N. V. RAMANA, J. ( 1 ) THE matter is listed for orders of this Court as to the maintainability of the writ petition. The petitioner filed this writ petition, which is at the stage of SR, for issuance of the following relief:to issue a writ, orderor directions, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing the judgement and decree in o. S. No. 8 of 1998 on the file of the Court of the IV Additional District munsif, Visakhapatnam (now known as IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, visakhapatnam) as being wholly without jurisdiction, illegal and violative of a. P. Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1956 and falling within the law declared by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Surya Devi Rai v. Ramchander Rai. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case may briefly be noted, and they run as thus: the petitioner is inhabitant of a slum known as Velampeta Slum, falling within the jurisdiction of Viskahapatnam Municipal Corporation (for short the corporation ). According to the petitioner, the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide g. O. Ms. No. 177, Housing, dated 27-8-1962 issued Notification extending the provisions of the A. P. Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1956 to velampeta also, and by reason thereof, no person is entitled to lay any claim in respect of the property in the slum, unless he successfully challenged the said notification. While so, it is the case of the petitioner, that respondent No. 2 instituted several civil suits in respect of certain pieces of land in Velampeta slum as belonging to him, and one such suit being O. S. No. 8 of 1988 on the file of the IV Additional District Munsif, Visakhapatnam, was instituted against the petitioner, for his eviction therefrom. The said suit on contest, by judgement and decree dated 27-4-1992, was decreed in favour of respondent No. 2. Thereagainst, the petitioner preferred an appeal in A. S. No. 78 of 1992 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, which by judgement dated 18-12-1995, was dismissed. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the said judgement before this Court in S. A. No. 113 of 1996, for the second appeal by judgement dated 17-1-2003, was dismissed confirming the judgement under appeal. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the said judgement before this Court in S. A. No. 113 of 1996, for the second appeal by judgement dated 17-1-2003, was dismissed confirming the judgement under appeal. Now, the petitioner seeks to assail the judgement dated 27-4-1992 passed in the suit O. S. No. 8 of 1988 by the IV Additional District Munsif, Visakhapatnam, on the following grounds:the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that pursuant to the Notification issued by the Government in G. O. Ms. No. 177, Housing, dated 27-8-1962, declaring Velampeta as a slum, Velampeta slum absolutely vested in the corporation, and that unless and until the person aggrieved had successfully challenged the said Notification, he could not have maintained the suit, and more so when Section 13 of the A. P. Slum (Improvement of Land) Act, 1956, bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect of slums. Inasmuch as respondent no. 2 had not at all challenged the Notification declaring Velampeta as a slum, velampeta absolutely vested in the Corporation and it became the owner thereof, and as such, the suit at the instance of respondent No. 2, could not have been maintained, and therefore, the judgement and decree dated 27-4-1992 passed by the IV Additional District Munsif, Visakhapatnam, in the suit O. S. No. 8 of 1998 filed by respondent No. 2, being ab initio void, is liable to be quashed and set aside by this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. ( 3 ) HE further submits that though the petitioner had filed written statement in the suit filed by respondent No. 2, he failed to bring the factum of the Corporation having become the owner of the slum pursuant to the issuance of Notification by the Government declaring Velampeta as a slum, and had respondent No. 2 made the corporation a party defendant to the suit, the fact that the Corporation being the owner of Velampeta slum, would have been brought to the notice of the Court, the Court would not have entertained the suit and the petitioner would not have suffered a decree. ( 4 ) BE that as it may, he submits that the Court below having no jurisdiction to try the suit in respect of matters relating to slums, the judgement and decree dated 27-4-1992 passed by the IV Additional District Munsif, Visakhapatnam, in the suit filed by respondent No. 2, cannot be sustained, and is liable to be quashed and set aside in exercise of this Court s certiorari jurisdiction. In support of his submission that this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is empowered to set aside the order of a subordinate Court, if it is found that the Court had usurped the jurisdiction not vested in it, the learned counsel placed strong reliance on the judgement of the apex Court in Surya Devi Rai v. Ramchander Rai. ( 5 ) I am unable to agree with any of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition. Though the petitioner is seeking to set aside the order dated 27-4-1992 passed by the IV Additional district Munsif, Visakhapatnam, in the suit O. S. No. 8 of 1988 filed by respondent No. 2, on the ground that the same has been passed without jurisdiction, he in effect, seeking to set aside the order dated 17-11-2003, passed by this Court in the second appeal S. A. No. 113 of 1996, which cannot be granted. As can be seen from the averments made by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, as against the judgement dated 27-4-1992 passed in O. S. No. 8 of 1988 