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2004 DIGILAW 345 (MAD)

M. Shajahan & Others v. B. Dhanalakshmi & Others

2004-03-04

D.MURUGESAN, N.DHINAKAR

body2004
Judgment :- Common Judgment: (D. Murugesan, J.) The above writ appeals raise common questions for adjudication. Hence, they are taken up together for disposal by this order. 2. The appellants, in all the writ appeals, are the stage carriage operators in Tiruchirappalli town operating on certain routes under valid permits. The respective first respondent, in all the writ appeals, are the grantees of mini bus permits to ply on the routes in which the appellants are also plying their vehicles. For convenience, the appellants will be hereinafter referred to as the “persons aggrieved” and the respective first respondent will be hereinafter referred to as the “grantees” of the permits. 3. Pursuant to the policy decision of the Government of Tamil Nadu, modifying the approved scheme, it enabled the Regional Transport Authorities to grant a maximum of 250 mini bus permits for every revenue district. The grantees were granted mini bus permits for different routes. The persons aggrieved, invoking Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), filed revision petitioners before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”) questioning the grant, basically on the following four grounds viz., (i) whether the persons aggrieved have locus standi to maintain the revision petitions; (2) whether the revision petitions are barred by limitation or not; (3) whether the Regional Transport Authority had granted the routes, for which there were no applications insofar as the grantees in W.A.Nos.1992 and 1993 of 2003; and (4) whether the permits granted to the grantees in other writ appeals exceeded 4 kms. Distance on served sectors and thereby the permits are invalid. 4. The Tribunal found that the persons aggrieved have locus standi to maintain the revision petitions, in view of the grant exceeding 4 kms. Distance on served sectors as well as the grant for a route which was not asked for. Insofar as the question as to whether the revision petitions are barred by limitation, the Tribunal found that the date of obtaining the certified copies of the order by the persons aggrieved shall be the date of the order and, in view of the same, the Tribunal found that the revision petitions are not barred by limitation. The Tribunal, on merits, also found that the grantees, in W.A.Nos.1992 and 1993 of 2003, were granted the routes without there being any request or application. The Tribunal, on merits, also found that the grantees, in W.A.Nos.1992 and 1993 of 2003, were granted the routes without there being any request or application. The Tribunal further found that the grantees in the other writ appeals were given grants that exceeded more than 4 kms. distance on served sectors. Finding so, the Tribunal set aside all the grants. Aggrieved by the orders of the Tribunal, all the grantees filed separate writ petitions. W.P.Nos.5674 and 5705 of 2003, filed by one Kalaiselvi, were allowed by the learned single Judge on 30.4.2003. Following the said order, the learned Judge allowed all other writ petitions also filed by the other grantees. The learned Judge was of the view that inasmuch as the first proviso to Section 90 of the Act mandates the application for revision shall be made within thirty days from the date of the order, the revisions filed beyond the said period are barred by time. However, in view of the second proviso empowering the Tribunal to entertain an application after the expiry of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making the application in time, and the Tribunal did not consider the revision petitions filed beyond the period of thirty days from the date of the order by exercising its power under the second proviso to Section 90 of the Act, the learned Judge allowed the writ petitions and remanded them for fresh adjudication by the Tribunal, as to whether there were good and sufficient cause for entertaining the revision petitions filed beyond the period of thirty days from the date of the order. The learned Judge also found that, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay could be condoned, it could hear the revision petitions on merits, with further liberty to the parties to raise all the questions afresh. The learned Judge also directed the status quo ante, prevalent on the date of disposal of the revision, shall be restored. These orders of the learned single judge have given rise to a cause for these writ appeals. 5. On the above background, the following questions arise for consideration before this Court:- (i) Whether the persons aggrieved have locus standi to file the revision petitions, questioning the grants? (ii) Whether the revision petitions are barred by time? These orders of the learned single judge have given rise to a cause for these writ appeals. 5. On the above background, the following questions arise for consideration before this Court:- (i) Whether the persons aggrieved have locus standi to file the revision petitions, questioning the grants? (ii) Whether the revision petitions are barred by time? (iii) Whether the grantees in W.A.Nos.1992 and 1993 of 2003 applied for the routes granted and, if not, whether the grants are bad? (iv) Whether the grants in respect of the other grantees are bad on the ground that the routes exceeded 4 kms. distance on served sectors. 6. Point No.1: Insofar as the first point as to whether the persons aggrieved have locus standi to file the revision petitions, we must point out that, though the said ground was raised before the Tribunal, the same is not canvassed before us. Even otherwise, inasmuch as the appellants who are the operators of particular routes known as served sectors for the purpose of this case, and the grantees were granted permits on served sectors, the appellants shall be necessarily considered as the persons aggrieved and consequently would have locus standi to question the grants. Accordingly, we answer the first point in the affirmative. 7. Point No.2: There is no dispute that a mini bus is a stage carriage, as defined under Section 2(4) of the Act. In terms of Section 69 of the Act, every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles. As the issue in these writ appeals relate to the applications for permits within the state, we do not refer the proviso to the said section. A person intending to apply for stage carriage permit shall make an application, in terms of Section 70 of the Act, with particulars. The said section reads as under:- “70. As the issue in these writ appeals relate to the applications for permits within the state, we do not refer the proviso to the said section. A person intending to apply for stage carriage permit shall make an application, in terms of Section 70 of the Act, with particulars. The said section reads as under:- “70. Application for stage carriage permit.