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2004 DIGILAW 352 (MP)

Devendra Chaudhary v. Warsilal Dua

2004-04-08

S.K.SETH

body2004
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal at the instance of defendants-tenants is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.8.2001 passed by the I Additional District Judge, Neemuch, in First Appeal No. 22-A/2001. By the impugned judgment and decree, the appeal preferred by the plaintiff-landlord was allowed and dismissal of the suit as ordered by the trial Court was set aside and a decree for eviction under S. 12(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') was granted. 2. Respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiff') filed a suit for eviction against appellants (hereinafter referred to as 'defendants') on the allegation that he is the owner and landlord of the Shop No. 6 situated on Mhow Nasirabad Road, Neemuch (hereinafter referred to as 'suit shop' for short). It was let out to defendants on monthly rent of Rs. 800/- (Rs. Eight hundred) for commercial purposes for running office and sale of machinery parts. Although tenancy commenced from 1.9.1988, but a Rent Note was executed on 1.10.1988. Under the rent note a sum of Rs. 22,000/- (Rupees Twenty two thousand only) was deposited by the defendants-tenants as security deposit for payment of rent. According to the plaintiff, defendants were irregular in payment of monthly rent. They had not paid rent for 58 months from September, 1989 to June, 1994 and defendants were in arrears amounting to Rs.46,400/-. Even after adjusting security deposit and other sum which were paid by the tenants, still Rs. 14,400/- was outstanding as arrear up to June, 1994. The tenancy was determined by the plaintiff by registered notice dated 25.11.1991. Even after determination of tenancy, defendants neither paid the arrears of rent nor vacated the premises. Plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit in the year 1994 claiming eviction together with arrears of rent. Plaintiff had also set up bona fide need of his major son Harjeet Singh, who holds a BE degree and is working as a Civil Contractor, for running office in the suit shop. It was also alleged that in 1991 defendants put locks in the suit shop and did not use suit premises for more than six month. Plaintiff had also set up bona fide need of his major son Harjeet Singh, who holds a BE degree and is working as a Civil Contractor, for running office in the suit shop. It was also alleged that in 1991 defendants put locks in the suit shop and did not use suit premises for more than six month. Thus, initially eviction was sought under S. 12(1) (a) and 12(1) (f) of the Act, however, during the trial plaintiff amended the plaint and also sought eviction under S. 12(1) (c) of the Act on the plea that contrary to the terms and conditions of the Rent Note, defendants allowed to set up an STD booth in the suit shop. The plaintiff also pleaded that his major son bad obtained a premises on monthly rent of Rs. 650/- (Rupees six hundred fifty) and had opened his office in the said premises w.e.f. 15.8.1998. 3. The claim of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendants by filing a written statement denying that the defendants are in arrears of rent. They also denied the bona fide need of plaintiff's son. They also denied that they were not using the suit accommodation since 1991. Defendants also denied the fact that plaintiff's son had taken premises on monthly rent of Rs. 650/-. With these pleadings, parties went on trial. 4. After appreciating the evidence, both oral and documentary, as adduced by the parties, learned trial Court dismissed the suit on each count. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, plaintiff preferred the first appeal, which was allowed by the lower appellate Court and a decree of eviction was granted under S. 12(1) (a), (b), (c) of the Act as mentioned hereinabove. 5. This appeal was admitted for final hearing on the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether lower appellate Court was justified in granting a decree u/s 12(1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act notwithstanding the deposit of rent by defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 13(1) of the Act, thereby allowing him to take benefit of section 12(3) of Act? 2. Whether lower appellate Court was justified in granting a decree U/S 12(1) (b) of the Act when admittedly that ground was not taken before the trial Court ? 3. 2. Whether lower appellate Court was justified in granting a decree U/S 12(1) (b) of the Act when admittedly that ground was not taken before the trial Court ? 3. Whether lower appellate Court was justified in granting a decree U/S 12(1) (c) of the Act in favour of this plaintiff ?" 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the records of Courts below. Before entering into merits of rival submissions, it would be appropriate to note that trial Court as well lower appellate Court have rejected the plea of bona fide requirement of the suit shop for plaintiff's son Harjeet Singh. It does not appear from the records of lower appellate Court that any cross appeal/cross objection was filed by the plaintiff against the said finding, in this second appeal, a cross objection under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC was filed on behalf of plaintiff and a decree for seeking eviction under section 12(1) (f) was also sought as there is genuine requirement of suit shop for the plaintiff's sone Harjeet Singh. In considered opinion of this Court there is no merit and substance in the cross objection preferred by the plaintiff. Both the Courts below after proper appreciation of evidence have arrived at a finding that plaintiff could not established a ground for eviction under section 12(1) (f). Hence, finding in this regard has become final and need not detain this Court on that question any longer. The cross objection is accordingly dismissed. Now coming to 'admitted facts, there is no dispute between the parties that plaintiff is the owner and landlord of the tenanted premises which was let out on 1.9.1988 on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 800/-. The rent note is also not disputed. It is also not disputed that Rs. 22,000/- was deposited by the defendants as security for the payment of rent. It is also not disputed that an STD booth was opened in the suit shop. It is in this back ground, rival submissions made by learned counsel for parties on the aforesaid three substantial questions of law require consideration. Question No.1 7. Attacking the eviction under section 12(1) (a) of the Act, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants submitted that tenant was under bona fide impression that deposit of Rs. 22,000/- was sufficient to cover the arrears, therefore, while depositing Rs. 4800/- tenant had raised a dispute on 4.5.1995. Question No.1 7. Attacking the eviction under section 12(1) (a) of the Act, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants submitted that tenant was under bona fide impression that deposit of Rs. 22,000/- was sufficient to cover the arrears, therefore, while depositing Rs. 4800/- tenant had raised a dispute on 4.5.1995. When the dispute was resolved tenant deposited the rest of arrears as per order of the trial Court. Learned counsel further submitted that delay in deposit of arrears of rent was also condoned by the trial Court on 5.2.2001, therefore defendants were not liable to be evicted under section 12(1) (a) of the Act. The trial Court rightly dismissed the suit and lower appellate Court wrongly upset the findings of the trial Court and held in favour of the plaintiff. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent-plaintiff submitted that despite service of registered notice tenants neither paid nor tendered the arrears of rent to the plaintiff before institution of suit or even after service of summons of suit within one month of service of summons of the suit despite specific pleadings in the plaint. He therefore, submitted that findings recorded by the lower appellate Court is perfectly valid based upon proper appreciation of evidence. These findings of facts are not open to challenge in the present second appeal. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of the appeal on this count. 8. Perusal of the records reveals that appellants were served with the summons of suit on 15.10.1994. The rate of monthly rent of the tenanted premise was not in dispute, still arrears of rent were neither deposited nor tendered by the appellant within one month from the date of service of summons. On 2.12.1994 plaintiff moved an application under section 13 of the Act praying for striking off the defense. In reply dated 23.1.1995, defendants did not raise any dispute with regards to either rate of rent or arrears thereof. While the application was pending, the appellants-defendants filed application dated 4.5.1995 under section 13(1) (2) of the Act and simultaneously also deposited Rs. 4800/- which according to them was outstanding as arrears of rent. By order dated 27.9.1995 trial Court found that tenant deposited rent during the suit, hence rejected the application under section 13(6) filed earlier by the landlord. While the application was pending, the appellants-defendants filed application dated 4.5.1995 under section 13(1) (2) of the Act and simultaneously also deposited Rs. 4800/- which according to them was outstanding as arrears of rent. By order dated 27.9.1995 trial Court found that tenant deposited rent during the suit, hence rejected the application under section 13(6) filed earlier by the landlord. That order of the trial Court was challenged by the landlord in CR No. 1166/95 which was allowed by this Court on 19.11.1996 and the trial Court was directed to decide the application afresh. Applications filed by both landlord and tenant were decided by the trial Court vide order dated 8.10.1998 and the trial Court found that defendants had not deposited the entire arrears, therefore they were directed to deposit Rs. 9600/- in addition to Rs. 4800/- deposited on 4.5.1995. In compliance of said order, appellants-defendants after one year deposited Rs. 9600/- on 18.12.1999 and on a subsequent application made by the defendants trial Court vide order dated 5.2.2001 allowed the application and condoned the delay. Trial Court without discussing evidence and the mandatory requirement of section 13(1) and 13(5) of the Act just in one paragraph reached to conclusion that no ground under section 12(1) (a) was made out. Trial Court failed to see that language of section 13 is clear and cast a statutory duty on the tenant to comply with section 13(1) if he desires to avoid eviction under section 12(a). In the case in hand as noticed above appellants had not complied with the First limb of section 13(1). Trial Court without recording any valid and cogent reasons just mechanically condoned the delay by order dated 5.2.2001. Trial Court completely ignored the admitted rate of rent and the averments made in applications/replies filed on behalf plaintiff wherein after furnishing details of payments made by the defendants, it was clearly stated that an amount of Rs. 14,400/- was outstanding against defendants as arrears of rent at the time of institution of the suit. Even the disputed arrears of rent were neither deposited in the Court nor tendered to plaintiff within one month from the date of service of summons of the suit. Deposit was made in the trial Court on 4.5.1995. Thus a clear cut default was committed by the appellants. Even the disputed arrears of rent were neither deposited in the Court nor tendered to plaintiff within one month from the date of service of summons of the suit. Deposit was made in the trial Court on 4.5.1995. Thus a clear cut default was committed by the appellants. That apart, appellants did not comply with the trial Court's order dated 8.10.1998 within a reasonable time and deposited Rs. 9600/- on 18.12.1999 only when he was threatened