Judgment :- The plaintiff is the appellant herein. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.304 of 1993 against the respondent, the Executive Officer, Pacode Town Panchayat seeking for permanent injunction restraining him from interfering with the plaintiff's possession in the suit property. According to the plaintiff, he and his predecessor have been in possession of the suit property for more than 60 years. He obtained decrees in two earlier suits in O.S.Nos.173 of 1990 and 105 of 1991. In both the suits, the possession of the plaintiff in the suit property has been decided. The defendant Panchayat who was a party in both the suits tried to disturb the possession. Therefore, the suit was filed for permanent injunction. 3. According to the defendant, the suit property is a poramboke and belongs to the Government. The respondent/defendant was not a party in O.S.No.173 of 1990. The plaintiff has no title in the suit property. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. On framing the appropriate issues, the trial Court after considering the evidence adduced by both the parties, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by that, the plaintiff filed the appeal before the lower appellate Court, which in turn, confirmed the same and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the second appeal. 5. Two points have been urged by the counsel for the appellant in this appeal: (1) In respect of the suit property, there are already two earlier suits in O.S.Nos.173 of 1990 and 105 of 1991 in which the Panchayat was a party. Both the Courts did not consider the question of res judicata. (2) The lower appellate Court did not discharge its function for formulating the point for consideration as provided under Order 41 and Rule 31 of C.P.C. 6. In support of the second point, the counsel for the appellant would cite the decision in LAKSHMI RAM BHUYAN v. HARI PRASAD BHUYAN (2003(1) S.C.C.197). 7. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and also gone through the judgments impugned as well as the citation referred to supra. 8. On going through the entire judgments, it is evident that both the Courts below would categorically hold that identity of the suit property has not been properly explained. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and also gone through the judgments impugned as well as the citation referred to supra. 8. On going through the entire judgments, it is evident that both the Courts below would categorically hold that identity of the suit property has not been properly explained. The detailed discussion made by the trial Court would show that there are various discrepancies with reference to the survey number and the area of the suit property in the light of the documents produced by the Panchayat, the defendant. The lower appellate Court also would refer to those documents and held that there is no material to show that the earlier suits in O.S.Nos.173 of 1990 and 105 of 1991 would relate to the suit property. In short, both the Courts have categorically held that identity of the suit property has not been established by the acceptable oral and documentary evidence. This factual finding, in my view, cannot be said to be wrong. 9. The second point urged by the counsel for the appellant is non-consideration of the provisions under Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. As pointed out by the counsel for the appellant, in 2003(1) S.C.C.197, the Apex Court would hold that Order 41 and Rule 31 C.P.C. casts an obligation on the appellate Court to state the points for determination, the decision thereon. 10. The ratio for this observation made by the Supreme court in the light of the fact is that when the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled and if the suit was dismissed by the trial Court and in appeal the decree of dismissal is reversed, the operative part of the judgment should be so precise and clear as it would have been if the suit was decreed by the trial Court to enable a self-contained decree being drawn up in conformity therewith. 11. But in this case, the judgment rendered by the trial Court was confirmed by the appellate Court. The appellate Court also would refer to the issues framed by the trial Court. Of course, no separate questions have been raised or referred to as points for determination. 11. But in this case, the judgment rendered by the trial Court was confirmed by the appellate Court. The appellate Court also would refer to the issues framed by the trial Court. Of course, no separate questions have been raised or referred to as points for determination. However, the discussion made by the lower appellate Court would clearly indicate that the lower appellate Court would deal with the question of identity of the suit property as well as with reference to the decrees passed in the earlier suits in O.S.Nos.173 of 1990 and 105 of 1991. As such, no prejudice can be claimed by the defendant. 12. As noted above, when there is a factual finding by both the Courts below that the decrees passed in the earlier suits would not relate to the present suit property and there is no acceptable material produced to establish the identity of the suit property, this Court sitting in second appeal would not go into the factual aspects to take a different view in the absence of any valid reasons. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P.No.21349 of 2003 is also dismissed.