Judgment :- K.K. Denesan, J. Tenants are the revision petitioners. Order of eviction dated 25-1-2003 in R.C.P. No. 115 of 1994 passed by the Rent Control Court, Ernakulam and affirmed by the appellate authority as per order dated 18-11-2003 in R.C.A.No.72 of 2003 concurrently finding that the landlord bonafide needs the building (hereinafter referred to as the ‘building’) for his own occupation, are sought to be set aside in this revision petition filed under Sec. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). This is the second round of litigation between the petitioners and the respondent-landlord. In the first round of litigation the findings of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority were against the landlord. Those findings were challenged by him in C.R.P. No.639 of 2001 filed before this Court. Having regard to the contention that change of circumstances had taken place in view of the subsequent events, C.R.P. No. 639 of 2001 was disposed of by this Court by order dated 5-9-2002 setting aside the orders impugned therein and remanding the matter for fresh consideration after affording opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence. In the light of the directions contained in the impugned order, the Rent Control Court allowed both parties to adduce further evidence and the court considered the evidence thus adduced and found that the need set up by the landlord was bonafide. 2. Respondent-landlord is the owner of the residential building occupied by the petitioners as tenants. Respondent has no other building of his own. He is married and presently residing with his wife and two children in the house belonging to his brother. After the brother’s marriage the atmosphere in the family became tense on account of the bickerings between the wives of the two brothers and in order to avoid the relationship between the families of the two brothers getting strained irreparably the respondent-landlord wished to reside separately and in the above circumstances the need for own occupation of the tenanted building by the landlord arose. 3. According to the respondent the need is bonafide. But petitioners/tenants would resist the claim contending that the brother of the landlord was staying with his wife in Mumbai and there was no occasion for the alleged quarrel between the two wives. 3. According to the respondent the need is bonafide. But petitioners/tenants would resist the claim contending that the brother of the landlord was staying with his wife in Mumbai and there was no occasion for the alleged quarrel between the two wives. This plea raised by the petitioners was accepted by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority in the first round of litigation. Now after remand, the Rent Control Court has reappreciated the evidence in the light of the further evidence adduced by the parties. Evidence now available is to the effect that the brother with his wife has come back from Mumbai and both the families are residing in one and the same house. The Rent Control Court has believed the evidence adduced by the landlord with regard to the subsequent events and has found that the landlord has made out a case for eviction under Sec. 11(3) of the Act. Consequently the petitioners have been ordered to be evicted from the building. The contention of the petitioners that notwithstanding the subsequent events the respondent could continue to reside in the house of his brother was rightly rejected by the Rent Control Court. Challenging the bonafides of the need pleaded by the respondent, it was also contended by the petitioners that the conditions of the building is such that it is unsuitable for the landlord to reside therein without effecting modifications or alterations to the building. The above contention was also rightly repelled by the Rent Control Court. The findings entered by the Rent Control Court have been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. We also notice that there is concurrent finding by the two authorities below that the respondent-landlord has no other building of his own except the building occupied by the revision petitioners. The courts below have rightly held that it was quite unnecessary to make an endeavour to find out as to how the landlord could have adjusted himself in his brother’s house. The landlord is the best judge of his requirements and he should be given complete freedom to choose the place of his residence. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence evaluated by the two authorities under the Act, we are satisfied that the courts below have appreciated the evidence on record properly and that the landlord has established that his need for the tenanted building is bonafide and reasonable. 4. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence evaluated by the two authorities under the Act, we are satisfied that the courts below have appreciated the evidence on record properly and that the landlord has established that his need for the tenanted building is bonafide and reasonable. 4. The revision petitioners have raised one more contention, namely, that the tenants are entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Act. For a proper appreciation of the entitlement or otherwise of the tenants to claim the protection of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Act, we consider it appropriate to reproduce below sub-sec. 3 of Sec. 11 of the Act and the second proviso to that sub-section: “…….(3) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him: xx xx xx xx xx Provident further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business:” The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority held that the revision petitioners were not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) since the building was taken on rent for their residential purpose which fact is evident from the lease deed marked as Ext. A1. Decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Chami v. Kallvani (1997 (2) KLT 577) was cited on behalf of the tenants to contend for the position that benefit of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) can be claimed by tenants occupying non-residential buildings as well as by tenants who are carrying on any trade or business in the building where they reside and are depending for their livelihood mainly on the income derived from such trade or business, provided no other suitable building is available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. The Appellate Authority did not find favour with the above contention advanced by the tenants and held that the observations made by the Division Bench in Chami’s case (supra) were only obiter dicta whereas the ratio in Parvathy Ammal v. Sankara Menon (1982 KLT 62) Decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court and referred to by a Division Bench in Meenakshi v. Kamalakshy Amma (1994 (2) KLT 434) is the binding precedent. In Parvathy Ammal (supra) this Court held against the claim for the benefit of the 2nd proviso to Sec. 11(3) made by the tenants occupying a residential building taken on rent for residential