M. Thanikachalam, J.: The accused in S.C.No.56 of 1994 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam, who stand convicted for the offence under Secs.302 I.P.C. and 498-A, I.P.C., are the appellants. 2. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nagapattinam, filed a final report before the Sessions Judge, seeking appropriate punishment against the accused under Secs.302 and 498-A, I.P.C, alleging that the accused being the son and mother, with an intention to commit murder of the wife of the first accused, by name Kundhavai, on her failure to meet out the unlawful demand of dowry, causing cruelty, committed murder of Kundhavai, on 20.4.1993 at about 8.00 p.m., in their house, by pouring kerosene over her and setting fire and therefore, they should be dealt with accordingly. The learned trial Judge upon perusing the documents, framed charges against both the accused under Sec.302, I.P.C. as well as Sec.498-A, I.P.C. Both the accused, disputing the allegations in the final report, had denied the charges. 3. The prosecution, in order to expose the guilt of the accused and to bring home the guilt of the son and other,‘had marched in 14 witnesses, seeking aid from 18 documents, as well as 10 material objects. 4. The evaluation of the above materials brought to surface the guilt of the accused, to the satisfaction of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam and in this view, he found guilty of the charges framed against both the accused. Then questioning the quantum of sentence, as mandated under Criminal Procedure Code, the learned trial Judge slapped life imprisonment for both the accused, for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. and two years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Sec.498-A, I.P.C, ordering the sentence to run concurrently. 5. The case leading to the conviction, as exposed by the prosecution witnesses, in brief, is as follows: (a) The first accused-Rajasekaran is the son of the second accused, by name Savithri. Thiru Rajamanickam (P.W.1) is the father of Kundhavai and Thangadurai (P.W.2). On 9.2.1992, the first accused married the daughter of P.W.1, Kundhavai. P.W.1 being a lawyer and Ex.M.L.A., celebrated the marriage in a grand manner and also gave 50 sovereigns of jewels, silver vessels and other vessels required for the family. (b) After the marriage, the first accused and his wife Kundhavai were living at Nagapattinam. On 9.2.1992, the first accused married the daughter of P.W.1, Kundhavai. P.W.1 being a lawyer and Ex.M.L.A., celebrated the marriage in a grand manner and also gave 50 sovereigns of jewels, silver vessels and other vessels required for the family. (b) After the marriage, the first accused and his wife Kundhavai were living at Nagapattinam. At that time, the accused used to demand more jewels, complaining that the jewels brought at the time of marriage are insufficient, which was reported by Kundhavai to his father P.W..1 Thereafter, on 8.12.1992, Kundhavai gave birth to a male child. The first accused, who went to the house of P.W. 1 demanded 8 sovereigns of gold chain, as well as Radar Watch, in the presence of P.W.3 and P.W.4. In addition, the first accused also requested P.W. 1 to send his wife as well as the child immediately, for which, P.W.I said that he will send the mother sand child, after two or three months, (c) The first accused, aggrieved by the conduct of P.W.I in not sending the child and wife immediately to the house, reported the matter to the relatives of P.W.I, for which there was a panchayat in the house of P.W.3. In the panchayat, P.W.2 questioned the first accused about the complaint to the relatives, for not sending the wife and child, which caused irritation to the first accused, resulting assault by knife, for which no complaint was preferred, in order to save the prestige of the family. Because of this incident, there was no settlement and finally in the month of March 1993, there was another compromise in the house of P.W.1’s sister, where it was decided that the sister of the first accused should take the wife of the first accused and child. In pursuance of the decision, Kundhavai and the child were taken to the house of the accused, which was taken by them on rental basis, from P.W.6. (d) On 20.4.1993 at about 8.00 p.m., when Kundhavai was watching T.V. in the hall, both the accused beat her, because of her failure to get more jewels from her birth place, thereby causing torture, poured kerosene and set fire. On hearing the noise of Kundhavai, P.W.6 went to the house and put off the fire with the help of the second accused also. The first accused, thereafter went to the house of P.W. 1 along with P.W.3. On hearing the noise of Kundhavai, P.W.6 went to the house and put off the fire with the help of the second accused also. The first accused, thereafter went to the house of P.W. 1 along with P.W.3. The first accused without informing the incident, requested P.W.I for an ambulance. Since no ambulance was available, P.W.1 took a taxi, went to Porulvaitha-cherry along with P.W.2 and the first accused. On reaching the house, P.W. 1 and P.W.2 noticed Kundhavai in the hall, who cried on seeing the father and said, Thereafter, P.W. 1 took the injured, admitted her in the Government Hospital, Nagapattinam at about 11.40 p.m. (e) When Dr.Rajakumarasamy, examined the injured Kundhavai, she narrated the incident to certain extent, which was incorporated in Ex.P-12. The doctor noting the condition of the injured, informed the Judicial Magistrate under Ex.P-3, for taking dying declaration and at the same time, he informed the matter to the police, under Ex.P-11. P.W.5, the then Judicial Magistrate of Nagapattinam, ascertaining her consciousness, recorded dying declaration Ex.P-4, in which he obtained the thumb impression of the deponent, as well as a certificate by the doc-tor-P.W.10, regarding the condition of the injured. (f) On receipt of Ex.P-11, P.W. 12 went to the hospital at about 12.05 a.m. (night). After the recording of the dying declaration by the Judicial Magistrate, he examined the injured in the presence of P.W. 10 about the incident. Her statement was reduced into writing as Ex.P-1. Since Ex.P-1 was recorded by a constable of the outpost police station, attached to the General Hospital, Nagapattinam, the matter was informed to P.W.8. After obtaining Ex.P-1, P.W. 12, registered a case in Cr.No.323 of 1995 for the offence under Secs.498-A and 307, I.P.C. and Ex.P-10, printed F.I.R. was prepared. (g) On receipt of the copy of the printed F.I.R., P.W. 13, the Inspector of Police took the case for investigation and in that process, he rushed to the hospital on 21.4.1993 at about 8.30 a.m., but he was unable to examine the injured, since she was unconscious. Inspecting the scene of crime, P.W. 8 prepared observation mahazar, sketch, as well as recovered M.Os. 1 and 2, in the presence of the witnesses. He had also examined number of witnesses and recorded their statements. On information, he arrested both the accused at about 7.30 p.m., on 21.4.1993. Inspecting the scene of crime, P.W. 8 prepared observation mahazar, sketch, as well as recovered M.Os. 1 and 2, in the presence of the witnesses. He had also examined number of witnesses and recorded their statements. On information, he arrested both the accused at about 7.30 p.m., on 21.4.1993. (h) Kundhavai, who was admitted in the hospital, succumbed to the burn injuries on 22.4.1993 at about 2.50 a.m. and in pursuance of the same, the case was altered from 307, I.P.C. to 302, I.P.C. under Ex.P-17. The F.I.R. were submitted to the Court concerned by P.W.9. In view of the death of Kundhavai, within the short period from the date of marriage, the matter was informed to the Revenue Authorities as well as the Deputy Superintendent of Police. On information, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nagapattinam conducted inquest, prepared Ex.P-9, which is spoken by P.W.7. (i) At the request of the Revenue Divisional Officer, P.W. 11 and one Kumarasamy, had conducted autopsy over the body of Kundhavai on 22.4.1993 at about 1.45 p.m., which revealed cent percent burn injuries all over the body. The external injuries and the internal injuries on dissection, revealed that Kundhavai died of shock and septicemia due to extensive burns, which is incorporated in Ex.P-15 and the injuries were incorporated in Ex.P-14. (j) The Revenue Divisional Officer, who conducted an inquiry, came to an opinion that Kundhavai died due to dowry harassment and cruelty and the same was reported to P.W.14. On that basis, P.W.14 took the case for investigation on 24.4.1993. He had examined the witnesses, recorded the statements, perused the investigation did by the Inspector of Police, which revealed that the accused are the cause for the death of Kundhavai. In this way, in order to punish the culprit, a final report was filed as aforementioned, leading to trial, ending in conviction, which is under challenge before us. 6. Heard the learned senior counsel, Mr.R.Asokan appearing for the appellants and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 7. The learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted, that there is no evidence for dowry demand, in order to say that the accused might have inflicted cruelty to the deceased and in the absence of such reliable evidence, the conviction slapped by the trial Court against the accused, under Sec.498-A is unsustainable. 