with striking of defense vide order 29.11.1999 if he failed to deposit it within 10 days. Thus consistent defaults were persistently committed by the appellants with regard to payment of arrears of rent. Not only this, without there being any valid reason appellants failed to pay/deposit monthly rent by 15 of each succeeding month as has been rightly noticed by the lower appel1ate Court, yet ignoring all these glaring and successive defaults with regard to compliance of second limb of section 13(1), trial Court found that no ground under section 12(1) (a) was made out. In the considered opinion of this Court, lower appellate Court adopted the correct approach in this regard and properly held that appellants were not entitled to the benefit of section 12(3) of the Act. It is now well settled that the twin obligations imposed by section 13 are mandatory in nature and in order to avoid a decree on any ground under section 12(1) of the Act, the tenant must pay the arrears of rent and thereafter the monthly rent in manner prescribed otherwise the inevitable result would be a decree for eviction, see 2000(2) JLJ 1 = (2000) 4 SCC 380 Jamna1al and others v. Radheshyam. When statute lays down the period within which the rent is required to be paid or deposited, then the statutory direction is directed against private individual, it is mandatory in nature and is required to be complied with if the tenant desires to avert eviction under section 12(1) (a) of Act. No doubt, rent legislation is normally intended for the benefits of tenant but those benefits can be enjoyed by the tenant only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions and in such matter equitable considerations has no place. No doubt, rent legislation is normally intended for the benefits of tenant but those benefits can be enjoyed by the tenant only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions and in such matter equitable considerations has no place. Thus, on this count the judgment and the decree of the lower appellate Court does not suffer from any infirmity calling for interference by this Court in present second appeal and decree for eviction under 12(1) (a) is hereby confirmed. Questions No. 2 and 3 9. Now coming to questions 2 and 3, in the considered opinion of this Court as both questions are interconnected, therefore, to avoid repetition, they are taken up for consideration simultaneously. The case of the plaintiff in the plaint was that in 1991 defendants put locks on the suit shop and did not use suit premises for more than six months, however, during the trial plaintiff amended the plaint and also sought eviction under section 12(1) (c) of the Act on the plea that contrary to the terms and conditions of the Rent Note, defendants allowed to set up an STD booth in the shop. This fact was not disputed by the appellants-defendants in their written statement. 10. Learned counsel appearing for appellants-defendants vehemently contended that no issue was framed by the trial Court with regard to ground for eviction under section 12(b) of the Act and still lower appellate Court passed a decree for eviction under 12(b) of the Act. As regards the ground under section 12(c) is concerned according to learned counsel for appellant, setting up an STD booth in portion of suit shop by son of appellant No.2 did not amount to use of suit shop contrary to the terms of Rent Note Ex. P-l. He, therefore submitted that eviction decree under section 12(1) (b) & (c) passed by the lower appellate Court deserves to be set aside. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord supported the decree of the lower appellate Court and submitted that findings are based on proper appreciation of evidence both oral and documentary which does not call for any interference by this Court in second appeal. 11. I have bestowed very serious consideration to the rival submissions and thereafter I have come to the conclusion that there is no merit and substance in the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. 11. I have bestowed very serious consideration to the rival submissions and thereafter I have come to the conclusion that there is no merit and substance in the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is an undisputed fact that there is no denial in the written statement that son of appellant No.2 was permitted to use a portion of the suit shop for running a STD Booth and that too without permission of the plaintiff/landlord. This is clear from the deposition of appellant No.1, who was examined as DW 1 in the trial Court. In the rent note, a specific stipulation was made prohibiting appellants defendants apart from carrying any business other than the one as mentioned in the rent note without prior permission of the plaintiff-landlord. Thus, in the perspective undisputed facts, the lower appellate Court rightly held that ground for eviction under section 12(1) (b) and (c) were also made out. Lower appellate Court rightly held that in absence of any specific denial, no issue was required to be framed in respect of ground under section 12(1) (b) specially keeping in view the admissions made by the appellant No.1 in his deposition. Learned lower appellate Courts rightly granted decree for eviction based upon proper appreciation of evidence and as such the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court are not open to challenge in this second appeal. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no merit and substance in this appeal hence it is dismissed with cost throughout, counsel's fee Rs. 1000/- if certified. The appellants, without creating any third party right, interest or charge shall hand over the vacant possession of the suit shop with full payment of rent till the date of delivery of possession within two month from today and shall also file an undertaking to this effect in the trial Court within 15 days from today. In the event of failure on the part of appellants, the respondent shall be at libertly to put the decree into execution forthwith.