by the IV Additional district Munsif, Visakhapatnam, the petitioner had preferred an appeal in A. S. No. 78 of 1992, on the file of the Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, which was dismissed, and thereagainst, he preferred second appeal before this court in S. A. No. 113 of 1996, which by judgement dated 17-11-2003, was dismissed. Inasmuch as the judgement dated 27-4-1992, of the trial Court stood confirmed before the first appeallate Court and before this Court in second appeal, by reason of the doctrine of merger, the judgement of the trial Court stood merged with the judgement in second appeal. It is not disputed by the petitioner that the judgement in second appeal has become final and is binding and operating judgement between the parties. It is not disputed by the petitioner that the judgement in second appeal has become final and is binding and operating judgement between the parties. It is not as though the petitioner had not availed the remedies available to him and seeking quashing of the trial court judgement. The petitioner having availed the remedy of appeal and second appeal available to him under law, has conveniently and ingenuously filed the present petition seeking quashing of the order of the trial Court on ground which he failed to take before any of the forums. The petitioner having not taken the grounds raised by him in the writ petition before any of the forums, be it the trial Court, first appellate Court or before this Court in second appeal, cannot be allowed to turnaround and say that the judgement of the trial court is without jurisdiction, and therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. ( 6 ) IN this context reference be made to the judgement of the apex Court in kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, wherein the apex Court considering the doctrine of merger, held:the logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior Court, tribunal or authority was subjected to remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior Court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. ( 7 ) ON the admitted facts, it is clear that the judgement and decree passed in O. S. No. 8 of 1988 by the trial Court first merged in the judgement passed in A. S. No. 78 of 1992, and then the judgement passed in first appeal stood merged in judgement of this Court in S. A. No. 113 of 1996, dated 17-11-2003, and having regard to the doctrine of merger, it is the judgement in s. A. No. 113 of 1996, dated 17-11-2003, which is final, binding and operative decree. ( 8 ) BE that as it may, the petitioner admittedly invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is well-settled law that writ of certiorari lies to inferior Courts or Tribunals or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers for removal of jurisdictional errors or errors committed by them, which have occasioned in the failure of justice. In a writ of certiorari, the High Court directs the inferior Courts, or tribunals or authorities to transmit to itself the record of proceedings, pending therein, for scrutiny, and if necessary for quashing the same. In Udit narayan Singh v. Board of Revenue, the apex Court held that writ of certiorari lies only to inferior Courts or Tribunals or authorities. ( 9 ) THIS being the law, governing the scope of writ of certiorari, it may be noticed whether this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can quash the order of another Bench of this court, in the instant case, the judgement dated 17-11-2003, passed by this Court in S. A. No. 113 of 1996, confirming the judgements of the first appellate Court and trial Court. ( 10 ) IN Naresh Sridhar Mirzakar v. State of Maharashtra, a nine-Judge Bench of the apex Court held that High Courts cannot issue writ to the Supreme Court because the writ goes down and not up. Similarly, it was held that one High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, since the writ does not go to a Court placed on an equal footing in the matter of jurisdiction. Similarly, it was held that one High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, since the writ does not go to a Court placed on an equal footing in the matter of jurisdiction. In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, Justice S. S. M. Quadri, speaking for the Constitution Bench of the apex Court held that writ of certiorari would not issue to coordinate Courts and that one Bench of a High Court cannot issue a writ to a different Bench of the same High Court. The apex Court again in Surya Devarai v. Ramachandran, upon which the learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance, reiterated this principle holding that while certiorari lies to bring decisions, of inferior Courts, Tribunals, authorities or any other body or persons, before the High Court for review, so that the High Court may determine, whether they should quash or not quash such a decision. The High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court and likewise one Bench of a High Court cannot issue a writ to a different Bench of the same High Court. ( 11 ) WHATEVER be the merits of the matter, the fact remains that certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be exercised to quash the order of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, and inasmuch as the petitioner in the guise of seeking quashing of judgement and decree dated 27-4-1992 passed by IV Additional District Munsif in O. S. No. 8 of 1988, is seeking quashing of the order of this Court in S. A. No. 113 of 1996, dated 17-11-2003, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. For the foregoing reasons, objections taken by the office are upheld. The writ petition, which is at the stage of (SR), is not maintainable, and is accordingly rejected. No costs.