purposes. The Appellate Authority too took the same view and rejected the claim of the tenants for extending the benefit of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) and dismissed the appeal filed by them. 5. According to the revision petitioners, the decision in Parvathy Ammal (supra) has not correctly laid down the law; and therefore the same requires reconsideration in the light of the observations contained in Chami’s case (supra). In Parvathy Ammal (supra) the evidence was to the effect that the tenant was residing in the building with his family and was conducting the business of giving cycles on hire. Learned Single Judge took the view that inspite of the fact that the tenant was carrying on some trade or business while occupying a residential building, it will not make the building a non-residential one. Referring to the provisions contained in Sec. 17 of the Act it was found that a residential building can be converted into a non-residential building only with the written permission of the Accommodation Controller. The learned Judge on a consideration of the conditions insisted by the second proviso to the effect that no other suitable building should be available in the locality for the tenant to carry on the business or trade he was carrying on in the building from which he was sought to be evicted, opined that what the proviso dealt with is the availability of a building to conduct the trade or business and not the availability of a residential building. The learned Judge also noticed that the above proviso is unconcerned about the residential accommodation of the tenant which is indicative of the fact that the building contemplated by the proviso is a non-residential building in which the tenant is allowed to carry on his trade or business. The Division Bench which rendered the decision in Meenakshi v. Kamalakshy Amma (supra) took notice of the decision of the Single Bench in Parvathy Ammal and held that the benefits claimed under second proviso to Sec. 11(3) by the revision petitioners-tenants therein, were rightly denied by the authorities below. We extract below the relevant portion from Meenakshy’s case: “This Court has held in Parvathy Ammal v. Sankara Menon (1982 KLT 62) that the tenant of a residential building will not be entitled to the protection of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act even though living there he carries on a trade or business also. The benefits claimed under the second proviso in S.11(3) were rightly denied by the authorities below.” 6. Decision in Parvathy Ammal came up for consideration before yet another Division Bench and that Bench in the judgment reported in Navu v. Chinnavvan Chettiar (2003 (2) KLT 283) agreed with the view taken in Parvathy Ammal on the following reasoning: “The Appellate Court relied on a decision of this Court reported in Parvathy Ammal v. Sankara Menon (1982 KLT 52) wherein it was held that the tenant of a residential building will not be entitled to the protection of the Second Proviso to S. 11(3) of the Act even though living there he carries on a trade or business also. Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to our notice an unreported decision of this Court wherein a Division Bench of this Court was of the view that this has to be reconsidered. But in that case, the question was not discussed. So far as the present case is concerned, it is admitted that the building was taken for the purpose of residence. But the tenants are doing laundry business also. According to us, the Second Proviso to S.11(3) of the Act cannot be applied. If the argument of the tenants are to be accepted, the buildings will be taken for the purpose of residence and the tenant can be protected under the umbrella of the proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. But the tenants are doing laundry business also. According to us, the Second Proviso to S.11(3) of the Act cannot be applied. If the argument of the tenants are to be accepted, the buildings will be taken for the purpose of residence and the tenant can be protected under the umbrella of the proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. An Advocate may take buildings on a rent for his residence purpose and he may use one of the rooms in that building for the purpose of his profession. Can we say that the building was taken on rent for the purpose of business or profession. Likewise, a Doctor may use one of the rooms in the residential building for private practice. In such cases, we have to understand the purpose for which the building was taken. It may sometimes happen that the person may take building for commercial purposes. At the same time, he may reside there also. That stands on a different footing. So far as the present case is concerned, it is clear that the purpose for which the building was used was for residential purpose. Hence, we are of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of the Second Proviso to S.11(3) of the Act.” 7. It is well settled that the paramount purpose of interpretation or construction of a statute is to find out the intention of the Legislature. In so doing, the court should adopt a construction most agreeable to justice and reason. Keeping this principle in mind and on a combined reading of the second proviso to Section 11(3) and Sec. 17 of the Act we are inclined to agree with the view taken in Parvathy Amma’s case (supra) that the tenant of a residential building will not be entitled to the protection of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Act even though living there he carries on a trade or business. 8. On a perusal of Ext.A1 lease deed, the courts below have found that the building was let on rent for residential purpose only. There is no case for the revision petitioners that they obtained the permission of the Accommodation Controller or the consent of the landlord before they commenced the alleged trade or business in a portion of that residential building. There is no case for the revision petitioners that they obtained the permission of the Accommodation Controller or the consent of the landlord before they commenced the alleged trade or business in a portion of that residential building. The language of second proviso to Sec.11(3) admits no doubt that the benefit contemplated therein is not available to all kinds of tenants but restricted to those class of tenants specifically mentioned therein. We find no justification on the part of the tenant in claiming the benefit of the second proviso on the plea that contrary to the understanding between the landlord and the tenant regarding the use of the building, namely, for residential purpose only, the tenant unilaterally used a portion of the tenanted premises for his income earning activity and therefore the tenant can avail the benefit of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3). In the result, order dated 25-1-2003 in R.C.P. No.115 of 1994 of the Rent Control Court, Ernakulam and order dated 18-11-2003 in R.C.A.No.72 of 2003 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Ernakulam are affirmed and the Rent Control Revision is dismissed.