JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, J. :- This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the Order of the learned HP. State Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dated 6th December, 1999 whereby the Original Application No. 60/1988 of the petitioner was dismissed as being barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The present petitioner was the applicant before the Tribunal. He is employed with respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 3 was promoted as Superintendent on 14.3.1984. The petitioner filed a representation against the promotion of respondent No. 3. This representation was rejected by the Managing Director of the respondent-Corporation on 24th February, 1988. The O.A. was filed in March, 1988 itself. In reply to the O.A. the respondent-Corporation has raised the plea of limitation, which reads as follows:- "That apart from being barred by delay and latches, the application is not maintainable on account of being barred by limitation also. The impugned order Annexure P-14 has been issued by Shri V.P. Mohan, IFS Managing Director of the respondent-Corporation with a mala fide intention to bring the application of the applicant within limitation. The applicant submitted representation dated 5.6.1984 to the Chairman, and not to the Managing Director. Perhaps he was not seriously disputing the appointment of the applicant to the post in question therefore, he conveniently slept over the matter for about 4 years. And one fine morning he woke-up from his deep slumber and learnt (See Annexure P-13 dated 1.2.1988) that his "case is still under consideration" in the office of Shri V.P. Mohan, the worthy Managing Director. Here again he conveniently forgot that he had represented to the Chairman and not to the Managing Director. Shri V.P. Mohan, the Managing Director entertained the re-presentation addressed to the Chairman on the basis of reminder dated 1.2.1988 (Annexure P-13) and with unusual promptness disposed off the representation of the applicant.” 3. The Managing Director Shri V.P. Mohan has entertained the representation of the applicant with a view to harm and harass the replying respondent since he is prejudiced and biased against the replying respondent 4. The objection raised by the respondent-Corporation makes interesting reading. The Corporation is blaming its own Managing Director for having decided the representation of the petitioner to help him.
The objection raised by the respondent-Corporation makes interesting reading. The Corporation is blaming its own Managing Director for having decided the representation of the petitioner to help him. The Managing Director has rejected the representation of the petitioner. However, as per the respondent-Corporation the Managing Director has rejected the representation only with a ft view to bring the application of the petitioner within limitation. This plea is highly absurd. Nothing has been shown to us as to what action has been taken against the Managing Director if his action was mala fide. 5. Mr. Neel Kamal Sood, learned- Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has relied upon a case titled S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 10. This judgment does not help him in any manner. In this case it is clearly stated that in the case of a service dispute the cause of action must be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority is made especially when there is a statutory appeal provided. The only contention of Mr. Sood is that in this case the statutory appeal lay before the Board of Directors. The appeal filed by the petitioner was to the Chairman of the Board of Directors. No explanation has been given as to why the Chairman of the Board of Directors did not decide the appeal earlier. The rejection of the appeal has been conveyed by the Managing Director on 24th February, 1988. This gave a fresh cause of action to the applicant and the application is therefore within limitation. 6. Mr. Sood, learned Counsel has also relied upon a case titled Ramesh Chand Sharma v Udham Singh Kamal and others, 1999(5) SLR 654. In our opinion this judgment has no applicability to the facts of the case since in that case the representation against the promotion of the respondent had been rejected on 2nd July, 1991 where after the applicant kept making representation and the O.A. was filed in the year 1994. In the present case the representation was made immediately after the promotion of respondent No. 3 and it was decided only in February, 1988 and the O.A. was also filed in 1988 and therefore said judgment is not applicable. 7.
In the present case the representation was made immediately after the promotion of respondent No. 3 and it was decided only in February, 1988 and the O.A. was also filed in 1988 and therefore said judgment is not applicable. 7. This Court has held in Mohinder Singh Malhi v. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation and another, Latest HLJ 2001 (HP) 439, as follows :- "8. In this connection, it may be profitable to refer to Section 21 of the act, which provides limitation. It enacts that the Tribunal shall not admit an application in a case where a "final order as mentioned under sub-section (2)(a) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance of the applicant. Subsection (2)(a) of Section 20 states that for the purposes of subsection (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances when the final order is made rejecting an appeal or representation. Clause (a) of Section 21(1) provides that if a final order has been made by Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any: appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance an application can be made within one year from the date of such final order. 9. In the instant case, the grievance of the petitioner before the State Government was the action taken by the1st respondent. Therefore, even if it is assumed that there was no appeal and what was submitted was merely a representation to the Government, then also, the case was covered by sub-section (2)(a) of Section 20 of the Act and it was open to the petitioner to invoke Section 21(1) of the Act and Section 21(2) has no application. And as the final order was passed in January, 1990 and the petition was filed in August, 1990, it was within time." 8. In view of the aforesaid judgment in this Court and the discussion above, we are of the view that the Tribunal7has erred in rejecting the O.A. on the ground of limitation. This is a fit Case where the dispute should have been decided on merits and not rejected on the technical plea of limitation. 9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed.
This is a fit Case where the dispute should have been decided on merits and not rejected on the technical plea of limitation. 9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order of the Tribunal dated 6th December, 1999 passed in O.A. No. 6071988 is set aside and the case is sent back to the Tribunal to decide the same on merits. Since the O.A. was filed in 1988 the Tribunal-is requested to decide the same expeditiously. No order as to costs.