JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:—This writ petition takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court, Mumbai, dated November 26, 1999, in Appeal (IC) No. 102 of 1994 in Application No. BIR-430/86, as well as the order passed by the Second Labour Court, Mumbai, dated May 31, 1994, in Application No. BIR-430/86. 2. The petitioner initiated disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. After following necessary procedure, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report, on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to pass order of dismissal of the respondent from service with effect from 12th July, 1985. The order of dismissal was passed on the facts established against the respondent, which obviously invited major punishment. The respondent was charged for misconduct of assault and intimidation of a fellow employee. It will be apposite to advert to the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, which reads thus: "From the entire evidence on record, the following facts established against BC-78316: 1. BC-78316 had a grudge against BC-77218 over the incident of 12-3-85, when he suspected him of having complaint the matter regarding his work so he was motivated to take revenge by violence on 14-3-85 while both of them were on duty at the Sewree Bus Chowkey. BC-78316 pulled BC-77218 from the bus, slapped him to death should he complained against him in future. 2. While no serious injury was caused on BC-77218 by BC-78316 yet the weapon was so sharp that a minor scratch injury was inflicted on the neck which was reddish in colour as observed by Shri Govekar, A.T.O.-8. 3. BC-78316 had taken the law in his own hand and his behaviour in this incident amount to an act subversive of discipline, on the premises of the undertaking. By holding the lethal weapon on the neck of BC-77218, he has caused him mental harm. 4. The above action of BC-78316 had attracted large gathering of people who shouted when they saw the opened barbers razor in his hand. 5. A witness cited by BC-77218 have not come out with the truth for obvious reason. Also BC-77218 has slightly changed his statement in order to shield his colleague so as to save him from the consequences." 3. 5. A witness cited by BC-77218 have not come out with the truth for obvious reason. Also BC-77218 has slightly changed his statement in order to shield his colleague so as to save him from the consequences." 3. On the basis of the above finding, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to consider the question of quantum of punishment and observed thus: "On a perusal of his service record, it is observed that he has joined the undertaking on 1-3-1978, has put in about 7 years and 4 months of service. His attendance record and general performance record has been found to be unsatisfactory. Also he has been reduced in grade for 56 months in March, 1980 for Gross negligence on duty. Considering the gravity of the grave misconduct proved against BC-78316, besides for the fact that he has got a criminal bent of mind who can go to any extent to inflict violence, in my opinion, he is not a fit person to be retained in the services of the undertaking. He deserves the maximum punishments. I, therefore, order that he be DISMISSED from the services of the undertaking with effect from 12-7-1985 which hereby do." 4. The respondent took the matter before the Labour Court by way of Application No. BIR-430/86. The Labour Court has positively found that the enquiry conducted against the respondent was fair and sufficient opportunity was given to the respondent. The Labour Court also affirmed the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority regarding the alleged misconduct of the respondent. However, with regard to the question of quantum of punishment, the Labour Court in the impugned judgment took a liberal view of the matter, as in its opinion, the recent trend of decisions of superior courts was to give chance to the delinquent employee to improve his conduct and not to dismiss him for slightest misconduct or a dishonesty involving a small misconduct. Accordingly, the Labour Court passed the following order: "The application is partly allowed. The opponent undertaking are hereby directed to reinstate the applicant, Shri Arun Vishwanath Golatkar, bus conductor No. 78316 with continuity of service but without backwages within one month from the date of order. No order as to costs." 5. Against this decision, the respondent, as well as the petitioner, took the matter in appeal before the Industrial Court. The opponent undertaking are hereby directed to reinstate the applicant, Shri Arun Vishwanath Golatkar, bus conductor No. 78316 with continuity of service but without backwages within one month from the date of order. No order as to costs." 5. Against this decision, the respondent, as well as the petitioner, took the matter in appeal before the Industrial Court. The appeal filed by the respondent for awarding relief of backwages being Appeal No. ID/96/94 was, however, dismissed by the Industrial Court by the impugned judgment and order. Insofar as the appeal preferred by the petitioner essentially against the order of reduction of punishment awarded by the Labour Court, being Appeal (IC) No. 102 of 1994, even that came to be dismissed. The only discussion while justifying the dismissal of the appeal referred by the petitioner can be discerned from paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus: "On the contrary, if the grounds of appeal of the original opponent are concerned, there is no substance in the grounds of appeal because by refusing full backwages, the original applicant has suffered from irreparable loss and that is by way of punishment for his improvement. So considering both the appeals, there is no substance in the grounds of appeals, hence I answer the point No. 1 in the negative." In this backdrop, the present writ petition has been filed questioning the correctness of the decision of the Labour Court in reducing the punishment to one of reinstatement with continuity of service, without backwages, and which view has been affirmed by the Industrial Court. 