Judgment :- The award of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court in I.D.No.43 of 1992 has given rise to the present two writ petitions, former by the Management and the latter by the Workman. The Tribunal has directed that the workman should be reinstated in service, but without back-wages and other benefits. 2. In the writ petition filed by the Management it is contended that the direction for reinstatement is unjustified. In the writ petition filed by the workman it is contended that the Tribunal should have directed payment of back-wages. 3. The workman was initially appointed as Conductor in Cholan Roadways Corporation in 1979. Subsequently in 1985, the said Corporation was bifurcated and the workman continued in Dheeran Chinnamalai Corporation. On the basis of certain allegations relating to non-issuance of tickets to two passengers, departmental enquiry was conducted. The allegations were to the following effect :- “ (1) You (petitioner) have collected Rs.5/- towards ticket charges from a passenger and up to 14 kilo meters till the inspection done by inspectors, you have not issued ticket to that passenger; (2) further, you have collected Rs.2.60p. towards travelling charges from one passenger boarded at Alankaranattam bounded to Nallappa Naickenpatti and had not issued the proper ticket and had issued the Namakkal-Thuraiyur journey ticket No:8 for Rs.5/- which was not used and not being used for travelling to the said passenger.” After enquiry was conducted, the Management filed petition under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for getting approval of the order of dismissal of the workman. Permission was accorded on 7.11.1987 and accordingly the workman was dismissed. Thereafter, the workman filed application under Section 2-(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act challenging the order of dismissal. The Labour Court on consideration of the materials on record found that there was no violation of principles of natural justice in the domestic enquiry conducted. The Tribunal while upholding the finding that the allegations had been proved, interfered with the punishment of dismissal and directed that the workman should be reinstated with continuity of service, but without back -wages. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the workman has submitted that domestic enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the statement of two passengers recorded at the time of inspection have been utilized, even though subsequently those passengers have not been produced for cross-examination. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the workman has submitted that domestic enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the statement of two passengers recorded at the time of inspection have been utilized, even though subsequently those passengers have not been produced for cross-examination. It has been further indicated that the Labour Court at one stage had held that the enquiry proceedings were not proper and given opportunity to the Management to examine witnesses, but the Management did not choose to examine the witnesses and only produced the very same materials which had been produced in the domestic enquiry. 5. The Labour Court relying upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court held that technical rules under the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable to the domestic enquiry. The statements of two passengers which had been recorded in the presence of the delinquent at the time of the inspection were tendered in the domestic enquiry and subsequently before the Labour Court. The Labour Court did not see any illegality in the aforesaid procedure. 6. It appears that both the parties stated before the Labour Court that they did not want to adduce evidence and the matter should be decided on the existing materials. Accordingly the statement of those persons were again tendered before the Labour Court. The management witnesses while proving the statement of two passengers have not been specifically cross-examined by the workman. No specific prayer has been made by the workman at any time stating that those two persons should be produced for cross-examination. In such peculiar facts and circumstances, I am not able to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the workman that the principles of natural justice had been violated. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the management has submitted that once it was found that the workman was guilty, the direction for reinstatement should not have been given. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel has relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. 8. In 1997 (2)S.C.C. 370 (UTTAR PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. BASUDEO CHAUDHARY) relied upon by the learned counsel for the management, misappropriation by the bus conductor was accompanied by creation of false documents and there were number of such violations. 8. In 1997 (2)S.C.C. 370 (UTTAR PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. BASUDEO CHAUDHARY) relied upon by the learned counsel for the management, misappropriation by the bus conductor was accompanied by creation of false documents and there were number of such violations. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the order of dismissal should not have been set aside and the punishment could not have been said to be disproportionate. 9. In 2002 WLR 443 (THE COIMBATORE DEVANGA WEAVERS CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTION AND SALES SOCIETY LTD. v. C. NATARAJAN AND ANOTHER), the delinquent employee was working under a Co-operative society. The act of misappro-priation of article worth about Rs.12,000/- was accompanied by falsification of documents. In such serious circumstances, I had the occasion to observe that the order of dismissal should not have been interfered with by the Labour Court. 10. The learned Senior counsel for the workman On the other hand, relied upon A.I.R. 2001 SC 427 (THE MANAGEMENT OF SHRI GANAPATI BUS SERVICE, TIRUNELVELI v. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT AND OTHERS). One of the appeals before the Supreme Court related to non-issuance of tickets on two dates. The Madras High Court had set aside the punishment of dismissal on the ground that punishment was disproportionate. The aforesaid decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court. 11. In 2000 (2) L.L.J. 191 (ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER, STATE BANK OF INDIA v. THOMAS JOSE AND ANOTHER), the employee under the bank had made withdrawal of Rs.3,000/- from the savings bank account of a third party. The Industrial Tribunal while finding the guilt held that the punishment of dismissal is too harsh and directed for reinstatement with back- wages. The writ petition was dismissed and so also the appeal relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 149 (SCOOTERS INDIA LTD v. LABOUR CIOURT, LUCKNOW), where the Supreme Court had observed that the Tribunal was right in affording an opportunity to the employee to reform himself and prove to be a disciplined and loyal employee. The Supreme Court observed as follows :- “ . . . In the aforestated case, in more or less similar circumstances, this Court declined to interfere with the view taken by the Labour Court that an errant workman should be given an opportunity to reform himself and prove to be a loyal and disciplined employee of Scooters India Limited. The Supreme Court observed as follows :- “ . . . In the aforestated case, in more or less similar circumstances, this Court declined to interfere with the view taken by the Labour Court that an errant workman should be given an opportunity to reform himself and prove to be a loyal and disciplined employee of Scooters India Limited. There is, in our view, a vital difference between an undertaking such as Scooters India Ltd. and the bank. A bank deals with public moneys. Misappropriation by an employee of bank is misappropriation of public moneys and must be treated very differently. Misconduct such as this cannot be treated as lightly as it has been done. We think that the appropriate order should at least have been of reinstatement without backwages plus a direction that the first respondent would not be entitled to any increments for a substantial period with all the cumulative consequences of such an order. That is the order that we propose to pass.” 12. The question as to whether particular punishment is justified or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and no specific and inexorable rule can be laid down as a matter of precedent. The Industrial Tribunal or for that matter the High Court, should consider the gravity of the allegations proved against the delinquent, past history of the workman and various other circumstances before coming to a particular conclusion as to whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the delinquency. 13. In the present case, the Tribunal has not considered any of the relevant circumstances and the reasons given by the Tribunal are superficial and irrelevant. Since the question of legality of the punishment in the light of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is primarily a matter of discretion, normally the High Court does not interfere with such order. Where, however, the order of the Tribunal is not supported by any reason, it is open to the High Court to interfere with such order. As already indicated, in the present case, the Tribunal does not appear to have given any relevant reason for interfering with the nature of the punishment. Where, however, the order of the Tribunal is not supported by any reason, it is open to the High Court to interfere with such order. As already indicated, in the present case, the Tribunal does not appear to have given any relevant reason for interfering with the nature of the punishment. Since the discretionary order passed by the Tribunal is not supported by any reason, such order cannot be confirmed and the matter is required to be reconsidered by the Tribunal keeping in view the various relevant facts and circumstances. 13. In the result, while upholding the finding of the Tribunal that domestic enquiry had been held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, I set aside the order of the Tribunal regarding modification of punishment imposed on the workman and hereby direct the Tribunal to reconsider the matter relating to punishment. It is obvious that the Tribunal has to hear the parties on this aspect and take a fresh decision in the matter. This may be done within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the order. 14. Subject to the aforesaid directions and observations, both the writ petitions are disposed of. There is no order as to costs.