-(1) An application for a permit in respect of a stage carriage (in this Chapter referred to as a stage carriage permit or as a reserve stage carriage shall, as far as may be, contain the following particulars, namely:- (a) the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates; (b) the type and seating capacity of each such vehicle; (c) the minimum and maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided and the time-table of the normal trips; Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, Section 72, Section 80 and Section 102, “trip” means a single journey from one point to another, and every return journey shall be deemed to be a separate trip:; (d) the number of vehicles intended to be kept in reserve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions; (e) the arrangements intended to be made for the housing, maintenance and repair of the vehicles, for the comfort and convenience of passengers and for the storage and safe custody of luggage; (f) such other matters as may be prescribed. (2) An application referred to sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by such documents as may be prescribed.” Section 71 relates to the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority in considering the application. Section 72 relates to the grant of stage carriage permits. Sub-section (1) of Section 72 is relevant for our consideration, which reads as under:- “72. Grant of stage carriage permits.- (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 71, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 70, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deem fit or refuse to grant such a permit: Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application.” Section 90 relates to the revision, and the said Section reads as under:- “90. Revision.-The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made to it, call for the record any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final: Provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order: Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making the application in time: Provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” Rule 159 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter will be referred to as the “Rules”) relates to the filing of a revision petition. The said Rule reads as under:- “159. Revision Petition.-An application to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under section 90 shall be in the form of memorandum setting forth concisely the purport of the petition and shall be presented to the Tribunal within thirty days of the date of receipt by the person aggrieved of the order or proceeding against which the application is preferred. The application shall be accompanied by five additional copies of the same and the original or a certified copy of the order of proceedings against which the application is preferred: Provided that an application signed or presented by or on behalf of more than one aggrieved party shall not be entertained. The application shall be accompanied by five additional copies of the same and the original or a certified copy of the order of proceedings against which the application is preferred: Provided that an application signed or presented by or on behalf of more than one aggrieved party shall not be entertained. Provided further that where an application is presented within thirty days of the date of receipt by the person aggrieved of the order or proceedings sought to be revised, but is returned, by the Tribunal for re-presentation in the manner prescribed and within the date, if any, specified by the Tribunal, it shall be deemed to have been presented within the prescribed time for the purpose of this rule.” According to the first proviso to Section 90 of the Act, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order. Of course, in terms of the second proviso, the Tribunal may entertain the application after he expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented from good and sufficient cause from that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under Section 90 prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It is the case of the grantees that the persons aggrieved ought to have filed the revision petitions within thirty days from the date of the order viz., the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority in granting permits to the grantees. Admittedly, all the revision petitions were filed beyond the period of thirty days from the date of the order. Hence, the Tribunal has erred in entertaining the applications on the ground that the date of the order, referred to in the first proviso to Section 90, is referable to the date of the communication of the order. 8. Admittedly, all the revision petitions were filed beyond the period of thirty days from the date of the order. Hence, the Tribunal has erred in entertaining the applications on the ground that the date of the order, referred to in the first proviso to Section 90, is referable to the date of the communication of the order. 8. On the other hand, it is the case of the persons aggrieved that, so long as the grants are not made public till such time the timing conference is convened and the vehicles are put on road, the operators on the served sectors were not aware of the grants and, being the persons aggrieved, they could question the grants only after they became aware of the grants. It is also argued that in terms of Rule 159 of the Rules, it is mandatory on the part of the persons aggrieved to filed the original or a certified copy of the order of proceedings against which the application is preferred, along with five additional copies of the same. When the rule mandates the production of the original or certified copy of the order of proceedings, the words, “within thirty days from the date of the order” employed in the first proviso to Section 90, shall be read as “from the date of communication of the order.” 9. To appreciate the above rival contentions, let us now consider as to how the provisions of the Act and the Rules should be read, to give effect the real meaning and object of the provisions. The Apex Court in “State Of U.P. V. Babu Ram Upadhya ( AIR 1961 SC 751 )” has held that the “rules made under a Statute must be treated, for all purposes of construction or obligations, exactly as if they were in that Act and are to the same effect as if they were contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligations. The statutory rules cannot be described or equated with administrative directions.” The above judgment was referred to by their Lordships of the Apex Court in “Peerless General Finance And Investment Co. Limited And Another V. Reserve Bank Of India ( 1992 (2) SCC 343 )” With Approval. His Lordship K. Ramaswamy, J., concurring with the views expressed by His Lordship N.M. Kasliwal, J., speaking for the Bench, held as follows. Limited And Another V. Reserve Bank Of India ( 1992 (2) SCC 343 )” With Approval. His Lordship K. Ramaswamy, J., concurring with the views expressed by His Lordship N.M. Kasliwal, J., speaking for the Bench, held as follows. “Therefore, the directions are incorporated and become part of the Act itself. They must be governed by the same principles as the Statute itself. The statutory presumption that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention should be given effect to, would be applicable to the impugned directions.” In fact such a ruling was made even while considering only the directions given by the Reserve Bank of India. 