JUDGMENT P.G Agarwal, J. 1. Heard Mr. B.K. Singh, the learned Amicus Curiae for the Appellant and the learned P.P. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the Sessions Judge, Sonitpur, Tezpur in Sessions Case No. 38(S)/ 96 (G.R. Case No. 1055 of 1995) convicting him under Section302, IPC and sentencing him to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- in default further imprisonment for six months. 3. This is a case of matricide, where the accused-Appellant before us Pancham Rawtia killed his own mother. The incident took place around 11 A.M. on 26.7.95 in the house of the accused-Appellant and he was sitting with his mother, brother and sister. The deceased was suffering from certain illness and after returning from the hospital, she was sleeping in the verandah whereas the accused-Appellant was sleeping inside the room. Thereafter, the accused-Appellant picked up an axe and hacked his mother on the neck causing instantaneous death. 4. Dr. Jyotish Ch. Sarma (PW 1) held the autopsy over the dead body and found the following injuries: WOUNDS: A sharp cut injury on the front and left lateral aspect of neck in the upper part deep upto cervical spine bones cutting the carotid artery, muscles and veins of neck of left side with presence of blood stain at wounds and margins and neck. THORAX: Cut on the left side at the site of trachea and larynx at the level of the site of external wound. A case of ante-mortem cut throat. Other organs are healthy. In the opinion of the Doctor, the death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of injuries sustained by the deceased. 5. Biren Rawtia (PW 2) and Kuwari Rawtia (PW 3) are the brother and sister of the accused-Appellant and the deceased Nirashi was the mother. They have all deposed about the death of their mother as a result of cut injury on the neck on the date of occurrence. Bharto Munda (PW 4) and Etowa Mahali (PW 6) are the neighbours who came to the place of occurrence and found the dead body. Lakhu Tosa (PW 5) is a witness to the inquest. Considering the oral and medical evidence on record, the trial Court held this to be a case of homicide and this finding of fact has not been challenged. 6. Lakhu Tosa (PW 5) is a witness to the inquest. Considering the oral and medical evidence on record, the trial Court held this to be a case of homicide and this finding of fact has not been challenged. 6. In the present case, there is no eye witness to the occurrence and the prosecution has relied on the circumstantial evidence as well as the judicial confession recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure PWs 2 and 3 being the inmates of the house, they were present when the incident took place even if they did not see the actual incident of assault. Soon after the assault was made, the accused was apprehended. In this case, we find that at the time of recording deposition, the witnesses were asked certain questions and the trial Court recorded answers mechanically as if they are contradiction as provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The statement under Section164 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be recorded unless it is required to be proved for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction. PW 2 has categorically stated that he saw bloodstained axe in the hand of the accused-Appellant soon after the assault and as such there is no scope for recording contradiction though admitted by the accused in his statement under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure The witness did not tell police that he did not see bloodstained axe in the hand of the accused- Appellant. We have perused the C.D. available on record and find that the contradictions have been wrongly recorded as there was no scope for these contradictions. The fact that the accused was apprehended with the help of the co-villagers stands well established. The weapon of assault was also seized. 7. Naba Kamal Bora (PW 7), Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, recorded the confessional statement (Ext.3). We find that the learned Magistrate has recorded the confessional statement in accordance with the rules and regulations and guidelines given by this Court. The confessional statement reads as follows: At 11 a.m. yesterday I was sleeping at home itself. By this time, my mother came from hospital. She was suffering from fever. When my mother came I came to know. After coming my mother slept on the front Veranda. Although I was lying inside the house I was not asleep. As I dozed dreamt a dream that my mother would become a witch. By this time, my mother came from hospital. She was suffering from fever. When my mother came I came to know. After coming my mother slept on the front Veranda. Although I was lying inside the house I was not asleep. As I dozed dreamt a dream that my mother would become a witch. That I rose (from sleep) then I went to the roost outside, picked up the axe and dealt cut blow with axe the neck and head of mother who was sleeping. My younger brother was sleeping nearby. My younger brother saw me. With the axe when I went close to my elder sister who was going to take bath, my brother saw and raised a hue and cry. My two brother chased me. I ran. Public captured me near the Police Station. Elder brother Shri Kanta captured me and asked me to drop the axe. 8. The following two pertinent questions were put to the accused person-(1) Why the accused is making confession, (2) The Magistrate assured the accused that even if he declines to make confession, he will not be remanded back to police. The learned Magistrate has also recorded that the accused was lamenting and weeping for having committing the serious crime of matricide. The accused in his statement under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure has admitted making of confessional statement as he was badly assaulted by police and apprehending that he maybe sent to police again and out of fear, he made the confessional statement. The record does not show that the accused had sustained any injury and so far the alleged fear is concerned, the learned Magistrate had assured him time and again that he will not be sent back to police even if he declines to adduce evidence. Hence, considering the evidence on record, we hold that the confessional statement was made voluntarily. 9. As regards the other point whether the confession is true or not, we find that there is sufficient corroboration to the statement as regards the place of occurrence, nature of assault and weapon used and the site of injury. The medical evidence fully corroborates the statement in the confessional statement as regards the injury and the weapon used. The witnesses stated about the place where the incident took place and the manner in which the accused was apprehended. The medical evidence fully corroborates the statement in the confessional statement as regards the injury and the weapon used. The witnesses stated about the place where the incident took place and the manner in which the accused was apprehended. In view of the above material corroboration, the trial Court held it to be the true version of the incident. 