7. The learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted, that there is no evidence for dowry demand, in order to say that the accused might have inflicted cruelty to the deceased and in the absence of such reliable evidence, the conviction slapped by the trial Court against the accused, under Sec.498-A is unsustainable. The learned senior counsel further submitted, that the dying declaration relied on by the prosecution and accepted by the trial Court, must be false and therefore, the conviction based on the dying declaration should go. It is further pointed out, that some of the material objects said to have been recovered from the scene of crime, have not been sent for chemical examination, in order to find out the availability of kerosene, since it is the specific case of the prosecution that the accused have poured kerosene and set fire to Kundhavai. He has further pointed out, that if at all, Kundhavai might have committed suicide, for which the accused could not be held responsible and their explanation tendered at the time of examination of 313 Crl.P.C. deserves acceptance. 8. Opposing the above contentions, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits, that there is strong and cogent evidence, not only to prove the demand of dowry prior to the incident, but also to prove the motive, for committing the murder by both the accused, which are well spoken by acceptable prosecution witnesses. It is the further submission of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that the trial Court have properly analysed the evidence and acme to adjust and unerring conclusion, which does not require any interference. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, we have to see the cause of death of Kundhavai, the place where the incident had taken place and certain admitted facts regarding the admission of Kundhavai in the hospital. 9. At the request of the investigating officer, P.W.11, the doctor conducted autopsy on 22.4.1993 at about 1.45 p.m. The doctors have noticed the burn injuries, all over the body, except in some places, over the thigh and foot. They have also noticed the corresponding internal injuries. Considering the over all effect of the injuries, as well as the chemical report, the doctors have come to the conclusion, that Kundhavai would appear to have died of shock and septicemia, due to extensive burns. They have also noticed the corresponding internal injuries. Considering the over all effect of the injuries, as well as the chemical report, the doctors have come to the conclusion, that Kundhavai would appear to have died of shock and septicemia, due to extensive burns. The reason given by the doctors for the death of Kundhavai is not challenged. During the cross-examination, it was elicited from the doctor, that there was no special feature indicating that the burns would have caused, due to pouring of kerosene and setting fire. She had also opined that the major burn injuries would have been caused due to pouring of kerosene and setting fire. It is also made clear during the cross-examination, that it is not necessary that there should be soot particles, when the kerosene was poured and fire was set. We find no difficulty in accepting the oral evidence of P.W.I 11, to conclude that Kundhavai died due to burn injuries. 10. The doctor, P.W.10 had seen the injured at the first instance at about 11.40 p.m., on 20.4.1993. From him, it is elicited during the cross-examination, when the injured was brought to hospital, there was no smell of kerosene over her body. It is further elicited that there was no trace, indicating that the burns were caused by pouring kerosene and setting fire. It is not the case of the doctor, that when kerosene is poured and set fire, it will have separate or special symptoms differing from any other burn injuries or it will have some specialised symptom, exposing that this kind of injury would have been caused only due to burn injuries, by pouring kerosene and setting fire. No medical opinion is also brought to our notice that there should be special phenomenon in a case of injuries caused by kerosene fire. In the absence of any such clear medical opinion, considering the evidence given by P.W. 10, it is not possible for us to hold, that Kundhavai would not have sustained burn injuries, as narrated in the final report or the injuries would have caused to her, by accidental fire. After pouring kerosene, if there was a complete burnt, then there would not have any possibility of smell, being felt. It is also not the case of the doctor, that in the case of kerosene pouring, it is mandatory that there should be smell of kerosene. After pouring kerosene, if there was a complete burnt, then there would not have any possibility of smell, being felt. It is also not the case of the doctor, that in the case of kerosene pouring, it is mandatory that there should be smell of kerosene. If it is half burnt, then only, ordinarily one can smell the kerosene, either over the body or in the dresses worn by the deceased. In this view of the matter, the fact that some of the burnt articles were not sent for chemical analysis, to trace out the existence of kerosene or its smell or the opinion given by the doctor that he has not smelt kerosene, when the injured was brought to the hospital, would not negate the case of the prosecution, if it is otherwise proved, by convincing evidence. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants would contend, that the deceased was admitted in the hospital only by the husband, but in the accident register, corrections were made, as if the deceased was admitted in the hospital by P.W. 1, drawing our attention to Exs.P-12 and P-13. In Ex.P-13, original Accident Register, it is written, as if the deceased was brought to the hospital by Rajamanickam, the father of the deceased. But Ex.P-12 indicates that the deceased was brought to hospital by Rajasekar and Rajamanickam i.e. A-1 and P.W. 1. As far as other matters are concerned, we find no variation or dispute or any correction in the accident register. The doctor, who had prepared this document, had given explanation, how this mistake had crept in, and how the same was received. By this correction of name, in our considered opinion, nothing is going to turn, either in favour of the prosecution, or in favour of the accused. It is more or less an admitted fact, that when the deceased was admitted in the hospital, the husband was also present. It is also in evidence, that after the incident, A-1 came to the house, where the incident had taken place and therefore, there is nothing strange in the husband accompanying the wife to the hospital, even assuming the worst that he is the cause for the injuries or something like that. It is also in evidence, that after the incident, A-1 came to the house, where the incident had taken place and therefore, there is nothing strange in the husband accompanying the wife to the hospital, even assuming the worst that he is the cause for the injuries or something like that. In this view, the correction made in the accident register or the discrepancy found therein, doubting the fact, who had admitted the deceased in the hospital, will not loom large and therefore, the attempt made by the defence, to create a doubt on the basis of this correction, is to be ignored as unworthy. 