Judgment V.M.Jain, J. 1. This Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs against the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed by the Trial Court and the appeal filed by them was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge. 2. The plaintiffs had filed a suit for possession by way of pre-emption of the land measuring 35 Kanals 1 Maria on payment of Rs. 15,000/- as pre-emption money, with the allegations that the defendant Nos. 2 to 8 (vendors) had sold the suit land vide sale deed dated 28.5.1973 in favour of defendant No. 1 Shrimati Resham for an ostensible consideration of Rs. 27,000/-. It was alleged that in fact, only Rs. 15,000/- were paid by defendant No. 1 to defendant Nos. 2 to 8 and the market value of the land was also not more than Rs. 15,000/- and that no notice of the sale of the suit land was given to the plaintiffs, who are the tenants over the suit land since the time of their father Handal, who died about four years back and as such the plaintiffs had a superior right of preemption to pre-empt the said sale. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 (vendee) by filing the written statement alleging therein that the plaintiffs were not the tenants over the suit land and the sale was for Rs. 27,000/- and the sale consideration was actually paid and fixed in good faith. 3. Various issues were framed. Both the sides led evidence. After hearing both sides, the learned Trial Court held that the plaintiffs were tenants over the suit land but did not have superior right of pre-emption since the sale was made by male and female owners. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed. The appeal filed by the plaintiffs was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, upholding the findings of the Trial Court. Aggrieved against the same, the plaintiffs filed the present Regular Second Appeal in this Court and the appeal was admitted on the various substantial question of law detailed in Para No. 10 of the grounds of appeal. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 5. Aggrieved against the same, the plaintiffs filed the present Regular Second Appeal in this Court and the appeal was admitted on the various substantial question of law detailed in Para No. 10 of the grounds of appeal. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 5. In my opinion, the following substantial question of law is involved in this appeal:- " Whether a tenant has a superior right to pre-empt the sale of the agricultural land made by the male and female vendors, keeping in view the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Atam Parkash v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1986-1)89 P.L.R. 329 (S.C.), vide which Clauses First, secondly and Thirdly of Section 15(1)(a), 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c) and the whole of Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 had been declared ultra vires the Constitution and the appeal filed by the tenant was still pending disposal in this Court, at the time, when the judgment was delivered by their lordships in Atam Parkashs case." 6. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellants submitted before me that the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Atam Parkash v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1986-1)89 P.L.R.329 (S.C.) had held Clauses First, Secondly and Thirdly of Section 15(1)(a), Clauses First, Secondly and Thirdly of Section 15(1) (b) and Clauses First, Secondly and Thirdly of Section 15(1)(c) and the whole of Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 , as ultra vires the Constitution and as such the plaintiffs being tenants over the suit land were entitled to pre-empt the sale in question. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by this Court in Ram Krishan v. Ratti Ram and Ors., 1986 Punjab Law Journal 701 and by the Honble Supreme Court in case of Nand Kishore and Anr. v. Avtar Singh and Ors. 1988 P.L.J. 47. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by this Court in Ram Krishan v. Ratti Ram and Ors., 1986 Punjab Law Journal 701 and by the Honble Supreme Court in case of Nand Kishore and Anr. v. Avtar Singh and Ors. 1988 P.L.J. 47. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant-respondent No. 1 submitted before me that the plaintiff-appellants did not have a preferential right of pre-emption on the date when the Trial Court decree was passed as some of the provisions of Section 15(1) and entire Section 15(2) of the Pre-emption Act were held ultra vires in 1986 by virtue of Atam Parkashs case (supra) and as such the plaintiff-appellants would not have any superior right of pre-emption even if during the pendency of the present appeal some of the provisions of Section 15(1) and entire Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act had been declared ultra vires. It was further submitted that the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Atam Parkashs case (supra) would have no application to the pending appeals. Reliance was placed on the cases of Shyam Sunder and Anr. v. Ram Kumar and Anr., J.T. 2001(6) S.C. 94, Harsh Dhingra v. State of Haryana and Ors., A.I.R. 2001 Supreme Court 3795 and Kulwant Kaur and Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001-2)128 P.L.R. 492 (S.C.). 7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, in my opinion, there is no merit in the contentions raised before me by the learned counsel for defendant respondent No. 1, whereas there is considerable force in the submissions made before me by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants. As referred to above, the plaintiffs were found to be tenants over the suit land not only on the date of sale and date of the filing of the suit but also on the date of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. As referred to above, the plaintiffs were found to be tenants over the suit land not only on the date of sale and date of the filing of the suit but also on the date of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. However, their claim for possession over the suit land by pre-emption on the ground of having superior right of pre-emption was declined by the Courts below on the ground that since the vendors were males and females and since in respect of the j share of the females, a tenant did not have a right of pre-emption under Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and the vendee having become a co-sharer in the suit land in respect of the share of the females, the tenants did not have a