu electricity Board v. Sumathi, (2000) 4 SCC 543 , the questions of strict liability have not been considered. The case of Sumathi (supra) is also entirely different inasmuch as that was a case where the Apex Court reversed the judgment of the High Court on the ground that after having referred the matter for arbitration entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was held to be not proper. The facts of that case are entirely different. In the present case, the views and observations expressed by the Supreme Court in the paras referred to hereinabove in the case of Shall Kurnari, 2002 ACJ 526 (SC), would apply. The facts of that case are entirely different. In the present case, the views and observations expressed by the Supreme Court in the paras referred to hereinabove in the case of Shall Kurnari, 2002 ACJ 526 (SC), would apply. Apart from the aforesaid judgment of the Apex court in the case of Shall Kumari, Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of executive Engineer, Electricity (Mandre)division, Awantlpora, Anantnag v. Mohammad Ashraf Bhat, 2000 ACJ 1199 (Jandk), has considered somewhat similar question with regard to negligence of the electricity department and in the said case in para 9 after considering various judgments on the question of entertaining a writ petition in such matter, the Division Bench of Jandk high Court has held that the writ petition claiming compensation under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. ( 14 ) SO far as consideration of the question of negligence is concerned, even though, during the course of hearing it was vehemently argued by Mr. Vivek Jain that as there is no negligence proved on the part of the Board compensation cannot be awarded. This argument of learned counsel is misconceived. Under the Indian electricity Act, 1910, the Electricity Supply Act and Electricity Rules and in particular provisions of rules 29, 44, 45 and 26 the board is required to conduct periodical inspection of the lines maintained by them, board is required to take all such safety measures to prevent such accident and maintain the lines in such a manner that life and property of the general public is protected. The Board is duty-bound to carry out activities in such a manner that safety and security provisions are enforced in accordance with the statutory rules. In the present case, except for making denial of the claim made by the petitioner, the respondent Board has not produced any document, affidavit or other material to indicate or establish that in the present case they had taken steps to prevent such a mishap. On the contrary, when the inquiry was conducted by the Electrical Inspector in pursuance to the direction issued by this court, no record was produced, concerned officials were not examined, they were not produced before the Electrical Inspector for recording the statements and the only witness who appeared before the Electrical inspector expressed his inability in producing the records and was not at all aware of facts of the case. On the contrary, the petitioner has examined three witnesses so also as placed on record, the papers of the criminal case in which statement of Munni singh was available to indicate that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were unauthorisedly taking electricity from the pole of MPEB and in spite of the complaints made by them from time to time in Hetampur substation, no action was taken by the officials of MPEB in this regard. ( 15 ) BOMBAY High Court as far as in the year 1924 has considered the question of negligence in the case of Vishnu Digambar paluskar v. B. B. and C. I. Ry. , AIR 1924 bom 278. In the said case the question of negligence and liability of the railway company to pay damages was considered. In the said case, a ladder was kept in the rack of a compartment by one of the employees of the railway company, the accident arose due to the ladder falling on a passenger. When the claim for compensation was made by the injured person because of fall of ladder, defence put up by the Railways was that negligence is not established, while considering the question of negligence, it has been observed by the bombay High Court in the aforesaid case that a duty is cast on the railway company to prevent dangerous goods being carried. A duty was enjoined upon the Railways to prevent dangerous articles being placed where they may fall upon passengers. It is incumbent on the railway company in such cases to prove that they did not know the nature of the goods or that the ladder was kept without their knowledge. It was held by the court that when such a duty is cast on the Railways towards its passengers and if the duty is not performed properly and reasonable care is not taken, Railways was held to be responsible. It was held by the court that when such a duty is cast on the Railways towards its passengers and if the duty is not performed properly and reasonable care is not taken, Railways was held to be responsible. In the present case, the question of negligence if viewed in the backdrop of the observations made by Bombay High Court it would be seen that under the statute governing the distribution, transmission and generation of electricity, a duty is cast upon the electricity Board to carry out their activities in accordance with the provisions of statute, namely, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder and it was incumbent upon them to take all such steps as is reasonably expected to be done for preventing any accident which may endanger life and property of strangers or public at large. In the present case, Board has not placed any material on record to even remotely suggest that they had taken all such steps, safety measures or care reasonably expected by them to prevent such a mishap. On the contrary, in the inquiry conducted by the Electrical inspector as indicated hereinabove and even before this court no responsible official of the Board has filed any affidavit or given any statement to indicate that they have taken sufficient steps to prevent any mishap. Orissa High Court has also considered the question of negligence where death of a cyclist took place because of live electrical wire falling on the road in the case of Padma Behari Lal v. Orissa State electricity Board, 1992 ACJ 554 (Orissa), considering the case it was held by the division Bench of Orissa High Court that the Electricity Board having not proved that they had taken all precautions and care were liable for the negligence. ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the totality of the facts and the circumstances of the case, in the backdrop of discussion made hereinabove and keeping in view the specific findings recorded by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shail Kumari, 2002 ACJ 526 (SC)and the observations made in paras 8, 9, 11 and 13 reproduced hereinabove, there is no doubt that not only on the ground of negligence but on the principle of strict liability the Board is liable to pay compensation to the petitioner. ( 17 ) EVEN though, the question of maintainability of the writ petition was considered and the objections raised by the Board were rejected by this court vide order dated 27. 9. 