10. So far the evidentiary value of confession is concerned, we may refer to the following observations of the Apex Court. In the case of Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 214 , the Apex Court held that the burden is on the accused to prove that the confessional statement was obtained by threat, duress or promise. The above ratio of law was reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of K.I. Pavunny v. Asstt. Collector (HQ), C.E.S. 1997 (3) SCC 721 . In a recent case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Kutty alias Lakshmi Narasinhan 2001 Cri LJ 4168, the Apex Court has held: Learned Judges of the High Court declined to act on the said confession mainly for two reasons. First is that the confession was retracted by the maker thereof and second is that the recovery of articles was made prior to the confession. We may state at the outset itself that both reasons are too insufficient for overruling the confession. It is not the law that once a confession was retracted the Court should presume that the confession is tainted. As a matter of practical knowledge we can say that non-retracted confession is a rarity in criminal cases. To retract from confession is the right of the confessor and all the accused against confessions were produced by the prosecution have invariably adopted that right. It would be injudicious to jettison a judicial confession on the mere premise that its maker has retracted from it. The Court has a duty to evaluate the evidence concerning the confession by looking at all aspects. The twin test of a confession is to ascertain whether it was voluntary and true. Once these tests are found to be positive the next endeavour is to see whether there is any other reason which stands in the way of acting on it. Even for that, retraction of the confession is not the ground to throw the confession overboard. The twin test of a confession is to ascertain whether it was voluntary and true. Once these tests are found to be positive the next endeavour is to see whether there is any other reason which stands in the way of acting on it. Even for that, retraction of the confession is not the ground to throw the confession overboard. The second requirement of law for basing conviction on confession is that the confessional statement must be true or trustworthy. The law is more or less well settled that where the first requirement of voluntariness is satisfied, the Court must, before acting upon the confession reach the finding that what is stated therein is true and reliable. For judging the reliability of such a confession or for that matter of any substantive piece of evidence, there is no rigid canon of universal application. Even so, one long method which may be useful in most cases on evaluating cases may be reiterated. The Court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence, circumstances and probabilities of the case and if the confession appears to be a probable catalogue of events and natural events with the rest of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the second test. In order to find out the truthfulness of the confession, let us examine the relevant portion of Ext.2, as quoted above. The relationship between the accused and the deceased and other witnesses has not been disputed by the prosecution, on the contrary, it has been admitted by the hostile witnesses. PW 1, the informant has also stated in the FIR and the deposition regarding the quarrel between the accused and the deceased. The death of the deceased on the date of occurrence, as stated by the accused, stands carefully established. The statement of the accused that he appeared before the police station alongwith the weapon of assault stands supported by the evidence of investigating Police Officer. PW 8, Babul Bora deposed that the accused voluntarily appeared before the police station with a 'Pocha' that he used at the time of occurrence, and he seized the same. The statement of the accused that he appeared before the police station alongwith the weapon of assault stands supported by the evidence of investigating Police Officer. PW 8, Babul Bora deposed that the accused voluntarily appeared before the police station with a 'Pocha' that he used at the time of occurrence, and he seized the same. The evidence of PW 8 on this point was not challenged learned Counsel for the defence has further referred to the evidence of PW 5, Mohan Daimari, who has deposed that the seizure was made at the residence of the accused. PW 5 is no doubt the seizure witness but he has also not deposed the truth. The witness admits his signature on Ext. 1, the seizure list. We have perused, Ext. 1, wherein it has been categorically stated that the seizure was made at the police station only and as the evidence of PW 8 has not been challenged, we hold that the material exhibit, Ext. 1, was seized at the police station and not at the residence of the accused, as stated by PW 5. The seizure list, therefore, corroborates part of the statement in Ext.2. We, thus, find that the confessional statement of the accused stands corroborated by the other facts and circumstances of the case, including the evidence of the hostile witnesses which can be relied upon to the extent possible and in all probability the incident had taken place in the manner in which the accused had confessed in his statement. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has referred to the observation of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai v. State of Gujarat (1992) 1 SCC 473 , wherein the Apex Court relying on the earlier observation in the case of Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 159 , has observed: In considering the reliability of this confessional statement the High Court had not kept in view the observations of this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. In this decision the Supreme Court had observed: The confession of an accused person is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the terms as defined in Section 8. It cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. It cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. The proper way is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether if it is believed a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept. The High Court has on the other hand made this confessional statement as the basis and has then gone in search for corroboration. It concluded that the confessional statement is corroborated in material particulars by prosecution witnesses without first considering and marshalling the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration. As held in the decision cited above only if on such consideration on the evidence available, other than the confession a conviction can safely be based then only the confession could be used to support that belief or conclusion. The observation of the Apex Court in Kashmira Singh (supra) was in respect of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, that is, for using the confession of a co-accused and hence, the decision in Kashmira Singh (supra) or Chandrakanta Chimanlal Desai (supra) are not relevant for our purpose. In the present case, the prosecution has sought conviction on the basis of confession of the accused himself and we may refer to the various decisions of the Apex Court: In law it is always open to the Court to convict an accused on his confession itself though he has retracted it at a later stage. Nevertheless usually Courts require some corroboration to the confessional statement before convicting an accused person on such statement. What amount of corroboration would be necessary in such a case would always be a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. Nevertheless usually Courts require some corroboration to the confessional statement before convicting an accused person on such statement. What amount of corroboration would be necessary in such a case would always be a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637 . A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a Court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only a rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule of practice or prudence that under no circumstances such a conviction can be made without corroboration, for a Court may, in a particular case, be convinced of the absolute truth of a confession and prepared to act upon it without corroboration but it maybe laid down as a general rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confession, unless the Court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars. Pyarilal, AIR 1963 SC 1094 The above proposition of law was followed by the Apex Court in the case of Kehar Singh (supra) popularly known as Indira Gandhi murder case. Where the confession was not retracted at the earliest opportunity, but after lapses of several months when the prosecution evidence was closed and the accused for the first time during examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure retracted the confession, the confession could be accepted as voluntary. ( AIR 1978 SC 1248 ) In K.L. Pauni (supra) the Apex Court held that in a criminal trial punishable under the provisions of the IPC, it is now well settled legal position that confession can form the sole basis for conviction. 11. In view of the circumstantial evidence and the confessional statement as quoted above, we hold that it was the accused-Appellant who killed his own mother Nirashi on the date of occurrence. Mr. B.K. Singh, the learned Amicus Curiae, however, submits that in the present case, the accused-Appellant is entitled to protection under Section 84 IPC. 11. In view of the circumstantial evidence and the confessional statement as quoted above, we hold that it was the accused-Appellant who killed his own mother Nirashi on the date of occurrence. Mr. B.K. Singh, the learned Amicus Curiae, however, submits that in the present case, the accused-Appellant is entitled to protection under Section 84 IPC. Referring to the circumstantial evidence and the confessional statement, it is submitted that the alleged act of murder was done in insane manner and as the prosecution has failed to establish any motive in killing the mother and as the conduct of the accused was not of a normal person, it may be inferred that at the relevant time, the accused-Appellant was suffering from temporary insanity. We need not be sociologist to subscribe to the view that a person who kills his own mother or father, such conduct of killing comes under the purview of abnormal behaviour. In the present case, the killing is of own mother and hence, admittedly, it was an abnormal behaviour. A question, however, arises as to whether an act of abnormality on the part of the accused-Appellant entitles him to protection under Section 84 IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the provisions of Section 84 IPC in the case of Ratanlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1971 SC 778 ; Sher Ali Wali Md. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 2443 ; Oyami Ayatul v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 216 , the Apex Court has laid down the following guiding principles: 1. The Court shall presume absence of insanity. 2. Burden of proof of insanity is on the accused though it is not that heavy as that of the prosecution to prove an offence. 3. Every minor mental aberration is not insanity and unless the conguitive faculty of mind is destroyed as a result of unsoundness to such an extent as to render one incapable of knowing the nature of his act. 4. The accused must suffer from legal insanity and not merely medical insanity. 5. The crucial point on which the unsoundness of mind has to be proved is the time when the crime is actually committed. 12. 4. The accused must suffer from legal insanity and not merely medical insanity. 5. The crucial point on which the unsoundness of mind has to be proved is the time when the crime is actually committed. 12. In the present case, there is no iota of evidence that the accused-Appellant at any point of time or at the time of incident, was suffering from mental illness or any legal insanity. Merely because the accused-Appellant had killed his mother without any motive, known to the Court, it can not be inferred that he was suffering from temporary insanity and as such the protection under Section 84, IPC, is not available to the accused-Appellant. 13. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the accused-Appellant never intended to kill his own mother and as such the offence committed by him is not covered under Section 300, IPC and at best it may amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II, IPC. Considering the weapon of assault used and the injury caused on the vital organ of the body cutting almost the entire neck and accepting prosecution version of the story, we are constrained to disagree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the accused-Appellant. 14. In the result, we find that the appeal has got no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed