JUDGMENT - KHARCHE S.T., J.: - By the order dated 12-9-1991, the review application filed by the appellant was allowed and the order dismissing the second appeal summarily was set aside and the appeal was admitted on the question whether on the basis of the concurrent findings of the two Courts below, that the appellants were the licensees, a decree for possession could be passed in view of the amended provisions of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. 2. Relevant facts are as under : The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for possession on the contentions that Mohan Dana, the father of the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 and husband of appellant No. 6, sold the suit house for a consideration of Rs. 7,500/- by virtue of the sale-deed dated 24-10-1969. Mohan Dana and Manjit Dana are the real brothers where as plaintiff is the son of Manji Dana. The case of the plaintiff is that Mohan Dana dies on 26-10-1969 and the defendants were allowed to occupy the said house as licensees. The licence was revoked and the possession was demanded, but the defendants did not deliver the possession and, therefore, the notice dated 7-2-1974 was served for revocation of the licence. In spite of receipt of this notice, the defendants did not vacate the suit house. The defendants combated the claim of the plaintiff by filing written statement and contended that the sale-deed was sham, bogus and without consideration and was not intended to be acted upon. The suit house was worth Rs. 40,000/- on the date of the alleged sale-deed and no prudent man would part with it for a meager consideration of Rs. 7,500/- Mohan Dana was put to loss in his business in the year 1963 and in order to satisfy the creditors who were pressing for repayment of loan and to save the property from their clutches. Mohan Dana was compelled to execute the sale-deed which was not intended to be acted upon. The defendants became the owners of the suit house after the death of Mohan Dana and the latter had no right to dispose of the suit house. The defendants denied that they are the licensees in the suit premises. 3. The trial Court framed the issues on the aforesaid pleading and the parties relied on the oral as well as documentary evidence. The defendants denied that they are the licensees in the suit premises. 3. The trial Court framed the issues on the aforesaid pleading and the parties relied on the oral as well as documentary evidence. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence recorded the finding that the plaintiffs have proved that they have purchased the suit house from Mohan Dana by virtue of the registered sale-deed dated 24-10-1963 and negatived the contention of the defendants that the sale-deed was Sham, bogus and without consideration. The trial Court also recorded the finding that late Mohan Dana was allowed to occupy the said suit house as a licensee. Consistent with these findings, the trial Court passed the decree directing the defendants to deliver possession. The defendants being aggrieved carried appeal to the District Court. The learned Additional District Judge on hearing the parties dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. This judgment of the Appellate Court is under challenge in this appeal. 4. Mr. Agnihotri, learned Counsel, for the appellants/defendants contended that while disposing of the review application, this Court by the order dated 12-9-1991 by which the review of the order dated 20-8-1991 was sought and the second appeal was summarily dismissed on the ground that the substantial question of law which arose is that even on the basis of the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below, no decree for eviction could be passed as this appeal would raise a pure question of law as to whether the licence could be terminated without the permission of the Rent Controller. This Court considering that pure question of law was now being raised upon the concurrent findings recorded, the review application was allowed and the order dismissing the second appeal summarily was set aside and the appeal was admitted on the question, whether on the basis of the concurrent findings of the two courts below, that the appellants were the licensees, a decree for possession could be passed, in view of the amended provisions of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short the Rent Control Order). 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Agnihotri, learned Counsel, further pointed out that the return of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be altered or modified or reversed by the administrative order of the District Judge and the order of the return of the plaint so altered or modified into an order of transferring the suit cannot confer jurisdiction on the lower Court. He contended that question of jurisdiction can be raised at any point or time and in support of these submissions he relied on the decision of this Court in the case of (Municipal Corporation of City of Amravati v. Ashok Ramkrishna Kamble)1, 1996(Supp.) Bom.C.R. (N.B.)581 and (Southern Automatic Industries v. Mrs. N.S. Talpade)2, 1999(1) Bom.C.R. 32 . 