JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.:- Petitioner has challenged the action of respondents in initiating proceedings against him under the H.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 22 as amended by H.P. Act 10 of 1982, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Respondent No. 1 forwarded to respondent No. 2 recovery certificate under the provisions of the Act for initiating steps to recover the amount mentioned in the said communication as arrears of land revenue against Smt. Rama Rani, loanee and her guarantors including petitioner. Collector declared the aforesaid amount of Rs.11,99,540/-as arrears of land revenue. For effecting recovery of this amount it was forwarded to Tehsildar (Recovery) to initiate proceedings. 2. Impugned claim of respondent No.1 is challenged on the ground of its being barred by time suit admittedly having been filed was subsequently withdrawn. Other grounds urged were, that even if it assumed for the sake of argument without conceding that respondent No.1 could initiate the action against the petitioner under the Act, no hearing was afforded to him by respondent No.1 who became judge of its own case. As such steps for initiating recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue by respondent No. 1 are arbitrary, unjust, ultra vires and are liable to be struck off. 3. Another plea urged was, that even if it be again assumed for the sake of argument without conceding that respondent No.1 could have initiated action against the petitioner, only remedy available to it is, under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 1993 Act). Thus, petitioner has prayed for allowing this writ petition on all these grounds and consequently quashing Annexure P-1 issued by respondent No.1 and subsequent action based on it being undertaken by respondents 2 and 3 against him, (the petitioner). 4. When put to notice, respondent No.1 has controverted all these pleas. While giving the chequered history of the case, it is pleaded that loan was raised by one Shri Mohan Lal Soni on 4.10.1982 it was later on transferred in- favour of his widow. Petitioner, besides two others stood guarantee for its due repayment alongwith interest etc. 4. When put to notice, respondent No.1 has controverted all these pleas. While giving the chequered history of the case, it is pleaded that loan was raised by one Shri Mohan Lal Soni on 4.10.1982 it was later on transferred in- favour of his widow. Petitioner, besides two others stood guarantee for its due repayment alongwith interest etc. Further case of respondent No. 1 is that there were persistent defaults as such suit was filed in the year 1993 being Suit No. 211 of 1993 in this Court with future interest from 2.9.1992 against loanee Smt. Rama Rani and her guarantors. It was subsequently transferred to the Court of District Judge, Shimla. It was allowed to be withdrawn at the request of respondent No. 1 on 18.6.1996 by the transferee Court i.e. Addl. District Judge. Shimla, when it was stated that respondent No. 1 intends to initiate steps for recovery under the provisions of the Act or the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. It was urged- by Shri Sharma that show cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide communication dated 5.9.2001 (Annexure R-1J). 5. Its perusal shows that it was issued to Smt. Rama Rani and copies were endorsed for necessary action to the guarantors including the petitioner. Whether in fact it was actually served upon the petitioner or not, nothing has been placed on record in this behalf. 6. With a view to support the stand of his client, Shri Sharma urged that petitioner was called upon to attend the office of Corporation for one time settlement, but he failed. Therefore, no fruitful purpose would have been served even if any show cause notice was issued to him. With a view to support this plea reliance was placed by him on letters dated 25.3.2003, 5.5.2003 and 4.7.2003. 7. This plea has been raised simply to be rejected. Reason being that in case the petitioner did not approach respondent No. 1-Corporation for one time settlement, it does not authorize it as a limb of welfare State to urge that it is above law or will not follow the letter of law in its spirit including judge made law. In no case respondent No. 1 can be allowed to feign ignorance of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, which is the law of the land, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In no case respondent No. 1 can be allowed to feign ignorance of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, which is the law of the land, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. So far respondent No. 1-Corporation is concerned, it is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Least that it is bound to ensure was compliance with the principles of natural justice and fair play even in the absence of express provision to this effect in the Act. Still it was incumbent upon the Managing Director of respondent No. 1 to afford reasonable hearing to the so-called defaulter(s) including petitioner in this writ petition) and he may have been in a position to legally satisfy the Managing Director that he was not liable for payment of the sum claimed. Limitation is one of such valuable plea amongst other available to the petitioner. There was nothing that prevented the Managing Director of respondent No.1 to have heard and then examined the matter on the grounds on which the petitioner could object to recovery certificate being issued against him. 8. Moreover, this question is no more res integra in view of decision of the Supreme Court in S.K. Bhargava v. Collector, Chandigarh and others, 1998(5) SCC 170, when while dealing with identical situation was held as under :- "9. In our opinion, even though Section 3 does not expressly provide for an opportunity being given to the alleged defaulter to explain as to whether any amount is due or not but in view of the nature of the said provision, the principles of natural justice must be read into it. The requirement of