1. This appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is directed against the award dated 15.3.2004 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Srinagar in the claim petition No: 115/2002 titled Daizy Handoo & ors v. National Insurance Co. and others. 2. The matter relates to an accident which took place on Srinagar-Jammu National Highway on 10.3.2002. The deceased Daleep Kumar Handoo son of Kashi Nath Handoo R/o Indira Nagar Srinagar who was working in the J&K Bank Ltd. Branch Badami Bagh Cantonment Srinagar as cashier-cum-clerk, was travelling in a Sumo bearing registration No. JK01E/6441 from Srinagar to Jammu to celebrate Mahashivratri festival at Jammu with his family. The said Sumo was being driven by respondent Mohammad Shafi Dar Son of Khazir Mohd Dar R/o Khawajapora Rainawari Srinagar who was also the owner of the said vehicle. It is alleged that driver was driving it rashly and negligently due to which it met with an accident at Lower Munda, Qazi Gund on National Highway. The vehicle fell into a deep gorge causing fatal injuries to the deceased to which he succumbed on the spot. The legal heirs of the deceased namely 1) Daizy Handoo wife of Late Daleep Kumar Handoo, 2) Diskshaw Handoo (minor aged 3 years) D/o Late Dalip Kumar Handoo, and 3) Vishal Handoo (minor aged 7 months) S/o Late Daleep Kumar Handoo, filed a claim petition before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Srinagar. The following issues were framed by the Tribunal in the case: - "1. Whether on 10.3.2002 Mohd Shafi Dar respondent No. 3 was plying TATA Sumo No. JK01E/6441 so rashly and negligently that near Lower-Munda Qazigund National Highway he lost control of the vehicle which fell into a deep gorge and Daleep Kumar Handoo who was travelling in the same died on spot? OPP. 2. Whether the driver of the offending vehicle was not holding a valid driving licence on the date of accident and as such the Insurance Company cannot be saddled with the liability? OPR-1. 3. In case the Issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled to from whom and in what proportion? OPP. 4. Relief. 3. After taking the evidence on record the Tribunal found that at the time of accident the deceased was drawing a salary of Rs.12887/- and that his age was 39 years. In case the Issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled to from whom and in what proportion? OPP. 4. Relief. 3. After taking the evidence on record the Tribunal found that at the time of accident the deceased was drawing a salary of Rs.12887/- and that his age was 39 years. The Tribunal considering the income of the deceased as well as his age and on applying multiplier of 16 found the legal heirs entitled to compensation of Rs.16,56,684/-. The Tribunal therefore awarded the compensation in favour of the legal heirs along with interest @ 9% from the date of application till its realisation. The Tribunal observed as under:- "Now for the determination of compensation, the question arises what multiplier should be applied while calculating the quantum of compensation. Keeping in view the age and income of the deceased and having taken guidance from the 2nd schedule and also taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the multiplier of 16 is proper in awarding the compensation in the present case which will also take into account the prospective increase of income of the deceased. The income of the deceased as already pointed out has been proved to be Rs. 12887/- and while deducting 1/3rd of this income towards his own expenses, the dependency income comes to Rs.8,592/-. Therefore, the compensation to the tune of Rs.8592 x 12 x 16 = 16,49,664/- is awarded to the claimants. Also an amount of Rs.2,000/- is awarded for funeral expenses. Further an amount of Rs.5000/- is awarded in favour of the petitioner No. 1 for mental shock and pain. The claimants had claimed compensation under other counts also. e.g. for medical treatment etc, but since there is no evidence on record about this, therefore, nothing is awarded in this behalf. Since the offending vehicle was under the insurance cover of respondents 1 and 2, therefore, the compensation liability is saddled on the respondents 1 and 2 respectively." The Tribunal directed as under:-- "Viewed thus, the petitioners are awarded by way of compensation an amount of Rs. 16,56,664/- in all under the various heads mentioned above minus interim relief, if received by the petitioners, plus interest at the rate of 9% from the date of application till realisation of the amount. 16,56,664/- in all under the various heads mentioned above minus interim relief, if received by the petitioners, plus interest at the rate of 9% from the date of application till realisation of the amount. Court fee shall be the first charge on the award amount. Criminal file received from the Court concerned, be sent back to the court concerned for further trial. A copy of the judgment be forwarded to the respondents 1 and 2 for immediate compliance. File be consigned to records after due completion." 4. Being aggrieved by the said award of compensation by the Tribunal, the appellants filed the present appeal on the sole ground that the amount of award was too excessive and exorbitant. Heard. Considered. 5. The only ground taken by Mr. JA. Kawoosa, learned counsel for the appellants is that the award passed is on higher side and that the Tribunal has taken the income of deceased as Rs. 12887/- and applied multiplier of 16 while as the Tribunal ought to have applied multiplier on the basic pay of 7900/- after deducting 1/3rd for the personal expenses from it. 6. I doubt whether the ground raised by Mr. J.A. Kawoosa, is available to the appellants to maintain the present appeal. 7. In view of the provisions of Section 149(2) and Section 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act and also law laid down by the Apex Court on this issue. 6. I doubt whether the ground raised by Mr. J.A. Kawoosa, is available to the appellants to maintain the present appeal. 7. In view of the provisions of Section 149(2) and Section 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act and also law laid down by the Apex Court on this issue. Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides as under: "(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgement or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgement of award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely: - (a) that there has been a breach of specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely: - (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle - (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organized racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licenced, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion, or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular." Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act reads as under: "170. Impleading insurer in certain cases. Impleading insurer in certain cases. -- Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that:- (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. Supreme Court in Shankarayya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1998 SC 2968 held that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by the Tribunal can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent mentioned in S. 170 are found to be satisfied and for that purpose the Insurance Company has to obtain order in writing from the Tribunal which should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal and unless that procedure is followed the Insurance Company cannot have a wider defence on merits that what is available to it by way of statutory defence. This view was reiterated in a series of other decisions in Rita Devi (Smt.) and others v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. And another (2000) 5 SCC 113, it was held that if the Insurance Company had not obtained leave from the Tribunal before filing the appeal, the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company before the High Court would not be maintainable in law. Ltd. And another (2000) 5 SCC 113, it was held that if the Insurance Company had not obtained leave from the Tribunal before filing the appeal, the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company before the High Court would not be maintainable in law. In Chinnama George and others v. N. K. Raju and another (2000) 4 SCC 130, it was held that the insurer can defend the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal only on certain limited grounds mentioned in S. 149(2) of the Act and if these grounds are not available to the insurer, then a joint appeal by the owner of the motor vehicle and the Insurance Company may not be of any avail and the Insurance Company is legally bound to satisfy the award and it cannot be termed as a `person aggrieved by the award and, therefore, the insurer would be barred from filing an appeal against the award of the Tribunal. H.S. Ahammed Hussain and another v. Irfan Ahammed and another (2000) 6 SCC 52 was a case where the insurer and the insured jointly filed an appeal. Supreme Court held that even though the appeal filed by the insurer was not maintainable, the appeal need not be dismissed and the insured may proceed with the appeal. The Court stated as under:- "Thus, the decision of this Court in the case of Chinnama George can be of no avail to the appellant and we do not find any merit in the submission that joint appeal by the insurer as well as the insured was not maintainable. In such an eventuality, the course which a Court should adopt is as noticed in the case of Narendra Kumar to delete the name of the insurer from the cause title and proceed with the appeal of the insured and decide the same on merit." 8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhushan Sachdeva and others (2002) 2 SCC 265, however the Apex Court took entirely a different view. It was held that it is open to the Insurance Company to invoke the right under S. 173 of the Act and maintain an appeal against the award made by the Tribunal. It was held that the insurer shall be treated as a person aggrieved by the award as the amount of compensation is to be paid by the insurance company. It was held that the insurer shall be treated as a person aggrieved by the award as the amount of compensation is to be paid by the insurance company. The Court also went on to observe that failure to file an appeal by the insurer would amount to `failed to contest and, therefore, the insurer can maintain an appeal under S. 173 of the Act. But this view was not accepted by a three-Judge Bench of the Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others (2002) 7 SCC 456, which considered the question elaborately and held that the right of appeal is not an inherent right and as the Insurance Company is permitted to contest only on the grounds stated in S. 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer cannot file an appeal on any other ground, except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under S. 170 of the Act. In that case, the Court observed as follows: "The aforesaid provisions show two aspects. Firstly, that the insurer has only statutory defenses available as provided in sub-section (2) of S. 149 of the 1988 Act and secondly, where the Tribunal is of the view that there is a collusion between the claimant and the insured, or the insured does not contest the claim, the insurer can be made a party and on such impleadment the insurer shall have all defences available to it. Then comes the provision of S. -173 which provides for an appeal against the award given by the Tribunal. Under S. 173. any person aggrieved by an award is entitled to prefer an appeal to the High Court. Very often the question has arisen as to whether an insurer is entitled to file an appeal on the grounds available to the insured when either there is a collusion between the claimants and the insured or when the insured has not filed an appeal before the High Court questioning the quantum of compensation. The consistent view of this Court had been that the insurer has no right to file an appeal to challenge the quantum of compensation or finding or the Tribunal as regards the negligence or contributory negligence of offending vehicle." 9. The view adopted in Nicolletta Rohatags case was followed by the Court in United India Insurance Co. The consistent view of this Court had been that the insurer has no right to file an appeal to challenge the quantum of compensation or finding or the Tribunal as regards the negligence or contributory negligence of offending vehicle." 9. The view adopted in Nicolletta Rohatags case was followed by the Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jyotsnaben S. Patel AIR 2003 SC 3127 and it was held: ".. On a consideration of the relevant provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act, it is plain and clear that the Insurance Company can contest the claim preferred before the Tribunal only on the statutory grounds prescribed under S. 149(2) of the Act, but, if there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person resisting the claim or if the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, the Insurance Company can step in and seek permission of the Tribunal and make a prayer for getting itself impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded can then contest the proceeding on grounds other than the grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of S. 149 of the Act. This is an enabling provision in the event of a collusion between the claimant and the insured or the tortfeaser". In view of this finding, I find that the present appeal is not maintainable which is dismissed. Order accordingly.