2002, in view of observations made by Jandk High Court in the case of mohammad Ashraf Bhat, 2000 ACJ 1199 (Jandk), it has to be held that writ petition is maintainable but at the cost of repetition it may be observed that this question was considered by the Apex Court in the case of M. S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, 2001 acj 1719 (SC), wherein it is observed as under:" (26) Next is the issue 'maintainability of the writ petition' before the High court under Article 226 of the constitution. The appellant though initially very strongly contended that while the negligence aspect has been dealt with under penal law already, the claim for compensation cannot but be left to be adjudicated by the civil law and thus the civil court's jurisdiction ought to have been invoked rather than by way of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This plea of non-maintainability of the writ petition though advanced at the initial stage of the submissions but subsequently the same was not pressed and as such we need not detain ourselves on that score, excepting, however, recording that the law courts exist for the society and they have an obligation to meet the social aspirations of citizens since law courts must also respond to the needs of the people. In this context, reference may be made to two decisions of this court: the first in line, is the decision in Nilabati behera v. State of Orissa, 1993 acj 787 (SC), wherein this court relying upon the decision in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1086 , decried the illegality and impropriety in awarding compensation in a proceeding in which the court's power under articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution stands invoked and thus observed that it was a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for custodial death of her son. It is undoubtedly true, however, that in the present context, there is no infringement of State's obligation, unless of course, the State can also be termed to be a joint tortfeasor, but since, the case of the parties stands restricted and without imparting any liability on the State, we do not deem it expedient to deal with the issue any further except noting the two decisions of this court as above and without expression of any opinion in regard thereto. (27) The decision of this court in O. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 scc 416 , comes next. This decision has opened up a new vista in the jurisprudence of the country. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits stands extended since Anand, J. (as His lordship then was) in no uncertain terms observed: 'the courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim-civil action for damages is a long-drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. The monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at times perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family. ' (28) Currently the judicial attitude has taken a shift from the old Draconian concept and the traditional jurisprudential system-affectation of the people has been taken note of rather seriously and the judicial concern thus stands on a footing to provide expeditious relief to an individual when needed rather than taking recourse to the old conservative doctrine of civil court's obligation to award damages. As a matter of fact the decision in D. K. Basu has not only dealt with the issue in a manner apposite to the social need of the country but the learned Judge with his usual felicity of expression firmly established the current trend of 'justice oriented approach'. As a matter of fact the decision in D. K. Basu has not only dealt with the issue in a manner apposite to the social need of the country but the learned Judge with his usual felicity of expression firmly established the current trend of 'justice oriented approach'. Law court will lose its efficacy if it cannot possibly respond to the needs of the society-technicalities there might be many but the justice-oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice. " ( 18 ) HAVING heard, the petition is maintainable and the Board is liable to pay compensation in the present case. The next question that requires determination is as to what should be the compensation that should be awarded in such cases. ( 19 ) THE petitioner has claimed compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 and Mr. Ankur mody, learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on the judgment of M. S. Grewal, 2001 ACJ 1719 (SC), submitted that the compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 was awarded to students who died because of drowning. He also placed reliance on the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of D. Chandrashekar, 2002 ACJ 2014 (Karnataka), where compensation of rs. 2,00,000 was granted to a fifth standard boy who died because of negligence of karnataka Electricity Board Transmission station. However, that was a case where the boy had suffered injuries because of electrocution, in the present case except for claiming compensation of Rs. 5,00,000, the petitioner has not given any basis for making the said claim. Compensation of rs. 5,00,000 awarded in the case of M. S. Grewal (supra) was based on the social status of the parents of the student involved therein, that student was studying in a posh public school and keeping in view that upper class of the society from which claimants came and keeping in view their social status, compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 was awarded. 5,00,000 awarded in the case of M. S. Grewal (supra) was based on the social status of the parents of the student involved therein, that student was studying in a posh public school and keeping in view that upper class of the society from which claimants came and keeping in view their social status, compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 was awarded. However, in the case of M. S. Grewal (supra) itself while considering the question of compensation Supreme Court has observed that while determining the question of compensation and awarding compensation to children the guiding factor enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 2001 ACJ 1735 (SC), should be followed and in such cases Second Schedule to the motor Vehicles Act can be considered to be a proper guide. In the present case as the claimants have not given any basis for claiming compensation of Rs. 5,00,000, the status of the family, their financial and economic condition have not been placed on record and, therefore, the safe manner in such cases would be to apply the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M. S. Grewal (supra) and to adopt the scientific method contained in second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 according to which the compensation would work out Rs. 1,50,000 plus other expenses pertaining to funeral and other incidental expenses. Considering all these, I am of the considered view that sum of Rs. 2,00,000 would be a just and reasonable compensation for death of six years old boy. ( 20 ) ACCORDINGLY, it is held that the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are liable to pay the compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 to the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of accident till payment. ( 21 ) IN view of above, petition is allowed. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are directed to pay the compensation as indicated hereinabove to the petitioner and it would be for the Board to take action for recovery of the amount if they so desire from respondent Nos. 4 and 5. Petition stands allowed and disposed of with the aforesaid observation. Petition allowed. .