12. Ex.P-1 is the complaint, which set the law in motion, including the wheels of investigation. This statement was recorded by P.W.12, after reaching the hospital, on the basis of the intimation given to him under Ex.P-11. Ex.P-11 says, that the condition of the patient viz., Kundhavai was bad, and she was unconscious. This intimation was sent by P.W. 10, and it must be at about 11.40 p.m., or thereafter. P.W. 12 would state, that he reached the hospital at about 12.05 hours i.e. on 20/21.4.1993. He had stated that when he went to the hospital, the Judicial Magistrate was recording the dying declaration and therefore, waiting there, till the recording of dying declaration was over, then he recorded the statement. In Ex.P-1 it is stated that the patient was conscious. On the basis of Ex.P-1, at about 2.00 a.m. on 21.4.1993, a case was registered under Secs.498-A and 307, I.P.C., in Cr.No.322 of 1993. In this document, the deceased appears to have implicated both the accused saying Since this document implicates both the accused, whereas some of the documents which come into being, before this, has not implicated the first accused, specifically, this document is sought to be questioned, as if prepared by the police, at the influence said to have been used exercised by P.W.1 13. In the accident register, it is noted, as reported by the deceased: “said to be allegedly met with fire accident due to her mother-in-law Name: Savithri, W/o. of Rathinasabapathi Mudaliar”. In this document also, the condition of the patient is described, conscious. This is the earliest statement, given to the doctor, where we do not find the name of the first accused. In this document also, the condition of the patient is described, conscious. This is the earliest statement, given to the doctor, where we do not find the name of the first accused. The doctor P.W. 10 had asserted, during the cross-examination, that the information furnished by the deceased in Tamil, was translated into English, and written in the accident register, by him. Before Ex.P-1 was recorded, admittedly a dying declaration was recorded, by the Judicial Magistrate P.W.5. In Ex.P-4, the deceased had stated, that her mother in law Savithri alone had poured kerosene and set ablaze. Not only that, she asserted further, that her husband had not poured kerosene and set fire. In her words, as recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, As seen from the above statement, when the deceased had not specifically implicated the first accused, before the doctor, as well as before the Judicial Magistrate; in Ex.P-1, we find both the names of the accused. Under these circumstances, naturally a doubt would arise, about the involvement of A-1 as well as doubting about the genuineness of Ex.P-1 itself. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellants, is prima facie justified in questioning the genuineness of Ex.P-1. But considering the other evidence available, acceptably we are unable to entertain any doubt, about the contents of the document to the entire extent. If at all, maximum it could be said, the name of the first accused has been included. To that extent, a benefit may be available to the first accused, subject to other evidence, coupled with law. 13-A. The doctor, who admitted the patient at the first instance in the hospital viz., P.W.10 would state that before commencing the treatment, he informed the admission of Kundhavai, in the hospital, to the Judicial Magistrate as well as the police. He further says, after the Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration, the treatment was commenced. The deceased had sustained more or less 100% burn injuries, thereby suffering untold miseries, mentally and physically, as admitted by P.W. 10. It is the practice, in a case of burn injuries, in order to relieve, from the sufferings of the injured, as admitted by P.W. 10, they used to give morphine and pethadine. If this kind of injections are given, the patient will be without pain and sufferings and will be in the stage of sleeping, ordinarily at least for 5 to 6 hours. If this kind of injections are given, the patient will be without pain and sufferings and will be in the stage of sleeping, ordinarily at least for 5 to 6 hours. He further admits that within 5 minutes from the time of injecting the above medicine, the patient will become unconscious. It is also the case of P.W.10, that immediately after the Judicial Magistrate, recorded the dying declaration, the above procedure was followed in the case of Kundhavai. As spoken by P.W.5, he went to the hospital at about 11.50 p.m., recorded the dying declaration and completed the proceedings, at about 12.10 night and the same is incorporated in Ex.P-4 also. It is the case of P.W. 12 also that he recorded the statement after the Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration. Under the above circumstances, Ex.P-1 must have come into existence only after 12.10 a.m. As seen from Ex.P-1, it is not known at what time, the statement was recorded. But P.W. 12 says that he went to the hospital at 12.05 a.m. and recorded the statement, after the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate and therefore, it should be only after 12.10 a.m. 14. The doctor has admitted that immediately after the dying declaration, treatment started, giving Pethadine and morphine. On the basis of the above evidence, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that Ex.P-1 would not have come into existence, as described therein and later on, implicating the first accused, this document might have been prepared and that is why, a case was registered belatedly at about 2.00 a.m. Though, there appears to be some prima facie discrepancy, we are unable to agree, that Ex.P-1 was not prepared or written, as per the statement given by the deceased. P.W.10 had also given, evidence that after the dying declaration by the Judicial Magistrate, P.W. 12 came to the hospital, examined Kundhavai, in his presence and he had also certified that the patient was conscious and to that effect, we find endorsement also in Ex.P-1. We find no reason, to discard the oral testimony of P.Ws. 10 and 12 in this regard. Probably, though it is not spoken by P.W. 10, only after the recording of Ex.P-1, treatment ought to have been commenced, viz., injecting norphine and Pethadine, though other kind of treatment should have been given, even previously. We find no reason, to discard the oral testimony of P.Ws. 10 and 12 in this regard. Probably, though it is not spoken by P.W. 10, only after the recording of Ex.P-1, treatment ought to have been commenced, viz., injecting norphine and Pethadine, though other kind of treatment should have been given, even previously. In this view of the matter, we are unable to entertain any doubt about Ex.P-1. Unless it is shown Ex.P-1 is the handy work of the police, on the basis of the inspiring evidence available on record, we cannot ignore Ex.P-1 totally. Kundhavai died, thereafter, admittedly, and in this view, Ex.P-1 also should be treated as a dying declaration. This document also could be relied on to the extent, where corroboration available. 