10. Keeping the above law in mind, let us now consider the words “within thirty days from the date of the order” employed in the first proviso to Section 90. Strong reliance was placed by Mrs. Radha Gopalan, learned counsel appearing for the grantees, over the judgment of the Apex Court in “Municipal Board, Pushkar Vs. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan And Others ( AIR 1965 SC 458 )”, to contend that in interpreting the provisions of limitation, equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide. She would also submit that the words “date of the order” must mean the date on which it was passed by the Regional Transport Authority and not on the date when it was communicated to the persons aggrieved. That was a case of shifting of a bus stand in the place known as Pushkar in the Rajasthan State. The matter arose under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the “old Act”). The Municipal Board of Pushkar passed a resolution on 24.5.48. The said resolution was considered by the Regional Transport Authority in its meeting held on 3rd and 4th December, 1959 and resolved to shift the bus stand. In order to bring the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority into effect, the bus stand should be notified under Section 68 of the old Act. Such a notification was made only on 28.6.60. Even before the notification was made, two residents of Pushkar filed a revision petition questioning the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority. That was rejected on 18.2.60 before the notification was made. Thereafter, five bus operators filed revision petitions. Such a notification was made only on 28.6.60. Even before the notification was made, two residents of Pushkar filed a revision petition questioning the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority. That was rejected on 18.2.60 before the notification was made. Thereafter, five bus operators filed revision petitions. The revision petitions were resisted on the ground that inasmuch as the revision by the two residents were already rejected, no further revision would arise and, secondly, the revision petitions were barred by limitation. These issues ultimately came up for consideration before the Apex Court. 11. It must be noticed that, on the date when the issue was considered by the Apex Court, there was no power for the revisional authority to entertain a revision filed beyond the period of thirty days, as contained in second proviso to Section 90 of the Act. However, the revisional authority had the suo motu power of revision. While considering the scope of Section 64-A relating to the revisionary power, in view of the different interpretations sought to be made on the law laid down by the Apex Court, we would like to extract the relevant paragraphs of the judgment, as follows:- “This brings us to the question of limitation. Section 64-A provides that State Transport Authority shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of the Regional Transport Authority unless the application is made within 30 days from the date of the order. According to the appellant, the impugned order was made by the Regional Transport Authority on December 4, 1959, and consequently the application for revision made by the respondents on April 13, 1960 was barred. It was suggested that in fact the respondents who moved the revision application on April 13, 1960 were aware of the order made by the Regional Transport Authority on December 4, 1959; but assuming that they had no such knowledge, the question of knowledge, it was urged, was totally irrelevant. The section has provided that no application shall be entertained unless it is made within 30 days from the date of the order and the courts cannot read it as within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the order. The section has provided that no application shall be entertained unless it is made within 30 days from the date of the order and the courts cannot read it as within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the order. In this connection the learned Attorney General has drawn out attention to the decisions of the Privy Council in Nagendranath v. Suresh Chandra, AIR 1932 PC 165 and General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmohomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6 where it has been emphasized that in interpreting the provisions of limitation, “equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide.” There can be no doubt that this principle has always been acted upon by the courts. This principle has recently been re-affirmed by this Court in Boota Mal v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No.507 of 1960 D/- 27.3.1962 ( AIR 1962 SC 1716 ). We agree therefore that the words “date of the order” should not be read “as from the date of knowledge of the order” in the absence of clear indication to that effect. In this connection the learned Attorney General has drawn out attention to several sections of the Motor Vehicle Act to show that where the legislature in prescribing the period of limitation intended that time should run from some other date than the date when the order was made clear indication of such intention was given. Thus S.13 in providing for an appeal from an order made refusing or revoking a driving licence says that an aggrieved person may appeal “within 30 days of the service on him of the order”. Section 15 which provides for an appeal from an order of the licencing authority disqualifying a person from holding a driving licence lays down that an aggrieved person may appeal “within 30 days of the receipt of the order”. Section 16 which provides for an appeal against certain orders of the Regional Transport Authority says that the aggrieved person may appeal “within 30 days of the receipt of intimation of such order”. Section 35 which is another section providing for appeal says that the appeal may be made “within 30 days of the date of receipt of notice of the order”. Section 35 which is another section providing for appeal says that the appeal may be made “within 30 days of the date of receipt of notice of the order”. There is considerable force therefore in the argument that if the legislature had intended that an application for revision under S.64-A may be made within 30 days from the date of intimation or knowledge of the order to the aggrieved person it would have said so; and in the absence of any such thing the court is bound to hold that the application will be barred unless made within 30 days from the date of the order by which the person is aggrieved. This still leaves open for investigation the problem as to what is the date of the order. According to the appellant the date when the Regional Transport Authority passed the resolution is the date of the order. Against this it is urged on behalf of the bus operators that it is the date when that resolution was brought into effect by the publication of the notification which should be considered to be the date of the order. In our opinion, the respondent’s contention should be accepted. For, it is a fallacy to think that the date when the Regional Transport Authority passed the resolution was the date on which the fixation of the new bus stand or the discontinuance of the old bus stand was ordered. It has to be remembered in this connection that Rule 134 itself contemplates that the fixation or alteration of bus stands would be made by a notification. It is only on such notification that a notified bus stand comes into existence. So long as the notification is not made there is in law no effective fixation of a new bus stand or discontinuance of the old bus stand.” The date of the order as employed in Section 64-A of the old Act was considered and interpreted by the Apex Court to mean “the date of the order of the Regional Transport Authority”. Their Lordships did not stop with that findings, but proceeded to consider as to “what is the date of the order”. Their Lordships considered the fact that though the proceedings could be made for shifting of a bus stand by the Regional Transport Authority, till such time the same is notified it will have no statutory backing. Their Lordships did not stop with that findings, but proceeded to consider as to “what is the date of the order”. Their Lordships considered the fact that though the proceedings could be made for shifting of a bus stand by the Regional Transport Authority, till such time the same is notified it will have no statutory backing. Hence, their Lordships accepted the submissions that the date of the order” means the date of publication of the notification, i.e., the date when public is made aware of the proceedings to shift the bus stand. 12. Coming to the present case, the first proviso to Section 90 directs the Tribunal to entertain a revision petition only if it is made within the period of thirty days from the date of the order. A right to file a revision petition is given to the person aggrieved. A person aggrieved may be or may not be a party to the proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority. The provisions of Section 90 and Rule 159 should be read keeping the above in mind. Even in case of a person who is a party to the proceedings could question the order only on receipt of the copy of the order. Therefore, it is reasonable to hold that in such cases the Regional Transport Authority is duty bound to communicate the order to the person aggrieved within thirty days to enable him to prefer revision petition, if he desired so. So far as the persons aggrieved are concerned, they were not parties to the proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority while considering the grants. However, they are the persons aggrieved over the grants to question the same on the ground that the routes were granted, though were not asked and the grants were contrary to the scheme viz., exceeding 4 kms. distance on the served sectors within Corporation limit. We have already held that the persons aggrieved viz., the appellants, have locus standi to maintain the revision petitions. 13. Rule 159 mandates that the application for revision shall be presented to the Tribunal within thirty days of the date of receipt by the person aggrieved of the order or proceedings against which the application is preferred. We have already held that the persons aggrieved viz., the appellants, have locus standi to maintain the revision petitions. 13. Rule 159 mandates that the application for revision shall be presented to the Tribunal within thirty days of the date of receipt by the person aggrieved of the order or proceedings against which the application is preferred. The words employed “within thirty days of the date of receipt” assumes importance inasmuch as the said rule mandates that the application shall be accompanied by five additional copies of the original or certified copy of the order including the original or certified copy of the proceedings. An argument was advanced by Mrs. Radha Gopalan, the learned counsel appearing for the grantees, that the rules made under a Statute cannot have the effect of overriding the provisions contained in the Statute itself and either the rules must be read consistently with the provisions contained in the Act or must be struck down as contrary to the provisions of the Act. She would rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in “Nedurimilli Janardhana Reddy V. Progressive Democratic Students’ Union And Others ( 1994 (6) SCC 506 )”, where the Apex Court held “that the rules are not, as indeed they cannot be, made to supplant the provisions of the Act but to supplement them and they have to be read as such.” She would also rely upon the judgment in “Additional District Magistrate (Rev.), Delhi Administration V. Sri Ram ( 2000 (5) SCC 451 )”, wherein, in paragraph 16, the Apex Court has held as follows. “It is a well recognised principle of interpretation of a Statute that conferment of rule making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto.” 14. It is true that in case of inconsistency between the rule and the provisions of the Act, the rules made under the Statute cannot override the very Statute itself. The first proviso to Section 90 is mandatory. It is true that in case of inconsistency between the rule and the provisions of the Act, the rules made under the Statute cannot override the very Statute itself. The first proviso to Section 90 is mandatory. At the time when the location of bus stand was considered by the Apex Court in Municipal Board’s case (supra), there was no provision enabling the Tribunal to entertain a revision petition filed beyond the period of thirty days on good and sufficient reasons under Section 64-A of the old Act, as the same was introduced only in the year 1978. On a reading of both the first proviso to Section 90 and Rule 159, we find that there is no inconstancy between them. While construing the words employed in the first proviso to Section 90 viz., “within thirty days from the date of the order”, Rule 159 should also be kept in mind, as the Court should construe the language of the two provisions in such a way as to avoid the effect of inconsistency unless of course language is so plain that it is almost impossible to reconcile and harmonize the two apparently inconsistent provisions. No rule making authority could make the rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act. Section 90 of the Act does not totally disentitle a person aggrieved to file a revision petition even if it is made beyond the period of thirty days, as the second proviso entitled them to satisfy the Revisional Authority the good and sufficient reasons for not filing the revisions within the prescribed period. How a rule should be read is answered in Babu Ram Upadhya’s case (supra). A rule under a Statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligations, exactly as if they were in that Act and are to the same effect as if they are contained in the Act itself and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligations. We could not read Rule 159 either supplanting or travels beyond the scope of Section 90 of the Act and the rule merely gives effect to the second proviso to Section 90. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for grantees in this regard are not applicable to the facts of this case, in view of our above findings. We could not read Rule 159 either supplanting or travels beyond the scope of Section 90 of the Act and the rule merely gives effect to the second proviso to Section 90. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for grantees in this regard are not applicable to the facts of this case, in view of our above findings. In our considered view, both the provisions could co-exist without any inconsistency and carry out the intention of the legislatures. 15. In fact, the Apex Court in Municipal Board’s case (supra) which was heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for grantees, though has held that the date of the order should not be read as from the date of knowledge of the order, accepted the contention that the date when the resolution was brought into effect by the publication of the notification should be considered to be the date of the order.” The Apex Court had taken the date on which the publication was made as relevant, as without there being a publication of the notification for location of a bus stand the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority would have no force in the eye of law. 16. On the above dictum of the apex Court, let us now consider the present case. What is the effect of a grant under Section 72 and on what date the same is given effect to? After the grant, a timing conference is held for fixing the schedule of timings under Rule 248. Under the said Rule, the Transport Authority may, if no schedule of timings is already fixed or approved for a stage carriage or a service of a stage carriage on any route, either on its own motion or on an application made to it in writing, by a general or special order fix and approve a schedule of timings for the particular stage carriage or he service of stage carriages in consultation with the applicant and the persons providing transport facilities on the route or sectors thereof. It shall also not be necessary for the Transport Authority to send individual notice of the timings conference to the operators concerned and it shall be sufficient, if the notice giving the existing and proposed schedule of timings and the time, date and place at which the subject will be discussed, is affixed on the notice board of the office of the Transport Authority and copies of the notice sent to the applicant and the concerned S.T.U. and the bus owners Association of the district through which the route passes. (emphasis supplied) The vehicle should run according to the schedule as contemplated under Rule 249. In terms of the above rules, so long as the timing conference is held to fix the schedule of timings after notice is issued and opportunity is afforded to the bus owners Association of the district, as in these cases, a grantee cannot put the vehicle into operation on the road. Applying the ratio in Municipal Board’s case, it could be held that the date on which the grant could be given effect to would be the date on which the schedule of timings is fixed and the vehicle is put on road. 17. The judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Board’s case (supra) also came up for consideration in “Madan Lal V. State Of U.P. And Others ( 1975 (2) SCC 779 )”. That case arose under Section 17 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. While considering the Municipal Board’s case (supra), in paragraph 6, their Lordships quoted with approval the law laid down in that case and held that the publication of notification serves as notice to the aggrieved party and enables him to make an application under Section 64-A of the Act within the prescribed time. Therefore, the Court held that the date of publication shall be taken as the date of service. 18. A similar question, as to the starting point for filing an appeal under Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in “The Assistant Transpory Commissioner, Lucknow And Others V. Nand Singh ( AIR 1980 SC 15 )”. A person aggrieved against the order of the Taxation Officer can file appeal within thirty days from the date of the order. While considering the words “the date of the order”, the Apex Court held as follows. A person aggrieved against the order of the Taxation Officer can file appeal within thirty days from the date of the order. While considering the words “the date of the order”, the Apex Court held as follows. “It is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. In a given case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not.” (emphasis supplied) 19. Recently, the Apex Court in “D. Saibaba V. Bar Council Of India And Another ( 2003 (6) SCC 186 )” considered a similar question of limitation, which arose under Section 48-AA of the Advocates Act, 1961. Section 48-AA of the Advocates Act relates to the power of review of Bar Council which statutes that “the Bar Council of India or its committees, other than its disciplinary committee, may of its own motion or otherwise review any order, within sixty days of the date of that order, passed by it under this Act.” Placing reliance on the words employed “within sixty days of the date of that order”, it was argued that after the period of sixty days, the Bar Council of Indian becomes functus officio and its jurisdiction to exercise the power of revision comes to an end. While construing the said provision, the Apex Court has held as follows:- “So far as the commencement of the period of limitation for filing the review petition is concerned we are clearly of the opinion that the expression “the date of that order” as occurring in Section 48AA has to be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge of the order to the review petitioner. Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilized for implanting a heart into a dead provision; however, the power to construe a provision of law can always be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart. (emphasis supplied) How can a person concerned or a person aggrieved be expected to exercise the right of review conferred by the provision unless the order is communicated to or is known to him either actually or constructively? The words “the date of that order”, therefore, mean and must be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed.” A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in “P. Balarama Krishna Rao And Another V. The Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh And Others ( AIR 1974 A.P. 294 )” had an occasion to consider Section 64-A of the old Act and Rule 196 of the Rules. After analyzing the case laws including the judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Board’s case (supra), the Division Bench held that “on a general principle that an author must be supposed not to have intended to contradict himself the court will try its best to construe the language of the two provisions in such a way as to avoid the effect of inconsistency, unless of course the language is so plain that it is almost impossible to reconcile and harmonize the two apparently inconsistent provisions.” The Division Bench went on to add that the two provisions thus deal distinctly with two separate matters or situations. In order to avoid a statutory result that flouts common sense and justice, it would not be proper for this Court either to disregard the statute or the rule or allow either of them to override the other. It is out duty to son interpret these provisions that they would be in accord with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense and justice.” 20. It is out duty to son interpret these provisions that they would be in accord with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense and justice.” 20. The Kerala High Court in “Joseph V. Deputy Collector (1982 KERALA L.T. 904)” while considering a similar provision of Section 23 of the Agricultural Workers Act, has held as follows:- “A distinction can be drawn between statutory provisions merely dealing with limitation, and provisions designed to confer a right of appeal or of revision, with an added prescription of time. The approach in the latter types of cases is to find out and give effect to the true legislative intent. When S.23, Agricultural Workers Act, provides for an appeal to be filed within 30 days, the intention is basically to provide for a remedy and not to provide for a remedy by the left hand and make it illusory by the right, which will be the result of holding that the appeal should be filed within 30 days from the date of the order, even if the aggrieved party were to remain ignorant about the passing of the order during the whole of the period. Rules of interpretation should not strive to frustrate the legislative intent; they should be geared to the fulfillment of the legislative aim. If the purpose of S.23 is to provide the aggrieved party with a right of appeal, and if it is held that the mere making and signing of the order and keeping it in the files will be sufficient for time to start running, the very purpose of the provision will be defeated. Alternatively, it can be held that the very concept of an appeal involves a right to complaint about some mistake committed by the original authority, and that the party concerned cannot be expected to make such a complaint till he comes to know about the commission of the mistake.” 21. The said judgment was relied upon subsequently in “P.C. Varghese V. Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram (AIR 1985 KERELA 44)”. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:- “Section 64-A of the Act which provides a revisional remedy stipulates that the application must be made within 30 days of the order. Rule 172 of the Rules reiterates this provision. The said judgment was relied upon subsequently in “P.C. Varghese V. Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram (AIR 1985 KERELA 44)”. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:- “Section 64-A of the Act which provides a revisional remedy stipulates that the application must be made within 30 days of the order. Rule 172 of the Rules reiterates this provision. Of course, there are certain other rules such as R.170 and 225 where the limit prescribed is 30 days of the receipt of the order appealed against. In those cases, certainly, there would be no difficulty in interpreting the provisions of the Rules. They are clear and unambiguous and sub serve the statutory purpose. But, it appears to me that the provision of limitation in S.64A of the Act and R.172 of the Rules must be read along with latter portion of R.172 which states that the application shall be accompanied by the original or a certified copy of the order of proceedings against which the application is preferred. The person aggrieved by the impugned order, whether or not he was present at the time of the passing of the order, whether or not copy of the order was served on him, is required to produce either the original or a certified copy of the order along with the application. In these circumstances, to hold that the time stipulated for filing the application would start to run from the date on which the order was made or signed or the decision was arrived at, would amount to stultifying the statutory remedy. He cannot produce the original unless it is served on him. He cannot produce a certified copy unless it is supplied to him. Where it is not supplied to him by the authority, he must be in a position to apply for and obtain a certified copy. This would postulate the presence of actual or constructive knowledge of the order in him. That is the basis of the provision. The expression “30 days from the date of the order” must be understood in this way. Time will begin to run only from the date on which he had actual or constructive knowledge of the order as the case may be, of the impugned order.” 22. That is the basis of the provision. The expression “30 days from the date of the order” must be understood in this way. Time will begin to run only from the date on which he had actual or constructive knowledge of the order as the case may be, of the impugned order.” 22. In “Housing Board, Haryana V. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association And Others ( 1995 (5) SCC 672 )”, while dealing with Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 relating to the provision of appeal against the order of district forum, the Apex Court held that “the limitation period of one month must be counted from the date of communication of the order duly signed and dated. That was also a case where a person, aggrieved by an order made by the district forum, may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within thirty days from the date of the order.” (emphasis supplied) 23. A survey of the above judgments leads us to the following conclusions. There is no inconsistency between the first proviso to Section 90 and Rule 159, as both the provisions could co-exist without offending each other. As per the law laid down by the Apex Court in Municipal Board’s case, the date of the order shall mean the date on which the bus owner’s association of the revenue district is served the notice of time conference. In view of the above reasons, we do not agree with the finding of the learned single judge that “the date of the order” means