6. Mr. Agnihotri, learned Counsel, contended that the sale-deed executed by Mohan Dana on 24-10-1963 (Ex. 47) was Sham, bogus and was not intended to be acted upon. This sale-deed has not been duly proved though the proof of execution of the document only is adduced. He contended that since Mohan Dana had suffered heavy losses in business, he was required to execute a nominal sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, no title has been transferred validly. He pointed out that the attesting witnesses were not examined in proof of the said sale-deed and in absence of proof, the sale-deed is not admissible in evidence. He contended that Mohan Dana knew only Gujarati language and, therefore, he did not understand the contents of the sale-deed and had only signed the same by putting his signature and the contents of the sale-deed were not made known to him. In support of these submission, he relied on the decisions of this Court in (Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Municipal Commissioner for Greater Bombay)3, 1982(1) Bom.C.R. 819 . 7. Mr. Agnihotri further contended that Mohan Dana and Manji Dana are the real brothers and the defendants are the sons of Mohan Dana and plaintiffs is the son of Manji Dana. He contended that Mohan Dana died on 26-10-1969 and the suit house is admittedly owned by Mohan Dana. 7. Mr. Agnihotri further contended that Mohan Dana and Manji Dana are the real brothers and the defendants are the sons of Mohan Dana and plaintiffs is the son of Manji Dana. He contended that Mohan Dana died on 26-10-1969 and the suit house is admittedly owned by Mohan Dana. He contended that the suit house was constructed sometime in the year 1954-55 and since then the defendants are living in that house and as the sale-deed executed by Mohan Dana was a nominal one the defendants have perfected their title to the suit house by virtue of adverse possession. He contended that there is no evidence to show that the defendants are the licensees in the suit premises and there is no evidence to show that any licence-fee was being paid and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law and no decree for possession could be passed in view of the amended provision in the Rent Control Order, by which Clause 13-A was inserted and also the definition of premises means and includes any licensee inducted into any building. 8. Mr. Sen learned Counsel, for the respondent/plaintiff contended that the defendants cannot be allowed to raise a new plea at the stage of second appeal that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit though the plaint was returned by the trial Court as the valuation of the suit indicated that the suit can be tried by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division. He contended that the learned District Judge by exercising the jurisdiction under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure transferred the said suit from the Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., to the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., for trial in accordance with law and in such circumstances the question of jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time. In support of these submissions, he relied on the decision of Supreme Court in (D.S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan)4, 2003(4) S.C.C. 705 . 9. Mr. Dn., to the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., for trial in accordance with law and in such circumstances the question of jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time. In support of these submissions, he relied on the decision of Supreme Court in (D.S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan)4, 2003(4) S.C.C. 705 . 9. Mr. Sen further contended that both the courts below have appreciated the evidence in proper perspective and recorded the concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have acquired title to the suit house by virtue of the registered sale-deed dated 24-10-1963 executed by Mohan Dana and that the sale-deed was not Sham, bogus and without consideration and that late Mohan Dana was allowed to occupy the suit house as a licensee. He further contended that the defendants are the licensees in the suit house and, therefore, they were not paying any rent to the landlord and, as such, no permission is required under Clause 13-A of the Rent Control Order for eviction of such licensees. He contended that Clause 13-A was inserted in the Rent Control Order by second amendment dated 27-10-1989 and since this appeal is a continuation of the suit by virtue or that amendment, the permission of the rent controller for issuance of quit notice would be necessary. But in the present case, since the defendants were not paying any rent to the landlord and as they were only licensees, no permission of the Rent Controller is required as per the definition of the tenant appearing Clause (2)(v) of the Rent Control Order. Therefore, Mr. Sen contended that the concurrent findings of both the courts below are not liable to be disturbed in the second appeal and the courts below were perfectly justified in granting decree for eviction. In support of these submissions, he relied on the decision of Supreme Court in (Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq)5, 2000(3) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)324 and the decision of Single Bench of this Court in (Nabab Khan Abdulla Khan v. Jamrubi Abdulla Khan)6, 1992(Supp.) Bom.C.R. (N.B.)610. 10. This Court has given thoughtful consideration to the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute that the suit house originally belonged to Mohan Dana and he and Manji Dana are the real brothers. 10. This Court has given thoughtful consideration to the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute that the suit house originally belonged to Mohan Dana and he and Manji Dana are the real brothers. The defendants are the sons of Mohan Dana who died on 26-10-1969 after execution of the sale-deed dated 24-10-1963. The plaintiff is the son of Manji Dana in whose favour the sale-deed (Ex. 47) of the suit house is said to have been executed on receipt of the consideration of Rs. 7500/-. 11. In Prakash Cotton Mills, A.I.R. 1982 Bom. 387 (cited supra), this Court relying on the decision of Supreme Court in (Bishwanath Rai v. Sachhindanand Singh)7, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1949, held that the correctness of the contents of the letter can only be proved by examining the writer of that letter. In Bishwanaths case, the Apex Court in para 7 observed that, "at one stage in its judgment, the High Court has stated that this letter was not relevant when Swamiji himself was not examined and that, if it had been relevant, the Court would have been inclined to entertain the request for examination of Swamiji as a Court witness. Great reliance was placed by learned Counsel on this view expressed by the High Court in its judgment. It appears to us that the High Court was quite wrong in holding that this letter was not relevant. The contents of this letter were proved by the evidence of Ram Chandra Sharma who stated that he knew the handwriting of Swamiji with whom he had correspondence even earlier. His evidence, thus, was sufficient to prove that Swamiji wrote this letter to Ram Chandra Sharma, and that the statements contained in the letter were made by Swamiji himself. It is true that, in the absence of examination of Swamiji the correctness of these statements cannot be held to be proved. Thus, the evidence of Ram Chandra Sharma proves the contents of the letter, but not the correctness of those contents. The letter was, therefore, admissible to the extent to which the fact that Swamiji wrote such a letter to Ram Chandra Sharma with its contents has bearing on the issues involved in this case. To that extent, the letter was relevant and admissible. The letter was, therefore, admissible to the extent to which the fact that Swamiji wrote such a letter to Ram Chandra Sharma with its contents has bearing on the issues involved in this case. To that extent, the letter was relevant and admissible. However, we are not inclined to agree with the High Court that, if this letter is relevant and admissible, the Court should have examined Swamiji as its own witness. The relevancy or admissibility was judged by the Court at the last stage of delivering the judgment. There was no justification for the appellant to wait for the judgment and not examine Swamiji as his own witness as held by us above. In the circumstances, this letter has to be taken into account to the extent just indicated by us above". 12. However, in (Dattatraya v. Rangnath Gopalrao Kawathekar)8, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2548 the Supreme Court held that "Ordinarily nobody sings a document without knowing its contents. However, if the person signing the document pleads ignorance then in certain circumstances it may be necessary for the party seeking to prove the document to satisfy the Court" that the executant had knowledge of its contents." 13. There could be no dispute about the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. Now let us examine the sale-deed (Ex. 47) in this context. The sale-deed was drafted in English whereas it is brought on record that Mohan Dana knew Gujarati only. It would also reveal from the draft of the sale-deed that it has been drafted by an Advocate and thereafter the parties went to the Sub-Registrars Office and registered the sale-deed. Cross-examination of the plaintiff would show that he can read and write good English. The deceased Mohan Dana was the real uncle of the plaintiff and the latter is well conversant with the hand writing and signature of his uncle. The witness J.G. Kalmegh Advocate was no more alive at the time when the evidence of the witnesses was recorded and the whereabouts of another attesting witness were not known to the plaintiff. The defendants did not raise any objection for exhibiting the sale-deed and, therefore, it was exhibited. The Appellate Court observed in para 16 of the judgment that "the sale-deed" was executed on 24-10-1963. The suit was filed in the year 1975. At that time, the age of Bhagwanji was 35 years. The defendants did not raise any objection for exhibiting the sale-deed and, therefore, it was exhibited. The Appellate Court observed in para 16 of the judgment that "the sale-deed" was executed on 24-10-1963. The suit