determination of the sum due by the Managing Director must be regarded as providing for the Managing Director hearing the alleged defaulter before coming to the conclusion as to what is the sum due. The very use of the word determine and sum due implies that there may be a lis between the parties and they have to be heard before a final conclusion is arrived at by the Managing Director. It is not a mere claim of the Corporation which is forwarded to the Collector for realization, but it is the sum due as determined by the Managing Director which alone is recoverable. As already observed, this determination cannot be done without notice to the alleged defaulter. It is not a mere claim of the Corporation which is forwarded to the Collector for realization, but it is the sum due as determined by the Managing Director which alone is recoverable. As already observed, this determination cannot be done without notice to the alleged defaulter. 10. Ms. S. Janani, learned Counsel for the respondent Financial Corporation sought to reply the decision of this Court in Director of Industries U.P. v. Deep Chand Aggarwal, 1980(2) SCR 1015. In that case, the validity of Section 3 of the Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965 of U.P. was challenged. That Section enabled the State Government to recover the sums advanced as arrears of land revenue and it was sought to be contended that the said provision was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The validity of the said Section 3 was upheld, but we find that the Court was not called upon to deal with a question as to whether the principles of natural justice were implicity enshrined in the said Section. In any case/this decision is of no assistance to the respondent for the simple reason that Section 3 of the U.P. Act is not identical with Section 3 of the Haryana Act, inasmuch as the U.P. Act did not contain a provision similar to Section 3(1)(b) of the Haryana Act which requires determination by the Managing Director of the sum due from the defaulter. We however, do not express any opinion that where a provision like Section 3(1)(b) of the Haryana Act; is not incorporated in a statute, whether the principles of natural justice would require a notice being given before any amount is sought to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. 11. For the reasons hereinabove as, admittedly, principles of natural justice were not complied with, it must be held that determination of the Managing Director under Section 3(1) (b) and the consequent certificate issued under Section 3(2) of the Haryana Act, both were vitiated." 9. After coming into force the Act including its amendment, Parliament enacted Act of 1993. It could not be controverted on behalf of respondent No. 1 that it is a Financial Institution within the meaning of this Act and has, initiated action against its defaulting loanees where the amount claimed is more than Rs. 10 lacs, including executions of decrees earlier passed by different Courts. 10. It could not be controverted on behalf of respondent No. 1 that it is a Financial Institution within the meaning of this Act and has, initiated action against its defaulting loanees where the amount claimed is more than Rs. 10 lacs, including executions of decrees earlier passed by different Courts. 10. Section 34 of the Act of 1993 has overriding effect. However, under Section 34(2) of the Act of 1993 it is specifically mentioned that its provisions or the rules made there under shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Act mentioned in this sub-section. In this context, Sections 17 and 18 in our opinion have also material bearing in the decision of this writ. For ready reference Sections 17, 18 and 34 which have relevance as well as material bearing on the facts of this case are reproduced hereunder :- "17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals :- (1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act. 18. Bar of jurisdiction. - On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, power and authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17. 34. Act to have overriding effect. - (1) Save as provided under sub-section (2), the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. (2) The provisions of this Act or the rules made there under shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Industrial Corporations Act, 1951, the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act, 1984, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and the Small Industries Development Bank of India, Act, 1989." 11. In the context of recovery initiated by; U.P. Financial Corporation under the provisions of U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act. 1972, an identical law like the Act as is applicable in the State of H.P.(j came up for consideration before the Supreme Court vis-a-vis both i.e the U.P. Act as well as Act of 1993. What was held in Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and others, 2003(2) SCC 455 and is relevant for the purpose of present proceedings is extracted herein below :- "3. The factual position sans unnecessary details is as follows A certificate was issued under the U.P. Act for recovery of certain dues from the appellant for its alleged failure to company with the terms and conditions of loan granted to it; similar failure was alleged by three Directors and three guarantors. On 14.2.2001 citation for recovery was issued by the Tehsildar, Varanasi, for recovery of the alleged dues as arrears of land revenue. Appellant challenged the said action before the Allahabad High Court in CMWP No. 13738 of 2001 on the ground that after the enactment of the Act, the proceedings were not maintainable. Reliance was placed on the provisions contained under Section 32(G) of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (in short the Financial Act) to contend that no other proceeding is permissible to be taken under the Act. Reference was made to Sections 17 and 34 of the Act to substantiate his stand. Stand of the Corporation before the High Court was that alternative modes of recovery were prescribed under different statutes and one cannot stand 1 in the way of the other mode. Choice was left upon to the Corporation to act either under the Act or under the modes permissible under the Financial Act. Proceedings initiated under the U.P. Act were covered by the said Act. A Division Bench of the High Court on consideration of the rival submissions held that the language of Section 34(2) of the Act placed the position beyond controversy and concluded as follows :- "The choice is clear left open to the Financial Corporation which may proceed under the DRT Act or may proceed under the other modes of recovering the debts as are permissible under the SFC Act i.e. it can proceed under the provisions of the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act. 5. 