the date the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority were made. 24. The next question falls for our consideration is as to whether the revision petitions filed by the appellants are barred by time. Though the date of knowledge shall mean the date on which the notice of timing conference is served on the Bus owners’ association, still the question remains as to whether the persons aggrieved could file revision merely on the basis of the knowledge of the grant, without original or certified copy of the order. The learned Single Judge has remanded the matter to the Tribunal for exercising the power under the second proviso to Section 90 and find out as to whether good and sufficient cause are available for the appellants in not making the revision petitions within time. The learned Single Judge has remanded the matter to the Tribunal for exercising the power under the second proviso to Section 90 and find out as to whether good and sufficient cause are available for the appellants in not making the revision petitions within time. The question, therefore, arises whether such a remand is required on the facts of this case. Though the Tribunal did not go into the limitation aspect to satisfy itself as to the good and sufficient cause for entertaining the revision petitions made beyond the period of thirty days, it proceeded to decide the revision petitions on merit, both on the ground that the grants in W.A.Nos.1992 and 1993 of 2003 were issued for the routes which were not asked and the grants in other writ appeals were made overlapping more than 4 kms. on served sectors, and set aside the orders. The learned single judge did not go into the above findings of the Tribunal and rendered any decision. We do not incline to remand the matter to the Tribunal only to consider the question of limitation, when the Tribunal has already decided the issue on merits. In that view of the matter, we now proceed to apply the second proviso to Section 90 and find out as to whether the revision petitions are within time on the basis of our findings in this order as to the limitation. 25. The grantees in W.A.Nos.1988, 1989, 1991 and 1993 has started operating the vehicles pursuant to the grant without there being any timing conference convened and schedule of timings fixed, as contemplated under Rule 248 of the Rules. A note prepared and submitted to the Court by the Regional Transport Officer, Tiruchirappalli indicates only that the grantees in all the above writ appeals are operating only on the tentative timings fixed. We do not find any provisions, either under the Act or under the Rules, to trace the power of the Regional Transport Officer to fix the tentative timings bypassing the Rule 248 of the Rules. In view of the failure to conduct the timing conference, it is seen that the appellants came to know of the grants only when the grantees started operating the vehicles on tentative timings fixed by the Regional Transport Officer. Hence, in these cases, the date of the knowledge shall be considered as the date of the order. 26. In view of the failure to conduct the timing conference, it is seen that the appellants came to know of the grants only when the grantees started operating the vehicles on tentative timings fixed by the Regional Transport Officer. Hence, in these cases, the date of the knowledge shall be considered as the date of the order. 26. In W.A.No.1988 of 2003, the date of grant is 29.9.2000. The appellant came to know of the grant only on 19.7.2001, when the grantee started operating the mini bus. An application for copy of the proceedings of the Regional Transport Officer was made on the same day. As the said application was returned on 17.8.2001, the appellant approached this Court for a direction to the Regional Transport Officer to furnish a copy, which was ordered on 25.9.2001. Immediately within nine days viz., on 04.10.2001 the appellant had filed the revision petition. Hence, we find that the revision petition is not barred by time. 27. The grantee in W.A.No.1989 of 2003 was granted permit on 4.10.2000. When the appellant came to know of the operation of the vehicle on 4.5.2001, he filed copy application on the same day, which was returned by the Regional Transport Officer on 6.6.2001. The appellant approached this Court for a similar direction for issuance of the copy of the proceedings of the Regional Transport Officer. This Court directed the furnishing of copy by order dated 7.9.2001 and the copy was furnished on 25.9.2001. Within a period of thirty days, the revision petition was filed on 24.10.2001. Hence, we find that the revision petition is not barred by time. 28. The grantee in W.A.No.1991 of 2003 was granted permit on 27.9.2000. The grantee started operating the vehicle on 19.7.2001. The appellant filed the copy application on the same day. As the same was returned, he approached this Court for a direction to furnish the copy, which was ordered on 5.9.2001. The copy of the proceedings was furnished on 25.9.2001 and the revision petition was filed on 4.10.2001. Hence, we find that the revision is not barred by time. 29. The grantee in W.A.No.1993 of 2003 was granted permit on 2.8.2000. When the appellant came to know of the operation of the vehicle on 25.4.2001, he filed copy application on 26.4.2001. The copy of the proceedings was furnished on 25.9.2001 and the revision petition was filed on 4.10.2001. Hence, we find that the revision is not barred by time. 29. The grantee in W.A.No.1993 of 2003 was granted permit on 2.8.2000. When the appellant came to know of the operation of the vehicle on 25.4.2001, he filed copy application on 26.4.2001. As the same was returned, the appellant approached this Court for a similar direction for issuance of the copy of the proceedings of the Regional Transport Officer. This Court directed the furnishing of copy by order dated 7.6.2001, and the copy was furnished on 13.7.2001. Immediately, the revision petition was filed on 16.7.2001. Hence, we find that the revision petition is not barred by time. 30. Insofar as the grantees in W.A.Nos.1987 and 1990 of 2003, we find that the timing conferences were held and the timings were fixed. In W.A.No.1987 of 2003, the date of the grant is 28.3.2001. Notice of timing conference was served on the district bus owners’ association on 23.7.2001. Copy application was filed on 1.8.2001 with a delay of eight days. The said application was returned on 16.8.2001 by the Regional Transport Officer and at the instance of the appellant, this Court directed issuance of the copy of the proceedings on 7.9.2001. The copy was furnished on 25.9.2001 and the revision petition was filed on 3.10.2001 with a delay of eight days. In all the revision was filed within sixteen days from the date of knowledge of the timing conference. Hence, we find that the revision petition is not barred by time. 31. In W.A.No.1990 of 2003, the date of the grant is 25.3.2001. Notice of timing conference was served on the district bus owners’ association on 