was filed in the year 1975. At that time, the age of Bhagwanji was 35 years. All the defendants i.e. son of Mohan Dana were major at that time. At the time of execution of the sale-deed. The defendant No. 1 Bhagwan was nearly 22 years old. The defendant No. 2 Dayalji was also major at the time of execution of the sale-deed. The defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were minors at that time. Definitely, the defendant No. 1 Bhagwan and defendant No. 2 Dayal were knowing that their father was selling the suit house to the plaintiff by way of register sale-deed. Then why they did not obstruct to their father at that time or did not allow him to execute the sale-deed. It appears that the defendants may not have any estate now and, therefore, they took several pleas. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have full knowledge about the sale-deed and about the sale of the house when it was sold i.e. in the year 1963. They never paid Municipal Corporation Taxes. Not a single defendants made any effort to see whether the said house was in their name or not. Not a single defendant approached to the Corporation and gave the application for showing their names in owners column. On the contrary, it seems that Mohan Dana gave the application to the Corporation and requested to mutate the name of the plaintiff in owners column. All the circumstances establish that the plaintiff/respondent purchased the house by way of registered sale-deed". 14. On close scrutiny, it would reveal that though the defendants have taken a plea that the sale-deed was Sham, bogus and was not intended to be acted upon, no satisfactory evidence has been adduced by them in support of this contention. In such circumstances, though the attesting witnesses have not been examined, it cannot be said that the contents of the registered sale-deed (Ex. 47) have not been proved especially when the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had full knowledge about the sale transaction. In such circumstances, though the attesting witnesses have not been examined, it cannot be said that the contents of the registered sale-deed (Ex. 47) have not been proved especially when the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had full knowledge about the sale transaction. The conduct of the parties would clearly reveal that the sale-deed was intended to be acted upon especially when it was Manji Dana who had submitted an application to the Corporation for recording the mutation entry on the basis of the sale-deed. In such circumstances, the contention of the learned Counsel that the sale-deed cannot be made admissible in evidence for want of proof of its contents is required to be rejected. 15. The next contention of Mr. Agnihotri is that the latter are in possession of the suit house since the year 1954-55 when the construction was made by the defendants father and, therefore, they have perfected their title by virtue of adverse possession. This contention is also devoid of any merit. Once it is held that the suit house has been sold by Mohan Dana by virtue of the registered sale-deed, it follows that the possession cannot be said to be adverse. 16. Adverse possession means possession of the land or interest in the land by a wrong man against the will of the right man. Adverse possession, as its words imply, must be actual possession of anothers land with intention to hold it and claim it as of his own, to the exclusion of the rightful owner. It must commence with the wrongful possession of the rightful owner at some particular time and must commence in wrong against right. It must be actual, open, notorious and hostile under claim of right, continuous and exclusive and maintained for the statutory period. Possession and adverse possession do not mean the same thing. Mere user of the property cannot be taken a definite assertion of the proprietory rights, there must be definite quality in the possession before it can be called adverse and some act of unequivocal character to put the owner on guard. There cannot be adverse possession of the claimant himself do not know that he was occupying some bodys land. Mere user of the property cannot be taken a definite assertion of the proprietory rights, there must be definite quality in the possession before it can be called adverse and some act of unequivocal character to put the owner on guard. There cannot be adverse possession of the claimant himself do not know that he was occupying some bodys land. However, permissive possession cannot be converted into adverse possession unless it is proved that the person in possession asserted an adverse title to the property to the knowledge of the true owners for a period of 12 years or more. 17. This Court may usefully refer the decision of Supreme Court in (State Bank of Travancore v. Arvindan Kunju Panicker)9, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 996 wherein it is held that "a permissive possession cannot be converted into an adverse possession unless it is proved that the person in possession asserted an adverse title to the property to the knowledge of the true owners for a period of 12 years or more." Therefore, in a secret animous to utter the possession as adverse would not be of any help to the defendants to claim title by adverse possession. 18. Since the possession of the defendants was only permissive after the execution of the sale-deed, by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the defendants have perfected their title to the suit house by adverse possession. 19. The next submission of Mr. Agnihotri is that the defendants are not the licensees in the suit premises and they continue to occupy the suit property as owner thereof because the sale-deed was executed by Mohan Dana in order to satisfy the creditors and to save the property from attachment, whereas the contention of Mr. Sen is that the defendants father was allowed to occupy the suit property as a licensee and Mohan Dana was not paying any licence fee and, therefore, the claim for recovery of licence-fee is not covered by the term tenant as defined in Clauses (2) and (5) of the Rent Control Order and therefore no permission is required by Clause 18-A of the Rent Control Order for eviction of such licensee. There appears to be a force in this contention. 20. There appears to be a force in this contention. 20. In Nabab Khan Abdulla Khan v. Jamrubi w/o Abdulla Khan, 1992 Mh.L.J. 260, cited supra, it has been observed that under Clause 2(5) of the Rent Control Order as amended tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for premises and includes a sub-tenant and person continuing in possession after the terms of his tenancy has expired. Category of mere licensees by whom the rent is not payable would not fall within the expression tenant and the expression landlord which has to be constructed in a similar manner would include a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a premises, etc. In as much as the defendant was not paying the rent, he was not entitled to claim protection either of Clause 13(1) or Clause 13-A of the Rent Control Order. It was not necessary, therefore, for the plaintiff to obtain permission of Rent Controller as required by Clause 13(1). 21. In the present case, the evidence has been considered by both the courts below and recorded concurrent findings of fact that Mohan Dana was allowed to occupy the said house as a licensee and if it is so then it would clearly reveal that since Mohan Dana was not paying any rent, he cannot be said to be a tenant in the suit premises so as to claim protection under the provisions of Clause 13-A of Rent Control Order and it is obvious that in such a situation the permission of the rent controller for eviction of a licensee from the suit premises would not be required. In such circumstances, the contention of Mr. Agnihotri that the suit for eviction was not maintainable without obtaining permission of the Rent Controllers is misconceived and, therefore, liable to be rejected. 22. The last but not the least submission of Mr. Agnihotri is that he is entitled to raise any substantial question of law as per proviso to section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. He contended that the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court on 3-11-1977 and the learned District Judge also passed an order on 20-3-19781 directing the transfer of the suit from the Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., to the Court of Civil Judge, Sr.Dn., by an administrative order. 23. He contended that the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court on 3-11-1977 and the learned District Judge also passed an order on 20-3-19781 directing the transfer of the suit from the Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., to the Court of Civil Judge, Sr.Dn., by an administrative order. 23. In D.S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan, 2003(4) S.C.C. 705 it has been held by the Supreme Court that a new plea which is essentially a plea of fact cannot be allowed to be urged for the first time at the hearing of appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, more so, when it is contrary to the stand taken by the appellant himself in the High Court and the Court below. 24. The learned District Judge is said to have passed the order by exercising jurisdiction under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, it cannot be said that it was an administrative order. Similarly, it is not possible to accept that the Civil Judge, Sr.Dn., who tried the suit had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. What is pertinent to not is that the objection regarding jurisdiction of the Court was not raised either before the trial Court or before the Appellate Court and, in such circumstances, the said issue cannot be allowed to be agitated in this second appeal. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Agnihotri and this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no error of illegality in the impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. 25. Mr. Agnihotri, learned Counsel, makes a request at this stage that this Court has already granted status quo by way of interim relief and the same may be continued for a further period of eight weeks. Mr. Sen, learned Counsel, for the respondent has no objection. Therefore, the said request is accepted. Appeal dismissed. -----