15. P.W.5 had testified, about the recording of dying declaration from Kundhavai under Ex.P-4, reaching the hospital, on receipt of Ex.P-3, on 20.4.1993 at about 11.50 p.m. As seen from the cross-examination, nothing is said, against the dying declaration or the procedure adopted by the Judicial Magistrate, in recording the dying declaration. The doctor, who was present, at the time of recording of the dying declaration had stated, that at the time of recording of the dying declaration, patient was conscious and to that effect, he had also certified in Ex.P-4, not challenged, when P.W.5 as well as P.W.10 were in the box. The question and answer recorded by P.W.5, as seen from Ex.P-4 also would indicate, that the Judicial Magistrate functioned judicially, questioned the injured, in order to ascertain her mental, capacity, to give statement and thereafter, satisfying himself, recorded the statement, which is buttressed, by a competent medical man also. Hence, Ex.P-4 should have its credit, and it should be accepted in toto. On that basis, seeking support or corroboration from other evidence if available, a conviction could be based, sustained and there could not be any legal impediment. In this view of the matter, we are unable to doubt about the consciousness of the deceased, during the recording of Exs.P-1 and P-4 and they could not be labeled, as the documents prepared falsely or to suit the occasion. It is also not the case of the first accused or to the second accused, in the statements filed at the time of examination under Sec.313, Crl.P.C. that Kundhavai was unconscious or incapable of giving statement. It is also not the case of the first accused or to the second accused, in the statements filed at the time of examination under Sec.313, Crl.P.C. that Kundhavai was unconscious or incapable of giving statement. In fact, A-1 had asserted, that he was enquiring the condition of Kundhavai, through the hospital staff. Therefore, if Kundhavai had not been conscious or incapable of giving statement, it would have been informed to the first accused and the first accused, who is an educated man, would not have omitted to state the same in the statement. When the oral evidence of the Judicial Magistrate, doctor and P.W.12 were informed to the first accused, by way of questioning, it is not the explanation of the first accused, that the deceased would not have given the dying declaration or she was unconscious. The above circumstance, is an added factor to confirm the genuineness of Exs.P-1 and P-4. 16. The second charge, against the accused is that they had caused cruelty to the deceased, since she failed to meet out the unlawful demand of dowry. The learned counsel for the appellants submits, that there is no independent evidence, to prove the demand of dowry, followed by cruelty, except the interested oral testimony and in this view, sustaining the conviction, on the basis of uncorroborated interested testimony is unsafe. We are unable to agree, considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, at the first instance, the deceased and the accused were living at Nagapattinam and thereafter, they shifted to Porulvaithacherry, near Nagapattinam. Demand of dowry and the dispute between the husband and wife or the relatives, as the case may be, could not be the subject matter of public demand. In this view, the public or the neighbours, may not have the chance, to know the above facts. This kind of activities, are taking place in secrecy, that too, within four walls of the house, between the relatives. For subjecting a girl, to cruelty for the non compliance of dowry demand, ordinarily we cannot expect independent witnesses. This kind of cruelty, could be gathered from this information furnished by the victim, to the parents, and other relatives, in addition, based on the conduct of the parties, even drawing presumption under the Evidence Act. The law does not mandate, that to prove an offence, independent witness alone should be matched in. This kind of cruelty, could be gathered from this information furnished by the victim, to the parents, and other relatives, in addition, based on the conduct of the parties, even drawing presumption under the Evidence Act. The law does not mandate, that to prove an offence, independent witness alone should be matched in. If at all, interested witnesses are examined, the Court should exercise more care and if necessary acid test also should be conducted, before accepting that kind of interested oral testimony. If it is the case of the prosecution, that the dowry demand, followed by beating capacity, are know to the people living in and around, then only the question of non-examination of neighbours will take predominant role, possibly eclipsing interested oral testimony, not otherwise. In this case, the dowry demand made y the accused, to the deceased as well as to P.W. 1, which is spoken well, that too, inspiringly and therefore, we find no reason, to doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution case, on the ground of non-examination of independent witnesses. 17. The learned counsel for the appellants contended, that there are material contradictions, in the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses, even cutting the root of the case and therefore, believing their evidence is unsafe. With the help of the learned counsel for either parties, we have gone through the entire evidence in detail. The incident had taken place on 29.4.1993. The pros-ecution witnesses were examined from 27.11.1995 i.e. after the lapse of 2 1/2 years. All the human minds are not alike and the memory power of a person would vary and the outcome would be according to his observation and reproducing capacity. Speaking like the replay of a tape, is not possible, by any witness. Depending upon the facts and other environments, there may be some differences in the oral evidence of the witnesses, while describing an incident, that too, according to the impact which they had, at the time of the incident. In this view, definitely there bound to be some kind of discrepancy or inconsistency or contradiction, as the case may be. Therefore, the contradictions, omission or commission if any, should not take predominant role always, to eclipse the real case, should not take predominant role always, to eclipse the real case, unless they are so material, compelling the Court, to disbelieve that evidence on that basis. Therefore, the contradictions, omission or commission if any, should not take predominant role always, to eclipse the real case, should not take predominant role always, to eclipse the real case, unless they are so material, compelling the Court, to disbelieve that evidence on that basis. In other words, if the discrepancy or contradiction as the case may be, is simple in nature, which is bond to occur due to failure in memory, lapse of time, then the allowance or margin should be given. It may not be fair, on the part of the Court, to eschew the evidence or disbelieve the prosecution case, only on the sole ground of discrepancy. In this view alone, we have to test the veracity of the oral evidence and not with a mind to negate the same on the basis of the contradiction alone, entertaining, nurturing fanciful doubt or lingering suspicion. 18. The marriage between Kundhavai and the first accused took place on 9.2.1992. She gave birth to a male child on 8.12.1992. She died on 20.4.1993 within one year three months of her marriage. The prosecution case is, the son and the mother, poured kerosene and set ablaze. The defence appears to be accidental fire, thereby indicating, that the deceased died under mysterious circumstances or death occurred to Kundhavai, otherwise than under normal circumstances i.e. within seven years of her marriage. True, on this basis, no case is registered against the accused under Sec.304(B), I.P.C., under the heading “dowry death”, though Sec.498-A is aimed against the accused. 19. Under Sec. 13-B of the Indian Evidence Act, there is a presumption as to dowry death, which says: “When the question is whether a person has caused the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand of dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.” 20. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that this presumption also should come to the aid of the prosecution, though the accused are not charged under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. In order to eradicate the evil of dowry and in order to fix the person, who caused the death of a married girl under the guise of dowry, a presumption is given under Sec.113-A, giving direction to the Court to presume certain things. In this case, admittedly, within 7 years, under the facts and circumstances of the case, other than under normal circumstances, Kundhavai died. Therefore, if the accused had been charged under Sec.304-B, I.P.C, this presumption would have been available to the prosecution directly. But as seen from the charges framed against the accused, they were called upon to answer the charges, only under Secs 302 and 498-A, I.P.C. In this view, we have to see, whether this presumption could be invoked for Sec.302, I.P.C. also, or whether the accused could be dealt with under Sec.304(B), I.P.C. 21. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor drew our attention to a decision in Alamgir Sani v. State of Assam,(2003)2 SBR. 240, for the proposition that even in the case of acquittal under Sec.302, I.P.C, the presumption under Sec. 113-HB of the Evidence Act, should come. In a case of dowry death, and murder, if the accused had been acquitted under Sec.302, I.P.C, the presumption under Sec.113-B of the Evidence Act, could not stand automatically rebutted. In the case involved in the above decision, the accused was charged under Sec.302 as well as 304(B), I.P.C. The Courts have come to the conclusion, no offence has been made out under Sec.302, I.P.C, whereas the offence under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. is made out. When the same was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is contended that once the accused had been acquitted under Sec.302, I.P.C, the presumption under Sec.113-B of the evidence act stands rebutted. Repelling the above contention, the Apex Court has held: “We also see no substance in the submission that merely because the appellant had been acquitted under Sec.302, I.P.C, the presumption under Sec.113-B of the Evidence Act stands automatically rebutted. The death having taken place within even years of the marriage and there being sufficient evidence of demand of dowry, the presumption under Sec. 113-B of the Evidence Act gets invoked. There is no evidence in rebuttal. The death having taken place within even years of the marriage and there being sufficient evidence of demand of dowry, the presumption under Sec. 113-B of the Evidence Act gets invoked. There is no evidence in rebuttal. We therefore see no reason to interfere. The appeal stands dismissed.” Here the accused are not charged under Sec.304-B, I.P.C, therefore invoking 113-B on the basis of the above dictum, may not be possible, directly. But considering the social evil of dowry demand unabated and innocent married girls were done to death by the in-laws and husbands as reported increasingly, we feel that the presumption contemplated as to dowry death, also could be extended to 302, I.P.C, provided the requirements of Sec.ll3-B of the Evidence Act is satisfied, whatever may be the period of punishment. Sec.302-B, I.P.C. says, where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown before her death, she was subjected to cruelly, then such death should be dealt with under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. i.e., dowry death. When we come to Sec. 113-B, in the explanation alone for the purpose of the section, dowry death will have the same meaning as in Sec.304-B of I.P.C. Therefore, if the death has been caused other than the normal circumstances, whether the accused is charged under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. or not, Sec. 113-B presumption also could be invoked and we are justified in saying so, as per the ruling of the Apex Court. 22. In K.Prema S.Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao,2003 S.C.C. (Crl.) 271, the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the provisions of Sec.113-A of the Evidence Act as well as Sec.498-A of I.P.C. While considering the scope of Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act and 498-A, I.P.C, the Apex Court has held: “Presumption under Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act cold also be raised against him on same facts constituting offence of cruelty under Sec.498-A, I.P.C.” Sec.113-A contemplates presumption as to abatement of suicide, by a married woman and it does not contemplate any presumption for the offence under Sec.498-A, I.P.C, viz., cruelty caused by husband or relative of the husband of a woman. Despite the fact, considering the purpose of Secs.113-A as well as 498-A, I.P.C, the Apex Court has ruled, even for Sec.498-A, I.P.C. the presumption contemplated for abatement could be extended. The same analogy could be extended to Sec. 113-B of the Evidence Act also, in order to fix the criminal liability under Sec.302, I.P.C. considering the scope of legislation. It is also observed in the above decision as follows: “The legislature has by amending the Penal Code and the Evidence Code made penal law more strident for dealing with and punishing offences against married woman. Such strident laws would have a deterrent effect on the offenders only if they are so stringently implemented by the law Courts to achieve the legislative intent.” Whether it is a dowry death or murder, in our case, a married woman, who was at the prime age viz., 20 years or so, was subjected to cruelty within 1 1/2 years from the date of marriage and was done to death by the husband and mother-in-law, as per the case of the prosecutions, preceded by dowry demand, which we call, “a social evil”, but that evil is so far not fully eradicated by any legislation or by the cry of a few, who are interested in the society. In this view alone, the Apex Court has said, that the legislative intent could be served only if the laws are implemented by the Courts, extending the provisions, as far as possible, where they could be made applicable. On that basis alone, in our opinion, the Apex Court has said even for 498-A, I.P.C., presumption under Sec.113-A of the Evidence Act could also be raised against the accused, constituting offence of cruelty, under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. In this view Sec. 113-B could be extended to draw presumption, thereby shifting the burden on the accused also, to prove that death had occurred to be deceased, not as narrated by the prosecution, whereas she met with an accident which took away her life. By extending this presumption to this kind of death, which took place within 7 years from the date of marriage, we feel this kind of crime could be curbed to certain extent, making the real accused not to escape under the burden of proof. 23. By extending this presumption to this kind of death, which took place within 7 years from the date of marriage, we feel this kind of crime could be curbed to certain extent, making the real accused not to escape under the burden of proof. 23. As revealed by the evidence, a charge ought to have been framed against the accused, even under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. also, since Secs.302 and 304-B, I.P.C. can visit together, as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Chandrasekaran and two others v. State etc.,(2004)1 L.W. (Crl.) 131. In the case involved in the above decisions, the first accused therein was convicted for the offence under Secs.498-A, 304 and 302, I.P.C. In the appeal, it was urged, the conviction under Sec.302, I.P.C. on the first accused is not legal, as there is no material to show that A-1 had caused the death of the deceased. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also elaborately discussing the meaning for dowry as well as discussing Secs.304-B and 113-B of the Evidence Act, this Court had come to the conclusion, that a conviction could be sustained against the person under Secs.302, 498-A and 304-B, I.P.C. also, thereby the conviction upon the first accused was confirmed. The Bench also deprecated the conduct of the society, indicating how indiscriminate attacks and abnormal violence against married women are on the higher side. On that basis also, we have to analyse this case, whether the accused could be convicted under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. also, though charges are not framed. 