6. According to the petitioner, that course was not open to the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, in the fact situation of the present case. It is argued that the decisions relied upon by the Labour Court are wholly inapposite to the fact situation of the present case, because, in those cases, the alleged misconduct was of insignificant nature, such as, not remaining on duty, or, not coming in uniform, or, the like; whereas, in the present case, the respondent has been found to have involved in serious misconduct of assault and intimidation on an employee of the petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, fairly submits that to show some indulgence to the respondent, the petitioner is willing to offer all terminal benefits to the respondent, inspite of the order of dismissal passed against him. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, fairly submits that to show some indulgence to the respondent, the petitioner is willing to offer all terminal benefits to the respondent, inspite of the order of dismissal passed against him. He has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (New Shorrock Mills v. Maheshbhai T. Rao)1, reported in 1997(I) C.L.R. 13 to contend that the approach adopted by the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court cannot be sustained in law at all. He further submits that, in any case, the Industrial Court has disposed of the appeal preferred by the petitioner very casually as can be found from the discussion in paragraph 13 of the judgment. On the other hand, Mr. Mahadeshwar, Advocate, appeared on behalf of the respondent, and adopted the view taken by the courts below and prayed for dismissal of this writ petition. 7. After considering the submissions and going through the records of the case, with the assistance of the Counsel for the parties, I have no hesitation in observing that, as has been consistently found by both the courts below, the enquiry conducted against the respondent was fair. Besides, the finding reached by the Disciplinary Authority, as adverted to above, with regard to the alleged misconduct of the respondent, also cannot be disturbed and the courts below have rightly refused to interfere with the same. The only question that remains to be considered is, whether the quantum of punishment awarded by the petitioner for the nature of misconduct established against the respondent, of dismissal from service, can be said to be appropriate in the fact situation of the present case. The Labour Court has interfered with that view on the reasoning that the recent trend of decisions of the superior Courts was to take liberal view and afford an opportunity to the concerned employee to improve his conduct. Indeed, the Labour Court was right in adverting to the decisions, referred to in its judgment (at pages 94 to 97 of the paper book of this writ petition). However, none of the said decisions will be of any avail to the respondent. In all those cases, the allegation of misconduct was not of serious nature, as in the present case. However, none of the said decisions will be of any avail to the respondent. In all those cases, the allegation of misconduct was not of serious nature, as in the present case. In that, in those cases, the misconduct was one of indiscreet behaviour, or, using improper and abusive language, or not remaining on duty, or, not coming in uniform, etc. However, in the present case, it is established from the record that the respondent indulged in serious misconduct of causing criminal intimidation and assaulting another employee of the petitioner. The facts, as established in the present case, are incomparable with the alleged misconduct in the reported decisions, relied on by the Labour Court. What is relevant to note is that the Labour Court has rightly noted that the trend to give opportunity to the delinquent employee is in respect of "small or minor misconduct". In the present case, the misconduct is a major and serious one. Although this grievance was made before the Industrial Court, the Industrial Court has affirmed the view taken by the Labour Court, and, in my opinion, without recording any tangible or intelligible reason to do so. The reason as weighed with the Industrial Court for dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, in para 13 of its decision as reproduced above, to my mind, to say the least, is a casual approach in deciding the appeal, which warranted serious consideration. 8. The next question is the nature of punishment to be awarded to the respondent. From the established facts on record, no serious fault can be found with the approach of the Disciplinary Authority in awarding punishment of dismissal. However, even if the Court was to take liberal attitude, the appropriate punishment could have been not less than "discharge" of the concerned employee, so that the employee is punished for the serious misconduct, but, at the same time, is not deprived of his terminal benefits. In the case, which is cited across the Bar by the Counsel for the petitioner of the Apex Court in Raw Shorrock Mills (supra), the Management had imposed punishment of discharge against that employee. The Division Bench of our High Court in the case of (Vasant G. Gurav)2, reported in 1968(II) L.L.J. 182 has observed that it is open to the employer to impose lesser punishment of discharge. The Division Bench of our High Court in the case of (Vasant G. Gurav)2, reported in 1968(II) L.L.J. 182 has observed that it is open to the employer to impose lesser punishment of discharge. Even in the present case, that course was open and ought to be taken by converting the order of "dismissal" to one of "discharge". Moreover, having regard to the fair submission made by the Counsel appearing for the petitioner across the Bar, the order of punishment can be converted or be treated as one of "discharge" in the present case, as the petitioner is willing to offer all terminal benefits to the respondent, inspite of the order of dismissal, which was subject-matter of challenge. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the courts below is set aside and, instead, the order passed against the respondent by the petitioner is maintained, on the assurance given on behalf of the petitioner through its Counsel appearing before the Court that the respondent will be offered all terminal benefits, inspite of the order of dismissal. 9. This petition, therefore, succeeds on the above terms. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs. 10. All concerned to act on the copy of this order duly authenticated by the Court Stenographer of this Court. Petition succeeds. -----