5. In support of the appeal learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the field of operation so far as the Act is concerned, has been clearly delineated in Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank and another, 2000(4) SCC 406. Section 34 of the Act confers overriding effect vis-a-vis others statutes. The only exceptions to such overriding effect are enumerated in subsection (2) thereof. Proceedings under the U.P. Act are not encompassed by the exceptions. On the contrary, the action permissible so far as Financial Act is concerned, can be spelt out from Section 32-G of the said Act. 9. Section 34 of the Act consists of two parts. Subsection (1)deals with the over riding effect of the Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act. Subsection (1) itself makes an exception as regards matters covered by sub section (2) The U.P. Act is net mentioned therein. The mode of recovery of debt under the U.P Act is not saved under the said provision i.e. sub-section (2) which is of considerable importance so far as the present case is concerned. Even a bare reading therein makes it clear that it is intended to be in addition to and not in derogation of certain statutes ones of which is the financial Act. In other words, a Bank or a financial institution has the option or choice to proceed either under the Act. To that extent, the High Court went wrong is by holding that proceedings under the U.P. Act were proceedings. U.P. Act deals with separate modes of recovery and such proceedings are not relatable to proceedings under the Financial Act. 10. Since a plea of casus omissus for purposes of interpretation-was urged, we think it necessary to deal with that plea also. 13. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary - (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., 2000(5) SCC 515. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of section 6(1) is plan and unambiguous. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of section 6(1) is plan and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in N. Narasimhaiah and others v. State of Karnataka and others etc., 1996(3) SCC 88. In State of Karnataka and others v. Nanjudaiah and others, 1996(10) SCC 619 the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Courts order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. 14. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole -appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be constructed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J. in Artemlou v. Procoplou, 1966(1) QB 878, "Is not to be imputed to a statue if there is some other construction available." Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C., 1963 SCC 557 and at AC, p. 577 he also observed : "there is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges." Therefore, the High Courts conclusions holding proceedings under the UP. Act to be in order are indefensible." 12. Now coming to the plea of claim being time barred. Learned Counsel for respondent No.1 was not in a position to explain as to for what reason and under what circumstances, civil suit was withdrawn on 18.6.1996 vide Annexure R-1/H. Except for alleging that action was proposed to be initiated either under the act or State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, therefore, the suit was withdrawn. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that both remedies are summary in nature, whereas suit would have provided parties to raise proper pleas which would have been adjudicated upon by the Court on the basis of evidence, both oral and documentary. Further it a well known fact that limitation gives a valid right to a litigant like petitioner to dispute the claim of his opponent like respondent No.1. Even if respondent No.1 would have succeeded in establishing its claim in the suit, but on its being proved to be barred by time, suit was bound to fail. We leave the matter here only because any observation made is likely to prejudice either of the parties. 13. Learned Advocate General on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 submitted that his clients acted on receipt of communication under the provisions of the Act from respondent No. 1 Respondent No. 2 then declared the amount as arrears of land revenue and ordered its recovery as envisaged by law. He further pointed out that no action has been taken by any of his clients of their own. He, however, clarified that no fault can be found against any action taken; by his clients and he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 14. No other point is urged. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that action of respondent No. 1 is not sustainable as recovery certificate was issued unilaterally without affording any hearing to the petitioner. It is further, held that the recovery, if any, can be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1993 and not under the provisions of the Act. Ordered accordingly. It is further, held that the recovery, if any, can be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1993 and not under the provisions of the Act. Ordered accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner is held entitled to costs of this writ petition from respondent No.1 which are quantified at Rs.5, 0007-. -