24. The Apex Court in K.Prema Rao’s case,2003 S.C.C. (Crl.) 271 has held that mere omission or defect in framing charge cannot come in away of doing justice, provided there is no failure of justice has been occasioned, holding that the accused may still be convicted for the offence actually committed and proved on the basis of the evidence on record, so long as accused has not been misled by any error or omission in framing the charge. In the case involved in the above decision, the accused was not charged under Sec.306, I.P.C, though the accused was charged under Sec.304-B, I.P.C, the acquittal was challenged by the parents of the deceased before the Apex Court. In the case involved in the above decision, the accused was not charged under Sec.306, I.P.C, though the accused was charged under Sec.304-B, I.P.C, the acquittal was challenged by the parents of the deceased before the Apex Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considering Secs.221, 215, 218, Crl.P.C. as well as the availability of the evidence in the case to sustain the conviction under Sec.306, I.P.C., despite the fact that there was no charge against the accused, convicted the accused under Sec.306, I.P.C., sentencing him to undergo 5 years rigorous imprisonment, with a fine of Rs.20,000. In that context, it is observed: “Sec.215, Crl.P.C. allows the Criminal Court to ignore any error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, if the accused was not, in fact, misled by such error or omission in framing the charge and it has not occasioned a failure of justice. As provided in Sec.215, Crl.P.C. omission to frame charge under Sec.306, I.P.C. has not resulted in any failure of justice. There is no necessity to remit the matter to the trial Court for framing charge under Sec.306, I.P.C. and direct a retrial for that charge. The accused cannot legitimately complain of any want of opportunity to defend the charge under Sec.306, I.P.C. and a consequent failure of justice. The same facts found in evidence, which justify conviction of the appellant under Sec.498-A for cruel treatment of his wife, make out a case against him under Sec.306, I.P.C. of having abetted commission of suicide by the wife. The appellant was charged for an offence of higher degree causing”dowry death“under Sec.304-B which is punishable with minimum sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment and maximum for life. Presumption under Sec.113-A of the Evidence Act could also be raised against him on the same facts constituting the offence of cruelty under Sec.498-A, I.P.C.” It is further concluded, the provision of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.221, Crl.P.C. read with Sub-sec.(1) of the section could be taken aid of in convicting and sentencing accused of offence of abatement of suicide under Sec.306, I.P.C, despite the fact, there was no charge under Sec.306, I.P.C. It is also further observed, no further opportunity of the defence to be granted to the accused, since he had ample opportunity to defend the other offence and the ingredients are more or less one and the same. In this case, no charge is framed against the accused under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. or no charge is framed against the first accused under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. In view of the fact that he was tried for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C, a conviction could be sustained, if evidence are available for the common intention and the act done by the first accused, in furtherance of the common intention, thereby roping him under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. Considering the nature of the offence, on the above basis, we have to approach the present case. 25. The father of the deceased Mr.Rajama-nickam, P.W.1 had given evidence about the performance of marriage and the ‘Seer’ provided to the son-in-law and the daughter, at the time of marriage, which we are not very much concerned at present. He had further stated, that whenever his daughter used to come to his house, she reported about the complaint of the accused, about the insufficiency of the seer or dowry given to him, demanding more. It is the further case of P.W.1 that the first accused, probably, being proud of a father of a male child, demanded a radar watch and gold chain weighing 8 sovereign, which is known to his sister’s son P.W.4, and uncle P.W.3. It is the further case of P.W.1, that because of the dispute, there was a panchayat, since the first accused had complained to the relatives, about the conduct of P.W.1 in not sending the wife and children, to his house, where there was an untoward incident of attacking Thangadurai, P.W.2. This evidence of P.W.1 is fully corroborated by P.W.2, who is competent to speak about the dowry demand of his brother-in-law and P.W.3 is also an equally competent person to speak about the same, being the material uncle of P.W.1. P.W.3 had given evidence about the panchayat, the conduct of the first accused and the reason for not preferring the complaint against A-1, when he had exceeded his limit, considering the prestige of the family which should not be known to third parties. P.W.4 the sister’s son of P.W. 1 had spoken that the first accused’s demand of radar watch and gold chain, as additional dowry, when he was present in the house of P.W.1. P.W.4 the sister’s son of P.W. 1 had spoken that the first accused’s demand of radar watch and gold chain, as additional dowry, when he was present in the house of P.W.1. He had further stated that when there was a Panchayat in the house of one Ramadoss, P.W.2 questioned the conduct of the first accused about his complaint to the relatives and aggrieved by the same, the first accused assaulted P.W.2 also, which is spoken by other witnesses inspiringly believably, fitting with the circumstances of the case. We do not find any reason to ignore the above evidence, which is inspiring, fitting with the facts and circumstances of the case, supported by Exs.P-1 and P-4. 26. The demand of radar watch and gold chain would certainly come within the meaning of dowry and it is not the submission by the learned counsel for the accused also, that this kind of demand will not come within the meaning of dowry and their case is total denial. The oral evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 others, is fully supported by the dying declaration, which says It is also further confirms about the dispute spoken by P.Ws.1 to 4 viz., that when there was a panchayat, the first accused assaulted P.W.2 and the relevant recital reads: This statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, when the patient was conscious, which reflected the real incident, which had taken place in the life of Kundhavai. Since the dying declaration is fully corroborated by P.Ws.1 to 4, we are constrained to conclude that the prosecution has proved the demand of dowry, followed by cruelty, such as beating the deceased, causing pain physically and mentally, thereby attracting Sec.498-A, I.P.C. 27. The learned trial Judge, analysing threadbare the above evidence given by P.Ws.1 to 4, came to an irresistible conclusion, that an offence is made out against both the accused under Sec.498-A, I.P.C, even under presumption, as ruled by the Apex Court, which is acceptable to us, since we find no error of any kind either in law or on facts, warranting interference. The evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 and the subsequent death of Kundhavai certainly makes out a case that accused had caused cruelty to the deceased, even bearing, as disclosed by the evidence and therefore, they were found guilty under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. which could not be disturbed and the same is confirmed. 28. The evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 and the subsequent death of Kundhavai certainly makes out a case that accused had caused cruelty to the deceased, even bearing, as disclosed by the evidence and therefore, they were found guilty under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. which could not be disturbed and the same is confirmed. 28. On 20.4.1993, Kundhavai sustained burn injuries in the house of the accused, not disputed. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that if the accused is not the cause for the burn injuries, sustained by Kundhavai or otherwise as projected by the defence, if Kundhavai had sustained injuries accidentally, while preparing food for the child; in the ordinary course, the accused should have immediately, by the available conveyance, taken the deceased to the hospital. But here, contrary to the normal course and strangely, the first accused had been to the house of P.W. 1, that too without informing the incident, requested to make an arrangement for ambulance and because of the non availability of the ambulance, a taxi was taken by P.W.1 and all of them rushed to Porulvaithacherry, to the house of the accused, where the incident had taken place. According to him, this conduct of the accused would suggest that the accused must be the cause for the burn injuries sustained by the deceased, though this alone could not be the basis for conviction. When the wife sustained burn injuries due to accident, a prudent husband should have taken immediate action, for saving her and on the way he should have informed to the relative also. This husband viz., first accused behaved strangely, thereby compelling us to think that he was guilty conscious and that is why he allowed her to die, after burn injuries, which is in a way strengthens the case of the prosecution. 29. The presence of A-2, and A-1 also to certain extent, at the time of the incident, is admitted, though not directly. The first accused claims that he was not present at the time of the actual incident, but admits that the came to the house at about 8.10 p.m. As per the statement filed under Sec.313, Crl.P.C, the defence of the first accused is that when he came to the house at about 8.10. p.m. there was a crowd in front of the house and on seeing the same, he went to P.W.1’s house, in order to bring Ambulance. p.m. there was a crowd in front of the house and on seeing the same, he went to P.W.1’s house, in order to bring Ambulance. P.W. 1 is not running a nursing home or he is not owning an ambulance. Therefore, a prudent husband, straight away ought to have gone to the hospital or where the ambulance is available, if he really intended to save Kundhavai. Contrary to the normal conduct, he had stated that he had gone to P.W.1’s house. The statement given by the first accused makes it clear, at least the first accused was present at about 8.10 p.m., thought he incident had taken place at 8.00 p.m. The second accused admits, that she was present at about 8.00 p.m. in the house, along with the deceased. She had further stated, that the deceased was viewing T.V. without taking care of the child, who was crying for food. It is the further case of the second accused, when she insisted the daughter-in-law to provide milk to the child and questioned the irresponsibility of the daughter-in-law, there was a wordy altercation, which was witnessed by other persons. She further says, thereafter she went upstairs and Kundhavai closed the door. The story projected by the second accused, that after the wordy altercation, she went upstairs and thereafter, hearing the noise, she came down, is a make believe affair, probably in order to escape from the liability. It is the further case of the second accused that after 10 minutes or so, her son came. If the incident was accidental, since there are number of persons, and if the first accused was not there, then as a prudent mother-in-law, she ought to have taken steps, to take the injured Kundhavai to hospital, for treatment. Admittedly, she has not done so, thereby indicating the story projected and explanation offered by the accused are all, cock and bull story, probably to avoid the liability or to escape from the clutches of law. 30. P.W.6, had not stated during the examination-in-chief, about the alleged fact that he opened the door and put off the fire. Even he has not stated, that the second accused was in the upstairs, while Kundhavai was in flame. Curiously, during the cross-examination, he would state that the second accused left, to the open terrace, whereas Kundhavai went inside the house and closed the door, after the dispute. Even he has not stated, that the second accused was in the upstairs, while Kundhavai was in flame. Curiously, during the cross-examination, he would state that the second accused left, to the open terrace, whereas Kundhavai went inside the house and closed the door, after the dispute. The way in which, he had given evidence during the cross-examination, fails to inspire us and it seems, against the truth; siding the accused for the reasons best known to him. If the evidence elicited from P.W.6 during the cross-examination, is true, he ought to have stated all those things, during the examination in chief or before the Investigating Officer. Even he had not stated so, before the investigating Officer. The absence of such evidence during the chief and disclosing certain things, during the cross-examination, favouring the accused, would indicate, that he is not a dependable person, and therefore, we are inclined to ignore the oral evidence of P.W.6. 31. It is the case of the prosecution, that the incident had taken place, within the four walls of the house of the accused and no third party was there. Therefore, we cannot expect any other witnesses, to speak about the actual incident and we have to purely depend upon the dying declaration of the deceased, as well as the other attending circumstances. In the dying declaration, which is acceptable to us, for the aforementioned reasons, the deceased Kundhavai had stated, categorically that Savithri and poured kerosene and set ablaze. This is the case of the deceased when she was admitted in the hospital, before the doctor also. Even ignoring Ex.P-1, that there is some exaggeration, we do not find any reason to ignore the dying declaration given by the deceased, to the Judicial Magistrate, which is fully supported by other attending circumstances viz., demand of dowry, and admitted dispute between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, even on the date of the incident. At the time of giving the dying declaration Kundhavai was conscious, oriented and she would not have thought of implicating the mother-in-law, falsely. It seems, fairly she had excluded the husband in the dying declaration, regarding pouring of kerosene and setting ablaze. Accepting the dying declaration, which is fully supported by other attending circumstances, as held by the trial Court, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial Court, except affixing the culpability upon A-2. It seems, fairly she had excluded the husband in the dying declaration, regarding pouring of kerosene and setting ablaze. Accepting the dying declaration, which is fully supported by other attending circumstances, as held by the trial Court, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial Court, except affixing the culpability upon A-2. The deceased Kundhavai whenever she had an opportunity, to complain about the ill treatment meted out by her, in the hands of her mother-in-law, had said so, to her father, after the incident, to the doctor, then before the Judicial Magistrate, then to the police also, while giving Ex.P-1. In all the statements, consistently, the deceased had accused the mother-in-law, exposing her act, including the pouring of kerosene and setting ablaze, which inspire us to fix the culpability of A-2 as the murderer of her daughter in law. Only with an intention to commit murder of daughter-in-law, because of her failure, to meet out the unlawful demand and her failure to obey the command of mother-in-law, the second accused ought to have poured kerosene and set fire. This act comes within the meaning of murder. 32. As far as the first accused is concerned, the dying declaration does not say that the first accused also poured kerosene, along with his mother and set fire. Whereas it says negatively also, that the husband did not pour kerosene. On the other hand, she had stated that on 20.4.1994, when she was watching TV, her mother in law and husband beat her, insisting to get money from her parents’ house and thereafter, in continuation of the incident mother-in-law poured kerosene. The dowry demand and cruelty were made, commonly by both the accused and therefore, the acts performed by both the accused viz., bearing, then pouring kerosene by A-2 on 20.4.1993 also must be with a common intention, to commit murder and in this view, the first accused is liable to be convicted under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. though no charge is framed against the first accused, under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. 33. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor drew our attention to Chittaramal v. State of Rajasthan,(2003)2 SBR. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor drew our attention to Chittaramal v. State of Rajasthan,(2003)2 SBR. 15, contending that even in the absence of charge under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. if a case is made out that both the accused shared the common intention and acted pursuant thereto, in addition, proving the overt act and active participation, the first accused could be convicted under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. In the case involved in the above ruling, the accused was charged under Sec.302 read with 149, I.P.C. but the accused was convicted under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. Then the question arose, before the Hon’ble Apex Court, whether the Court was right in convicting the accused for the offence under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. in the absence of any specific charge framed under that section. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court has ruled, the conviction could be sustained with the help of Sec.34, I.P.C. The same principle could be extended to this case, since the involvement or participation of the second accused is proved, we feel there is no legal impediment, to convict the first accused under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. 34. P.Ws.1 to 4, as aforementioned, had spoken about the dowry demand and cruelty met out by Kundhavai in the hands of the accused. At the time of the incident, the first accused also must have been present and that is why, after the incident, he came to his father in law’s house, to show some bona fide, as if he had not committed any crime, whereas Kundhavai sustained injuries in the accident, instead of attempting to save his wife’s life. The incident took place at 8.00 p.m. on 20.4.1993 and the second accused was admittedly presents at 8.10 p.m. The case of the first accused that he come after the fire was extinguished, appears to be an after thought, fails to withstand for acceptance, in view of the dying declaration given by the deceased which says, at the time of the incident, the first accused was also present. The dying declaration-Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-1 make it abundantly clear, that before Kundhavai was put to flame, she was beaten by A-1 and this overt act, presence and involvement impliedly, allowing the mother to pour kerosene and to set ablaze Kundhavai, in our considered opinion, prove the common intention of both the accused, and their acts in furtherance of the common intention, squarely attracting 34, I.P.C. and in this way, the first accused is also liable to be convicted under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. Though there was no specific charge against him, the charge reads, about the intention of both the accused and their active involvement also. The evidence and the other attending circumstances, undoubtedly discloses the common intention of the first accused. In this view, as held by the Apex Court, the conviction of A-1 could be sustained under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. or even under Sec.304-B, I.P.C. 35. We have already held that at the time of the incident A-1 and A-2 were present and except these two and the deceased, no other person was present. In the presence of the accused, as proved, Kundhavai sustained burn injuries, which terminated her life prematurely. In the statement filed by the first accused under Sec.313, Crl.P.C, he had stated that Kundhavai sustained injuries in the fire accident and the relevant portion is The second accused would state that on hearing the noise she came down and P.W.6 broke open the door, which was bolted inside and thereafter, by joint attempt, the fire was extinguished. Thus, it is seen the accused have taken a stand that the deceased died due to the injuries sustained by her in the fire accident, which was known to them and that is why, such a stand was taken. It is not the case of the accused that the deceased had committed suicide, by bolting the door inside the house. In this view, it should be held, the burden is upon the accused to prove the same, as contemplated under Secs. 103 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. In a criminal case, the burden is always upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. In this view, it should be held, the burden is upon the accused to prove the same, as contemplated under Secs. 103 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. In a criminal case, the burden is always upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. But under the facts and circumstances of this case, when the prosecution had proved their case to the satisfaction, then if it is to be repelled, the burden should be shifted upon the accused also, especially considering the dowry demand, when they say the deceased had not sustained injuries in their hands, whereas she met with the death by accidental fire. For that, though an attempt is made through P.W.6, for the reasons assigned by us superior, the same failed and there is no other evidence, compelling us to think that the deceased might have died, due to fire accident. Thus, looking the case from this angle, we are inclined to hold that Kundhavai was the victim in the hands of her husband and mother-in-law, not only for dowry demand, but also followed by cruelty, then culmination into death. As held by us, even under presumption, the accused could be convicted under Sec.304-B, I.P.C., but we are not adopting the said course, since we are satisfied that the conviction and under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C. against the first accused and the conviction under Sec.302, I.P.C. against the second accused, would meet the ends of justice, in this case, in addition to the proved offence under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. 36. In the investigation also, except some discrepancy regarding arrest, we find nothing material, affecting the case of the prosecution. The investigating officer, as P.W.13 had deposed about the receipt of the first information report on 21.4.1993 at about 8.30 a.m. and the commencement of investigation. He had visited the scene of crime, prepared observation mahazar Ex.P-5. While inspecting the premises, he had not noticed any damage to the door. It is the case of the second accused that P.W.6 forcibly opened the door, which was bolted inside. If that is so, there would have been some symptom, which is not the case, as seen from Ex.P-5. It is not even suggested to P.W. 13 that there was some damage in the bolting system and the Inspector failed to note the same. If that is so, there would have been some symptom, which is not the case, as seen from Ex.P-5. It is not even suggested to P.W. 13 that there was some damage in the bolting system and the Inspector failed to note the same. He had also recovered from the scene of crime, Kerosene tin, as well as some matches, probabilising the prosecution case, that the accused might have used the kerosene and set ablaze the victim. On 22.4.1993 at about 2.50 a.m., Kundhavai succumbed to the injuries and the case which was originally filed under Sec.307, I.P.C. was converted to Sec.302, I.P.C. To discredit the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses, no material contradiction was brought to the notice of the investigating officer also. 37. The trial Court analysing all the facts and circumstances of the case, had found both the accused guilty. Except the above said modification, the findings of the trial Court does not require any interference. 38. In the light of the above observation and for the reasons assigned, concurring with the findings of the trial Court, we choose to dismiss the appeal, confirming the conviction and sentence under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. against the both the accused under Sec.302, I.P.C. against A-2, and conflicting the first accused under Sec.302 read with 34, I.P.C, maintaining the same sentence imposed for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. The accused are released on bail, by this Court, while the pendency of appeal. They are directed to surrender before the trial Court, to serve out the remaining period of sentence and on their failure, the trial Court is directed to take necessary steps, to secure the accused.