23.7.2001. Copy application was filed on 1.8.2001 with a delay of eight days. The said application was returned on 16.8.2001 by the Regional Transport Officer and at the instance of the appellant, this Court direct issuance of the copy of the proceedings on 7.9.2001. The copy was furnished on 25.9.2001 and the revision petition was filed on 3.10.2001 with a delay of eight days. In all the revision was filed within sixteen days from the date of knowledge of the timing conference. Hence, we find that the revision petition is not barred by time. 32. The copy was furnished on 25.9.2001 and the revision petition was filed on 3.10.2001 with a delay of eight days. In all the revision was filed within sixteen days from the date of knowledge of the timing conference. Hence, we find that the revision petition is not barred by time. 32. Insofar as the grantee in W.A.No.1992 of 2003, it is seen that though the notice of timing conference was served on the district bus owners’ association on 12.3.2001, the appellant has stated that he came to know of the grant on 23.4.2001 and has filed the copy application only on 24.4.2001, after a period of more than thirty days. As we have held that the date of service of notice of timing conference on the bus owners’ association should be the date of knowledge, the copy application filed on 24.4.2001 by the appellant is beyond the period of thirty days from the date of the said notice. Hence, we find that the revision petition is barred by time. In view of our above finding that the revision itself is barred by time, we do not incline to go into the merits of the case. Accordingly, W.A.No.1992 of 2003 is dismissed. 33. In view of the above, let us now consider the merits of the case in so far as the challenge to the grant in W.A.No.1993 of 2003 on the ground that the routes granted was not requested in the application. The Tribunal has found that the grant was made for the route for which there was no application. Hence, the Tribunal set aside the grant. As it is a factual aspect, we perused the records produced by the learned Special Government Pleader. A note by the Regional Transport Officer, Tiruchirappalli is also furnished to the Court. From the said notice, it is seen that the grantee in W.A.No.1993 of 2003, though applied for the route from Tiruverumbur bus stand to Anna Nagar bus stand, there is no modification application for the route actually granted. Section 70 of the Act mandates the applicant to furnish the particulars as to the route or the routes or the area to which the application relates. A format is prescribed in SCPA, which also requires the applicant to specify the route or area for which the permit is applied. Section 70 of the Act mandates the applicant to furnish the particulars as to the route or the routes or the area to which the application relates. A format is prescribed in SCPA, which also requires the applicant to specify the route or area for which the permit is applied. This insistence as to the particulars is for consideration of the application by the Regional Transport Authority under Section 72 of the Act. The second proviso to Section 72 prohibits the Regional Transport Authority to issue the permit in respect of any route or area not specified in the application. The Tribunal had, in fact, set aside the grant only on the ground that the grant was made in respect of the route not applied for. We do not see any error in the said finding of the tribunal, as the grantee in W.A.No.1993 of 2003 was issued grant, which was not covered in the application. An attempt is made by Mrs. Radha Gopalan, learned counsel to contend that slight deviation in the route will not render the very grant itself invalid. She would further submit that in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 72, the Regional Transport Authority is empowered to issue the grant with such modification as it deems fit. Hence, the learned counsel submitted that by virtue of the said proviso, the Regional Transport Authority is empowered to grant permit for the carried route also. We are not inclined to go into the above submissions, in view of the proviso to Section 72 disentitling the Regional Transport Authority to grant permit for the varied route. This proviso shall be read in consonance with sub-section (1) of Section 72 of the Act. The particulars in respect of the route are required to be furnished by the applicant as contemplated under section 70 and the format go to show the purpose for which the same are required. Hence, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal insofar setting aside the grant in respect of the grantee in W.A.No.1993 of 2003. 34. Coming to the other writ appeals, the Tribunal has set aside the grants on the ground that the routes covered under the grants overlapped more than 4 kms. on served sectors. The fact that the routes overlapped more than 4 kms. is disputed by the grantees. For satisfying ourselves we have perused the records. 34. Coming to the other writ appeals, the Tribunal has set aside the grants on the ground that the routes covered under the grants overlapped more than 4 kms. on served sectors. The fact that the routes overlapped more than 4 kms. is disputed by the grantees. For satisfying ourselves we have perused the records. From the records it is very clear that the Commissioner, Corporation of Tiruchirappalli has certified that the routes covered under the grants exceed 4 kms. in the Corporation Limit. Mr. Radha Gopalan, learned counsel for the grantees argued that the limit exceeding 4 kms. falls in the municipal limits and in such event, there is no prohibition for issue of grants for the routes, though it exceeds 4 kms. In support of the same, she produced certain tax receipts issued by the Municipality to contend that the routes fall within the jurisdiction of the municipality. We are not impressed by those documents, as the authenticity of those documents for the purpose of the case would be the report of the Commission. The Commissioner on more than one occasion had submitted the report to the Regional Transport Authority that the routes fall within the Corporation limit and it exceeds 4 kms. There is no dispute that the Regional Transport Authority cannot issue grants for the routes exceeding 4 kms. on served sectors. On the above factual finding, the Tribunal has set aside the grants. We, absolutely, find no error in the said finding, as we ourselves are convinced that the routes granted in respect of the grantees exceeded 4 kms. on served sectors. Hence, the grants in respect of the grantees in W.A.Nos.1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1993 of 2003 are also liable to be set aside. 35. For all the above reasons, the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority, Tiruchirappalli in issuing the grants to each of the first respondent in W.A.Nos.1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1993 of 2003 are set aside and the writ appeals are allowed and W.A.No.1992 of 2003 is dismissed. No costs.