superior right of preemption and could not pre-empt the sale where some of the vendors were females. However, the position changed altogether after the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Atam Parkashs case (supra). As referred to above, by virtue of the said judgment, the Honble Supreme Court held Clauses First, Secondly and Thirdly of Sections 15(1)(a), 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c) and the whole of Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act to be ultra vires the Constitution. By declaring these provisions ultra vires the Constitution by the Honble Supreme Court, the result would be as if these provisions never existed on the Statute book. Once that is the position, the plaintiffs being the tenants over the suit land had superior right of pre-emption under Section 15(1)(c). Fourthly of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. Since the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act, referred to above, were declared ultra vires the Constitution by the Honble Supreme Court and the effect thereof would be that the said provisions were not there on the Statute Book at all times, even on the date when the suit was decided by the Trial Court, the plaintiffs had a superior right of pre-emption being tenants. 8. In Atam Parkashs case (supra) itself, the Honble Supreme Court had made declaration that in those cases in which the suits were still pending in various courts and in those cases where the suits have been decided and the appeals are pending in appellate Courts, "such suits and appeals will now be disposed of in accordance with the declaration granted by us". It was further made clear that in these cases, where the suits have been decided and the decrees have become final, the decrees will be binding inter parties and the declaration granted will be of no avail to the parties thereto. Thus, from the above, it would be clear that the Honble Supreme Court had categorically directed that those suits and appeals, which were still pending at the time when the judgment in Atam Parkashs case (supra) was delivered by the Honble Supreme Court, those suits and appeals will have to be disposed of in accordance with the declaration granted by the Honble Supreme Court in Atam Parkashs case (supra). That being the position, in my opinion, it would be clear that the plaintiffs being tenants over the suit land not only on the date of sale and date of suit but also on the ate of the decree passed by the Trial Court, certainly had a right of pre-emption to pre-empt the sale in question. 9. In 1986 Punjab Law Journal 701 (supra), this Court after placing reliance on the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Atam Parkashs case (supra), under somewhat similar circumstances, had taken a similar view holding that in view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Atam Parkashs case (supra) Section 15(2) of the Pre-emption Act was no more on the Statute Book and the right of pre-emption was available either to a tenant or to the co-sharer and resultantly the suit of the plaintiff for possession by way of pre-emption was decreed. The Honble Supreme Court in the case reported as Nand Kishore v. Avtar Singh, 1988 P.L.J. 47 (supra), placing reliance on Atam Parkashs case (supra) had also taken a similar view considering that the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Pre-emption Act had been struck down in Atam Parkashs case (supra). 10. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent No. 1 is concerned, in my opinion, there is an obvious fallacy in the submission of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent No. 1. In Atom Parkashs case, the Honble Supreme Court had struck down, certain provisions 9f Section 15(1) and the entire Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, being ultra vires the Constitution. In Atom Parkashs case, the Honble Supreme Court had struck down, certain provisions 9f Section 15(1) and the entire Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, being ultra vires the Constitution. The result would be that those provisions were not there on the Statute Book as the same were declared ultra vires the Constitution. Under such circumstance, there would be no question of retrospective operation of the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court. The authorities Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar,4 (supra) and Harsh Dhingra v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3795 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for defendant-respondent No. 1, thus, in my opinion, would have no application on the facts of the present case. So far as the authority J.T. 2001(6) S.C. 94 is concerned, the Honble Supreme Court had considered the retrospectivity of the amendment Act vide which the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 had been amended in the State of Haryana. In my opinion, the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in this authority would have no application to the facts where certain provisions of the Act had been declared ultra vires the Constitution by the Honble Supreme Court. Thus, the law laid down in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, J.T. 2001(6) S.C. 94 (supra) would have no application to the facts of the present case. This is especially so when in Atam Parkashs case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court had categorically stated that the pending suits and appeals will be disposed of in accordance with the declaration granted by the Honble Supreme Court in Atam Parkashs case (supra). 11. In view of my detailed discussion above, I decide the above mentioned substantial question of law in favour of the plaintiff-appellants and hold that the plaintiffs being the tenants over the suit land had a superior right of pre-emption. Resultantly, the finding of the Courts below on issue No. 1 is reversed and it is held that the plaintiffs had a superior right to pre-empt the sale in question. 12. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-appellants is decreed for pos session of the suit land by way of pre-emption, on deposit of Rs. 12. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-appellants is decreed for pos session of the suit land by way of pre-emption, on deposit of Rs. 27,000/- (minus the 1/5th preemption money already deposited) on or before 13.4.2004 in the Executing Court, failing which the suit of the plaintiff-appellants shall stand dismissed. However, there shall be no orders as to costs in this appeal.